Transcript Demographic Trends and Challenges in case of Statehood in

Demographic Trends and
Challenges in case of Statehood
in Palestine, 2012-2048
Youssef Courbage
Bir Zeit, January 2012
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Introduction
• Two manners to analyze demographic trends and
challenges in Palestine:
• -As those of a « normal » country: size, growth, structure,
projections, impact on education, on employment…
• -As those of an occupied country. In this case we have to
take into account that Palestinian and Israeli demography
are deeply embedded.
• In this space, that of « historical » Palestine, demography
could not be detached of the Israeli project and to its
Palestinian response.
• The growth of the Jewish population and the reduction of
the Palestinian one is a major strategic object of the Zionist
project, before and after the Naqba of 1948.
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Populationnism and pro-natalism
• The Zionist project has been and still is populationist and
pronatalist .
• It was obviously based on immigration.
• Less known but even more effective is the role of fertility,
to have the largest number of Jewish children.
• Not only for the ultra-orthodox and religious, but in all
segments of the society.
• By a mirror-effect, the Palestinians have been engaged
into a “war of cradles” or a “battle of numbers”
• Yet, by definition, benefiting from the sole asset of fertility
(no possible immigration).
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One or two states, depending on
demography?
• As far as Statehood is concerned, it is
obvious that the establishment of a single
state in Palestine, or of two states (in
which form?) depends a great deal on the
population dynamics of the two
populations.
• Fertility of the Palestinians for a long while
had been an anomaly in the theory of
demographic transition.
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An atypical Jewish fertility…
• Now it is the turn of the Jews in Israel to become the
anomaly to this theory.
• Very high GNP per capita (around 40 000 USD), no
illiteracy, high intake in secondary and university
education, high urbanization.
• Yet, in spite of all these “inhibiting” factors to
reproduction, Jewish fertility is increasing, which is a
most uncommon situation.
• With a rise from a high 2.6 in 1990 to 3.0 in 2010, Jewish
fertility is likely to surpass Palestinian fertility, (1948
Palestinians, now at 3.5 and West Bank at 3.8).
• A unique phenomenon (diaspora Jews at 1.5 only).
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…confronted to the Palestinian
fertility decline
• Contrariwise, Palestinian fertility has followed the opposite
pattern, after a rise during the first intifada,
• and politically considered as an efficient weapon against Israeli
occupation and colonization, it has fallen with the second
intifada.
• What has been the magnitude of this fall? Figures are rather
puzzling depending on MOH estimates and PCBS : 3.4
according to the MOH, 4.5 according to the last PCBS published
survey in 2006, 4.05 in the West Bank and 5.3 in Gaza in 2007
4.2 in 2010 : 3.8 in the West Bank, 4.9 in Gaza.
• The most threatening demographic aspect for the statehood of
Palestine in the future is the competition between Jewish
demography and Palestinian one, namely in the conflict zones:
the West Bank and East-Jerusalem.
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The amazing increase of settlers
population: low mortality…
• Chart 1 shows the phenomenal growth of the numbers of
settlers from 41 000 in 1977 to 560 000 in 2011, a
multiplication by 14.
• In the West Bank (including East Jerusalem), the annual
rate of growth of the Jewish settlers is 4% per annum, for
the Palestinian it is only 2.6%.
• The higher increase of the Jewish settlers in the West
bank is due to 4 factors:
• Their lower mortality rate, higher life-expectancy than the
Palestinians and less aged persons, above 65 years.
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Immigration
• Immigration: Indeed almost all the Jewish population in
Palestine, founds its origin in immigration.
• This is even more true for the Jewish settlers. Every year
there are some 5 000 new comers thanks to immigration
alone, either from the other side of the Green Line or
directly from abroad.
• Contrariwise, the Palestinians have been emigrating
since 2000 as shown by the International Migration
Survey taken in 2010 by PCBS.
• But immigration does not tell the whole story.
• More important is the extremely high fertility rate of the
settlers, as such and compared to the Palestinians.
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A “sub Saharan” fertility
• The last Israel Central Bureau of Statistics
yearbook of 2011 enables sound comparisons of
fertility between Jews settlers and Palestinian
“natives” in the West Bank.
• Settler’s fertility has been rising all over the 4
decades following the 1967 occupation. In 2010,
it had reached (without Jerusalem), 5.18
children per woman, thus increasing from an
already high level of 5.06, in 2009, a 2.3% rise.
