Transcript No Slide Title

You are about to view a PC PowerPoint presentation.
(PowerPoint version 2003 or later)
Some slides have a built-in timing
but in most cases a slide will
wait for a ‘click’ before proceeding.
However, please note that you can
also use PowerPoint’s own navigation.
At the lower left of the screen display you will see:
Click on
to return to the start
of the previous slide.
Click on
to see a submenu from which you can
go to next or previous slides, pause
the presentation or end the show.
Click on
to go to the start of the next slide.
Click to proceed…
SLIDE
1OF 50
THE BATTLE OF LONG TAN
A dotPPT PowerPoint Animations presentation
Version 01b
The Long Tan Cross (pic taken ANZAC Day 2005), at the site of the 11 Platoon action of 18 Aug 1966
Featuring Maps by Dave Sabben,
Animation by dotPPT PowerPoint Animations (visit the website: www.dotPPT.com )
and
Excerpts from the book “The Battle of Long Tan as told by the Commanders to Bob Grandin”
(Allen & Unwin, 2004, ISBN 1 74114 199 0)
SLIDE
Click to start the presentation…
2OF 50
In 1966, Australia increased its commitment of
troops in South Viet Nam to a two-Battalion “Task
Force” plus appropriate support units.
Prior to this, Australia had military advisors
scattered throughout the South and a Battalion Group
operating out of Bien Hoa with the US 173rd Airborne
Brigade (Separate).
The new Task Force took over responsibility for
Phuoc Tuy Province, on the coast to the south east
of Saigon.
Click to proceed…
SLIDE
3OF 50
35
75
40
Hat
Dich
Binh
Ba
Nui
Nghe
2
70
Nui
Dat
50
55 of
451966, Australia increased
In
its commitment
75
troops in South Viet Nam to a two-Battalion “Task
P plus
H appropriate
U O C
T U Y
Force”
support units.
P Australia
R O had
V military
I Nadvisors
C E
Prior to this,
scattered throughout the South and a Battalion Group
70
operating out of Bien Hoa with the US 173rd Airborne
Nui
Brigade (Sep).
Dat
(2)
The new Task Force took over responsibility for
Phuoc Tuy Province, on the coast to the south east
of Saigon.
Long
Tan
65
Hoa
Long
2
The Australians set up their Logistics
Base
(1ALSG) near the sea port of Vung Tau...
… and their Operational Base (1ATF) around a
small hill (“Nui Dat”) near the centre of the
40
province…
65
Long
Phuoc
Scale: approx 5 Kilometre grid
Copyright Dave Sabben 2007
45
50
By mid-July, the base was fully manned, but development was slow…
1APC Squadron and 5RAR occupied the base
site in late-May to early-June 1966 and were
joined by the Task Force HQ, Artillery,
supporting units and 6RAR in June and July. Click to proceed…
Click to proceed…
SLIDE
4OF 50
35
75
50
45
40
Hat
Dich
P H
Binh
Ba
U O
P R
Nui
Nghe
55
C
T U Y
O V I N C E
2
70
70
Nui
Dat
(2)
Nui
Dat
Long
Tan
65
Hoa
Long
75
65
Long
Phuoc
2
Scale: approx 5 Kilometre grid
Copyright Dave Sabben 2007
40
45
50
Bytheir
mid-July,
the basethey
wasbegan
fully manned,
but to
development
was5slow…
After first setting
perimeter…
to clear out
a notional line
kms out from the base.
Long
The
This
Phuoc
was
within
“Line
andAlpha”
Line
Long
Alpha
Tan
– the
villages
needed
line inside
to
bewhich
deserted…
kept
the
enemy
but,
but
atwell
could
first,
Long
villagers
direct
and aimed
Binh
often
Ba
fire
entered
were
into
populated.
the
thebase.
area.
Byarea
mid-August,
the
area
within
5were
kms
of
theclear
base
wasHoa
patrolled
but
still
not
secure…
Click to proceed…
June 1966
SLIDE
5
OF
50
The Battle Of Long Tan as told by the Commanders to Bob Grandin (Aug 2004)
Page
Page
72 -62
…an
– Itattack
wasn’t
onlong
the before
base was
thenot
VC considered
worked outathat
probability
they could
andtake
therefore
on theitlone
was
poorly
battalion
defended.
at Nui
There
Dat was
(in June
little
). barbed
Information
wire of
filtered
note out
through
the front
to the
of ARVN
the FDLs,
andand
to the
no
anti-personnel
United States
minefields.
intelligence
It was
networks
preposterous
that theto
VCsuggest
were planning
the baseamight
regimental
be in danger.
attack on
Nui Dat within a few days.
We believed that the local VC were not about to take on a two-battalion Task Force with
its supporting
Page 72 – Information
artillery regiment,
was available
mortarsthat
andtwo
armour,
VC regiments
and with could
US Airassemble
Force fighters
anywhere
and
bombers
in the not
province
far away…
in 24 to 48 hours, but the gravity of the threat was not stressed.
To Long Tan Ian McNeill (1993)
Page
249history
- “After
some days
(early June
reconnoitring
(of the Task Force
(The
official
of Australia’s
involvement
in )Sthe
E Asia
conflicts 1948-1975)
perimeter
)
stopped
and
it
seemed
very
likely
that
the
enemy
was finalising
Page 321 - “The defences (were) incomplete...”
preparations
to
attack.”
Page 361 - “...physical defences at Nui Dat in the first eleven weeks were undeveloped...”
Page 413
249 -- “(
“Intelligence
warning)of
a four-battalion
attack
oneven
the base hastened plans
Page
at its establishment
The
task force ... could
not
for
the
call-forward
of
6RAR
...
on
14
June
instead
of
by
23
June
as initially arranged.”
obtain such stores as wire and mines for its own defence...”
Page
309
(refer
map
Page
310)
“...
the
radio
station
(
275’s
HQ
set
) started
The VC also knew the layout of the Task Force base…
to move west towards the task force. ... the radio set associated with 275
Page
361 -(was
“The) Viet
Cong would
ana accurate
picturegrid
Regiment
approaching
Nui have
Dat at
rate of a general
one-kilometre
of
the layout
of the base
from
Route 2.” (ie, 14 Aug)
square
each day.”
“...
twoobservation
days before from
the mortaring
(For
example,
note 15
on Page275
561Regiment
shows that
VC) had
estimated
... enemy
radioatraffic
indicated
(‘sthe
radio
to have
reached
5000 at
metres
east- actually,
of the base.”
1ATF
artillery
21 guns
24 when all were within the base)
The Battle Of Long Tan Lex McAulay (April 1986)
PagePage
16 - “Brigadier
Jackson was
aware, 1ATF
was
at its
weakest.
Nottoonly
75 “Intelligence
hadwell
tentatively
located
a now
second
regiment
of VC
thewas
north
the base
camp
its beginnings,
buthook
mostround
of theand
soldiers
and officers
inexperienced.”
of Nui
Dat,inpossibly
moving to
approach
Nui Dat were
from the
west.”
By mid-August, the area within 5 Kms of the base was well patrolled but still not secure…
… It is
well
documented
that the
itself reaction
was not very
in the first
months… base…
In fact – there
was
even
the expectation
of base
an enemy
to thesecure
establishment
offew
an Australian
Glossary:
FDLs = Forward Defensive Lines (the perimeter)
VC = Viet Cong - the Australians’ enemy in Viet Nam
ARVN = Army of the Republic of Viet Nam - the
Vietnamese soldiers fighting for South Viet Nam
A VC Regiment had between 2500 and 3000 soldiers.
Click to proceed…
June and
July 1966
SLIDE
6
OF
50
43
69
68
Song
Cau
2
SAS
& ARU
Nui
Dat
TASK
FORCE
BASE
68
67
RCLs
TARGET
AREA
69
Mortars
67
66
49
48
Nui
Dat 2
__________
__________
XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX
Suoi
Da Bang
103 Fd Bty
Artillery
1 Fd Sqn
Engineers
47
__________
XXXXXXXX __________
XXXXXXXX __________
XXXXXXXX __________
XXXXXXXX __________
XXXXXXXX
__________
XXXXXXXX
Task
Force HQ
46
45
44
Field
Gun
Long Tan
__________
XXXXXXXX
66
Destroyed
Bridge
43
65
65
Long Phuoc
Weir
Scale: approx 1000 metre grid
Copyright Dave Sabben 2007
44
45
46
47
48
49
Indeed, the enemy reaction came in mid-August…..
Inwas
the
earlyHQ,
hours
ofthe
17 Task
August,
theand
VC Engineer
bombarded
the
Australian
base
at
Nui
Fire
Task
Force
returned
from
SAS,
ARU,
Artillery
Force
artillery
batteries
lines
and
were
thehit.
enemy
There
fire
were
quickly
24 Dat…..
casualties…..
stopped.
Glossary:
RCL = lightweight Recoilless Rifle that fires a heavier
projectile than would be possible with a recoiling weapon
HQ = Head Quarters – the command element of any unit
SAS = Special Air Service – a specialist infantry unit
ARU = Australian Reinforcement Unit – holding soldiers
who will reinforce other units needing more troops
Click to proceed…
17 Aug 1966
Pre-dawn
SLIDE
7OF 50
D
43
69
68
B
6RAR
6RAR
46
45
44
6RAR
A
47
49
48
Song
Cau
__________
XXXXXXXX
2
Nui
Dat
69
Nui
Dat 2
__________
XXXXXXXX __________
XXXXXXXX __________
XXXXXXXX __________
XXXXXXXX __________
XXXXXXXX
TASK
FORCE
BASE
68
Mortars
67
67
RCLs
__________
__________
XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX
Suoi
Da Bang
66
Field
Gun
Long Tan
66
__________
XXXXXXXX
Destroyed
Bridge
43
65
65
Long Phuoc
Weir
Scale: approx 1000 metre grid
Copyright Dave Sabben 2007
44
45
46
47
48
49
th, they heard
th August,
the A/6RAR
early
hours
of
17morning
– likely
some
of
the
VCbaseplate
withdrawing.
Meanwhile,
a B/6RAR
patrol
left
onthe
the
of
17thnoises
Aug
and
located
the
mortar
On 17During
Task
Force
HQ,
SAS,
was
ARU,
re-tasked
Artillery
to and
move
Engineer
west
and
lines
search
were
for
hit.the
There
VC
teams
were
and
24 casualties…..
theirpositions...
tracks.
th
th
th
…and
Fire
was
on
returned
the
18
,
the
from
RCL
the
&
Task
Gun
Force
positions.
artillery
batteries
and
the
enemy
fire
quickly
stopped.
