Transcript USCGC BLACKTHORN - Armed Forces History Museum

USCGC BLACKTHORN
Lesson’s learned from the Coast Guard’s
“worst peace-time
accident”
By CWO VANDEN HEUVEL
Blackthorn (WLB 391) 1of 39 180’ buoy tenders. Commissioned on Mar 27,1944. She
served all over the U.S., from Ice-breaking on the Great Lakes to buoy tending in San
Pedro, Calif. It spent most of its life in the Gulf of Mexico at Mobile. Ala., before being
assigned to her final homeport of Galveston, Texas in 1976.
On January 28
• The BLACKTHORN had 50 men aboard.
44% of the crew had less than one year of
shipboard experience; 7 crewmembers
were sailing for the first time on the day of
the accident. 5 of those 7 went down with
BLACKTHORN.
Many units immediately responded to perform Search and Rescue efforts.
On-scene immediately
F/V Bayou
Saved 23 crewmembers
M/V Capricorn’s
oar-propelled lifeboat
Tampa Bay Pilots
boats
CG-Assets
CG- 41452
CGC VISE
CGC WHITE SUMAC
State Assets
Pinellas County
Sheriffs
Tampa PD
St Pete PD
FMP
Salvage and bodyrecovery
Coastal Diving &
Marine Construction
Of Tampa
Pinellas Park
Fire Dept
A survivor cries after receiving
treatment late into the night.
Of 14 bodies found after the Blackthorn was raised, 13 were in the Engine Room.
“Blackthorn tragedy forced Coast Guard to rethink training”
Civilian Investigation: National Transportation Safety Board
• NTSB recited recommendations they had issued from
the 13-month earlier Cuyahoga incident, arguing that
recency of service had again been ignored in selecting
the CO of Blackthorn.
• NTSB remained steadfast, that CO’s should not be
selected for command without first having been assigned
to a comprehensive refresher course.
• The course according to the NSTB, at the very least
should include instruction from a CO of a CG cutter
similar to the cutter which he/she was being assigned.
NTSB Investigation Con’t
• The board revealed during the CO’s five years ashore
since last being assigned to a ship, that he underwent no
such refresher training.
Testimony indicated, the only professional training that
he had completed was a Rules of the Road
correspondence course, which he actually finished after
assuming command of Blackthorn.
• The Coast Guard Marine Casualty report and
Commandant's action findings, sighted both vessels at
fault for failure to adhere to the Rules of the Road.
NTSB Conclusion
• NTSB cited that the probable cause of this accident was
the failure of the Blackthorn to keep to the proper side of
the channel when meeting another vessel in a bend and
because the CO failed to adequately supervise the
actions of an inexperienced officer-of-the-deck.
• Contributing to the accident was the failure of the CO of
Blackthorn and the pilot/master of Capricorn to establish
passing arrangement with bridge to bridge
radiotelephone or whistle signals and failure of the CO to
remain aware of all traffic in the channel.
• The high loss of life was attributed to the Capricorn’s
anchor getting caught in Blackthorn’s shell plating and
rapidly dragging her astern before she quickly capsized.
In 1982, the rusting Blackthorn was recommitted to the deep to become
part of Pinellas County’s artificial reef program. The estimated cost of
her salvage was estimated at several million dollars.
A few of many safety changes implemented in
Tampa Bay since 1980
As a result of this collision, additional range lights were added
throughout Tampa. Buoy optics have been upgraded using LED
technology on the aids located closest to the Skyway Bridge.
• CVTS (Cooperative Vessel Traffic Service) has been implemented
as a joint partnership between the Coast Guard and the Tampa Port
Authority. Their primary function is to coordinate safe and efficient
vessel movement and prevent marine accidents and waterway
incidents in Tampa Bay and also the associated loss of life and
damage to property and the environment.
• The CVTS is in the process of becoming a regulated traffic service
under the Code of Federal Regulations. 2009. (Coast Pilot 5, CH. 5)
Tampa Bay Navigation Guidelines & CVTS requirements
Tampa’s navigational guidelines are recommended by the COTP (Sector Commander)
and the Port of Tampa Bay harbor Safety Committee.
A few guidelines:
During periods of restricted visibility, vessels should not transit the bay unless at least two
sets of channel buoys are visible ahead. Vessels should proceed at speeds safe to
prevailing conditions.
All meeting and passing situations should be made at the safest location possible, with
due regard to the size of vessels, width of the channel, and existing conditions. Light
draft vessels should give way to deep draft vessels if conditions permit.
CVTS requirements: Radio traffic monitored 24/7. Security Broadcast system/reporting
points are designated to give Masters, Pilots, and persons in charge of vessels realtime information on the density of marine traffic throughout Tampa Bay. This includes
detailed vessel descriptions and ETA info for Sunshine Skyway Bridge traffic in both
directions.
Coast Guard changes the training and qualification requirements for
command and establishes a school to focus on command operations.
•
SUBJ: COAST GUARD DECK WATCH OFFICER (DWO) EXAMINATION PROGRAM
A. COAST GUARD DECK WATCH OFFICER EXAMINATION PROGRAM,
COMDTINST 16672.5 (SERIES) 1. REF A REQUIRES A PROSPECTIVE CO, XO,
OINC OR XPO OF AN AFLOAT UNIT TO PASS THE APPLICABLE DWO EXAM
(INITIAL OR RENEWAL) NO MORE THAN ONE YEAR PRIOR TO THE EXECUTION
OF PCS ORDERS. THIS STANDARD APPLIES EVEN IF THE MEMBER IS
CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO A CUTTER AND/OR POSSESSES A VALID
MERCHANT LICENSE.
