Transcript Report of the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)

Hard Choices:
Equipping an Army for a New Strategy
with a Smaller Budget
Tony Cucolo
Major General, US Army
21 MAR 12
1
The G-8’s Role
Where I’m from: “Army G-8”
Deputy Chief of Staff G-8
• Integrates staffs and commands to provide fully equipped forces as directed
• Manage Army reset for the current and next fight
• Assess the Army’s next essential need
• Develops and defends the “Army Program”
How does the
Army support the
defense
Strategy?
What size Army?
What
capabilities?
Translate
requirements to
solutions
Develop the
Army resourcing
plan
Quadrennial
Defense Review
Center for
Army Analysis
Force Development
Program Analysis and
Evaluation
3
The FD’s Role
What I do: “Force Development”
Equipment
Modernization
Strategy
Translate
requirements
into
programs
Joint and
Futures
Materiel
Plan,
synchronize,
and integrate
equipping
requirements
for
deployed units
Integration
Balance,
prioritize
requirements
against
resources
Resourcing
4
New Defense Strategic Guidance
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5 Jan 12
Transition from today’s wars to preparing for future
challenges
Rebalance to Asia-Pacific, while remaining vigilant in
Middle East
Maintain our Article 5 commitments to NATO
Strengthening alliances/partnerships across all regions
10 primary missions of the US Armed Forces; 4 for
sizing:
 Counter Terrorism and Irregular Warfare
 Deter and Defeat Aggression
“deterring and defeating aggression by an opportunistic
adversary in one region even when our forces are committed
to a large-scale operation elsewhere”
 Maintain a Safe, Secure, and Effective Nuclear
Deterrent
 Defend the Homeland and Provide Support to Civil
Authorities
Maintain a ready and capable force, even as we reduce
our overall capacity
Ability to surge and regenerate (reversibility)
Keep faith with troops, families, and veterans
4
“Sizing” Guidance
•
Sizing guidance:
 Deter and Defeat Aggression: One large-scale combined arms
campaign with follow-on small-scale stability/transition
operations for limited period using standing forces (or sustained
with partial mobilization), and defeat aggression by an
opportunistic adversary in another region, simultaneously.
 Counter Terrorism and Irregular Warfare: Sustain capabilities,
capacity, and institutional expertise for direct action and security
force assistance.
 Defend the Homeland: Heightened defense posture in/around
the United States (including missile defense) and support to
civil authorities for one large-scale terrorist attack or natural
disaster or complex catastrophe.
 Specifics:
► Reduce AC end strength to 490K by end of FY 17
► Reduce at least 8 AC BCTs, including 2 ABCTs in Europe
5
Hybrid Strategies
Three components of Hybrid Threats
 Nation States or Proxies with a range of capabilities
 Desire to preclude U.S. from executing its “way of war”
 Capabilities that create a “Strategic Lever”… specifically designed
to impact U.S. actions
• Recognize conventional
confrontation with the US is a
Proxies
losing proposition
• Focus on US vulnerabilities
Terrorist/Criminal
• Utilize home terrain
HYBRID
activity
advantages
STRATEGY
• Nontraditional employment of
all possible capabilities
• End State:
frustrate US operations
ensure survival of key
capabilities
turn conflict into protracted
war of attrition
Conventional
Structure and Capability
Strategic
Capabilities
Irregular
Operations
U.S. is likely to face a hybrid strategy into the foreseeable future
6
Hybrid Threat Concept
CONUS
Intermediate
Staging Base
• Anti-access and area denial
Joint Operational campaigns … strategic thru tactical
levels
Access Concept
• Engage at small unit level to obtain
overmatch
AirSea
• Use violence, intimidation and
Battle
coercion against the population
Gaining &
• WMD capable… but still seeking
Maintaining
nuclear
Access
• Avoid detection and targeting by
Hybrid
operating among the people
Threats
• Slow down or halt our momentum
using anti-tank missiles, IEDs, air
defense and SOF
• Increased use of robotics and
unmanned aerial systems
• Employ electronic warfare to
counter US precision
• Conduct sophisticated information
campaigns designed to erode US
will over time
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A Changed View: Range of Military Operations
Formerly, a
narrow lens…
Specific Threat
Specific Location
(…but
The Army
still did what
it was told
outside this
narrow lens)
Specific threat, degree of certainity,
and known location drove:
Doctrine
Equipment
Training
Organizational Structure
Force Posture
Hard Complex problems, but simple
narrative to Congress and the
American People based off real
potential threat to vital national
interests.
