Transcript ELECTRONIC VOTING MACHINE

ELECTRONIC VOTING MACHINE
(EVM)
MALFUNCTIONING-HACKING IN EVM?
Presentation for Improved, Fool-proof Ballot/EVM
System
Dr. Kirit Somaiya – Ex Member of Parliament
All India Convenor – BJP Committee on EVM
22 July 2009
ELECTRONIC VOTING MACHINE (EVM)
Electronic Voting Machine (EVM) has become a issue of
national debate. Experts have been continuously
expressing their concern about the malfunctioning of EVM
since Lok Sabha 2004 results. Satinath Choudhary
approached the Supreme Court in 2004.
Development has taken place in the developed countries
since last couple of years and the issue of malfunctioning
demands healthy debate and corrective measures.
Leaders belonging to all major political parties – BJP,
Congress, CPM, TDP, ADMK, RJD, LJP, INLD, MDMK,
Trinamool Congress –have expressed concern about the
malfunctioning of EVM.
2
ELECTRONIC VOTING MACHINE (EVM)
Activists, NGOs, experts, authorities have expressed
concern about the present EVM system in India. Several
examples have also been put forward regarding unusual /
abnormality and also mal-functioning.
Developed countries like USA, Germany, Netherlands,
Finland, Ireland, Brazil have either disposed of EVM or
have come out with fool-proof system.
We feel there is a necessity of national debate on “Foolproof Ballot/EVM System” in India.
Here is the Presentation on the same.
Dr. Kirit Somaiya – Ex MP
All India Convenor – BJP Committee on EVM 3
ELECTRONIC VOTING MACHINE (EVM)
History of EVM in India
• Electronic Voting Machine (EVM) used / introduced in the
world since 1970s. During the 70s, Election Commission of
India consider to use EVM in India. An Expert Committee
was appointed in 1990 to review the designs, etc. An expert
moved the Supreme Court in 2005 about the mal-functioning
of EVM system in India. It was referred to the Election
Commission of India.
•
The Election Commission appointed the Expert Committee
on 29th December 2005, which submitted Report in 2006. The
Committee suggested major “measures” for security,
protection, upgradation. It also emphasized to use EVM only
after providing security measures suggested by the
Committee.
4
Introduction, Progress of EVM in India
Introduction of the concept in India
1970
First use in 11 constituencies
1982-84
First Expert Committee
1990
Use of EVM in few Lok Sabha Constituencies 2004
Appointment of another Expert Committee
2005
Committee’s Report with emphasis on
protection
100% use of EVM
2006
Lok Sabha
2009
5
India concern
Lok Sabha 2009 elections
• Dr. Subramanian Swamy, former Law Minister, alleged in April
2009 that a group of people who had been convicted in the
US for hacking bank accounts and credit cards had been
recruited by a certain political party to possibly rig the
elections
• The Shiv Sena alleged that EVM malfunction caused its
candidate Mohan Rawale to lose in South Mumbai. Said
Rawale: “I wonder how I got only five votes from an area that
is a Shiv Sena stronghold.”
• Journalist Cho Ramaswamy discussed how in MDMK leader
Vaiko’s constituency, Virudhunagar, Tamil Nadu, “while
counting, the votes increased by 23,000 more than the polled
votes”.
6
POLITICAL PARTIES & EVM
• BJP – L.K. Advaniji demanded transparent fool-proof
ballot/EVM system
• L.K. Advaniji demanded EVM with Paper Backup in
future elections
• CPM, TDP, ADMK, RJD, LJP, INLD, MDMK of Vaiko,
Trinamool Congress have raised issues about
malfunctioning of EVM
• Mr. Gulam Nabi Azad, Union Minister has charged EVM
malfunctioning in the recently held Orissa elections. He
made the statement before the Press at Bhubaneshwar
in JuneJuly 2009
• Mr. Amrinder Singh, Punjab Congress President has
made public demonstration with EVM and charged
malfunctioning of EVM
7
FORMER BUREAUCRATS / EXPERTS
RAISE CONCERN
• Omesh Saigal – ex-Chief Secretary, Delhi Govt. & exSecretary, Govt. of India – has submitted representation
to the Election Commission
• Issue raised is malfunctioning of EVM.
• Other former bureaucrats – Dr. Krishan Saigal – ex-Chief
Secretary, Assam, Ravi Kathpalia –Ex Controller General
of Accounts, GOI, Ms Asha Das – Ex Secretary, GOI,
K.P. Fabian – former Ambassador, S.K. Agnihotri – exChief Secretary, Assam, A.R. Lall – Advocate, Supreme
Court have also raised this issue.