• Settlers fertility is therefore much higher than
Palestinian ones: 5.18 versus 3.8, thus more
than one child per woman or 37% more.
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population “momentum”, and the
low age at marriage
• Another reason for the high rate of growth of the
settlers:
• Is the population momentum , i.e. the fact that
they have a high number of youngsters and the
possibility to reach reproductive ages very
quickly. (Chart 2), a very young age-sex
structure comparable to what we find now in Sub
Saharan Africa.
• Also, their age at first marriage, both females
and males is particularly low.
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Chart 1: Jewish settlers in the West Bank
(including East-Jerusalem), 1977-2011
600000
550000
500000
450000
400000
350000
300000
250000
200000
150000
100000
50000
0
1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011
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Chart 2 : Age-sex structure of the Jewish
population in the West Bank, 2010
70
60
50
Females
40
Males
30
20
10
0
-60,0
-40,0
-20,0
0,0
20,0
40,0
60,0
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Jerusalem, an even more complex
issue
• If we single out Jerusalem (which is what the Israeli
statisticians do), it is noteworthy that the “war of cradles”
here is even more intense.
• The Palestinian population in East-Jerusalem had kept
for long a high fertility, a sort of protection against
political risks.
• Yet, this situation did not last forever. Now, Palestinians
have still a respectable 3.84 children on average in
2010, but lower than previous year and less by 11%,
than the Jewish inhabitants of the Holy City: 4.26 (4.16,
the previous year).
• Fertility disequilibrium is even more pronounced,
considering East-Jerusalem alone, fertility of the quarter
of a million settlers (the precise figure is unknown), 5.40
exceeds the Palestinian one 3.84, by 40%.
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The comparative situation of the
Palestinians of 1948
• In the sixties of last century, with almost 9 children per
woman (world record level), the Palestinians of 1948
(around 17% of the population of Israel, 4 June 1967
borders)
• much exceeded the Jews, whose fertility was high but
much lower: 3.4.
• Now it is a completely different story. Jewish fertility is
increasing, year after year. After a low of 2.6 it is now in
the vicinities of 3 (2.97 for Jews by religion, 2.88 for
“Jews and others (i.e; non Arab Christians, no religion.
• Contrariwise, Palestinians of 1948, fertility was cut by 3
reaching a low of 3.3 now, hence few decimal point
above Jewish fertility and
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Chart 3 : Jewish and Palestinians
of 1948 fertility
9,00
8,00
7,00
6,00
Jews
Palestinians
5,00
4,00
3,00
2,00
19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
60 62 64 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12
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A reversal in fertility situation
• Demographic trends, fuelled by fertility trends,
the most effective component of population
dynamics, shows (chart 4), proves the reversal
of reproduction behavior, with the inversion in
the West Bank and especially in East Jerusalem.
• It shows also that in Israel, the convergence
between Jewish and Palestinian of 1948 fertility
is a matter of few years.
• The remnants of high Palestinian fertility are
found only in the Gaza strip only: 4.9 children
per woman (but half what it used to be during
first intifada).
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Chart 4: Recent fertility differences
among Palestinians and Jews, 2010
6
5
4
Palestinians
3
Jew s
2
1
0
West Bank, w ithout
Jerusalem)
East- Jerusalem
Israel
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Population perspectives and
Statehood
• We will present now different sets of population
perspectives from now on until 2048, pointing
out the issues they raise in terms of statehood
for the Palestinians. (Table 1).
• Chart 5 presents the likely evolution of the total
Palestinian population (West Bank, East
Jerusalem, Gaza, Palestinians of 1948)
compared to the Jewish population in historical
Palestine.
• As of 2020, the number of Palestinians will be
equal to the number of Jews : 6.9 millions.
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Table 1: Population perspectives in
historical Palestine, 2011-2048
Jews
Palestinians
West Bank
Jerusalem
Gaza
Palestinians of 1948
2011
6155
5503
2285
284
1658
1276
2015
6475
6067
2477
308
1882
1400
2020
6872
6772
2720
338
2186
1528
2025
7268
7514
2960
368
2510
1676
2030
7666
8273
3192
396
2849
1836
2035
8071
9015
3404
423
3193
1995
2040
8497
9717
3594
447
3531
2145
2045
8939
10364
3758
467
3849
2290
2048
9212
10724
3843
477
4025
2379
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• But, afterwards the Palestinians will increase
more, namely thanks to population momentum,
especially to the higher fertility of the Gaza strip,
which lets recall has a fertility rate of 4.9, higher
than Palestinian fertility of the West Bank and of
East-Jerusalem.