Historic Examples:
1920-30s Rainbow Planning
Airmobile
Active Defense
Air Land Battle
Now: Air Sea Battle
With
hybrid
strategies
presenting
hybrid
threats
But now a specified wide lens
HD/DSCA
Stability
Ops
Deter &
Defeat
COIN
CT/IW
Cyber &
Space
CWMD
BPC
FHA
Conduct Unified Land Operations
Gain and Maintain Access
Nuke
Defeat Anti-Access
Defeat Area Denial
Joint Combined Arms Fire & Maneuver
As operational construct
No holistic Operational Construct will arise that encompasses all
of Unified Land Ops and drive doctrine, equipment, etc., as Air
Land Battle did.
8
Unified Land Operations
Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to gain and maintain a
position of relative advantage in sustained land operations in
order to create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution
Executed through…
Decisive Action
Offensive
Defensive
Stability
DSCA
By means of…
Army Core Competencies
Combined Arms Maneuver
Wide Area Security
Guided by…
Mission Command
9
The “specialize” or “generalize”
question…
How adaptable is the general purpose
formation built for unified land
operations?
10
Our Strength is Our Ability to Adapt
Operational Adaptability
codified in doctrine
(“Unified Land
Security Force
Advise & Assist
Teams
Haiti Earthquake
Assistance
Pakistan
Flood Relief
Operations”)
Advise &
Assist
Brigades
PRT
Support
Heavy Air
Assaults
Hurricane
Katrina
Relief
OIF I
Full Spectrum
Operations
Sustain Ops
in Honduras,
Bosnia,
Kosovo and
Egypt
Police Training
Programs
Border
Training
Support to
Civil Affairs,
PSYOPS, Info
Ops and CT
Ops in Horn
of Africa
AirLand
Battle
Executed by Operationally Adaptable Brigades & Battalions
11
Our Marching Orders Are Clear
THE ROLE OF THE ARMY
The purpose of the U.S. Army is to fight and win our Nation’s wars.
Warfighting is our primary mission. Everything that we do should be
grounded in this fundamental principle. Our strategic framework is
guided by three principal and interconnected roles:
•
PREVENT: The Army prevents conflict by maintaining credibility based
on capacity, readiness and modernization. It averts miscalculations by
potential adversaries.
•
SHAPE: The Army shapes the environment by sustaining strong
relationships with other Armies, building their capacity, and facilitating
strategic access.
•
WIN: If prevention fails, the Army rapidly applies its combined arms
capabilities to dominate the environment and win decisively.
Prevent, Shape, Win
Prevent wars (deter & contain):
Prevent
1. Brandish land forces of sufficient
size and fighting power to deter
potential opponents
2. Demonstrate ability to deploy
forces
3. Conduct sustained stability
operations to prevent conflict
Shape the Security Environment:
Shape
1. Expand and strengthen relationships
with partners around the globe
2. Develop new relationships*
3. Foster mutual understanding
4. Help partners defend themselves,
both internally and externally
5. Open access for US forces
Win decisively and dominantly:
Win
1. Lead Joint Task Forces; provide
connectivity to JIIM elements*
2. Employ a versatile mix of units to
conduct sustained land campaigns and
counter-terrorism operations
3. Conduct sustained stability operations
to conclude a conflict
13
But Equip for what?
14
Equip to Win.
Decisively…against the application of
a hybrid strategy.
15
The equipping challenge: optimizing
the available resources to adequately
equip to address the strategy.
