Transcript ba 322 ppt chapter 4 - Sites At Penn State

CHAPTER 4
Win-Win Negotiation:
Expanding the Pie
4-1
CHAPTER 4
4-2
Faulty Perceptions of
Win-Win Negotiation
•
•
•
•
Compromise
Even split
Satisfaction
Building a relationship
Instructor’s Manual with Overheads to accompany
The Mind and Heart of the Negotiator 5/e (Thompson)
Copyright ©2012 Pearson Education,
Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall
CHAPTER 4
4-3
Telltale Signs of Win-Win Potential
•
•
•
•
Does the negotiation contain more than one issue?
Can other issues be brought in?
Can side deals be made?
Do parties have different preferences across
negotiation issues?
Instructor’s Manual with Overheads to accompany
The Mind and Heart of the Negotiator 5/e (Thompson)
Copyright ©2012 Pearson Education,
Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall
CHAPTER 4
4-4
Exhibit 4-1: A Pyramid Model
of Integrative Agreements
Level 3:
Pareto-optimal
Level 2:
Settlement demonstrably superior
to other feasible settlements
Level 1:
Mutual settlement
(positive bargaining zone)
Instructor’s Manual with Overheads to accompany
The Mind and Heart of the Negotiator 5/e (Thompson)
Copyright ©2012 Pearson Education,
Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall
CHAPTER 4
4-5
Expanding the Pie:
Strategies That Do Not Work
•
•
•
•
•
Commitment to reaching a win-win deal
Compromise
Focusing on a long-term relationship
Adopting a “cooperative orientation”
Taking extra time to negotiate
Instructor’s Manual with Overheads to accompany
The Mind and Heart of the Negotiator 5/e (Thompson)
Copyright ©2012 Pearson Education,
Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall
CHAPTER 4
4-6
Exhibit 4-2: Types of Information in Negotiation and How Each Affects Distributive and Integrative
Agreements
Type of
Information
Definition (example)
Claiming Value
Creating Value
BATNA
(and
reservation
price)
Position
(stated
demand)
Underlying
interests
The alternatives a negotiator has outside of the
current negotiation (e.g., “If I don’t buy your
car, I can buy my uncle’s car for $2,000”)
Revealing this information severely hurts
ability to maximize negotiator surplus
Usually, a negotiator’s opening offer; the
behavioral manifestation of his/her target point
(e.g., “I will give you $1,500 for your car”)
The underlying needs and reasons a negotiator
has for a particular issue (e.g., “I need a car
because I need transportation to my job site,
which is 15 miles away in a rural zone”)
Priorities
A judgment about the relative importance of the
issues to a negotiator (e.g., “I am more
concerned about the down payment than I am
about the financing for the car”)
Key facts
Pertains to information that bears on the quality
and the value of the to-be-negotiated issues
(e.g., “The car has a rebuilt engine and has
been involved in a major collision;” “The
oranges are genetically modified”)
Argument either made to support one’s own
position or to attack the other party’s position
(e.g., “You will get lots of dates if you buy my
car because women like it”)
Opening with an aggressive target point
significantly increases the negotiator’s
surplus (share of the bargaining zone)
Revealing this information generally
increases likelihood of obtaining a
favorable slice of the pie because
negotiators who provide a rationale for
their demands are more adept at realizing
their targets
Increases a negotiator’s surplus
indirectly, because if more value is
created via sharing priorities, then the
probability that a negotiator will get a
larger slice of the pie increases
This information can affect the slice of
the pie the negotiator obtains in that facts
either increase or decrease the value of
the to-be-negotiated issues
Revealing or obtaining this information does not affect
ability to reach level 2 or 3 integrative agreements;
might help negotiators reach level 1 integrative
agreements
Does not affect integrative agreements
Substantiatio
n
Most dominant type of distributive tactic
(24% to 27% of all statements);** can
increase a negotiator’s slice of the pie
because providing a rationale (even an
absurd one) can often be effective in
obtaining a demand
Very important for reaching win-win deals; by
(truthfully) revealing underlying interests, negotiators
can discover win-win agreements (e.g., one sister tells
the other that she wants the orange because she needs to
make juice and has no need for rinds)
Vitally important for maximizing the pie (e.g., the sister
who said she cared more about the rinds relative to the
juice created potential for integrative agreement)
Affects the quality of win-win agreements in that failure
to reveal key information may lead a negotiator to overor undervalue a particular resource (e.g., someone who
sells “fresh organic orange juice” does not want to have
genetically-modified oranges as an ingredient)
A distributive tactic; does not increase win-win
negotiation and may, in fact, reduce likelihood of winwin*
•Pruitt, D. G., (1981). Negotiation Behavior. New York: Academic Press; Hyder, E. B., Prietula, M. J., & Weingart, L. R. (2000). Getting to best: Efficiency versus optimality in negotiation.
Cognitive Science, 24(2), 169–204. ** Carnevale, P. J., & Lawler, E. J. (1986). Time pressure and the development of integrative agreements in bilateral negotiations. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 30(4), 636–659.
Instructor’s Manual with Overheads to accompany
The Mind and Heart of the Negotiator 5/e (Thompson)
Copyright ©2012 Pearson Education,
Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall
CHAPTER 4
4-7
Expanding the Pie:
Strategies That Work (I)
•
•
•
•
•
•
Perspective-taking
Ask questions about interests and priorities
Provide information about your interests and priorities
Unbundle the issues
Make package deals, not single-issue offers
Make multiple offers of equivalent value simultaneously
Instructor’s Manual with Overheads to accompany
The Mind and Heart of the Negotiator 5/e (Thompson)
Copyright ©2012 Pearson Education,
Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall
CHAPTER 4
4-8
Expanding the Pie:
Strategies That Work (II)
• Structure contingency contracts by capitalizing on
differences
•
•
•
•
•
Valuation
Expectations
Risk attitudes
Time preferences
Capabilities
• Cautionary note on effective contingency contracts
• Presettlement settlements (PreSS)
• Postsettlement settlements
Instructor’s Manual with Overheads to accompany
The Mind and Heart of the Negotiator 5/e (Thompson)
Copyright ©2012 Pearson Education,
Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall
CHAPTER 4
4-9
Exhibit 4-6: Decision-Making Model
of Integrative Negotiation
not acceptable
(optimistic)
not acceptable
(bleak)
Resource
Assessment
Assessment
of Differences
Construct
Offers and
Trade-Offs
Current
“Best”
Terms
Impasse
both agree
Postsettlement
Settlements
Instructor’s Manual with Overheads to accompany
The Mind and Heart of the Negotiator 5/e (Thompson)
Implement
Agreement
Copyright ©2012 Pearson Education,
Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall
CHAPTER 4
• All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be
reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any
form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying,
recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission
of the publisher. Printed in the United States of America.
• Copyright ©2012 Pearson Education,
Inc. publishing as Prentice Hall
4-10