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Observations, objections regarding the
present EVM system in India
• 2005 – An IT Expert filed a Petition on EVM
• Supreme Court sent the Petition to the Election
Commission
• 2006 – Expert Committee appointed by the Election
Commission submitted report with several
recommendations to plug loopholes on manipulation,
mal-functioning
• BEL and ECIL were asked to make corrections
• EC has not implemented the recommendations, security
measures
9
Observations, objections regarding the
present EVM system in India (Contd…)
• Several instances found in Lok Sabha 2009 about malfunctioning of EVM
• Various petitions in High Courts and Supreme Court
about mal-functioning of EVM
• Various technocrats, IT experts have expressed doubt
about the fool-proof EVM system in India
• Concern expressed by the experts and authority about
the mal-functioning of EVM used in India
10
EVM MALFUNCTIONING OBSERVED IN
LOK SABHA 2009 ELECTION
• Any button pressed, light/vote registered to one
particular candidate
• EVM could not be opened on the counting
• Seal found open
• EVM malfunctioning on polling day
11
EXAMPLES OF ABNORMAL / UNUSUAL
FUNCTIONING/BEHAVIOUR OF EVM
• Malfunctioning of EVM seen during the Lok Sabha 2009
elections
• EVM could not start
• EVM got jammed and did not open on counting day
• EVM stopped functioning during the poll/in between the
polling process
• When button of one candidate pressed, light on another
candidate got flashed
• Polling staff was not at all updated or aware about the
security measures
• EVMs lying/ was used in previous elections in a
particular district were used in the same district in the
Lok Sabha 2009
12
EXAMPLES OF ABNORMAL / UNUSUAL
FUNCTIONING/BEHAVIOUR OF EVM
• In a EVM, an independent candidate with no base/logic,
got/shown 500+ votes and major political parties
candidate got 0 or 1 vote
• EVM result in many booths shows 100% votes against
one candidate (more than 200 votes polled in that area)
• Differences between the polling figures declared by the
Election Commission in the booths and the outcome /
result shown in EVM in those booths
• State Election officials/Election Commission for reasons
known to them, have not collected all such information /
data, process, study, research them
• No special follow up undertaken of EVM till todate.
13
EXAMPLES OF ABNORMAL/UNUSUAL
FUNCTIONING / BEHAVIOUR OF EVM
Chandrapur – Maharashtra
• EVM in Booth No.176 – Nutan School – Votes
given/button pressed for Candidate No.1 but vote/light
flashed against another candidate
• EVM replaced around 2.30 pm in between the polling
process on 16th April 2009
• No further study, action till today
14
EXAMPLES OF ABNORMAL / UNUSUAL
FUNCTIONING/BEHAVIOUR OF EVM
61 NOIDA ASSEMBLY
• An Independent candidate got 415 votes in Booth No.61.
He got 0 to 1 in other booths
• How it is possible for an Independent who has no
connection, concern with that area?
• Sector 25 – Jalvayu Vihar, Noida In this area, main
contest observed between BJP, Congress
• In Booth 61, BJP and Congress got one vote each and
BSP 7 votes
• Is it not EVM mal-functioning?
15
ABNORMAL / UNUSUAL BEHAVIOUR
OF EVM 61 NOIDA ASSEMBLY
Boot
h No.
Name of the
Area
BJP
BSP
Congres
s
SP
Others
No. of
votes
polled
60
Sector 25
282
7
145
2
1
437
61
Sector 25
Jalvayu Vihar
Block M
1
0
0
1
415
417
62
Sector 25
Jalvayu Vihar
Block L,K,M,N
264
19
158
3
5
449
63
Sector 25 Block
N,K,L,K,QJ
247
27
125
1
1
401
64
Sector 25 Block
N
241
24
102
3
9
379
16
EXAMPLES OF ABNORMAL / UNUSUAL
FUNCTIONING/BEHAVIOUR OF EVM
GHAZIABAD – UP
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Abnormality observed in Muradnagar segment of Ghaziabad
Contest was mainly between BJP, Congress, BSP
Rajnath Singh won by 80,000+ votes
Mr. Satish, an independent candidate, who has no base, no
background, in all got 2719 votes
Mr. Satish secured 998 votes in 24 rounds. He got 507 votes in
Round No.19 in Muradnagar Vidhan Sabha
Mr. Satish has no locus standee in Booth No.247
All 507 votes were given/allotted/counted by EVM in Polling
Booth No.247 alone
In Booth No.247, BJP Candidate Rajnath Singh and Congress
Candidate got 0 votes each and BSP candidate Amar Pal Sharma
got 1 vote.
17
EXAMPLES OF ABNORMAL / UNUSUAL
FUNCTIONING/BEHAVIOUR OF EVM
Cuttack – Orissa
• EVM Booth No.160 – Any button pressed, light/vote
flashed against BJD
• Congress, BJP people in Nimasahi Booth of Cuttack
drew the attention of the Polling Officer
• Presiding Officer/polling officials have no explanation
for the same
• Election Commission had to accept the manipulation /
malfunctioning of EVM
• Repolling was held in Nimasahi Booth No.160.