As
At
they
the
time
tothe
their
bombardment,
new
task,
they
AAug
Company,
had
6RAR,
was
–on
ona
the
3-day
northern
patrol
slopes
north
ofof
Nui
Nui
Dat2.2.
On
D/6RAR
the
16 moved
they
wasof
had
sent
had
out
three
at
contacts…
18
toanother
take
over
Allcontact
exit
from
tracks
headed
and
north
continue
east
the
and
search…..
east…..
A/6RARs
task
had
been
to noon
sweep
down
Line
Alpha
towards
Long
Tan,
before
returning
to Dat
base.
…now
thought
to
beB/6RAR
VC
moving
in to bombard
the
Glossary:
“exit tracks” = the tracks left by the enemy as they left
the firing position.
Click to proceed…
CLICK INSIDE THIS BOX
TO UNDERSTAND
HOW MILITARY UNITS
ARE SHOWN:
IN THIS PRESENTATION
17 and 18
August 1966
SLIDE
8OF 50
View of the concert area – on the lower east slope of Nui Dat hill. The rubber plantation in the left distance (1000 metres away) was the
“home” of 6RAR in 1966-67. The rubber plantation in the right distance (5000 metres away) is where the Battle of Long Tan was fought.
D
B-
6RAR
6RAR
D
12 10
D
11
D
47
46
49
48
68
68
N
67
Nui
Dat 2
67
Suoi Da
Bang
Scale: approx 1000 metre grid
47
47
48
Copyright Dave Sabben 2007
49
B and D Companies met at 1:00pm and discussed the situation. The follow-up task was transferred to D/6RAR.
D/6RAR
changed
formation:
10the
Platoon
tocart
follow
theout
north
track,
11concert
Platoon
forward
follow
theunder
south
track.
As
they
As B/6RAR
talked,
they
headed
could
back
hear
to
base,
sounds
D/6RAR
of
the
shook
Task
Force’s
and
started
first
to follow
tuning
the cart
up to
and
tracks
getting
heading
east…
way…
After
200
metres
the
tracks
split,
both
still
leading
eastwards…
Click to proceed…
18 Aug 1966
1300-1540 hrs
(1pm-3:40pm)
SLIDE
9OF 50
6RAR
10
D
B-
6RAR
12
47
46
D
D
11
D
49
48
68
68
N
67
Nui
Dat 2
67
Suoi Da
Bang
Scale: approx 1000 metre grid
47
47
48
Copyright Dave Sabben 2007
49
When 11 Platoon (with two sections forward) reached the road, it started an obstacle crossing drill.
The two leading sections crossed the road and secured the other side, then platoon HQ started to cross.
CONTACT
Click to proceed…
18 Aug 1966
1300-1540 hrs
(1pm-3:40pm)
SLIDE
10 OF 50
Where 11 Platoon crossed, the track sloped slightly down hill to the
north, our left, and the hill crested some 75 to 100 metres to the right.
It was a gentle slope, limiting our visual distance to the south.
When about ten metres from the fence I suddenly saw five or six VC,
casually walking, with their heads down, along the track from the right.
They had come over the rise just after the others in Platoon HQ had
crossed the track and moved into the rubber. The VC had missed seeing
them by a few seconds.
Without hesitation, I raised my rifle and fired two quick shots at a VC.
He dropped as I had hit him with both rounds. The other VC took cover.
Sergeant Bob Buick - 11 Platoon, D/6RAR
Major Harry Smith - OC Delta Company, 6RAR
The 11 Platoon Commander requested permission to give hot pursuit. I
agreed - there were 5 or 6 VC, at least one of whom was at least
wounded - a Platoon was well able to handle that task.
With 11 Platoon pushing ahead, I ordered 10 Platoon to maintain its
direction and rate of advance.
Company HQ and 12 Platoon would advance behind 10 Platoon.
I reported the contact to 6RAR HQ:
CONTACT: 18 Aug 1540hrs. - D Coy - Contact with 6 to 8 enemy dressed in greens at grid reference YS478673,
possibly wounding one. Remainder fled east. One AK-47 (assault rifle) retrieved. No own casualties.
CONTACT
Glossary:
OC = Officer Commanding – for a Company, usually a
Major; for a Platoon, a Lieutenant (Lt) or a Second
Lieutenant (2Lt).
Not to be confused with “CO” = Commanding Officer,
applying to Battalions and larger units.
Click to proceed…
CLICK INSIDE THIS BOX
TO UNDERSTAND
HOW GRID
REFERENCES ARE USED
IN THIS PRESENTATION
18 Aug 1966
1540 hrs
(3:40pm)
SLIDE
11OF 50
6RAR
10
D
B-
6RAR
12
47
46
D
D
11
D
49
48
68
68
N
Nui
Dat 2
6
67
67
Suoi Da
Bang
Scale: approx 1000 metre grid
47
47
48
Copyright Dave Sabben 2007
49
The enemy fled east, followed by 11 Platoon, as the Company closed up and followed at a slower pace.
Clearing the hut, 11 Platoon lost sight of the enemy patrol, but kept following the blood trail eastwards…
Click to proceed…
18 Aug 1966
1540-1600 hrs
(3:40 to 4pm)
SLIDE
12 OF 50
Until the first contact, the Company had been in an older part of the rubber plantation, but as 11 Platoon
chased the small enemy force they – and the Company – moved into a younger plantation, similar to this…
Click to proceed…
18 Aug 1966
SLIDE
13 OF 50
B-
6RAR
D
12 10
47
46
D
6RAR
11
D
D
49
48
68
68
N
67
Nui
Dat 2
6
67
Suoi Da
Bang
Scale: approx 1000 metre grid
47
47
48
Copyright Dave Sabben 2007
49
At this stage, the Company was following the contact, so the tracks they had been following were forgotten.
11 Platoon continued the pursuit. Suddenly they were stopped by massive fire from their left-front (north east).
Click to proceed…
CLICK INSIDE THIS BOX TO
SEE WHAT DELTA COMPANY
DIDN’T KNOW –
WHERE THE VC WERE:
18 Aug 1966
1600-1610 hrs
(4 – 4:10 pm)
SLIDE
14 OF 50
2Lt Gordon Sharp, OC 11 Platoon, D/6RAR
(an excerpt from the book “The Battle Of Long Tan
as told by the Commanders” to Bob Grandin”.)
Without warning, two enemy machine guns fired from
the left front (north) – from the scrub and creek line at
the southern base of the Nui Dat 2 feature. The left man
of 4 Section was about 75 metres from the enemy.
“FIRE!”
Sharp immediately placed his platoon in an ‘L’ shape to
bring maximum fire to bear, then called for artillery.
While the fire-fight to the north was developing, a
group of about 80 VC attacked from the east…
11 Platoon was suddenly in a very difficult predicament.
Captain Morrie Stanley
161 Bty, RNZArtillery
Attached as forward artillery observer (FO) to D/6RAR
Harry (Smith) and I had already agreed
on the grid reference of our location.
“LOAD!”
He approved the request from Gordon Sharp for artillery
fire support, which we considered might have been
useful even if I directed the fire at some distance from
11 Platoon’s known position.
Initially, I engaged with my own 161 Battery,
but the situation deteriorated rapidly.
CONTACT: 18 Aug 1610 hrs. -11 Platoon under heavy fire from grid 487674 (southern slopes of Nui Dat 2).
Within minutes the first artillery shells were dropping on the slopes of the hill and being adjusted closer…
Click to proceed…
18 Aug 1966
1610 hrs
(4:10 pm)
SLIDE
15 OF 50
B-
MEANWHILE, AT THE TASK FORCE BASE . . .
Two choppers sat on the 1ATF helipad waiting to take the concert
party back to Vung Tau;
The APCs were at the concert, on other duties or in the workshop;
A/6RAR returned to base after a 3-day operation to the north east;
6RAR
RAAF
9Sqn
3Tp
B-
6RAR
A
6RAR
1APC
D
12 10
6RAR
47
46
6RAR
D
D
D
11
D
49
48
68
68
N
Nui
Dat 2
I
Weir
67
100
30
67
Suoi Da
Bang
Scale: approx 1000 metre grid
47
47
48
Copyright Dave Sabben 2007
49
AtThe
1615
initial
hrs,11
Smith
Platoon
advised
estimate
his CO,
wasColonel
an enemy
Townsend,
platoon…
that
…but
11 this
Platoon
was was
quickly
fighting
revised
an estimated
to an enemy
VCcompany.
company.
As the
On this
VC poured
news,
the
fireCO
into
ordered
11base…
Platoon…
thewhile
B/6RAR
…D/6RAR
thepatrol
VC mortared
to halt
and
theawait
rest
of
orders
D/6,Tan
which
toand
go to
moved
reinforce
100
metres
D/6RAR.
north.
Meanwhile,
at
the Task
Force
was
in contact
at Long
B/6RAR
waited
to return…
Glossary:
RAAF = Royal Australian Air Force – 9 Squadron flew
the “huey” helicopters in Viet Nam.
APC = Armoured Personnel Carrier – a lightly
armoured tracked vehicle capable of transporting
about twelve soldiers.
CO = Commanding Officer – the officer commanding a
Battalion (a Lieutenant Colonel [LtCol]) or a larger unit.
Click to proceed…
18 Aug 1966
1610-1620 hrs
(4:10-4:20pm)
SLIDE
16 OF 50
B-
6RAR
6RAR
D
12 10 D
47
46
D
11
D
49
48
68
68
N
Nui
Dat 2
I
30
67
100
67
Suoi Da
Bang
Scale: approx 1000 metre grid
47
47
48
Copyright Dave Sabben 2007
49
As the enemy continued to engage 11 Platoon… …10 Platoon was sent forward to support the withdrawal of 11.
12 Platoon took over CHQ defence. After about 300 metres, 10 Platoon hit another formation of enemy.
Glossary:
CHQ = Company Head Quarters
Click to proceed…
18 Aug 1966
1620-1630 hrs
(4:20-4:30 pm)
SLIDE
17 OF 50
2Lt Geoff Kendall
OC 10 Platoon, D/6RAR
103 Bty
Major Harry Smith
OC D/6RAR
“I told the platoon to drop
their packs. We started
off, two-up in extended
line, towards the sound of
the firing…” 105 Bty
“The skies opened up and
rain was bucketing down”
“At 1615 hours I’d reported
11 Platoon’s enemy as an
estimated platoon. At 1626
I upped that to a company”
“We went on probably
another 150 metres…
…the sound of the firing
up front was enormous”.