16
Budget Guidance
•
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•
•
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•
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•
•
•
•
•
26 Jan 12
•
•
•
•
Cut $487 billion over next decade; $259 billion over next 5
years
No longer size active forces to conduct large and protracted
stability operations while retaining expertise of a decade of
war
Asia-Pacific region places a renewed emphasis on air and
naval forces
Middle East ... Increasingly maritime
Eliminate 2 heavy brigades in Europe
Security partner of choice – innovative, low-cost, and smallfootprint approaches
Premium on self- and rapidly-deployable forces
Premium on forces present or able to rapidly reposition
Reduced inter/intra-theater airlift
Cut Regular Army to 490K by end of FY 17, including at least
8 BCTs (future design under review)
Retain more mid-grade offices and NCOs
Delay GCV and Army aviation modernization; terminate
JLENS and HMMWV upgrades; reduce JAGM
Air Force
 Disestablish 6 fighter squadrons (5 A-10, 1 F-16)
 Divest C-27J
Limited military pay raises beginning in 2015
Reductions in planned civilian pay raises
Increased TRICARE fees for retirees
Additional BRAC round(s)
18
The process begins with defining the
and validating requirements…and
since we cannot afford to resource
every valid requirement, routine
prioritization becomes key.
19
Turning Requirements into Solutions
Strategy
What the field
needs
TRADOC
Develop / Integrate
Leader
Input
Urgent
Needs
Future
Force
Requirements
Lessons
Learned
Affordability /
Best Value
Acquisition /
Life Cycle
Managers
HQDA
Policy /
Guidance
Requirements
Buy / Maintain
investments
Resources
Balance
- Develop
- Acquire
- Distribute
- Upgrade
- Sustain
- Divest
- Validate (G-3)
- Prioritize (G-3)
- Resource (G-8)
- Approve (Senior
Leaders)
- Document (G-3)
20
Current Priorities and Top 10 Programs
Priorities
Empower, Protect and Unburden the Soldier; equip the Squad to
be the foundation of the decisive force
Network the Force
Deter & Defeat Hybrid Threats by Replacing, Improving and/or
Transforming:
- Combat Vehicles
- Aviation
- Light Tactical Vehicles
10 Critical Programs
• Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS)
• Warfighter Information Network –
Tactical (WIN-T)
• Joint Battle Command-Platforms
(JBC-P)
• Nett Warrior
• Distributed Common Ground SystemArmy (DCGS-A)
• Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV)
• Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle
(AMPV)
• Paladin Integrated Management
(PIM)
• Kiowa Warrior (KW)
• Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV)
2121
But the challenge goes beyond
equipment…and with great complexity.
22
“Balanced”
Spending
The Metric of Spending
Ranges
RDT&E
BOS/Family Prog
Facilities
Balance = 6 – 7%
Balance = 7 – 9%
Balance = 5 – 8%
Training & Ops
Balance = 11 – 14%
Procurement
Balance = 14 – 18%
Sustainment
Balance = 3 – 5%
Other Support
Balance = 2 – 2.5%
Chem Demil
Manpower
Balance = 40 – 45%
Balance = 0.5 – 1%
if we get it wrong?
StrategicWhat
Expectations
When
What We Did
What We Expected
What We Got
Post WWII
• Precipitous drawdown
• Strategic nuclear war with
USSR
• Conventional war in Korea
Post Korea
• Force reduction
• Strategic nuclear war with
• Pentomic Division then ROAD Division
• Tactical nuclear weapons
USSR preceded by
conventional/tactical nuclear
war in Europe as part of NATO
alliance
• Defense of Korea with the
ROK
• Protracted counterinsurgency
in Vietnam
• Steep drawdown
• Conventional/Tactical
• Ended conscription…converted to the All
Volunteer Force
• Developed new doctrine…AirLand Battle
• Modernized…Big Five Systems
• Revolutionized training...National Training
Centers
Nuclear War with the Warsaw
Pact in Central Europe with
NATO Allies
• Defense of Korea with the
ROK
• Began a steep drawdown (collecting the
• Army reoriented to fight
• Enduring Stability Operations
“Peace Dividend”)
• Restored the honor and reputation of US
Arms
• Stabilized at a lower level of budget and
manpower
conventional wars with rogue
states
• Planning construct was for
two nearly simultaneous Major
Theater Wars (MTW’s) plus
lesser operations
in Bosnia and Kosovo
•One major, unconventional
country takedown…Taliban
Afghanistan
• One major, brief conventional
fight with Iraq
• Two major
counterinsurgency wars…Iraq
and Afghanistan
• CT Operations in the Horn of
Africa
Post Vietnam
Post Gulf War
• Army budget reduction in favor of
Strategic Air Command
• End of the Cold War
• One brief conventional fight
with Iraq
24
The best hedge against an uncertain
future is a well-trained, well-equipped,
and well-disciplined land force with
global reach.