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INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM –
REVIEW REPORT
Few facts –
• Voting pattern in Parliament and Assembly elections in
Rellivalasa village is worth noting. Voting pattern shows
vast difference
• Voting not recorded by the Electronic Voting Machine
accurately to which candidate voters voted.
19
INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM –
REVIEW REPORT
VOTING PATTERN – PARLIAMENT – RELLIVALASA VILLAGE
Booth
No.
Village
TDP
BS
P
70
Rellivasala
320
06
71
Do
289
72
Do
73
74
INC
BJP
PRP
140
08
57
14
169
16
313
10
223
Do
133
07
Do
369
10
Pyramid
Party
Lok
Satta
BS
SP
Indep
enden
t
Total
votes
polled
04
01
14
09
559
50
09
07
08
07
569
14
90
05
07
27
12
701
11
319
71
07
02
03
03
556
288
21
68
11
07
24
15
813
For the same booth, voting for Assembly is total contradiction (see next Table)
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INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM –
REVIEW REPORT
VOTING PATTERN – ASSEMBLY – RELLIVALASA VILLAGE
Boot
h No.
INC
BJP
BS
P
TDP
PRP
Pyrami
d Party
Lok
Satta
Ind.
I
Ind. II
Ind
III
Ind.
IV
Total
votes
polled
70
129
7
5
332
79
4
2
0
1
0
0
559
71
170
10
8
308
41
9
6
1
4
4
8
569
72
227
23
16
326
77
9
3
3
4
6
6
700
73
332
3
115
10
71
4
3
15
3
0
0
556
74
276
31
8
370
91
7
6
2
7
6
11
815
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INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM –
REVIEW REPORT
• In Khammam Constituency, Polling Station 198,
Electronic Voting Machine could not read data and the
voters were discounted by the EC officer. As per booth
data collected from the Dist. Collector office, this
particular booth data is missing
• Manipulated Electronic Voting Machines can
misbehaveand corrupt the entire memory as well as
hang the Control Unit and rendering E2PROM
unreadable
22
INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM –
REVIEW REPORT
• In Pedakurapadu (Guntur Dist) Constituency Booth
No.2, 122 votes were polled in the First Electronic
Voting Machine. As the EVM malfunctioned and was
replaced by a second EVM
• Electronic Voting Machines are not stable
S.NO.
PARTY
VOTES
1
INC
186
2
TDP
176
3
PRP
34
4
IND
18
Total
414
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INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM – REVIEW REPORT
List of Booths where the machines could not read data
Assembly Code
Booth Code
Assembly Name
Booth Name
23
60
Ramagundam
Medipalli
23
61
Ramagundam
Medipalli
70
197
Secunderabad
Osmania University
80
60
Alampur (SC)
Leeza
80
69
Alampur (SC)
Leeza
84
128
Shadnagar
Kesampet
104
185
Parkal
Katrapally
104
197
Parkal
Nallabelly Yelugur
104
209
Parkal
Semgem
104
212
Parkal
Gavicharla
104
221
Parkal
Bollikunta
104
224
Parkal
Ramachandrapuram
112
198
Khammam
Kothagudem
198
142
Vijayawada West
Mallikarjuna Petta
231
31
Giddalur
Kandulapuram
240
250
Sullurpeta (SC)
MPP School Ramapuram
Kuppam
257
44
Panyam
Bollavaram
257
45
Panyam
Bollavaram
24
INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM – REVIEW REPORT
Table showing polling booths where there was particular pattern of voting
SNo
Assembly
Mandal
Panchayath
Booth
TOL
TDP
%
INC
%
1
Rajam (SC)
Vangara
Vangara
30
11
0
0
11
100
2
Yerragondapalem
Dornala
Dornala
135
27
0
0
27
100
3
Jammalamadugu
Jammalamadugu
Gandikota
120
555
0
0
555
100
4
do
do
Goriganur
75
712
0
0
712
100
5
do
do
Dharmapuram
74
458
0
0
457
99.8
6
do
do
Devagudi
69
776
0
0
774
99.7
7
do
do
K. Sirigepalli
119
782
0
0
780
99.7
8
do
do
Devagudi
70
920
0
0
917
99.7
9
do
do
Peddandlur
118
822
0
0
818
99.5
10
do
do
Jammalmadugu
73
398
0
0
396
99.5
11
do
do
P.Sugumanchipalle
72
391
0
0
389
99.5
12
Mydukur
Khajipet
Khajipet
144
776
0
0
772
99.5
13
Punganur
Sadam
Yarrathivaripalle
166
640
0
0
635
99.2
14
Jammalamadugu
Jammalamadugu
Goriganur
76
695
0
0
685
98.6
15
Kamalapuram
Kamalapuram
Kokatam
3
445
0
0
437
98.2
The data suggests EVMs used in these booths have been manipulated.). Congress candidate got
almost 100% votes in various booths
25
INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM – REVIEW REPORT
Table showing difference between actual votes polled and votes counted by EVM
11 – BHANDARA GONDIA LOK SABHA
LAC
Total Voters
Total Votes
polled
Votes counted
on EVM
Difference
60-Tumsar
251813
177786
177116
670
61-Bhandara
294139
201173
201171
2
62-Sakoli
265588
198450
198343
107
63Arjuni/Morgaon
199932
154757
155037
280
64-Tiroda
195340
141411
141299
112
65-Gondi
241090
155496
155698
202
1447902
1029073
1028664
1373
TOTAL
26
PETITIONS IN INDIA
• Retired computer science professor Satinath Choudhary,
“producing doctored EVMs is child’s play”, as early as
2004
• Banwarilal B. Purohit vs. Election Commission of India
filed in 2004
• Shailendra Pradhan filed a PIL in 2009 in the Madhya
Pradesh High Court at Jabalpur
• The PMK, which suffered a shock defeat in Virudhunagar
constituency in 2009 Parliamentary election, has filed an
appeal to the Election Commission
• The MDMK has filed a PIL in Madras High Court against
EVMs.