“I again asked for the B
Coy patrol of about 32 men
to come to us, but that was
again not approved.”
“When 10 Platoon hit VC, I
knew we were up against a
force larger than our own.”
161 Bty
“We saw a line of troops moving across our right
front in what looked like assault formation. I was
a little concerned that they could be part of 11
Platoon, so kept the guys going until it was
obvious they were enemy“.
“Up to now we’d been supported by a single
artillery battery (6 guns). I now called for the full
regiment (24 guns). After a time, permission was
granted and we were able to fire at different
targets concurrently.”
“The closest of them would only have been
twenty-odd metres away but they still hadn’t seen
us. I ordered my guys to fire… …we knocked over
the whole right-hand element.“
“We would also need reinforcement. The quickest
way to get them to us was by chopper. My request
was turned down – no choppers, no secured LZ.
I was told reinforcements would be sent by APC.”
“We continued but moved only a few metres
before we were hit with a hail of fire from our left
front.”
“Until then, we were on our own. Time was against
us – it would be dark in two and a half hours!
And then the 10 Platoon radio went off the air…..”
As the enemy continued to flank 11 Platoon… …10 Platoon was sent forward to support the withdrawal of 11.
12 Platoon took over CHQ defence. After about 300 metres, 10 Platoon hit another formation of enemy.
When Regimental fire missions were approved, all three
105mm
Batteries (of 6 guns each) became available …
Click
to proceed…
…plus the 6 155mm self-propelled guns of the American Battery which fired into the enemy reserve positions.
Click to proceed…
18 Aug 1966
1620-1630 hrs
(4:20-4:30 pm)
SLIDE
18 OF 50
B-
6RAR
6RAR
D
47
46
12
Pte Bill ‘Yank’ Akell
D Company Signaller
D
10
11
D
D
49
48
68
68
N
Nui
Dat 2
This photo demonstrates the “mud mist” effect.
67
This is the Long Tan cross as it was some years ago, before xbeing developed as
I
shown in the title slide of this presentation. Please note
red
30 the 600
100 staining at the lower
I
end of the cross vertical. It is mud splashed up from the bare ground during
the
100
monsoon rainstorms. Once the ground below is saturated, the raindrops hit the mud
67
with such force that the splash forms a red “mist” up to twenty inches (to 50cm) high
and thick enough lower down to hide a person laying on the ground. The soldier’s
uniforms were also stained red, adding to the camouflage effect.
Suoi Da
Bang
Scale: approx 1000 metre grid
47
47
48
Copyright Dave Sabben 2007
49
At 1640
10
AtPlatoon
hrs,
about
Smith
1645
reported
passed
hrs, amachine
monsoon
on the VC
gun
rain
battalion
firestorm
frominformation
advanced
the hill in support
across
– just before
the
of the
battlefield.
the
enemy
10 Platoon
they
The rain
were
radio
was
in contact
went
torrential.
offwith.
the air.
11
Visibility
A platoon
D/6 signaller,
under
now estimated
the
Pte rubber
Bill ‘Ýank’
VC
canopy
on
Akell,
thewas
hill
rushed
halved.
as a alone
battalion
Within
fromand
minutes,
CHQ
reported
to 10
a knee-high
Platoon
company
tomud
deliver
sized
mist
assaults
the
covered
spare
from
radio
thetheir
ground.
set.
east.
Click to proceed…
18 Aug 1966
1630-1645 hrs
(4:30-4:45 pm)
SLIDE
19 OF 50
B-
MEANWHILE, AT THE TASK FORCE BASE . . .
The two choppers were still at the 1ATF helipad but the crews
had moved to Task Force HQ to find out what’s happening.
3 Troop 1APC was placed on standby and told to go to A/6RAR;
A/6RAR was placed on standby to board the APCs for Long Tan;
6RAR
6RAR
D
RAAF
9Sqn
3Tp
1APC
BA
6RAR
2Lt GordonD Sharp6RAR
OC 11 Platoon, D/6RAR
KIA Long Tan 18 Aug 1966
6RAR
47
46
12
D
10
11
D
D
49
48
68
68
N
Nui
Dat 2
x
30
Weir
600
I
67
100
67
Suoi Da
Bang
Scale: approx 1000 metre grid
47
47
48
Copyright Dave Sabben 2007
49
At about 1650 hrs, 11 Platoon’s Sgt Bob Buick reported that 2Lt Gordon Sharp had been killed.
Buick
Meanwhile,
assumed at
command
the Taskof
Force
11 Platoon.
base, both
It had
thebeen
APCs
just
and
anAlpha
hour Company
since he’dof
fired
6RAR
thewere
first put
shots
onof
standby…
the battle.
Click to proceed…
18 Aug 1966
1645-1700 hrs
(4:45-5 pm)
SLIDE
20 OF 50
B-
6RAR
6RAR
D
12
D
10
47
46
11
D
D
49
48
68
68
N
Nui
Dat 2
x
30
600
I
67
100
Suoi Da
Bang
30
Reinforcements
67
30
Scale: approx 1000 metre grid
47
47
48
Copyright Dave Sabben 2007
49
With
While
new
10 artillery
Platoon’s
requests
radio
was
and
off
the
the
need
–tobefore
prepare
a spare
Company
arrived
Aid
-Post
1110
Platoon’s
(CAP)
radio
the 10
had
Platoon
its they
aerial
wounded,
shot off.
Smith
prepared
CHQ
and 12
Platoon
toair
move
souththe
east,
towards
both
and 11for
Platoons.
As
shook
into
CHQ
settled
back
down
into
defence,
retaining
a
Section
of
12
Platoon
to
man
their
perimeter.
11
For
Platoon
arest
VC
time,
were
was
CHQ
still
lost
within
receiving
contact
50tasked
metres
fire
with
from
both
of10
north
11
Platoons.
Platoon
and
heavy
and
Worse
artillery
assaults
– support
neither
falling
from
Platoon
the
some
east.
100
could
They
metres
direct
also
from
their
saw
artillery
VC to
perimeter.
their
requests.
south.
formation,
The
of
comms
12now
Platoon
were
was
restored
with
to
go
Platoon,
to
11
Platoon
which
and
advised
that
their
they
withdrawal
had
casualties
back
and
to their
CHQ.
were
At
withdrawing.
this
stage,
Click to proceed…
18 Aug 1966
1700-1710 hrs
(5:00-5:10 pm)
SLIDE
21 OF 50
Major Harry Smith
OC D/6RAR
IN THE RUBBER
“I heard on the radio net Brig
Jackson gave approval in principle
only for the APC force to move,
but Alpha and the APCs waited …
for the executive order.”
“My anger grew with each passing
delay. I recall being told the APCs
were again delayed in leaving. I
retorted … ‘If they don’t hurry up
and get out here then they might
as well not come at all’.”.
2Lt Geoff Kendall
OC 10 Platoon, D/6RAR
“We withdrew to CHQ by a couple
of backward fire and movement
leaps. This got us out of the area
being blanketed by enemy fire
and must have been out of their
sight because we were able to get
back to Harry’s location without
further casualties. On arrival the
OC ordered me to put my platoon
down in defence facing toward
the 11 Platoon fire-fight area.”
2Lt Dave Sabben
OC 12 Platoon, D/6RAR
Sergeant Bob Buick
Now commanding 11 Platoon
“My orders were to put two
sections in front of CHQ and one
behind, and to start an advance
towards 11 Platoon. 10 Platoon
would meet up with us en route.”
“The plan changed when Harry
had to stop to form a firm base.
He kept my third section and
ordered me to proceed with two
sections to go get 11 Platoon.”
“There were just twenty of us…”.
“The platoon signaller, Vic Grice,
replaced the short antenna that
had been shot off the radio with
the long antenna. With
communications re-established,
we adjusted the artillery closer.”
”The aerials, the noise of the firing
and the storm were not the only
problems with the radio – the
enemy began to interfere with and
jam the radio frequency.”
By now, the company was divided into four groups, each with its own tasks and priorities…
Click to proceed…
18 Aug 1966
1700-1710 hrs
(5:00-5:10 pm)
SLIDE
22 OF 50
B-
WO2 Jack Kirby
CSM, D/6RAR
6RAR
Cpl Phil Dobson
Medic, D/6RAR
D
9
47
46
48
12-
6RAR
12/D
10
D
D
11
D
49
68
68
N
Nui
Dat 2
30
x
30
600
I
67
100
Suoi Da
Bang
30
Reinforcements
67
30
Scale: approx 1000 metre grid
47
47
48
Copyright Dave Sabben 2007
49
As At
10
Platoon
to CHQ
with its
casualties,
thecircling
twoCSM,
sections
12 Platoon
headed
south
the
hut…
11CHQ,
Platoon,
stillPlatoon
heavily
engaged,
watched
the VC
toJack
theirof
south
toCpl
‘close
the
door’
onto
them.
thereturned
10
casualties
were
passed
by
the
Kirby,
to
Phil
Dobson
in
the
CAP.
The
platoon
had
been
fortoan
hour,
hadCAP
about
50%
casualties
was
out
of ammunition…
…then
and
started
east
towards
11 Platoon,
avoiding
the enemy
following
up themoving
10 Platoon
withdrawal.
The
restturned
of 10 Platoon
wasthere
placed
defend
the
and
Company
HQand
from
therunning
enemy
in from
the east.
Glossary:
CSM = Company Sergeant Major – A Warrant Officer
Class 2 [WO2] - the senior non-commissioned officer
in an Infantry Company.
CAP = Company Aid Post – the place where wounded
are treated first before evacuation to hospital.
Cpl = abbreviation for Corporal.
Click to proceed…
18 Aug 1966
1710-1720 hrs
(5:10-5:20 pm)
SLIDE
23 OF 50
B-
6RAR
47
46
48
D
6RAR
10
D
9
12
11
D
12/D
49
D
68
68
N
Nui
Dat 2
30
10
10
30
10
x
600
I
67
10
Suoi Da
Bang
30
100
Reinforcements
67
30
Scale: approx 1000 metre grid
47
47
48
Copyright Dave Sabben 2007
49
At 1710
hrs,
Smithbegan
requested
an ammo
resupply,
asking…
that
be dropped
from towards
choppers
As the
enemy
to probe
the CHQ
defences…
12 it
Platoon
advanced
11overhead.
