Security - ISACA Denver Chapter
Download
Report
Transcript Security - ISACA Denver Chapter
Security Management and
Organizational Change
John G. O'Leary, CISSP
1
Abstract
Outsourcing, migration to the cloud, mergers, acquisitions,
divestitures, "right-sizing,” layoffs and major reorganizations are
facts of life in the second decade of the 21st century. All these
situations can create serious information protection concerns,
but security is usually considered only after financial, legal and
structural issues have been settled and the ink is already dry on
the bottom line. We’ll look at large-scale organizational change
from an IT security perspective and try to provide realistic
strategies for handling the very real and emotionally charged
issues that inevitably arise at the first discussion of moving
functions out the door or offshore or to the cloud. We’ll examine
what to do before, during and after major organizational
upheaval to insure that adequate controls are in place.
2
Speaker Biography
John G. O'Leary, CISSP, has a background that spans four decades as
an active practitioner in information systems, IT Security and
contingency planning. He has designed, implemented and managed
security and recovery for networks ranging from single site to
multinational and has trained tens of thousands of practitioners. John
conducts on-site programs at major corporations and government
facilities worldwide. He also facilitated for 10 years the meetings of
working Peer Groups, where security professionals from diverse
corporations shared ideas, concerns and techniques. John received
the 2004 COSAC award, the EuroSec 2006 Prix de Fidelite and the
2011 ISC2 Lifetime Achievement Award. He has yet to fall for a
Nigerian money scheme, but will almost always divulge a password
for chocolate.
Copyright 2012 by John G. O’Leary
3
Objective
At the conclusion of this workshop,
participants should be more able to
understand, anticipate and handle the
information security issues which appear
in the midst of mergers, acquisitions,
divestitures, outsourcing, migration to
the Cloud, “rightsizing,” major
reorganizations and other species of
large-scale organizational change.
4
Agenda
I. Merging
II. Hunkering Down
III. Outsourcing –including
Migration to the Cloud
IV. Personnel Issues
in any Reorganization
V. Potential Countermeasures
5
Merging Dissimilar Organizations
Company Differences
Intellectual
Technological
Operating Systems
Applications Software
Business structure
6
Intellectual
Views of Company Mission
Corporate Cultures
Key Management People
Management Techniques
Strategic Directions
Setting Priorities
7
Views of Company Mission
Keep the entity alive
Make money
for shareholders (including management)
for growth
to pay off debts
to acquire other companies
to fund research
8
Views of Company Mission
Serve
the public
the industry
the community
some special group
In times of special need
How security supports
the mission
9
Corporate Cultures
Stodgy, conservative
Control-oriented
No surprises
Stay the course
Minimal change
Plan to plan the plan
10
Corporate Cultures
High-flying, wild, unfettered
Exciting, flexible
Latest (if not greatest) technology
Changing directions
Constant upheaval
”Sounds good, let's do it"
11
Corporate Cultures
Dominant
profession
Attitudes toward
security
12
Key Management People
Focus on survival (or parachute)
View of security's role
during transition
in the new organization
Reaction to culture clash
13
Key Management People
"Turf" issues
Possible successors
Leadership by example
Concentrated awareness effort
14
Management Techniques
Participative vs. authoritarian
Policies:
scope
number
wording
compliance
effectiveness
15
Management Techniques
Security as part of annual review?
Punishment of offenders
Visible support for security efforts
16
Strategic Directions
Adjusting security objectives to
align with new corporate thrusts
Effectiveness of old controls in
new environment
Acceptability of proposed
security measures
17
Strategic Directions
3 to 5 year planning
horizon (??)