• On basis of this chart, we can infer that a one
state on the whole of historical Palestine is
inconceivable, for the Palestinians, naturally but
also for the Israelis, whose occupation will
create an inextricable demographic issue 9.2
million Jews (46%) dominating a majority of 11.8
millions Palestinians .
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Chart 5 : The perspectives of the Palestinian and
Jewish populations in historical Palestine
12000
11000
10000
9000
Jews
Palestinians
8000
7000
6000
5000
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050
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Without Gaza?
• However, since 2005, Gaza had been detached by the
Israelis from the area of direct occupation. Mainly, for
demographic reasons: few thousand settlers facing 1.5
million Palestinians.
• Hence, it makes sense to look at the demographic
perspectives of historical Palestine excluding Gaza.
(Chart 6).
• In this case, while keeping almost the entire territory of
historical Palestine, there will still be a comfortable
Jewish majority, even in 2048 : 9.2 millions Jews and 6.7
millions Palestinians in the West bank, East-Jerusalem
and the Palestinians of 1948.
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• A one state, under a demographic Jewish
majority is therefore conceivable. Besides, the
trend of the curves clearly show that after 2048,
the numerical advantage will remain for the
Jews.
• Hence, a natural policy measure should be to
everything possible to keep the Palestinian
authority, and never single out Gaza. Failing to
do this will pave the way to the creation of a
One-state on almost all of historical Palestine.
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Chart 6 : Same perspectives,
without Gaza
10000
9000
8000
7000
Jews
Palest without Gaza
6000
5000
4000
3000
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050
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The most serious issue: the demography of
the settlers in the West Bank
• Chart 7 presents 3 variants of popualtion
growth of the settlers from 2011 unti 2048,
based on varying assumptions of fertility
and immigration.
• Chart 8 gives the percentage of settilers in
the total population of the West Bank.
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Chart 7 : The explosion of the
settlers in the West Bank
2500
2000
1500
High
Medium
Low
1000
500
0
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050
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Chart 8: Percentage of Jewish settlers in the West
Bank (including East-Jerusalem)
31,0
29,0
27,0
25,0
23,0
21,0
19,0
17,0
15,0
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050
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Jerusalem
• The growth of settlers in the West bank is mainly due to
those living in East Jerusalem, which accounts for a little
bit less than half the total number of settlers: 200 000 or
more out of 560 000.
• In East-Jerusalem, fertility differentials among
Palestinians and settlers are now much higher than
before and have recently increased in 2010.
• Fertility will be the most important component to keep
the Palestinian population in Jerusalem besides an
“acceptable” threshold.
• In the whole “reunified” city the proportion of Palestinians
stands now at 37,6% in the city (296 000 Palestinians for
a total of 788 000 inhabitants).
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To keep Palestinians below 30%
• The proclaimed official goal of the authorities, is
to limit the proportion of Palestinians at 30%.
• Few years ago in 2001, the Israeli demographer
Sergio della Pergola forecasted that the
proportion of Palestinians would continue to
increase to 38-40% maybe, tosuch an extent
that:
• “A possible shift of the majority of Jerusalem’s
population from the Jewish parts to the Arab and
other parts”, would occur.
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• But this was before the tremendous increase in
the building sector in the neighborhoods which
would attract an even greater number of settlers
because of immigration and especially the
spectacular reversal of fertility trends.
• Chart 9 presents the past growth of the two
populations.
• Since 1972, Jewish population has been
multiplied by 2.13 while the Palestinian one was
multiplied by 3.5.
• This kind of differential growth would have
undermined the israelization of the Holy City.
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Policy measures
• The proportion of Palestinians has been
regularly increasing from 27%, reaching 30%
(the threshold) in 1993 to 37% now.
• Thus the demographic policy:
• -Increase Jewish immigration to the EastJerusalem settlements and to the Old city
• -Encourage Palestinian emigration outside the
city through administrative procedures
• -Enlarge the perimeter of the city by unofficially
integrating West bank settlements: Maale
Adoumim, Goush Etzion.
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How to counteract?
• -And more importantly in the long term, to
encourage high Jewish fertility: 5.7 children per
woman now (against 3.8 for Palestinians, an
enormous gap!).
• Possible policy measures from the side of the
PA. International actions to prevent buildings in
the settlements. Locally, difficult to act for the
reversal of Palestinians (and Jewish) fertility.
More effective policy to prevent the expulsion of
Palestinians from Jerusalem?
