Transcript Process Safety Pays

HSE in Oil & Gas
Russia & CIS
Moscow, March 13-15, 2012
Christian Jochum, EPSC Director of Centre
How to change managers’
attitudes toward Process
Safety
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European Process Safety Centre (EPSC)
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Network funded 1992 by 40+ mainly European based (petro)chemical
multinationals to develop best practice in major accident prevention/process safety
Objectives:
 Information/know how exchange
 Legislation (esp. Seveso II & ATEX)
 participation & co-ordination of EU funded projects
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Outputs:
 Internal reports & books
 User groups & public conferences
 EU projects & working groups
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Major topics 2012:
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Process Safety Scenarios
Process Safety Indicators
Process Safety Auditing
Process Safety Competence
Ageing Assets and Facilities
Safety Critical Equipment
www.epsc.org
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How to control process safety risks
 Equipment, which is fit for purpose (hardware, control systems)
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Design
Maintenance
 Safe operations (Safety Management System)
 Rules (Government, Trade Associations, Company)
 Operating Procedures
 Compliance  operating discipline  human factors safety culture
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How to achieve sustainable compliance
 Compliance to operating procedures may lead to “additional” work and
therefore needs
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Training
Supervision
Sanctions
 Sustainable compliance can only be achieved by
 Understanding, why “shortcuts” may be dangerous (competence)
 Clear message by all management levels that safety has highest priority (safety
culture)
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The problem: Failure of all process safety barriers have low
probability, but high consequences
Deepwater Horizon, April 20, 2010
If luck as the last barrier fails ...
Specific
Specificerrors
errorsin
in
information
informationhuman
human
processing
processingstages
stages
Initiating
event
Latent
Latenterrors
errorscreate
create
gaps
gapsin
indefences
defences
ect
Det ation
situ
n
atio
situ
ret
p
r
Inte
e
Tak on
i
act
Performance
Performance
Shaping
ShapingFactors
Factors
Latent
Latentfailures
failuresatatthe
the
managerial
manageriallevel
level
Defences
Defences- -aim
aimfor
for
redundancy
redundancyand
anddiversity
diversity
Trajectory of
accident
opportunity
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Compliance requires Process Safety Culture – and this has
to start from the top
 Clear commitment from senior management is needed
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Policy Statement
Priority for safety investments (money!)
Timely response to safety issues and concerns
Continuous monitoring of performance
Behave as “role model” in day-to-day activities and especially at site visits
 However, this needs understanding of process safety issues first
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Awareness for the risk of (low probability) process safety incidents cannot be
presumed for senior management
The shock of a major incident at a “similar” company has to be used, but fades
away quickly
Threat of (even criminal) litigation may help, but does not change culture
Therefore other ways have to be found to enhance the commitment of senior
management for process safety
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EPSC/EFCE project “Process Safety Awareness for Business
Leaders”
• DVD “Process Safety Pays” with video and template for PowerPoint
presentation
• To be presented by senior process safety person at e.g. Management Board
meeting, duration 30-60 minutes
• Video as “opener” or “teaser” to achieve positive emotions for process
safety for non-technical senior management
• 7 minutes
• Process safety correlated to flying as an activity with positive connotation
• Followed by PowerPoint presentation focussing on the special issues of the
company
For more information visit www.epsc.org and click on “Process Safety Pays”
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Changing the mind of middle management/supervisor level
 Demonstrate clear commitment
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Timely response to safety issues and concerns
Continuous monitoring of performance
Behave as “role model”
 Don´t tolerate breaching/bending procedures
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Analyze critically any breaching/bending of procedures
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Take clear and visible action if procedures are not followed
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Don’t turn a blind eye to rule breaking (bypassing, overriding, workarounds) even if it
has no immediate consequences (which may be down to sheer luck)
Encourage reporting of deviations, near misses etc. (“no-blame culture”)
What was the real reason (laziness or inadequate procedure)?
Disciplinary action or update of procedure
Cover abnormal situations as much as possible by procedures, too
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Start up, shut down, maintenance
“foreseeable” emergencies
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Case Study: Buncefield/GB Explosion and Fire 2005
What went wrong in Buncefield?
 Failures leading to massive overfilling of a gasoline storage tank
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Level control instrumentation failed during filling process
Only 1 screen to control 4 filling operations (different windows)
Overfill protection was not in operating mode
 None of these failures had been new
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Problems with the level control instrumentation had been tolerated since
months
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Some operators used a cooking timer as independent control for filling operations
Overload of operator´s capacity when monitoring multiple operations was
evident, but ignored
Overfill protection device was not checked after maintenance
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What Buncefield tells us about Process Safety Culture
 Management systems had been in place but not fully complied with
 Management and operators accepted serious deviations for a long period
 Consequently, management and not the operators had been hold legally
responsible for the incident
 A stable process safety culture would have prevented these failures of the
safety management system
 It can also be said that an effective safety management system is an
indicator for a good safety culture – a ”chicken and egg – problem”)
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Process Safety Culture can drive accident rates further down
Accident
Rate
Improved
Plants / Hardware
Safety
Management
Systems
Human Factors
Culture
Time
Conclusion and outlook
 Safety Culture is not rocket science, but common sense
 There are no new systems needed, but rather a change in thinking and
attitudes
 Clear commitment of all management levels is a prerequisite
 This is more difficult in process safety, as serious incidents are rare
events
 Process Safety Performance Indicators, including all loss of containment
events, have been developed in U.S.A. (American Petroleum Institute,
Centre of Chemical Process Safety) and Europe (European Chemical
Industry Council Cefic, EPSC) and will improve this process
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Thank you for your attention!
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