27
PETITIONS IN INDIA
• Various PILs have been filed at High Courts and Supreme Court
• Supreme Court – Jana Chaitanya Vedika (NGO) has moved the
Apex Court regarding authenticity and credibility of EVM
system.
In the Petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution the
Petitioners are seeking directions from the Hon’ble Court to
ensure that the votes cast by the voters, which are part of their
constitutional right of free expression under Article 19(1)(a), are
registered properly and without any tampering/manipulation of
the Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) which are used in the
election
• Supreme Court - NetIndia, renowned Company in EVM
technology, has submitted an affidavit in the Supreme Court
regarding lack of security measures, transparency and hacking
of EVM in India
28
PETITIONS IN INDIA
• Supreme Court – Mr. Mohan Rawale – 5-time Shiv Sena
MP – has filed a Petition in the Supreme Court on EVM
malfunctioning
• Mumbai High Court – Dr. Jagtap and Dr. Jadhav have
moved the Mumbai High Court regarding malfunctioning
of EVM
• Orissa High Court – Activists have moved the Orissa
High Court regarding malfunctioning of EVM
• Hyderabad – Issues raised at Andhra Pradesh High
Court
• Tamil Nadu – EVM malfunctioning issues raised at the
High Court
29
IT SECURITY
EXPERT VIJAY MUKHI’S SUGGESTIONS
• After spending years in the security industry, we believe
that in principle all technology can be tampered with.
• There is no such thing as 100%.
• As a EVM is a technology machine it can be tampered with
in principle.
• The world has realized that there is only one way to
prevent misuse of technology and that is by having a open
process where the whole world can participate in trying to
break security.
• What we recommend to the Government and the Election
Commission is to make public the entire EVM eco-system,
which includes the hardware schematics and the software
that control the EVM.
30
IT SECURITY
EXPERT VIJAY MUKHI’S SUGGESTIONS
(contd….)
• Today, we cannot say that the EVM is safe or unsafe from
being tampered with because like the rest of the country,
as we have no information whatever on the EVM. The
entire EVM ecosystem is a state secretary inaccessible to
just a few.
• The GSM world introduced a SIM card that had a
password stored within it. Years ago, it would take hours
to clone a SIM card, today it takes about 15 minutes max.
There is no way to undo the damage as there are over a
billion users of GSM today.
• We want EC/Government to follow international best
practices in securing the technology used to public
governance and welfare.
31
IT SECURITY
EXPERT VIJAY MUKHI’S SUGGESTIONS
(contd….)
• We recommend that in the din of politics a reason
edvoice will not be heard at all and hence to put an
end to this controversy it would be better to have a
paper trail of the vote caused. As people do not
understand technology, tempers get frayed and by
introducing paper, something that people understand,
would put an end to a controversy.
32
EVM around the world
• There is a veritable tsunami of negative reports about
Electronic Voting Machines from all over the world.
There is no country in which EVMs have been welcomed
so enthusiastically as they have been in India, and
perhaps this is with good reason.
• Hardly any major developed country uses EVMs to any
extent; indeed, despite the fuss over “hanging chads”
and other arcana in their 2000 elections, even Americans
who are partial to technological solutions have resisted
the siren-song of voting machines after due
consideration.
33
EVM around the world (Contd…)
United States (California)
• In April 2004, California banned 14,000 EVMs because the
manufacturer (Diebold Election Systems) had installed
uncertified software that had never been tested and then lied
to state officials about the machines. The machines were
decertified and criminal prosecution initiated against the
manufacturer.