25
Hard Choices:
Equipping an Army for a New Strategy
with a Smaller Budget
Tony Cucolo
Major General, US Army
21 MAR 12
26
Back Up
27
Army Global Commitments
Army Global Commitments
PACOM
NORTHCOM
SOUTH KOREA
18,970 SOLDIERS
(Part of AC Station Overseas)
CONUS SPT BASE
2,870 SOLDIERS
(RC Mobilized
Stateside)
EUCOM
CENTCOM
USAREUR
38,230 SOLDIERS
(FWD Stationed)
OEF- AFGHANISTAN
65,810 SOLDIERS
JAPAN
2,500 SOLDIERS
ALASKA
13,850 SOLDIERS
(FWD Stationed)
BOSNIA
90 SOLDIERS
IRAQ
130 SOLDIERS
OEF- PHILIPPINES
480 SOLDIERS
HAWAII
22,630 SOLDIERS
(FWD Stationed)
KFOR
690 SOLDIERS
KUWAIT
15,100 SOLDIERS
AFRICOM
QATAR
1,860 SOLDIERS
JTF- HOA
1,220 SOLDIERS
MFO
640 SOLDIERS
SOUTHCOM
JTF-GTMO
350 SOLDIERS
OTHER OPERATIONS
& EXERCISES
5,200 SOLDIERS
HONDURAS
JTF-BRAVO
290 SOLDIERS
ARMY PERSONNEL STRENGTH
SOLDIERS DEPLOYED
SOLDIERS FWD STATIONED
TOTAL SOLDIERS
94,730
96,180
190,910
RC AUTHORIZED FOR
MOBILIZATION / ON CURRENT
ORDERS
Component
ACTIVE (AC)
558,570
N/A
USAR
204,770
17,460
ARNG
359,020
35,590
1,122,360
53,050
RESERVE (RC)
IN NEARLY 120 COUNTRIES OVERSEAS
21 Feb 2012
28
Allocation of Defense Resources
Allocation of resources within DOD have remained relatively
constant over the past 60 years, except during war.
29
An independent thought:
The role of the Army is to provide
strategic breadth and depth to the
Joint Force through the conduct of
decisive unified land operations in
support of National objectives.
The Army gives the Commander in
Chief the widest range of options for
actions on land.
30
Army Force-Sizing Missions
Defeat
Opportunistic
Aggression
Deter and
Defeat
Aggression
Conduct Stability &
Counterinsurgency
Operations
Defend the
Homeland &
Support Civil
Authorities
Counter
Terrorism &
Irregular
Warfare
31
FOUO -- DRAFT -- PREDECISIONAL
Smaller Force ... Different Focus
2003
Rotational Depth
Force Pool 1
AC
2018
RC
AC
RC
AC
Force Pool 2
Force Pool 3
AC
AC
RC
RC
AC
AC
FOUO -- DRAFT -- PREDECISIONAL
RC
Defend the Homeland & Support Civil
Authorities
Counterterrorism & Irregular Warfare
RC
RC
Defeat Opportunistic Aggression
Combined Arms Campaign +
Transition Operations
32
Affordably Building a Force
Identify areas where risk can be accepted and trades can be made to achieve
high priority/high payoff modernization objectives.
Cost
Organization Size
Capability
Item Cost
(Portfolio, Formation, Platform)
Variant of Item
Schedule
Procurement
Schedule
Quantity
Where does the Army accept risk?
Combined Arms Maneuver – the application of the elements of combat power in a
complementary and reinforcing manner to achieve physical, temporal, or
psychological advantages over the enemy, preserve freedom of action, and exploit
success.
Wide Area Security – the application of the elements of combat power in
coordination with other military and civilian capabilities to deny the enemy positions
of advantage; protect forces, populations, infrastructure, and activities; and
consolidate tactical and operational gains to set conditions for achieving strategic
and policy goals.
Source: TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1
Operational Concepts to Engage
Army Unified Land Operations play a
significant role in Joint Unified Action
• Joint Operational Access Concept
(Counter Anti-Access / Area Denial)
– Littoral Operations Concept
– Joint Concept for Entry Operations
– Sustained Land Operations Concept
– Joint Sustainment Operations Concept
– USA / USMC Concept for Gaining and Maintaining Access
• Building Partner Capacity Concept
• Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept
• Cyber Operations Concept
35