Platoon…He also
…where
asked forthey
an air-strike
ran in to on
thethe
probes
enemy’s
trying
depth
to flank
positions,
11 Platoon.
and that
Bythe
1730
Bravo
hrs, Company
all three platoons
patrol bewere
sentintocontact.
assist.
Click to proceed…
18 Aug 1966
1720-1730 hrs
(5:20-5:30 pm)
SLIDE
24 OF 50
Brigadier O. D. Jackson
CO 1ATF
AT THE BASE
Brigadier Jackson was concerned
at denuding the base of too many
troops and APCs. He was worried
about the whereabouts of the
other VC Regiment, the 274th.
5RAR was only now returning from
its Binh Ba operation, its perimeter
defended by assorted small units
6RAR had three Companies out,
with Charlie Company defending
the whole 6RAR perimeter.
Lt.Col. C. Townsend
CO 6RAR
When Major Noel Ford, the OC of
the Bravo Company patrol, asked
if they could move towards Delta
Company, Townsend told him to
remain in his location and await
further orders. Meanwhile, with
Delta requesting an ammo
resupply, Major O’Brien and RSM
Chinn started to coordinate the
delivery of the spare ammo to the
6RAR “Eagle Farm” chopper pad.
Flt/Lt Bob Grandin
Pilot, 9 Sqn., RAAF
Lt Adrian Roberts
OC 3Troop, 1APC Sqn
“The artillery just kept firing so the
“I took ten Carriers – 3 Troop and
pilots went to the TFHQ Ops tent to
2 Section, 2 Troop – to A/6RAR’s
see what was happening. When
lines. Once there, I went to 6RAR
Smith asked for an ammo resupply
HQ for a briefing. Major Passey,
by helicopter, Gp Capt Raw knew
the 6RAR Ops Officer, ordered me
that such a flight was against
to ‘Pick up Alpha Company and get
Canberra’s policy at the time. Riley
to
Delta Company and break up the
stepped forward and said he would
attack
’. He said 6RAR’s CO would
go. I suggested it was a suicide
join us later by helicopter.
mission. Frank just responded ‘You
I
rushed
back to the Carriers. But
don’t have to come’.”
the order to move did not come”.
“We rushed over to the pad”.
…and things were no less busy at the Task Force base…
Glossary:
OC = Officer Commanding (the Company Commander)
RSM = Regimental Sergeant Major – the senior noncommissioned officer in an Infantry Battalion, amongst
whose responsibilities is ammo resupply.
TFHQ = Task Force Head Quarters – Ops = Operations.
Click to proceed…
18 Aug 1966
1720-1730 hrs
(5:20-5:30 pm)
SLIDE
25 OF 50
B-
MEANWHILE, AT THE TASK FORCE BASE . . .
The two crews raced to their helicopters and flew from the Task
Force helipad to the 6RAR helipad to collect the ammo.
3 Troop 1APC, with 2 Section of 2 Troop, were now at A/6RAR;
However, permission to load and go had not yet been given;
6RAR
RAAF
3Tp
9Sqn
A
1APC
B6RAR
6RAR
D
6RAR
47
46
48
D
6RAR
10
D
11
D
12/D
9
49
D
12
68
68
N
Nui
Dat 2
10
10
Weir
30
30
x
?
10
600
???
10
100
I
67
Suoi Da
Bang
30 30
67
?
???
?
???
Scale: approx 1000 metre grid
47
47
48
Copyright Dave Sabben 2007
49
The 12to
Platoon
contacts quickly
escalated
asenemy
the enemy
sought
to flank
theirofnew
Unknown
the Australians,
large groups
of the
wereprobes
flanking
them out
of sight
the target.
defenders.
The
Meanwhile,
As two
same
other
thing
athelicopters
the
happened
Task Force
flew
at 10
base…
the
Platoon
concert
…the
– the
party
ammo
enemy
to Vung
resupply
wasTau,
trying
process
USto
jets
gauge
were
started
the
called
limits
andto
the
of
Long
reinforcements
the Tan
Australian
for the positions.
air-strike.
waited…
Click to proceed…
18 Aug 1966
1730-1740 hrs
(5:30-5:40 pm)
SLIDE
26 OF 50
B-
6RAR
47
46
48
D
6RAR
10
D
11
D
12/D
9
49
D
12
68
68
N
Nui
Dat 2
10
30 ?
30 ???
10
10
Super Sabre F100 D
67
10
10
x
600
I
10
100
Reinforcements
67
30 30
?
Suoi Da
Bang
???
Scale: approx 1000 metre grid
47
47
48
Copyright Dave Sabben 2007
49
?
???
Overhead,
At 10 Platoon,
the jetsthe
arrived…
enemy…Due
– having
to the
found
thicka cloud
solid target
cover,-they
withdrew
couldn’t
to consolidate
identify the and
target,
prepare
whichtheir
wasattack.
to be the
unknown
tothe
Delta
Company,
the
columns
of VC
soldiers
moved
westwards
to extent
outflank
Australians.
At Still
11
At
enemy
Platoon,
12
Platoon,
opposing
it was
obvious
11
VCPlatoon.
continued
they Instead,
couldn’t
to send
they
hold
out dropped
flanking
out
much
probes,
bombs
longer.
and
trying
Sgtnapalm
Buick
to define
prepared
a thousand
the
themetres
survivors
ofthe
this
further
new
to withdraw.
force.
east.
Click to proceed…
18 Aug 1966
1740-1750 hrs
(5:40-5:50 pm)
SLIDE
27 OF 50
MEANWHILE, AT THE TASK FORCE BASE . . .
B-
The two helicopters, loaded with ammo, left the 6RAR pad and
flew into the storm clouds. One circled over the rivers as
the other flew to Long Tan village to get a visual fix.
3 Troop and A/6RAR still awaited the order to go to Long Tan…..
6RAR
9Sqn
RAAF
3Tp
A
1APCB9Sqn
6RAR
6RAR
10
D
6RAR
RAAF
D
11
1111-
6RAR
47
46
D
48
12/D
9
D
[15
[13 men
men]
M.I.A.]
49
D
12
68
68
N
Nui
Dat 2
?
30
10
???
30
10
x
10
Weir
67
30
10
30
600
I
100
30
Reinforcements
67
?
Suoi Da
Bang
???
Scale: approx 1000 metre grid
47
47
48
Copyright Dave Sabben 2007
?
49
???
With artillery and small arms fire suppressing the enemy, the 11 Platoon men pulled back in a 150 metre dash…
They
At12
The
CHQ
carried
Platoon
enemy
and
with
10
still
reaction
Platoon,
them
engaged
allwas
the
the
VC
to
known
VC
bypass
patrols
launched
wounded
the
to the
north
original
a series
but
andwere
position
of
south
platoon-sized
forced
which
butto
tosought
leave
follow
attacks
behind
to
upcut
from
the15
off
withdrawal
the
known
the
east
11Task
Platoon
or
tofrom
believed
test
the
withdrawal.
flanks.
defences.
to be dead.
And
still
the
enemy’s
wide
circling
of
Company
continued.
Meanwhile,
at
the
Force
base…
Click to proceed…
18 Aug 1966
1750-1800 hrs
(5:50-6 pm)
SLIDE
28 OF 50
B-
MEANWHILE, AT THE TASK FORCE BASE . . .
As
the
helicopters
returned
base,
the order
was
finally
given
The
two
helicopters,
loadedtowith
ammo,
left the
6RAR
pad
and for
flew
the into
APCs
the
and
storm
A/6RAR
clouds.
to leave.
One circled
Alpha Company
over the rivers
boarded.
as
The COthe
6RAR
had
said
he’d follow
by chopper,
the 10
other
flew
to Long
Tan village
to get aso
visual
fix.APCs
sped
to
the
nearest
gap
in
the
perimeter
wire…
3 Troop and A/6RAR still awaited the order to go to Long Tan…..
B/6RAR again sought permission to go to D/6RAR: now approved.
6RAR
3Tp
A
1APCB9Sqn
6RAR
6RAR
RAAF
9Sqn
D
RAAF
6RAR
47
46
48
D
6RAR
10
D
11-
12/D
9
119Sqn
49
D
12
68
N
D
11- men] D
[13
[15 men
M.I.A.]
68
D
[13 men]
Nui
Dat 2
RAAF
?
10
10
10
Weir
67
?
30
???
Suoi Da
Bang
???
9Sqn30
x
RAAF
600
10
30
67
30
Scale: approx 1000 metre grid
47
47
48
Copyright Dave Sabben
? 2007
49
???
The VC assaulting the CHQ & 10 Platoon position then pulled back to reorganise. Their fire-fight died down.
The
The
At chopper
about
second
1800
chopper
crew
hrscalled
(6pm)
was“Orange”.
the
called
first
inhelicopter
and
“Wrong;
the ammo
we’ll
approached
throw
was thrown
again”.
Deltaout
Company’s
D/6atthrew
treetop
another
location.
heightRed
“right
Red
– the
smoke
into
crew
thewas
called
CSM’s
thrown.
“Red”.
lap”.
Click to proceed…
18 Aug 1966
1800-1810 hrs
(6 - 6:10 pm)
SLIDE
29 OF 50
“After we delivered the ammo we returned to the Task Force helipad and thence to
the Operations Tent – Frank [Riley]’s idea of staying involved and maybe seeing some
more action. We reported that we had not seen anything of note during the mission.
It had been our first taste of action, yet the talk was mostly about the weather.
As the squadron commander, Wing Commander Ray Scott, was on his way with the
rest of the squadron, we were sent back to the helipad to await further orders. Our
thoughts turned to the possibility of an attack from the north east and how
vulnerable we would be with the whole squadron sitting side by side on the helipad.
The sound of the artillery firing repeatedly and continuously kept us intact with the
raging battle happening less than five kilometres away.”
Flt/Lt Bob Grandin Pilot, 9 Sqn., RAAF
Lt Adrian Roberts OC 3Troop, 1APC Sqn
“Within the 1ATF perimeter there were only a few places APCs could enter and exit.
Arriving at the engineer’s wire, I was horrified to discover that the gap had been
changed. The new gap was so well concealed that I had to send a runner to the
engineers to get some one to open it. That took about ten minutes – ten minutes that
we really couldn’t afford.
Thinking ahead, my experience on earlier operations was that the only place I could
get the Troop across the Suoi Da Bang [river] was upstream from a concrete dam
south of the Long Tan road. I would make for that after getting past the wire.