• EVM gadbad in US 2004 Presidential elections. In Gahanna,
Ohio, only 638 votes were cast, but EVM result declared Bush
received 4,258 votes to Kerry’s 260.
• A study by UC Berkeley’s Quantitative Methods Research
Team reported that irregularities associated with EVMs may
have awarded 130,000-260,000 votes to Bush in Florida in
2004.
34
EVM around the world (Contd…)
United States
• Various bills proposed in House/Senate –
 HR 550: Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility
Act of 2005
 HR 774 and S 330: Voting Integrity and Verification
Act of 2005
 HR 939 and S 450: Count Every Vote Act of 2005
 HR 533 and S 17: Voting Opportunity and Technology
Enhancement Rights Act of 2005
 HR 278: Know Your Vote Counts Act of 2005
 HR 5036: Emergency Assistance for Secure Elections
Act of 2008
35
EVM around the world
(Contd…)
Germany (2009)
• The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany declared EVMs
unconstitutional.
The Netherlands ( 2006)
• The Interior Ministry withdrew the licences of 1,187 voting
machines because it was proven that one could eavesdrop on
voting from up to 40 metres away. The suit was brought by a
Dutch citizen’s group named ‘We Do Not Trust Voting
Machines’. This group demonstrated that in five minutes, they
could hack into the machines with neither voters nor election
officials being aware of it.
36
EVM around the world (Contd…)
Finland (2009)
• The Supreme Court declared invalid the result of a pilot
electronic vote in three municipalities.
United Kingdom (2007)
• The Open Rights Group declared it could not express
confidence in the results for the areas that it observed.
Their report cites “problems with the procurement,
planning, management and implementation of the
systems concerned”.
37
EVM around the world
(Contd…)
Ireland (2006)
• Ireland embarked on an ambitious e-voting scheme, but
abandoned it due to public pressure.
Brazil (2006)
• There were serious discrepancies in the Diebold
systems predominantly used in Brazil’s 2006 elections.
38
EVM STORY
• We understand very clearly the complete process of
development, manufacturing and rollout of EVMs across
India. ECIL & BEL have done the research and development
in-house and shipped the software to their vendors Renesas
in Japan, Microchip in US respectively for the software to be
fused into the Chips. The mode of shipment goes through
many layers before it reaches the vendor and similarly back to
the manufacturers. The security adopted in the transfer of the
software is not known, as well there is ambiguity on the Prof.
Indiresan Expert Committee review report 2006 on whether
an OTP or a Masked ROM chips are used. As a layman
wecan consider OTP to be a Blank CD in which you can write
what you want at your location and Masked ROM is like
buying a Movie CD which is pre-written.
39
EVM STORY
• A chance but still there exists the opportunity to swap the
chips while shipment and the manufac-turers have no method
of verification. The only way to verify the EVMs is putting
them to a Mock Poll, and we have already demonstrated how
properly functioning EVM while in Mock Poll can be
manipulated to favour a candidate in the actual poll.
• Further as there is no precise verification tool to check
whether the EVM is manipulated opens up several different
opportunities of tampering the EVM.
40
CLARIFICATION EXPECTED FROM
THE ELECTION COMMISSION
Is it true –
•
EVM in the same area is repeatedly used in the same
area/periphery
•
2006 Indiresan Expert Committee Report
implemented partially
•
Expert measures about security remain unaddressed
•
Election Commission itself does not know what is
inside the EVM, chip, hardware, software
•
Expert Committee of 1990 and 2006 had Prof.
Indiresan as member and Chairman
•
No consultation with any other bright IT experts done
41
CLARIFICATION EXPECTED FROM
THE ELECTION COMMISSION
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
90% of the Report of 1990 and 2006 is same including the
language
EVM used in India – hardware, software is same since 1990
EC refused to share any information on software, hardware,
etc., with any political party, candidate or anybody else
Non-transparency creates suspicion
EC has never studied the issue of malfunctioning
EC refused to accept modern technology, i.e. EVM with
paper back up
No audit pre-poll, during poll, post poll of EVM has been
done till today
42
CLARIFICATION EXPECTED FROM
THE ELECTION COMMISSION
•
•
•
•
•
No records of when, how what about the failure of EVM
machines maintained, checked, studied
Repairs, maintenance, storage, transportation to be
foolproof
The polling staff is purely temporary, on deputation for the
election day and counting day, has no knowledge and
concern or trained about the EVM technology, security
measures, etc.
No standard guideline, programme, procedure implemented
by EC
EVM code is installed by a private company/MNC of a
foreign country and not at a Government PSU, i.e.
BEL/ECIL
43
Observations about EVM –
Manufacturing faults
Manufacturing faults in the hardware may result in
malfunctions. More sinister issues arise from malicious
and intentional tampering. The programs used are
proprietary and not open for inspection, unlike, say, open
source programs which any individual can test out.