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Chart 9:Past growth of the Palestinian and Jewish
populations in Jerusalem, 1972-2010
600
500
400
Jews
300
Palestinians
200
100
0
19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 20 20 20 20 20 20
72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10
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Other issues: Demographic shifts,
political shifts
• Indeed, socio-economic and political
developments impact on population dynamics.
• Yet, demography might act also as an
independent factor.
• One important aspect in the prospects of
Palestinian population, is the demographic
differentials trends between the West Bank,
East-Jerusalem and the Gaza strip.
• From 2011 until 2048, the three population
groups will increase but the trend will be lower in
the West Bank and East-Jerusalem than in the
Gaza strip. (Chart 10)
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Chart 10: Palestinian population in the West
Bank, Jerusalem and Gaza, 2011-2048
4500
4000
3500
3000
West Bank
2500
East-Jerusalem
2000
Gaza
1500
1000
500
0
2011
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2048
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Much higher growth in Gaza
• In the West Bank, fertility is lower and emigration has
became significant.
• Same, in East-Jerusalem, where the occupying
authorities put pressure on the population to push them
to emigrate.
• In Gaza, there is strong population pressure, namely in
terms of population density.
• Yet, unless emigration from the Gaza strip becomes
significant (but to where?), population increase will be
phenomenal : even if fertility rate fell to the replacement
level of 2.1 children per woman in 2048, the population
of Gaza, 1.7 million now, will cross the threshold of 4
millions (3.8 millions if fertility fell to 1.7 children, a
“European “level”.
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Differential voting patterns in Gaza
• At the last Palestinian elections, in 2006 there
was a slight cleavage between the West Bank
and the Gaza strip (Chart 11).
• In Gaza other parties got a marginal proportion
of the votes : 8% versus 23% in the West Bank
and East-Jerusalem.
• Hamas won almost the absolute majority in
Gaza : 48.3% whereas in the West Bank,
although the first in number of votes, it was at
several points from the absolute majority:39.5%
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• Naturally, political attitudes, voting patterns
are of course transient phenomena. We
cannot assume that these patterns would
remain for ever.
• However, demographic shift of the
population and of the electoral body from
the West Bank to Gaza, whose share of
39% now will approach the absolute
majority : 48% in 2048, (Chart 12) will
probably impact on future Palestinian
elections.
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Chart 11: Voting patterns at the Palestinian
elections in 2006
50,0
45,0
40,0
35,0
30,0
Hamas
25,0
Fatah
Others
20,0
15,0
10,0
5,0
0,0
Gaza
West Bank + East Jerusalem
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Chart 12: The proportion of the Palestinian
population living in Gaza, 2011-2048
50,0
49,0
48,0
47,0
46,0
45,0
44,0
43,0
42,0
41,0
40,0
39,0
38,0
37,0
36,0
35,0
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050
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The case of the settlers
• It is well known that the Israeli settlers in the West Bank
and East-Jerusalem, do vote for the extremist parties, in
a higher proportion than the population living beyond the
Green Line.
• Likud :
28%
• Kadima
9%
• Ysrael Beitenu 8%
• And to religious parties:
• Shas
11%
• United Torah 14%
• Ichid Leumi 20%
• Labor 2%, Meretz, 0.5% Hadash and Balad : 0%.
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• Hence, the shift in population from the « Green
Line » to the settlements, will translate
mechanically into an increase of the voters for
the right wing nationalists and religious parties.
• The number of settlers is likely to grow to such
an extent to reach 1.7 million and over 18% of
the Jewish population in 2048.
• The impact of this significant demographic shift
on future elections results is obvious.
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Chart 13: The population growth beyond the Green
Line and in the settlements
7500
7000
6500
6000
5500
5000
4500
4000
3500
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
Green line
Settlers
2011
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2048
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Chart 14 : The proportion of the settlers population
among the Jewish population
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050
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Conclusion
• In 2011, recent demographic history presents one clear
aspect : the inversion of demographic trends.
• For Palestinians, demographic transition and fertility
decrease has speeded. Against all odds. For the Israelis
on the contrary, it is increasing, year by year without
discontinuity.
• This is a unique model in the world, which should push
us to think of real modernization phenomena in this part
of the world.
• Concerning policy measures, Israeli fertility beyond the
Green Line and in the settlements has been encouraged
by the demographic policy of the State to increase
Jewish fertility. Billion of dollars have been spent for this
purpose. Lessons should be taken from this “successful
experience”.
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