It was a big diversion but entry to and exit from the river any further north in the wet
season was simply not possible.”
The helicopters arrived back at the base just as the APC and A/6RAR reinforcement column were leaving...
The constants at the base were the rain and the intense rate of fire sustained by the 24 guns of 1 Field Regt.
Glossary:
Helipad – the area set aside for helicopter landings.
1 Field Regt – First Field Regiment (artillery) – the
parent unit for all the artillery at Nui Dat, comprising 6
guns each from 103 and 105 Australian Batteries, 161
NZ Battery and Battery A, 2 Battalion, 35th Artillery, US
Army (of M109 Medium [155mm] self-propelled guns).
Click to proceed…
18 Aug 1966
1800-1810 hrs
(6 - 6:10 pm)
SLIDE
30OF 50
MEANWHILE, AT THE TASK FORCE BASE . . .
As the helicopters returned to base, the order was finally given for
the APCs and A/6RAR to leave. Alpha Company boarded.
The CO 6RAR had said he’d follow by chopper, so the 10 APCs
sped to the nearest gap in the perimeter wire…
6RAR
B/6RAR again sought permission to go to D/6RAR: now approved.
B-
RAAF
9Sqn
B-
6RAR
D
46
3Tp
6RAR
10
D
11-
6RAR
47
48
12/D
9
D
[15 men
M.I.A.]
49
D
12
6RAR
A
68
1APC
D
11-
N
9Sqn
68
D
[13 men]
Nui
Dat 2
RAAF
?I
100
???
67
?
30
???
Suoi Da
Bang
x
10
Weir
60
30
10
30
600
10
67
30
Scale: approx 1000 metre grid
47
47
48
Copyright Dave Sabben
? 2007
49
???
10 Platoon
At 12
could
Platoon,
look more
downassaults
the rubber
from
tree
north
avenues
and south
and see
were
theeliminated
VC forming
– the
up in
firefight
the distance
died away.
to their east.
As
As
12Several
the
Platoon
the VC
11 Platoon
continued
groups
threw asurvivors
ofyellow
six
their
toencircling
smoke
10started
VC followed
grenade.
their
moves…
withdrawal,
them
The
…a
group
in,group
while
they
saw
formed
more
lost
the smoke
radio
enemy
up facing
comms.
and
werethe
came
seen
They
known
intowere
tomove
the
CHQ/10
pulling
12
past
Platoon
Platoon
to
back
theposition.
“blind”.
south.
location.
Click to proceed…
18 Aug 1966
1800-1810 hrs
(6 - 6:10 pm)
SLIDE
31 OF 50
MEANWHILE, AT THE TASK FORCE BASE . . .
6:40
As
the
helicopters
return
base…
order
finally6:50
given
for the
The APCs waited for
the to
gap
in thethe
wire
to beisopened,
when…
APCs
and
A/6RAR
to
leave.
Alpha
Company
climbs
aboard.
Sending two carriers back for CO 6RAR, the other eight carriers
Lt
Adrian
Roberts
The CO
6RAR
had said
he’d follow
by chopper,
10deployed
APCs
sped
through
the
gap…
They continued
to so
thethe
weir,
speed to the
nearest
gap“I
in was
the perimeter
wire…
OC
3Troop,
informed
through
6RAR
to protect
the crossing
and to
started
cross, –one
at approved.
a time.
B/6RAR
again seeks
permission
goSquadron
toto
D/6RAR
now
1APC
Sqn 1APC
that
the CO
with A/6RAR on board. ofB-6RAR
now wished to move
6RAR
B-
46
3Tp A-
1APC
6RAR
68
N
with the APCs to Delta
6RAR
D
Company and wanted my
47force to return to collect him.
48
D
6RAR
10
D
12/D
9
I was aware that Delta
Company was in dire straits
at Long Tan. What to do?
11-
11-
68
Nui
Dat 2
D
I
D
?
30
100
men]
10[13
???
10 I
30
100
x
carriers returned for the CO’s
party] would catch up with
Weir
600
20
60
me at the crossing where I
knew we would be delayed.”
Suoi Da
Bang
49
D
[13 men]
12
I opted to send back two
carriers … while I pushed on
to the river crossing … with
the other eight carriers.
D
[15 men
M.I.A.]
D
12
I believed that [the two
67
11-
67
30
Scale: approx 1000 metre grid
47
47
48
Copyright?Dave Sabben 2007
49
???
The group formed up and started an advance towards CHQ. They were ambushed and stopped by 12 Platoon.
TheCHQ
VC continued
and 10 Platoon
their encircling
were thenmove,
attacked
east by groups
about
platoon
strength.
as from
Bravosouth-east
Company and
approached
and theofAPCs
cleared
the
base wire.
A water crossing is a dangerous move for APCs. The vehicle floats with only a foot or so (30cm)
of 1966
18 Aug
1810-1820
to proceed…
space between the water and the top hatch.Click
(This
picture shows the APC beginning to climb out of the hrs
(6:10-6:20 pm)
water, so the front is raised.) The crossing to get to Long Tan took place when the river was swift and
SLIDE
swollen, it was raining, within an hour of full darkness, and with the real threat of an enemy ambush.
Click to proceed…
32 OF 50
MEANWHILE, AT THE TASK FORCE BASE . . .
Once the company assumed its final defensive position
Bravo Company was mortared as it made its way to Delta Coy.
the
placements of the sub-units didn’t change. At that
There were no casualties and they were soon on their way again.
time
the average
ofswift-flowing
a Section river
wasone
5 or
able
Meanwhile,
the APCsstrength
crossed the
at 6
a time.
men.
TheHQ,
brunt
of the
fighting
nextAPCs
30 minutes
At 6RAR
the CO’s
party
boardedfor
the the
returned
and they
to leave
base. clockwise to south west.
was prepared
in the arc
fromthe
north
B-
1APC
3Tp -
6RAR
D
x
68
N
Section 47
6RAR
A11 Platoon
9 Section,
12 Platoon
7 & 8 Sections,
12 Platoon
CAP CHQ &
FOO
3Tp -
CHQ
Section
6RAR
10
D
11-
6RAR
6RAR
A Composite
-HQ
46
D
48
12/D
9
D
[15 men
M.I.A.]
49
68
1,A2- & 36RAR
Sections,
10 Platoon
11-
Nui
Dat 2
D
12
1APC
I
D
?
100
men]
10[13
10 I
???
100
x
Weir
Approx. 100 metres
67
600
20
67
50
30
Suoi Da
Bang
Scale: approx 1000 metre grid
47
47
48
? Copyright Dave Sabben 2007
49
???
The VC attacks
The enemy
on 10encirclement
Platoon failed
proceeded,
- the VC pulled
out ofback
sightto
ofreorganise.
the Australians
Theyand
were
unknown
reinforced
by with
them…
fresh troops.
The
12survivors
Platoon and
of the
theambush
11 Platoon
moved
group
south.
made For
theirthe
way
first
back
time
to in
CHQ
over
where
two hours,
they took
there
upwas
perimeter
a lull inpositions.
the fighting.
Glossary:
CAP = Company Aid Post – first aid for the wounded.
CHQ = Company Headquarters
FOO = Forward Observation Officer - the officer and
his signallers who controlled the artillery firing – in
this case, Captain ‘Morrie’ Stanley of 161 Bty, RNZA.
Click to proceed…
18 Aug 1966
1820-1830 hrs
(6:20-6:30 pm)
SLIDE
33 OF 50
MEANWHILE, BACK WITH DELTA COMPANY…
“The company had had no time to dig in … Fortunately, the position at which we
had chosen to stop was on a slight reverse slope and therefore the enemy machinegun fire mostly went just over our heads, with only the fire of the upright VC
assaulting waves getting right into our area.”
“The VC continued to launch assault waves on the 10 and 12 Platoon area. Machinegun fire poured in from out near the slopes of Nui Dat 2. Preceded by bugle and
whistle calls ... the enemy assault waves continued relentlessly.”
“The artillery was closed in to 100 metres. We could see the
shells land. We could feel the concussion through the sodden
earth and we could smell the explosive. Best for us, we could see
the damage it was doing as it protected us from the VC masses.”
Major Harry Smith
OC D/6RAR
Captain ‘Morrie’ Stanley
FO 161 Bty, Attached to D/6RAR
Throughout much of the battle, especially after the defensive
position had been established, Morrie Stanley had ordered almost
continuous artillery fire in a series of regimental fire missions with
adjustments. “One effect of all this gunfire was the noise. From the
time fire commenced at about 1600hrs until about 1900hrs when
the battle proper ceased the tremendous din gave the effect of a continuous violent
thunderstorm.” “Generally, the situation was very frightening with the rain, sound and
shock of shell and small arms fire. I think the incessant violence and confusion caused
us to draw mainly on instincts that we had developed from training and previous
experience.” Morrie Stanley had been walking the artillery in from all sides, carefully
avoiding the original 11 Platoon position. By the time of the final assaults, artillery was
falling about 100 metres out from the perimeter – and was still being called in closer.
The company – then with about 60 men effective - was finally in the position from which it would not withdraw.
Near-continuous artillery fire formed a screen of destruction between the Australians and the VC.
Click to proceed…
18 Aug 1966
1830 hrs
(6:50 pm)
SLIDE
34 OF 50
MEANWHILE, AT THE TASK FORCE BASE . . .
Bravo Company moved into the rubber after the mortaring…
With the CO 6RAR party aboard, the two APCs sped to the
gap in the wire and exited the base…
At the river, Roberts left one APC to guard the crossing point
and lead his 7 remaining APCs towards Delta Company…
6RAR
B-
1APC
3Tp x
46
HQ -
6RAR
A-
6RAR
D
6RAR
48
68
D
6RAR
10
D
11-
11-
D
[13 men]
12
D
[15 men
M.I.A.]
D
68
N
3Tp -
1APC
A-
6RAR
Nui
Dat 2
x
?I
100
600
???
30
x
600
Weir
67
49
x
600
67
50
Suoi Da
Bang
Scale: approx 1000 metre grid
47
47
?
48
Copyright Dave Sabben 2007
49
???
The
As the
VC VC
quickly
circling
followed
move up
continued….
the 12 Platoon
… Bravo
withdrawal.
Company
Soon
advanced
they probed
and both
the groups
south edge
of APCs
of D/6RAR
were on
inthe
strength.
move.
The enemy to the east, then estimated at a battalion… …started company-strength assaults from the east.
