Transcript Bank Safety and Liquidity Provision 银行安全和... Philip

Bank Safety and Liquidity Provision
银行安全性和提供流动性
Philip H. Dybvig
大顽童
Washington University in Saint Louis and
SWUFE
华盛顿大学.圣路易斯、西南财大
Hangzhou June 9, 2012
杭州 2012年6月9日
Overview
主要内容
• What do banks do?
银行是做什么的？
• Bank regulation pre-Basel
巴塞尔协议之前的银行监管
• Regulation under Basel
巴塞尔协议下的银行监管
• Shadow banking
影子银行
• Financial crisis
金融危机
• Current regulation
当前监管
• Suggestions looking forward
建议与展望
What Banks Do
银行做什么
• Asset Side Services (e.g., originating and
servicing loans)
资产方服务（例如,提供贷款与贷款服务）
• Liability Side Services (e.g., accepting deposits
and providing cash)
负债方服务（例如,吸收存款与提供现金）
• Transformation Services (creation of liquidity)
转换服务（创造流动性）
Diamond and Dybvig (1983): liquidity creation by
banks
Diamond and Dybvig (1983):银行流动性创造
Traditional Bank Regulation传统银行监管
• Bank Examiners银行检查者
– examined the loan documentation and
lending practices检查贷款资料与贷款实践
– formed an opinion of the safety and
soundness of the bank形成对银行稳健性
与否的意见
• Glass-Steagall格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案
– separated investment banking from
commercial and mortgage banking从商业
与抵押银行业务中分离出了投资银行业务
– limited deposit insurance umbrella to a
short list of activities限制存款保险保护
Regulation under Basel巴塞尔协议下的监管
• Designed to create a “level playing field”
试图设计创造出一个“公平的竞争环境”
• Capital requirements based on coarse
aggregates基于粗糙针对总量的资本需求
– based on punishment in a repeated game
以重复博弈中的惩罚为基础
– game not repeated if the bank blows up!
如果银行膨胀、倒闭，博弈并非能重复
• No more Glass-Steagall, so government is
insuring hedge funds etc.废除了格拉斯-斯
蒂格尔法，政府得承担对冲基金的责任
Shadow Banking影子银行
• Huge unregulated repo market巨大的监管
空白下的回购市场
• Some possible causes可能的原因
– regulatory arbitrage监管套利
– limits on deposit insurance对存款保险的限
制
– restrictive regulation under Basel巴塞尔协
议下有限的监管
Financial Crisis (simplified and partial view)
金融危机（简化与局部视觉）
• Collapse of shadow banking影子银行崩溃
• US real estate small compared to shadow
banking美国房地产与影子银行业比规模较小
• Bank commercial paper, MMFs, too big to fail,
etc.银行拥有商业票据、货币市场基金等，大而不
倒
• Basel regulation failed巴塞尔监管失败
– simultaneous bank failures in many countries在
许多国家银行同时倒闭
– coarse risk measures easy to game粗略的风险
评价与监管让银行容易钻空子
A Surprisingly Accurate Quote from 1986令
人惊讶的正确的预测
Proposals to move toward 100% reserve banking
would prevent banks from fulfilling their primary
function of creating liquidity. Since banks are an
important part of the infrastructure in the economy,
this is at best a risky move and at worst could
reduce stability because new firms that move in to
fill he vacuum left by banks may inherit the problem
of runs.
要求银行业100％储备的建议，将妨碍银行创造流动性，
履行其主要功能。银行是经济基础设施的重要组成部
分，这一建议充其量是一次冒险，最坏的结果是减少
经济的稳定性，因为新的公司将填补银行留下的真空，
但是这些公司同样会面临挤兑的问题．
Diamond, Douglas W., and Philip H. Dybvig, 1986,
Banking Theory, Deposit Insurance, and Bank
Regulation, Journal of Business 59
How to Eliminate Bank Failures
Completely怎样完全消除银行倒闭
If we want to avoid the problem of banks
blowing up, it is simple: just make banking
illegal. 如果想避免银行膨胀爆炸的问题：
最简单的是取消银行业。
Of course, this destroys whatever benefits
we get from banks.但是，这样也毁灭了银
行给我们带来的收益
Big Questions问题
• Is liquidity provided by banks important?
银行提供的流动性重要吗？
• Is liquidity provided by shadow banks important?
影子银行提供的流动性重要吗？
• Will increasing deposit insurance limits and
regulation shrink shadow banks?
需要提高存款保险的限制，还是监管限制影子银行？
• Will Basel start becoming effective in controlling
risk? (I doubt it.)
巴塞尔协议开始在控制风险方面变得有效？（我很
怀疑）
My Recommendations我的建议
• Eliminate Basel and bring back the bank
examiners.取消巴塞尔协议，重回传统银行审查
• Reinstate Glass-Steagall.恢复格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法
• Eliminate the limits on deposit insurance (in
process?).取消存款保险限制（正在进行？）
• Move towards narrow banking if bank liquidity
provision can be shown to be surplus (doubtful
at this point).如果银行反映出了能提供多余的流
动性（这一点也值得怀疑），也需要限制银行业
务发展。
Thanks! 谢谢！
These slides and a lot of other current
papers can be found at:
http://phildybvig.com/somepapers.html