44
Fraudulant way of tampering
• Tampering with the software to add malicious code to
alter vote totals or favour any candidate
• Tampering with the hardware of the machine to alter vote
totals or favour any candidate
• Intentional mis-configuration of the ballot design to
misidentify a candidate’s party
• Abusing the administrative access to the machine by
election officials might also allow individuals to vote
multiple times.
45
TROJAN HORSE
• In-built Trojan Horse in software
• Programming code available to few selected
• No provision for checking, inspection of software,
hardware by anybody including the Election Commission
• Leakage, corruption can make hacking feasible
• New EVMs purchases in January 2009 – 182,000 from
BEL and 78,000 from ECIL
• Coding, decoding of these new machines
• Imported chips are used
• No transparency about the chips, hardware, software
46
TROJAN HORSE
(Contd…)
• No political party or candidate taken into confidence
about the software, hardware, etc.
• Even the Election Commission do not have any system
to check the transparency and security
• Chips can be corrupted
• EVM used can be corrupted
• Hacking, etc., can take place during transportation,
handling, Polling Station, storing places, repair,
maintenance
• So many individuals, private persons involved in EVM
handling
47
Technical details about the EVMs
used in India
•
•
•
•
2 PSUs – BEL and ECIL are the suppliers of EVM in India
Chip used in EVM imported from Japanese company
Software designed in India and sent to Japanese company
Transportation of EVMs, chips are handled by private
contractors/sub-contractors
• Repairs and maintenance done by BEL/ECIL engineers
• BEL, ECIL is also outsourcing the work to private
people/contractors
• No system of control, security measures about
transportation, delivery, handling by private people /
contractors, persons involved in repair and maintenance
and also supervision on the day/eve of polling
48
EXPERT COMMITTEE APPOINTED BY THE
ELECTION COMMISSION
REPORT – OBSERVATIONS &
RECOMMENDATION
EXPERT COMMITTEE OF ELECTION
COMMISSION REPORT –
OBSERVATION, RECOMMENDATION
• 2009 – EC appointed an Expert Committee with reference to
suggest amendment and additional features
• EC noted EVM of 1990 has become outdated – to be
replaced
• Committee headed by Prof. P.V. Indiresan with Prof. A.K.
Agarwala and Prof. D.T. Shahani as Members.
50
EXPERT COMMITTEE OF ELECTION
COMMISSION REPORT –
OBSERVATION, RECOMMENDATION
Observation
• It was agreed by the manufacturers that these could be
implemented and that it primarily involved some alterations in
the software, while hardware design would remain the same.
Once the software was modified by the manufacturers to meet
the above recommendations, only a detailed check of
functional working of the modified EVM would be needed,
which EC as the user could do on its own or get done before
inducting the upgraded EVMs
• The Committee notes with satisfaction that the entire cable is
in the public view with all the time, any such tampering
becomes self-evident. Further, in case any such device
51
EXPERT COMMITTEE OF
ELECTION COMMISSION REPORT –
OBSERVATION, RECOMMENDATION
has been attached to the cable, it will leave telltale punch
marks which can be recognized easily. Therefore, this
probability also is ruled out by the Committee
• Altering the results of the polls before, during and after the
poll duration provided, due security pre-cautions already in
force and additional modifica-tions suggested by the
committee are enforced and the sealing at various stages is
adhered to. In case for any reason the Unit has been
tampered, it immediately gives an indication that the system
has malfunctioned and this remain as a permanent record on
the Machine and this record can be checked at any time later.
52
EXPERT COMMITTEE OF
ELECTION COMMISSION REPORT –
OBSERVATION, RECOMMENDATION
• The Committee recommends that before every election the
manufacturers may be asked to check (this can be done very
fast through a very simple exerciser) and ensure that all the
units are functioning as designed. Incidentally, this method
will be checked, by what is called ‘the self test signature of
Machine’ and thereby the Manufacturers will be able to certify
that the Machine is identical to what they have supplied and it
has not been modified or replaced by any other.
53
EXPERT COMMITTEE OF
ELECTION COMMISSION REPORT –
OBSERVATION, RECOMMENDATION
• Election Commission to maintain a register of the voters in the
sequence of their voting, not only the process of recount is
possible but also verification of the recount against any
possible tampering is also possible. Each role and key press
is time/data stamped
• Further as each key press in EVM units whether valid or
invalid is date-time stamped and recorded no activation of a
possible “Trojan Horse” by any specific key press sequence
on EVM during poll can possibly go unnoticed.
54
EXPERT COMMITTEE OF
ELECTION COMMISSION REPORT –
OBSERVATION, RECOMMENDATION
• Any system can be tested randomly by mock poll to prove this
performance. Further as each key press in EVM units
whether valid or invalid is date-time stamped and recorded no
activation of a possible “Trojan Horse” during poll can possibly
go unnoticed.