Click to proceed…
18 Aug 1966
1830-1840 hrs
(6:30-6:40 pm)
SLIDE
35 OF 50
MEANWHILE,
AT THE TASK FORCE BASE . . .
Lt Peter Dinham
“When
theplantation
firing started,
my
The seven
APCs charged
the rubber
and followed
OC 2 Platoon,
A Coy,into
theaboard
axis ofthe
theAPCs
road northwards
– right
intoAlcorta,
the circling
VC.
sergeant,
Frank
rolled
As
the
APCs
were
in
contact,
the
two
others
reached
the
river,
and dismounted on contact. off the APC, followed by Ron
crossed and, with theBrett,
third APC,
to join the
andraced
engaged
theothers.
VC.
Meanwhile, Bravo Company Ireached
the
road
where
11
quickly got the rear Platoon
ramp of Bhad had its first contact.
46
3Tp x
HQ -
68
A-
N
67
the APC lowered
and
6RARwe all
Bdebussed – platoon DHQ and
6RAR
Lou Stephens’ section – about
1APC
12 of us in total.
We formed an extended line
6RAR
1APC
3Tp -APCs’
and, with the
.50cals
6RAR
firing support,
we
engaged
6RAR
Aabout 1001APC
enemy to our front.
The3Tpfiring
was intense but
6RAR
A - only
lasted
a minute or so
before I ordered the group to
remount the APC.
We estimated later| that we’d
100
inflictedWeir
some 40 casualties
with no casualties to us.”
6RAR
D
6RAR
D
10
48
11-
11-
D
[13 men]
12
D
[15 men
M.I.A.]
49
D
68
Nui
Dat 2
IIx
I xI
50
100
100
600
100
600
100
x
600
67
|
Suoi Da
Bang
100
|
|
100
|
100
100
|
47
47
3Tp -
1APC
A-
6RAR
100 ?
???
Scale: approx 1000 metre grid
48
Copyright Dave Sabben 2007
49
The
The
After
enemy
The
enemy
the
inner
circling
battle,
to the
VC encirclement
south
aDelta
POWof
Company
said
the that
company
group
reached
thisappears
was
consolidated
the
a company
to
road
have
inas
been
the
from
the
rubber
in
D445
first
a cut-off
of
plantation.
Battalion
the position
major
sent
Itassaults
isnear
towas
“close
the
still
from
crossroads…
the
raining
the
door”
east
heavily,
on
came
theand
in.
they
AsAustralians.
Atthey
were
the were
sound
focussed
beaten
The
of the
other
onoff,
APC
the
companies
company-plus
battle
contact
raging
tooftheir
D445
to
assaults
the
south,
were
north
came
in
they
of
thethem
appear
inarea
from
rather
but
to
south
did
have
than
not
east,
decided
watching
come
thenunder
to
south,
return
their
fire
then
left
to
from
(southern)
the
east
the
east.
again.
APCs.
flank…
Click to proceed…
18 Aug 1966
1840-1850 hrs
(6:40-6:50 pm)
SLIDE
36 OF 50
“Despite the repeated assaults and the scarcity of ammo,
the company stood – or rather, laid on - its ground.
There was no thought of withdrawal from this place.
It did not occur to me that we would not survive. I guess
I was too busy to worry, exploring every past experience
to seek guidance in what we might do to repel the
enemy. I would have given quids for a few Vickers
machine guns…
Maybe the mind and body accepted what was happening
and regardless of the uncertainty and danger, you just
did the job and that was all that mattered.”
Major Harry Smith
Officer Commanding
Delta Company, 6RAR
Captain Morrie Stanley
161 Bty, RNZArtillery
Attached as FO to D/6RAR
“After the defensive position had been established, [I]
ordered almost continuous artillery fire in a series of
fresh regimental fire missions with adjustments.
I was able to take advantage of the rain and intense
gunfire that caused the area to be shrouded in smoke,
steam and fog. This helped me because my judgement
of distance was assisted by the observation
(or lack of it) of flash against this screen.
The enemy and some of our own boys were also
silhouetted to us.
Because of the rain, I had to keep remarking our
position on my map, and to keep the map oriented so
that I did not make mistakes with the grid lines.”
The company experienced its heaviest attacks from 6:35 to 6:50. Enemy assaults came in “human waves” Artillery was called in from 100 metres out, to 50 metres out and finally to only 25 metres from the perimeter…
Click to proceed…
18 Aug 1966
1840-1850 hrs
(6:40-6:50 pm))
SLIDE
37 OF 50
46
48
47
68
6RAR
10
D
11-
B-
6RAR
100A -
6RAR
|
49
68
6RAR
Nui
Dat 2
IIx
x
HQ -
D
[15 men
M.I.A.]
D
1APC
3Tp -
11-
D
[13 men]
12
N
67
D
I xI
100
100
600
100
600
100
x
600
67
Suoi Da
Bang
3Tp -
1APC
A-
6RAR
|
47
100
473Tp -
1APC
Scale: approx 1000 metre grid
48
Copyright Dave Sabben 2007
49
x
HQ -
6RAR
In
InAs
the
thethe
last
few
Breaking
last
few
minutes
shots
minutes
through
of
of this
the
of the
fading
battle
contact,
contact
light,
the
on
the
remaining
into
the
VCnorth-south
the
launched
now-dark
three APCs
their
track,
rubber
last
caught
Roberts’
desperate
plantation,
up with
seven
assaults
the
the
APCs
first
B Company
on
again
seven.
thesped
company
The
group
north.
VC arrived.
fled
position.
east.
6RAR
A -echoed
The
By
As
The
now,
CO
they
defenders
6RAR
artillery
approached
ordered
could
was landing
the
Roberts
seecrossroads,
thewithin
to
headlights
pursue.
25they
yards
The
ofhit
the
of
APCs
another
the
approaching
turned
Delta
company-sized
Company
east
APCs
andflickering
perimeter.
chased
VC unit
the
through
who
The
VC were
into
assaults
the
the
moving
trees
gathering
ceased
towest
their
atdarkness.
to
7:00pm.
south.
east.
Click to proceed…
18 Aug 1966
1850-1900 hrs
(6:50 - 7 pm)
SLIDE
38 OF 50
6RAR
D
D
10
11-
x
46
48
47
D
6RAR
[13 men]
6RAR
AD
12
6RAR
B-
HQ
11--
68
BD-
6RAR
6RAR
3Tp -
1APC
N
D
[15 men
M.I.A.]
49
68
Nui
Dat 2
x
1APC
3Tp x
67
x
HQ -
6RAR
A-
6RAR
600
600
x
600
67
Suoi Da
Bang
Scale: approx 1000 metre grid
47
47
48
Copyright Dave Sabben 2007
49
AtOn
about
arrival,
It was
7:10pm,
the
totally
Bthe
Company
dark.
APCs
The
arrived.
troops
rain had
They
were
stopped.
and
placed
A/6RAR
Iton
was
the
were
silent…
south-west
deployed
The Battle
toby
west
OC
ofarc
D/6RAR
Long
of the
Tan
incompany
had
a screen
ended
perimeter.
to. the east.
The
CO
of 6RAR,
Col
Townsend,
then
dismounted
APCwithdrawn
and
assumed
of –the
force.
The
artillery
was
stopped
the
APC
approach
but that
ordered
to remain
laid
on last-fired
just
in case.
After
a ten-minute
waitLt
infor
silence,
it was
apparent
the the
VC
had
fromcommand
the targets
immediate
battlefield.
Click to proceed…
18 Aug 1966
1900-1910 hrs
(7 - 7:10 pm)
SLIDE
39 OF 50
Lt Peter Dinham
OC 2 Platoon, A Coy, 6RAR
7:10 pm to Midnight
“During this time, movement and
moaning could be heard to the
east. Hopeful that it might have
been some of our own wounded.
A Coy’s WO2 Jack Roughley and
Cpl Ross Smith made three
separate attempts between them
to crawl forward, but the sounds
ceased when the source was
approached. These were acts of
heroism that were never fully
recognised.”
Major Harry Smith
OC D Coy, 6RAR
“I was not happy when Colonel
Townsend [CO 6RAR] ordered a
withdrawal of everyone back to
the edge of the rubber to dustoff
the casualties. I argued heatedly
with the CO that I wanted to stay
and sweep through the area in
APCs at first light to where 11
Platoon had been. We could have
made an LZ by having the APCs
push over a few rubber trees.”
Lt Adrian Roberts
OC 3 Troop, 1APC Sqn.
Cpl Robin Jones
5 Platoon, B Coy, 6RAR
“We loaded the dead onto 2Lt Ian
Savage’s APC, the rest of D Coy
onto the others and left the battle
area at 2245hrs. We moved out
with convoy lights on and the
leading vehicle using headlights.
At the edge of the rubber, I had
the troop stop, turn outwards and
form a hollow square. With
hatches open and internal lights
on, we defined the dustoff LZ.”
“Bravo Company led the way from
the battle area on foot to the new
APC LZ, followed by Alpha. It was a
case of blind navigation on a
compass bearing – you couldn’t
see your hand in front of your face.
We stopped numerous times after
falling over or running into a tree.
We made the rubber’s edge about
an hour or so later. I never liked
night navigation ever again.”
With no threat of an enemy counterattack, Townsend ordered the whole force to move to the edge of the
rubber plantation to evacuate the dead and wounded: D Coy on the APCs; A and B Coys to follow on foot.
Glossary:
WO2 = Warrant Officer Class 2 – the senior NCO in a
Company – the Company Sergeant Major (CSM).
“Dustoff”= the code name for a helicopter casualty or
medical evacuation flight.
LZ = Landing Zone for helicopters
Click to proceed…
18 Aug 1966
1910-2400 hrs
(7:10pm to
midnight)
SLIDE
40 OF 50
11-
x
46
48
47
68
N
67
9Sqn
Suoi Da
I
Bang
RAAF
1 sortie
USArmy
HQ -
6RAR
D-
6RAR
3Tp -
1APC
A-
6RAR
B-
6RAR
D
[15 men
M.I.A.]
49
68
Nui
Dat 2
67
Scale: approx 1000 metre grid
47
47
48
Copyright Dave Sabben 2007
49
Bravo
and
Alpha
Companies
moved
by
footDelta
and ended
secured
the
APCs
and
LZ.
AtAt2245hrs
midnight,
(10:45pm)
the Delta
theCompany
APCs with
“Operation
CO
6RAR
Vendetta”
and
Company
and
aboard
a area
new around
“Operation
moved the
to the
Smithfield”
edge
ofthe
the
was
plantation.
started.
