Transcript J di John_Resource Curse

Is there really a Resource Curse? Implications for
Governance and Production
Jonathan Di John
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Resource Curse: Natural resource abundance leads to:
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2.
3.
poor economic performance/growth collapses
high levels of corruption/poor governance
greater political violence.
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Contrary to earlier arguments that mineral abundance can help
overcome traditional resource gaps (savings, fiscal and foreign
exchange constraints). Innis (1966) ‘staple thesis’
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Resource Curse theory applied to all natural-resource abundant
economies, not just in Sub-Saharan Africa
Variants of the Resource Curse Argument:
•Dutch Disease: natural resource booms render
manufacturing and agricultural sectors uncompetitive
Variants of the Resource Curse Argument:
•Rentier State and theory of rent-seeking: the economic effects
•oil abundance, especially when controlled by the state, is assumed to
generate extraordinarily large degrees of rent-seeking and corruption
•increases in rent-seeking and corruption will generate lower growth
•Corrupt transactions—the need to keep bribes secret reduces the
security of property rights, which lowers investment in long-gestating
projects
Variants of the resource curse argument
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Rentier State and theory of rent-seeking: effects on political stability
• 1) ‘honey pot’, or rent-seeking argument, which suggests that oil
abundant less developed countries generate valuable rents and that the
existence of these rents tends to generate violent forms of rent-seeking that
take the form of ‘greed-based’ insurgencies.
• 2) rentier state argument: oil states are more likely to have weak state
structures because they have less need to create strong bureaucracies to
raise revenue. Weak state structures, in turn, can make the state more
vulnerable to insurgency.
The Resource Curse and Political Violence
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rentier state model: mineral abundance generates: a) low levels of government
legitimacy, b) slow economic growth; c) higher levels of political violence. Why?
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A) a growing independence of states from citizens due to high levels of unearned
income (from mineral rents) and low levels of domestic taxation.
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B) a potentially retarding effect on state capacity of unearned income is the decline
in bureaucratic capacity..
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C) mismanagement of resource wealth can create grievances that, when combined
with a history of ethnically-based secessionist tendencies, can increase the
likelihood of organised armed rebellion.
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The plausibility of these arguments depends on the extent to which oil wealth
necessarily generates the aforementioned problems.
Theoretical and Empirical Problems
• Leaders are implicitly assumed to “own” the natural
resources, that is, they are assigned the ‘property
rights’ over resources.
• How rulers appropriate and maintain power is not
adequately analysed.
Theoretical and Empirical Problems
• Rent distribution through patronage is common to all economies at
lower levels of development.
• North et al (2009) on ‘limited access orders’:
• The principal solution through history to the classic Hobbesian problem of
endemic violence is the creation of what Nortth et al (2007) call limited
access orders (as opposed to the much rarer, open access orders, which
characterizes advanced market economies).
• The limited access order creates limits on the access to valuable political
and economic functions as a way to generate rents.
• When powerful individuals and groups become privileged insiders and thus
possess rents relative to those individuals and groups excluded (and since
violence threatens or reduces those rents), the existence of rents makes it in
the interest of the ‘privileged insiders’ to cooperate with the coalition in
power rather than to fight.
Theoretical and Empirical Problems
• Leaders are assumed to have predatory as opposed to
developmental aims.
• Implicitly assumed that leaders in petro-states are
revenue-satisficers and not revenue-maximizers.
Theoretical and Empirical Problems
• Selection Bias
• Is resource abundance the result of failed policies?
• By definition, most countries that do not have a
diversified agricultural and manufacturing base are
natural resource dependent.
• Abundance versus dependence
Theoretical and Empirical Problems
• Resource curse theorists do not examine the
possibility that mineral abundance can be
central to the development of manufacturing
industry in particular
• (Wright and Czelusta (2007); Lederman and
Maloney (2007).
Is there empirical evidence to support the resource curse?
• Variation and Change in growth of mineral abundant economies not
well explained (e.g Botswana, Malyasia, Venezuela, Nigeria)
• Economic growth in non-mineral rich economies not well explained
(e.g. India, China, Tanzania, Malawi)
• Recent growth accelerations in aid dependent economies not well
explained (e.g. Mozambique, Uganda, Tanzania, Ghana). The fact
that aid dependent economies may be pursuing more liberal
economic policies demonstrates that policy matters more than levels
of rents in the economy
• Corruption rates/governance indicators indeterminate with respect to
long-run growth
• Mineral abundance economies do not appear to be more corrupt
than non- mineral abundant economies
Is there convincing evidence in support of the rentier state model?