•
SUBJ: PROSPECTIVE COMMANDING OFFICER FAMILIRIZATION TRAINING. A.
CUTTER TRAINING AND QUALIFICATION MANUAL, COMDINST M3502.4
(SERIES) 1. REF A, PARA 7.D, REQUIRES COMMANDING OFFICERS/OFFICERS
IN CHARGE TO SPEND A PERIOD OF UNDERWAY FAMILIRIZATION ON A
CUTTER OF THE SAME CLASS AS THEIR NEW COMMAND,BUT NOT THE SAME
CUTTER. THIS REQUIREMENT WAS ISSUED AS ARESULT OF THE NSTB
RECCOMENDATIONS FOLLOWING THE COLLISIONS AND LOSS OF LIBE
ABOARD CGC CUYAHOGA AND CGC BLACKTHORN. EXEMPTIONS EXIST FOR
INDIVIDUALS WHO PREVIOUSILY SERVED AS CO/OIC/XO/XPO OF THE SAME
CLASS OF VESSELS WITH AUTHORIZED WAIVER APPROVAL THROUGH CG751.
The Commandant’s precept (2009) for selection board panels considering
officers for Command Afloat assignments. A highly stringent, similar process is
conducted for Enlisted afloat command selections.
•
Assignment to command afloat represents the highest degree of trust and
confidence the Coast Guard can place in an officer. A Commanding Officer at sea can
expect to be involved in situations requiring immediate life and death decisions.
Those selected must reflect the highest standards of conduct, character, capability,
attitude, and military bearing. These challenges are best met by professional
mariners who have successfully demonstrated their operational expertise at sea.
Those selected must have a proven record of superior leadership. We must ensure
that CG personnel serving under the officers you select do so in an environment that
inspires and develops our junior ranks. If we are to be successful in retaining a
quality, diverse, and motivated work force, we must ensure that only the best leaders
command our cutters.
•
In view of our 218-year legacy as a military, multi-mission, maritime service, we must
select our most capable and responsible officers for command afloat assignments.
You and your fellow Panel members are the principal guarantors of this commitment.
You have been very carefully selected to accomplish this task.
•
The Panel shall refer to the provisions of Section 14.A of reference (b) and the
Commandant’s Guidance to PYO9 Officer Selection Boards, enclosure (1), in the
development of criteria for determining the officers recommended for selection.
Command and Operations School
PCO/PXO
•
The Command and Operations School
was established as the Prospective
Commanding Officer/Prospective
Executive Officer (PCO/PXO) School
in 1986. The sinking of the cutters
CUYAHOGA and BLACKTHORN
highlighted the need for a course that
refreshed the collision avoidance and
damage control skills of senior leaders
aboard cutters prior to assuming their
duties. For several years before the
PCO/PXO School was established,
there was an attempt to meet training
through a variety of other Navy and
commercial schools. The current
school was established to consolidate
training, save money, and take
advantage of the visual simulator
•
•
AD NAUTAS, PER NAUTAS
For Sailors, By Sailors
Blackthorn Memorial Galveston, Texas
Note, the Black memorial buoy numbering 23 to represent the lives lost. It remains
permanently lit.
A memorial ceremony is held on the anniversary in St Petersburg, Fl.
A time to honor both, our living and fallen shipmates.
•
SUBJ: CGC BLACKTHORN (WLB-391) COLLISION - 30TH ANNIVERSARY. 28 JANUARY 2010 MARKS THE
30TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE USCGC BLACKTHORN (WLB-391) TRAGEDY.
•
IN 1980, CGC BLACKTHORN COLLIDED WITH THE 605 FOOT TANKER CAPRICORN IN THE TAMPA BAY
SHIP CHANNEL, TAKING THE LIVES OF 23 OF BLACKTHORN'S 50 CREWMEMBERS.
•
.ON WEDNESDAY, 28 JANUARY 2010 AT 1100 EST, A MEMORIAL CEREMONY WILL BE HELD TO HONOR
THE LIVES OF OUR FALLEN SHIPMATES AT THE NORTH END OF THE SKYWAY BRIDGE IN PINELLAS
COUNTY, ST PETERSBURG, FL.
•
WE ALSO HONOR THE SACRIFICES OF THE CGC BLACKTHORN CREW BY OUR DEDICATION TO
CONTINUAL IMPROVEMENT OF THE PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF TODAY'S CUTTERMEN.
•
I ENCOURAGE ALL SHIPMATES TO TAKE A MOMENT TO REFLECT ON THIS TRAGEDY AND ITS
REMINDER OF THE DANGERS WE FACE ON A DAILY BASIS WHILE EXECUTING OUR MISSIONS. THOSE
WHO ARE AVAILABLE ARE ENCOURAGED TO ATTEND THE CEREMONY.
•
VADM R. J. PAPP, JR., COMMANDER, COAST GUARD ATLANTIC AREA, AND 13TH GOLD ANCIENT
MARINER, SENDS.
Memorial site in St. Petersburg, FL.
(approx 2 miles N. of the collision site)
Seaman Apprentice Flores, Guardian
SA William Flores died while saving the lives of many others after the
BLACKTHORN sank. With less than 3 months onboard, he held open the
lifejacket locker and passed them out to his shipmates in the water. He then
swam below decks to aid crew that were trapped inside, never returning to the
surface. He was posthumously awarded the CG Medal for heroism.
END
•
“ Morn not for them, they sail with One
more divine”