There,
The helicopters
they formed
inopen
and
square
took
theand
casualties
called
for
direct
and
to the
Australian
helicopters
at forces
Vung Tau
to (15
evacuate
minutes
theflying
casualties.
time).
“Smithfield”
wasflew
a an
Task
Force
operation
formed
toUS
follow
uphospitals
the enemy
withdrawing
from
Long
Tan.
Click to proceed…
Overnight
18 Aug to
dawn 19th
SLIDE
41 OF 50
I
RAAF
9Sqn
I
(Various)
D
USArmy
x
5RAR
HQ D-
46
473Tp A-
68
B-
N
The two
11 Platoon
soldiers
found on
the battlefield
on the 19th 6RAR
Barry Mellor
6RAR
and
1APC Jim Richmond were medivac’d
6RAR
to hospital.
11-
48
68
AB-
Both
recovered
from their
wounds.
Nui
Dat 2
6RAR
Whole
Company 10 Pl
APC 2
Suoi Da
Bang
APC 1
47
49
6RAR
12 Pl
67
D
[15 men
M.I.A.]
47
11 Pl
67
Artillery
In depth
Scale: approx 1000 metre grid
48
Copyright Dave Sabben 2007
49
The
rest
of
the Coy
forceplatoons
to 5RAR,
the to
area
ofareas
Delta’s
final
stand,
where
split
to their
own
tasks:
TheAt
APCs
dawn
and
19th
Delta
August,
Dreturned
Company,
moved
the
was
flown
ofintheir
to the
own
APC
contacts
LZ andthey
and
“Operation
started
to
Smithfield”
clear
the
battlefield.
began.
AD/5RAR
and
B Coys
swept
cleared
through
to of
thetheir
edges
battle
area
of the
to15
battlefield
ensure
there
and,
were
withno
D/5RAR,
ambushes
started
laid,
toand
follow
secured
up the
the
VCeastern
withdrawal.
limit.
11 Platoon
found
two
missing
still alive,
though
wounded.
They
were
casevac’d
immediately.
Click to proceed…
Dawn 19 Aug
to evening
21 Aug 1966
SLIDE
42 OF 50
D Company,
6RAR, manning on 18 August 1966
My Company was sent out briefed to find an enemy force expected to be about a
Roll of Honour – Long Tan
(Those entitled
to strong
wear the
Presidential
UnitWe
Citation
for the
Battle
Long
Tan)
platoon
– US
perhaps
30 men.
did not
know
at of
the
time,
but Task Force
HQ had dismissed reports of at least one VC Regiment in the area of Long Tan in
CHQ
10 Platoon
11 Platoon
12 Platoon
the days2LT
after
mid-August
1966.2LT G.C. Sharp
Maj H.A. Smith, MC
G.M.
Kendall (MID)
†
2LT D.R. Sabben (MID)
Capt H.l.
McLean –Williams
Sgt
N.J. Rankin
Sgt 2781704
R.S.
Buick, MM
Sgt
J.
Todd with
#
2781465
2Lt G How
C Sharp
was
it then,
that we were able
to withstand
a prolonged
engagement
Pte
P A Large
WO2 J.W. Kirby DCM †† perhaps Cpl
T.H.
Lea
#
Cpl
J.M.
Duroux
††
Cpl
L.
Drinkwater
up to 2000 NVA and VC over a three hour plus period?
SSgt R.
Gildersleeve
Cpl I.E.(1APC)
McDonald
Cpl 1730993
W.R.Moore (MID)
Cpl M.V. McCullough ##
54570
Cpl P E Clements
Pte A F McCormack
Sgt W. O’Donnell (MID) Each of my
Cpl three
D.R. well-trained
Mogg
Cplinexperienced
B.E. Magnussen
#
Cpl K.T.
Miller
but
platoons
in their
individual
2781847
J Jewry
Sgt D.A.
ThomsonL/Cplactions,
LCpI
G.J. Ballinger
LCpl
J.C. Robbins
# D J McCormack
LCpl
C.T. the
Lithgow
††
1730994
Pte
and then
the company in
defence,
fought
tenaciously
against
Cpl P.N. Dobson (MID)
LCpI
G.K.
Crowther
LCpl
C.T.
Ainslie
##
LCpl
W.T.
Luther
##
overwhelming VC forces. Our initial wide dispersement and flanking moves, the
55120
A Aldersea
Pte# Wresupply
D Mitchell
Cpl MW.
Green Pte R regimental
LCpIartillery
J. Jewry
† LCpl
R.C.
LCplwere
P. all
Slack-Smith
support and
the1731013
RAAFCarne
ammunition
to our
Cpl J.W. Harris
Pte R.A. Aldersea
† Pte J.E. Beere
#
Pte AG. Bartlett
advantage.
The
timely
arrival
of
reinforcements
on
APCs
as
the
enemy
withdrew
1730929
Cpl C.M.
MarchantPte G A Drabble
Pte S.R. Belford
Pte 1731040
D.A. Drabble Pte† D J Salveron
Pte D.F. Beahan
#
from thePte
battlefield
may have prevented
a possible
afterBextrum
dark.
LCpl MG. Campbell
K.D. Branch
Pte R.M. Eglinton,
MMcounterattack
Pte N.R.
1730941
Pte K But
H Gant
Pte D J Thomas
LCpl G.R.
Richardson
Pte
Brown
# leadership
Pte 38712
D.F. Fabian
Ptelevels,
R.D. Brown,
MM ##
if not
forC.W.
the outstanding
at section #and platoon
practiced
LCpl G.R.
Smith
Pte
J.C.
Cash
#
Pte
K.H.
Gant
†
Pte
W.R.
Buckland
3411673 Pte# E F
Grant
application
basic
Infantry, weapon
and
fieldcraft
Pte†skills,
F B gallantry,
Topp
LCpl D.A. Spencer
Pte ofA.R.
Deller
Pte 1200265
E.F.
Grant
Pte R.T.courage
Burstalland
determination
on Dixon
the battlefield,
weV.R.
would
not have
survived.
Pte W.A.
Akell (MID)
Pte P.R.
Pte
Grice
†M
Pte V.M. Cameron
1730947
Pte
V
R
Grice
216559
Pte
R Wales
Pte I.M. Campbell
Pte
K.P.
Doolan
Pte
B.
Halls
Pte
G.R. Davis
#
Some of my minimal recommendations for honours and awards were
Pte D.J.
Collins Pte J M
Pte
P.J.
Doyle
Pte
J.E.
Heslewood
Pte
P.H.
Dettmann
43893
Houston
3787607
Pte
C
J
Whiston
downgraded and others were not forwarded to higher HQ for processing. The
Pte I.
Dixon
Pte H.T. Esler
Pte J.R. Holmes
##
Pte B.D. Forsyth
#
companyPte
wasB.D.
later
awarded the
US W.F.
Presidential
(PUC)
other
Pte R.C. Healey
Firth
# Pte
Hornett Unit CitationPte
A.R.butFraser
USA andPte
GRVN
medals
offered in
1966
rejected
Pte P.R. Hunt
D.A.
Graham
Pte
J.M.were
Houston
† by Canberra.
Pte K.W. Graham
#
They
shall
grow
not
old,
as
we
that
are
left
grow
old.
Pte R.V. Perandis
Pte
B.G
Jameson
Pte
A.F.
McCormack
†
Pte
S.
Hodder
The lesser Australian Imperial awards approved for Delta Company were, to
Pte R.N. Stewart
PteOfficial
McGrath
Ptethe
D.J.
McCormack
†
Pte “…little
T.R. Humphries
Age
shall
notl.J.weary
them,
years
condemn.
quote
the
History,
To#nor
Long
74),
short of ##
Pte S.R. Williams
Pte D.l. Mitchell
Pte Tan
B.C.(Page
Meller564, endnote
#
Pte G.D. Langlands
insulting
for D.B.
the
heroism
displayed…”
forMitchell
themorning,
now-iconic
battle
the war.
Major Harry Smith
At
the going
down
of the
sun,Pte
and
in
the
Pte
Montgomery
W.D.
†
PteofP.A.
Large
†
OC D/6RAR
Moss
Pte
l.D.
Munro
##
Pte
T.
Newall
I remainPte
veryR.C.
proud
of
my
officers
and
men
and
am
saddened
by
those
we
lost.
We will remember
them.
Attached from
Pte P. Nash
Pte J.H. Quincey ##
Pte A.L. Parr
161 Battery
Pte G.M. Peters
Pte J.P. Richmond #
Pte B.R. Reilly
RNZ Artillery
Pte J.E. Riley
Pte D.J. Salveron
†
Pte T.P. Ryan
#
Capt M. Perhaps
Stanley MBE
Pte W.A.
D.J.battle
Thomas
† the last
Pteword…
V.W. Simon
it is fitting to allow
theRoche
commanderPte
of the
to have
LCpl W.G Walker (MID)
Pte A.M. Stepney
Pte F.B. Topp
†
Pte B.F. Vassella
LBdr M.N. Broomhall
Pte L.S. Vine
Pte K.J. Tronc
Pte G.C. Warrell
Pte M.R. Wales
† Pte C.J. Whiston
†
Pte H.P. Webb
#
CLICK INSIDE THIS BOX TO
Pte T.W. Watts
Click
to proceed…
INSIDE#THIS
BOX
TOTan; ++ = KIA on
SEE
OTHER
(+ = KIA CLICK
Long Tan;
= WIA
Long
other
Operations & Tours;
##THREE
= WIA on
otherSLIDES:
Operations & Tours)
GO TO THE END OF
•The VC/NVA version;
SLIDE
THE PRESENTATION
• Was Long Tan a VC ambush?
Click to proceed…
OF
• Long Tan’s legacy.
Lest we forget.
43 50
THE VC AND NVA VERSION OF THE BATTLE OF LONG TAN
A few days after the battle, Radio Hanoi and Radio Peking each broadcast
a version of the battle at Long Tan. Excerpts include:
“... wiped out 500 (Australian) mercenaries...”
“... set fire to three M113 armoured cars...”
“... shot down one of the US aircraft that went to the rescue...”
“... captured a large quantity of arms and ammunition.”
“The day before, 17 August, the LAF ... wiped out
one hundred Australian mercenaries.”
The official history of the (so-called) liberation of the South was published in 1986.
In it, the description of the battle bears no similarity to the Australian version.
Several high awards are listed as being bestowed on participants of the battle.