Table 1 . Growth and Corruption in Mineral -Abundant and Non -Mineral Abundant
Developing Countries, 1965 -2000
1965-1990
Median GDP
Growth
Rate 1965-90
(Range)
Median Corruption
Index 1980 -85 (1)
(Range)
1990-2000
Median GDP
Growth
Rate 1990-2000
(Range)
1. Mineral-Abundant
Developing Countries (2)
(13 observations)
2. Non-Mineral-Abundant
Developing Countries (2)
(19 observations)
4.3
(2.5 - 12.4)
5.6
(1.5 - 9.5)
3.9
(0.2 - 6.5)
3.6
(0.7 - 8.8)
1. Mineral-Abundant
Developing Countries
(13 observations)
2. Non-Mineral-Abundant
Developing Countries
(19 observations)
4.0
(1.6 - 7.0)
3.7
(-0.6 - 10.3)
3.3
3.2
Median Corruption
(0.7 - 6.8)
(1.0 - 5.0)
Index 1996
(Range)
Note: (1) A corruption index of 10 indicates minimum corruption, an index of 0 indicates maximum corruption;
(2) Mineral-Abundant is defined as those economies where mineral/fuel exports in total exports in 1980 is equal
or greater to 35 percent; non -mineral abundant is defined as those economies where mineral/fuel exports in total
exports is less than 35 percent in 1980 .
Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators ; Subjective Corruption indices from Transparency
International
Is there empirical evidence to support the resource curse?
• comparative work on oil states, Smith (2004) has found that, in the
period 1974-1999, oil wealth is robustly associated with increased
regime stability, even when controlling for repression, and with a lower
likelihood of civil war.
• As Smith notes:
• “Durable regimes in oil rich states are not the outliers that both rentier state
and resource curse theorists have assumed them to be. Regimes such as
Suharto’s in Indonesia, which lasted 32 years, Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist
regime in Iraq, which lasted 35 years (and was only ousted by a full-scale
U.S.-British invasion in March, 2003), and long-lived monarchs of the
Persian Gulf appear to be more representative of regime durability than do
the favourite cases of Iran, Nigeria, Algeria, and Venezuela –the “big four.”
Moreover, the durability effect has been independent of the consistent
access to rents with which regimes can buy legitimacy, since the busts
created no trend toward regime crisis or instability in exporting states.”
(p.242)
Policy Considerations
• Taxation of mineral rents inadequate in sub-Saharan Africa (e.g.
Zambia, DRC).
• Need for governments to develop productive strategies that
exchange mineral rights for local content conditions, whereby foreign
investors are obligated to use domestic suppliers on an increasingly
greater scale. Local content management has been one of the main
ways in which FDI can be utilised for the benefit of national
productive capacity.
• Capacity-building in the geological survey capacity in sub-Saharan
Africa needs to be developed in order to improve the bargaining
power of states vis-à-vis multinationals. This is an area where the
international financial institutions can play a leading role.
• Dual Track strategy of growth (e.g. Mauritius, Malaysia) promising for
promoting growth and political stability. Requires strong national
political parties (e.g. China, Malaysia, Indonesia).
Threshold effects: which factors enhance the development
prospects of mineral and fuel abundant less developed
economies?
• Taxing Resource Abundance Effectively
• The Ownership Structure of Exporting Industries
• Implementing Dual-Track Growth Strategies
Political Stability: elite bargains and political parties
• The degree of centralised rule and patronage matters for political stability
• A cursory examination of relatively peaceful polities (Tanzania, Zambia.
Malawi, South Africa, Botswana) and those where the state survived even
during civil war (Mozambique) suggests that:
• The construction of political organisations, particularly political parties, has
been central to providing the institutional mechanisms of distributing
patronage to regional elites and to important political constituencies in
ways that either prevent challenges to authority and/or maintain cohesion of
the ruling coalition
• Unravelling of elite bargains in Zimbabwe has led to instability and
violence.
Business Climate: Infrastructure, taxation, and regional trade pacts
• Johannesburg –Maputo Corridor presents promising opportunities for FDI
• Landlocked countries—Zambia, Malawi have high transport costs
• Corporate Taxation on FDI, especially mining projects is not generally
burdensome. Most countries use taxation to promote FDI.
• Large Taxpayer Offices make tax payments relatively simple.
• SADC has the most promise among African regional trade pacts (mostly
due to the diversification of production and development level of South
Africa, the dominant partner in the region).
Politics of Business
• Many big projects involve personal deals with
political party elites. Property rights are selectively
protected.
• Many large mining deals are off-budget and contracts
remain secret.
Vulnerabilities for Growth, Investment and Stability
• Exports and tax base overly reliant on prices of natural resources.
• Apart from South Africa, the infrastructure gap is large (i.e. road, ports, and
electricity, irrigation). Landlocked countries worst affected.
• Likely revision of tax regimes to increase mining tax royalties.
• Skilled labour in short supply in most countries as a result of deindustrialisation, especially in Zambia, Mozambique, less so in South
Africa.
• Political party fragmentation a threat to stability (e.g. Zambia, South Africa,
especially Zimbabwe).
• History of large-scale capital flight, emigration of skilled workers.