55
EXPERT COMMITTEE OF
ELECTION COMMISSION REPORT –
OBSERVATION, RECOMMENDATION
Recommendation
Post-Poll
• Carrying out on a sample basis, recounting of votes in certain
booths post poll at an appropriate administrative level, to act
as a deterrent against potential mischief-makers so as to
generate a climate of confidence about the infallible nature of
electoral process
56
EXPERT COMMITTEE OF
ELECTION COMMISSION REPORT –
OBSERVATION, RECOMMENDATION
Conclusion
• The Committee after a review of the material presented to it
has felt it necessary to highlight certain very key conclusions
and recommendations as below :
(i) The basic Electronic Voting Machine developed by
M/s. Bharat Electronics Ltd. (BEL) and M/s. Electronics
Corporation of India Limited (ECIL) is a secure system. The
security emanates from two very important basic factors :
(a) The fixed program nature of the software which is
fused into the processor and which is effectively
unalterable
57
EXPERT COMMITTEE OF
ELECTION COMMISSION REPORT –
OBSERVATION, RECOMMENDATION
(b) The faithful recording of all events in the processor
(electronically) and the possibility of recalling the same
with the added (manual) administrative procedures on
BU, CU at various stages in public view prescribed by
the Election Commission which make available the
sequence of voters voting rendering it possible
tampering.
(ii) With the provision of non-volatile memory, any physical
interruption leads to the retention of all voting information till
that point.
58
EXPERT COMMITTEE OF
ELECTION COMMISSION REPORT –
OBSERVATION, RECOMMENDATION
(iii) With the system as designed by the above agencies having
built-in security, the Election Commission and the
Government only need to ensure the security of the
equipment, to safeguard the sanctity of the electoral process.
The procedural safeguards as stated in Section 6.0 should be
implemented
(iv) The Committee wishes to place on record the high level of
accomplishments of the Engineers and Scientists of M/s.
Bharat Electronics Ltd and M/s. Electronics Corporation of
India Ltd. In developing an Electronic Voting Machine using
the latest technology.
59
EXPERT COMMITTEE OF
ELECTION COMMISSION REPORT –
OBSERVATION, RECOMMENDATION
(v) The Committee unanimously recommends the use of the
upgraded EVMs in elections after due modifications stated in
this report
(vi) Committee also recommends strongly that bio-metric method
of voter identification is pursued by EC and tested for
feasibility in large population and integrating this sub-system
with EVM in future.
60
INDEPENDENT
TECHNICAL TEAM
REVIEW REPORT
INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM –
REVIEW REPORT
• Independent Technical Committee has studied in depth
and presented its report/observations
• Experts were requested by activists, NGOS to study
healthy EVM system in India
• The engineers were involved in developing a simulated
product in similar lines with the features of the Electronic
Voting machine with a Control Unit, and a Ballot Unit and
have performed extensive research to understand how
vulnerable the Electronic Voting Machines are.
62
INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM –
REVIEW REPORT
• The following questions are the outcome of the
Evaluation done.



Questions – On Process
Questions – On Expert Committee Report
Questions – Technical
63
INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM –
REVIEW REPORT
• Issues on Expert Committee Report
 All through the executive committee report the major
issue raised by most of the people i.e. tampering of
the Electronic Voting Machine has not been
technically addressed. Further we have noted that
the answers provided to the abovementioned problem
are not technical clear
 Source code was not fused in India at the
manufacturer’s premises under stringent security but
it was sent over to the vendor outside the country and
delivered through various delivery channels to the
manufacturer and so can be prone to any kind of
tampering at various stages of the shipment
64
INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM –
REVIEW REPORT
• Issues on Expert Committee Report (contd)
 As the entire lot shall have the same Unique ID and
this also has to be sent along with the source code to
the vendor for fusing into the Chip, there is always a
possibility of Trojan being added into the chip with the
ID already existing. The E2PROM being replaced
while polling operations being conducted due to
E2PROM malfunctioning, this should have made
EVM inoperative.
 No evidence of how many number of EVMs upgraded
with modifications suggested by the Experts
Committee and how many odl EVMs were reused for
this elections
65
INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM –
REVIEW REPORT
• Issues on Expert Committee Report (contd)
 Software modification not possible due to hardware
design as the chips used are Masked Chips and
technically unalterable and require a complete new
Circuit Board with a new chip mounted on it with
proposed modifications to the software
 Even if few EVMs were upgraded with Dynamic Key
Coding, programme is incapable of recording every
key pressed and key sequence when pressed
activates the Trojan. Also to test each of the
Electronic Voting Machines with such a number of key
sequences would be highly impossible.
66
INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM –
REVIEW REPORT
• Issues on Expert Committee Report (contd)
 None of the Control Unit Circuit Boards were sealed
and there is no mention of a modification to the
existing Ballot Units.