No mention at all is made of casualties inflicted upon VC or NVA forces.
It wasn’t until July 2006 that, in a “60 Minutes” interview on camera,
a senior VC/NVA commander admitted to two Long Tan veterans, Bob Buick
and Dave Sabben, that the Australians had, in fact, won the battle.
Click to proceed…
SLIDE
44 OF 50
WAS LONG TAN A VC / NVA AMBUSH?
It wasn’t until the late 1980s that a theory gained temporary popularity that suggested
the battle at Long Tan was the result of a carefully laid VC / NVA ambush
and that Delta Company stumbled into the trap, surviving only by pure luck.
The evidence speaks against the Battle having been a planned and prepared VC ambush:
1.
2.
3.
4.
There were no pre-positioned battlefield communications;
The VC had no pre-dug positions on or within small arms range of the Battlefield;
The first contact was initiated by the Australians;
The initiation of the main action does not indicate an ambush. First one then two machine guns,
firing at a range somewhere between 150 and 250 yards;
5. The idea of an ambush is to force those ambushed to have to assault the ambushers. It was the
reverse at Long Tan – the enemy had to go looking for those “ambushed”;
6. The VC did not use command detonated devices (ie, Claymore-style devices), nor were any being
carried by the VC;
7. There was no VC force to hit the APCs at the river crossing – an obvious place to stop them;
8. The VC had to spend three hours trying to find the Delta Company Platoons and to define their
perimeters within their own so-called ambush killing zone;
9. A planned ambush has a planned withdrawal - the actual withdrawal was described as “shabby”;
10. The VC in their assaulting waves were still carrying crew-served weapon ammunition and
unprepared grenades in pouches;
11. The VC had grenades and satchel charges, but there were no reports of them being used against
Delta Company;
12. Since then, no VC paperwork cut before the event (orders etc.) to indicate that an ambush was
planned have come to light.
The theory that Long Tan was an ambush is untenable.
Click to proceed…
SLIDE
45 OF 50
LONG TAN’s LEGACY…
The battle at Long Tan was not the largest battle the Australian or ANZAC forces
experienced in Viet Nam. It did not have the most troops involved, nor did it last the longest
time. However, the stakes involved were the most critical to the Australian and New Zealand
involvements, and the results in proportion to the ANZAC forces involved were the greatest.
After Long Tan, the enemy, both VC (local forces) and NVA (North Vietnamese Army) never
again sought to “take on” the Task Force base at Nui Dat. While they still operated in the
Province, and engaged the ANZACs, all the subsequent major engagements took place at or
outside the province borders, or when they were trapped in or near towns. By the end of the
first year of the Task Force, unarmed vehicles moved unescorted on the main access roads.
Long Tan was not feted in Australia, and was not accorded “icon” status until the Viet Nam
Veterans themselves chose its date – 18 August – as national Viet Nam Veterans’ Day. The
date was ratified by the government and all Viet Vets now honour Long Tan Day as “their”
day for remembering those who served, were wounded or died in the Viet Nam campaign.
For the record – 105 men of Delta Company, 6RAR, moved into the rubber plantation, along
with a three-man New Zealand artillery party. 17 of the Delta men died and 21 were
evacuated wounded. One APC man was wounded and later died of his wounds. A Company
experienced several lightly injured but these were not serious enough for evacuation.
The enemy lost 245 plus men by bodycount, with captured documents and POWs later
affirming that over 800 had died and some 1400 had been wounded in the battle.
In 2006 a Chinese General speaking informally with an Australian ex-Brigadier suggested
that the actual number of troops lost (dead and severe amputees) was in excess of 2500.
Click to proceed…
SLIDE
46 OF 50
Thank you for watching
THE BATTLE
THE OF
ENDLONG TAN
ERRATA (version 01b)
The following mistakes and enhancements are fixed / added in this version:
(1) 102 Battery changed to 103 Battery in the glossary text, slide 30.
(2) Text on slide 46 altered to say that the VC/NVA never again tried
to attack the base – there were still contacts within the Province.
This presentation(3)isFixed
distributed
dot
PPTon
PowerPoint
Animations
tense in slide 18 text. (4) Added version
number
slide 2.
(5) On slide
7, SAS
to “Service”.
free, but is copyrighted
and
maydefinition changed from “Services”
acknowledges
the valuable
(6) On slide 18, the B/6 element remaining in the field was 32 men, not 48.
not be used by others
for
profit.
of excerpts
(7) The
addition
of a D Coy, 6RAR Manning Roll forcontribution
18 Aug 1966
and a Long Tan battle Honour Roll, both on slide 43.from the book
(8) And the best one – the addition of pix of artillery in supporting action!
“The Battle of Long Tan as told by
Any comments or feedback on this
=======
the Commanders to Bob Grandin”
presentation may
be directed
The following
mistakes to
or enhancements have been advised and may be fixed
(Allen
Unwin,
2004, ISBN 1 74114 199 0).
or added
in the in
next version of this presentation
(no &
target
date).
the “contact” email
address
www.dotPPT.com
(1) The number of dots above the APC symbol – I have used three dots to indicate a
Troop of 10 vehicles, two dots to indicate 2 vehicles and one dot to indicate 1 vehicle.
However, in slide 32 and the early part of 33, the 2 vehicles are shown with three dots.
(2) APC and Infantry movements on 19 Aug – Slide 42 is roughly correct but not
accurate in detail. C/6 came out to the plantation as did the rest of 1APC Squadron.
I need to get the sequences and movements a bit better than they are here.
A dotPPT PowerPoint Animation presentation
(3) Artillery pix - I am trying to source more authentic1966 pictures of 105 artillery
This presentation took crews
hundreds
of hours
research
and
develop.
If you
enjoyed
it or learned from it, and would
in action
with thetoL5
Pack Howz
(not
M2A2s) in
their have
Nui Dat
base positions.
like to contributeIfto
its development,
please
consider
a add
deposit
small
I can
obtain more pix plus
permissions
I will
moreof
to athe
next amount
version. (say, $5 or $10?)
to (Australian) Westpac bank account BSB# 733 000, Account# 853 546 (branch = 360 Collins St, Melbourne),
_____________________________________________________________
or (Australian) CBA
bank account BSB# 063 550, Account# 1024 7640 (branch = Hampton, Victoria),
If
you
have feedback,
please go Your
to website
www.dotPPT.com,
select
‘contact’
andmuch appreciated.
either account in the name
of David Sabben.
anonymous
contribution
to costs
will be
feedback / corrections. (Good intentions offered, but no guarantees!)
Who knows?send
Thisyour
may
enable other similar presentations to be developed in the future. Thank you.
proceed…
Click to Click
end tothe
presentation.
MILITARY SYMBOLS FOR UNITS AS USED IN THIS PRESENTATION
Above the flag, a small symbol will show the
size of the unit x = Battalion – over 600 soldiers
| = Company – about 100soldiers
= Platoon – 30-35 soldiers
= Section – 7 to 10 soldiers
= single man/group or vehicle
On the left of the flag is the name or number
of the unit – in this case, A (Company).
(Sometimes there will also be a minus sign meaning that the unit is not at full strength.)
On the right will be the name of the unit’s
parent unit – in this case, 6RAR.
Inside the flag there’ll be a symbol to indicate
the type of unit. We’ll show X for infantry,
for armour and
for helicopters.
On the staff there’ll be one or more ‘flag’s.
If there’s more than one flag, then there’s
more than one unit in that location.
Above it is a ‘staff’ - like a flagpole.
A coloured disk shows the location of the unit
on the map. Blue for our units; red for enemy.
A
6RAR
Enemy units will not have the same “staff” and
“flag” symbol. They will have red location disks
to show location but, since size of unit, name,
parent unit and type of unit are not known, the
standard symbols used In this presentation
will be:
10 for a section or squad,
for a platoon, 30
I
100 for a company
x
600
and for a battalion.
Where the size of the enemy force has been
estimated by an observer, that number is
included within the disk but these are
estimates only. However, since the numbers
roughly match our units, the appropriate size
symbol will be placed above the disk.
x = Battalion – over 600 soldiers
| = Company – about 100soldiers
= Platoon – 30-35 soldiers
= Section – 7 to 10 soldiers
= single man/group or vehicle
CLICK THIS BOX
TO RETURN
LESSON:
Military Unit
Symbols.
SLIDE
48 OF 50
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE USE OF GRID REFERENCES ON MAPS
A standard grid reference is a 6-digit number used to identify a location on a map.
On maps (and in these map-diagrams) there are numbered vertical and horizontal lines…
These are called ‘grid lines’. We’ll use them to identify the location of the hut in the plantation:
47
48
68
Nui
Dat 2
68
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
2
9
1
67
67
47
48
The first two digits indicate the vertical line to the left (west) of the location to be identified = 47
The next digit is the number of tenths from it to the next vertical line to the right (east) = 7
The next two digits are the horizontal line below (south of) the location to be identified = 67
The last digit is the number of tenths from it to the next horizontal line above (north of) it = 3
The grid reference for the hut in the plantation is therefore 477673
(Where a grid reference has two letters before the digits, the letters identify the map .)
CLICK THIS BOX
TO RETURN
LESSON:
Grid
References
SLIDE
49 OF 50
WHAT DELTA COMPANY DIDN’T KNOW ABOUT ENEMY DISPOSITIONS
Source: ‘To Long Tan’ the official history of the Australian Army
and the Vietnam War 1950-1966, and other histories.
To Long Tan, Page 371:
[The enemy troops] appear to have consisted of:
the full strength [three battalions] of 275 Regiment,
possibly augmented by one NVA battalion.
In the vicinity [at Long Tan] was D445 Battalion.
One of the battalions took the high ground on Nui
Dat 2, the others remaining outside Line Alpha.
x
600
x
10
600
xx
400
x
The course of the battle and searches on the day
after the battle confirmed the locations of some of
the battalions and of the 275 Regt HQ position.
600
x
600
A VC battalion was usually 500-600 and up to 850
strong. Regt HQ was from 300-500 depending on
support units operating with them at the time.
While in defensive positions, the VC battalions had
constant screen patrols out to secure their positions.
It was one of these patrols which 11 Platoon
contacted at 1540 hrs (3:40pm).
10
x
600
In theory, up to 3500 VC troops were in the area on
18 Aug 1966. However, it is thought that not more
than 1500-2000 became involved in the battle.
Click to proceed…
CLICK THIS BOX
TO RETURN
LESSON:
Enemy
Dispositions
SLIDE
50 OF 50