 Technically not clear how any embedded device
without any processor or micro controller or any chip
transfer data with encryption
 The Committee to the best of its ability has looked
into all possibilities of tampering with the EVM and
has come to the conclusion that there is no way of
altering the results of the polls before, during and
after the poll duration provide due to security
precautions already in force and additional
modifications suggested by the Committee are
enforced
67
INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM –
REVIEW REPORT
• Issues on Expert Committee Report (contd)
 No evidence to support the fact that the suggestions
made by the expert committee were followed
subsequently
 Suggestions are not completely followed by the
manufacturers leaving enough room for security
breach, which was the main cause of concern
 Knowing the time of the first voter from the EVM and
mapping to the register can actually bring out the
detail of vote cast by every citizen thus putting
democracy into a major threat
68
INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM –
REVIEW REPORT
• Issues on Expert Committee Report (contd)
 There was no diagnostic check available for
checking the sanctity of the embedded program
in the EVM. Neither the technicians, who prepare
the EVMs for elections, understand the
recommendations made by the technical
committee
 No evidence to support the fact that the
suggestions made the expert committee were
implemented subsequently
69
INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM –
REVIEW REPORT
• Possible Manipulations
 Software developed for the EVM locally by the
manufacture was either uploaded through inernet or sent
through courier to the concerned distributor of the chip
vendor in form of CD. No secured methodology adopted
for the transfer of developed source code/programme
software to be fused in to the chip
 Chips delivered from warehouse picked by a courier, etc.
provides grave opportunity of replacing and manipulating
thus procured chips at various levels of shipment.
70
INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM –
REVIEW REPORT
• Possible Manipulations (contd)
 No verification program developed to cross check every
chip for genuine code before mounting on to the circuit
board of EVM. No manufacturer in a position to define
whether chips are original due to lack of thorough
verification tool
 Ballot unit can be swapped at any point of time as there is
no encrption between Ballot Unit and Control Unit. A new
Ballot Unit can be attached to the Control Unit throwing
immense opportunity for running Trojans
71
INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM –
REVIEW REPORT
• Possible Manipulations (contd)
 Pre-poll – After the withdrawal of candidates for a
constituency, the allotment of keys on the Ballot Unit is
done through the Control Unit by pressing the
“CANDIDATE SELECTION” button. Trojan can be
activated to favour a particular key by means of adding
percentage over other key or by deducting a set of votes
polled for all other keys and adding to the favoured key. It
cannot be detected.
 While Poll – Trojan can be activated by anybody going in
as a voter entering the sequential key code on the Ballot
Unit. This can go absolutely undetected as the buttons
pressed in that sequence cannot be captured because of
the functional behaviour of the Trojan.
72
INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL TEAM –
REVIEW REPORT
Remedies proposed
• Standard Verification tool can be developed
• A Printer added to the EVM can give print out of every
vote to the voter which he/she can verify whether the
vote was cast properly
• EVM should be part of E-governance of Government of
India
73
Ways to reduce EVM Frauds
No IT technology/software/hardware in the world is
foolproof. According to security experts, in a short
time, “hackers” find out the ways of hacking :
• EVM frauds can be reduced
• Parallel testing to have independent set of results
• EVM with paper back up
• Testing tool made available to all candidates/political parties
• Open, transparent software, hardware system
• Implementation of e-governance policy of India
• Pre-poll, during poll and post-poll fullfledged test, audit test
of EVM
74
Ways to reduce EVM Frauds
(Contd…)
• All EVMs which found malfunctioning in Lok Sabha 2009
should be checke, verified and studied by independent
machinery/experts
• BEL, ECIL and any Government person, staff of election duty
including the Election Commission should not be allowed to
touch all these machines
• Reason for malfunctioning should be studied by independent
experts and should be published
• Logic and accuracy testing before elections
• Independent software verification and certification. Can use
code signatures to ensure software is identical. Open source
may also be a good idea.
75
Conclusion
• In light of all the above discussions, it is clear that there is
reasonable doubt about the reliability of EVMs.
• Given the poor experience with Electronic Voting Machines
worldwide, it is difficult to believe that India EVMs are
somehow far superior to those used elsewhere, and somehow
immune to fraud.
• This has to be demonstrated. A priori, the evidence suggests
that India’s EVMs are susceptible to fraud in a number of
dimensions.
76
Conclusion (contd…)
• It appears that both technical and procedural measures must
be put in place to allay the concerns about the reliability, or lack
thereof, of electronic voting machines.
• It is entirely possible that the election machinery has taken
every possible step in good faith, but that clever criminals have
subverted the system for their own ends. Improved
transparency, and public scrutiny of the system, including an
analysis of ways in which it can be made more secure, are
urgent and imperative before any future elections.
77