Migration to cloud
Targets and level of
awareness program
Security
development
projects
18
Setting Priorities
Data sharing and consolidation
Increased web connection
Confidentiality
Management "hot buttons"
New directions
Dealing with multiple audit groups
19
Company Differences
Technological
Leading edge vs. Trailing
Single vs. Multi-vendor
Centralized vs. Decentralized
Integration of data/server centers
Degree of networking
Sophistication of users
Technical prowess of staff
20
Technological Differences
Leading vs. Trailing Edge
Hardware capabilities
Software sophistication
Perception of threat
Susceptibility to outage
Effect of an outage
Vulnerability to disgruntled
employee
Attitudes
21
Technological Differences
Centralized vs. Decentralized
Flagpole vs. boondocks
Span of control
Level of involvement
Familiarity with local conditions
Level of commitment
Full-time vs. part-time
Response time for change requests
22
Technological Differences
Integration of Data/Server Centers
Standalone, separate security domains
Usually for regulatory reasons
No integration, but data storage and
vaulting for backup capabilities
Partial integration, usually by application;
communication links, local control
Full integration; full complete switchover
capability
23
Technological Differences
Sophistication of Users
Awareness of threats and vulnerabilities
Old controls in the new environment
re-justify
re-engineer
replace
eliminate
24
Technological Differences
Sophistication of Users
Acceptance of additional "burden" of
security
Speed and method of implementation for
new controls
25
Operating System
Vendors
Version currency
Future/Migration planning
Maintenance level/procedures
Decentralized operations
“Vanilla” vs. “Hooks”
Compatibility
26
Application Software
Vendors
Contracts
Duplicate systems
Choosing
survivors
Business impact
27
Application Software
Support staff skill
Change control
User sophistication
Compatibility
28
Business Structure
Industry type
Predominant
occupational culture
View of Systems (&
Security)
Asset
Overhead
29
Business Structure
"Turf" battles
Access to Top
Management
Total
expenditures
Systems
Security
Industry norms
30
Consolidation – Post-merger
Controlling Security
centralized administration
distributed administration
selecting administrators
training
audit requirements
strength of audit staff
migration plan
31
Getting it done
Form a team
members from both sides
allot limited time for
grumbling
joint responsibilities and
mixed subcommittees to
foster team spirit
small core, temporary
members as needed
32
Getting it done
Develop
the plan
dates and
deliverables
personal
responsibility
management
approval (higher-ups
from both sides of
the merger)
33
Getting it done
Work the plan
build a history of small but real
achievements
praise cooperative groups
take the path of least resistance
be flexible, but not a pushover
34
Getting it done
Work the plan
report successes and
failures
ask for help & suggestions
don't waste time on
stonewallers; isolate them
and let peer pressure work
for you
leave slack for management
hot buttons
35
Exercise
HP or Cisco or Oracle or
Walmart or Sony or some
European firm (choose one)
just bought your company
Outline a plan for the
integration of your existing
systems
36
Hunkering Down
Divestiture
Downsizing
Hiring Freezes
Induced Retirements
Layoffs
Facility Closing
Outsourcing / Cloud
37
Divestiture: Selling off to another
Usually the least traumatic form of
corporate contraction
Long-term employees
corporate identity
refusal to accept
feeling of betrayal
Culture clash for "new” employees
No loyalty to either old or new company
Sensitive information and trade secrets
38
Divestiture
Even rumors of divestiture can cause
security problems
Searching for information
Browsing sensitive files
Collecting valuable data or programs for
personal storage and possible future use
Setting logic bombs to detonate if an
employee number vanishes from the
payroll file
...
39
Divestiture
Normally rational employees may attempt
irrational retribution against the company
IT systems are prime targets
Networking, wireless make it easy
In a partial, or staged divestiture,
“former” employees might still be
working at their old desks, using their old
ID’s on their old machines to access
sensitive data
40
Downsizing: Tightening the belt
Hiring freezes
overworked areas get no
relief from constant pressure
can lead to frustration,
anger and blaming the company
too much to do; no help in sight;
something's gotta give
cutting corners and ignoring timeconsuming security practices
temporary abeyance of separation
of duty principles
41
Induced Retirements
Generally not a problem
Might be a win-win for company and retirees
Disgruntlement - “I didn't make the cut”
Hard to motivate those who are leaving
Is it really a choice?
Extra work for those left behind
Allocation of sensitive information and
functions when senior people leave
Organizational memory
42
Layoffs
Always a shock, especially with
no “parachute”
Press coverage is unfailingly
negative
Behavior can be irrational,
unpredictable, violent
Desperation can spur the
revenge motif
43
Layoffs
Strong effect on those who
survive
Dial-up access from home
Logic bombs which go off
unless the programmer is there
to defuse them
Sensitive information for
sale to competitors or
newspapers
44
Layoffs
Security and audit must operate in
a state of heightened awareness
Violation tracking
Follow up
Accurate, timely communication
with personnel and group managers
Audit/security alliance
45
Layoffs
Timing
Advance notice for security
Revoking access to all
systems
Might want other users to
change passwords
Turn up rheostat on
logging and log review
Outprocessing procedures
46
Layoffs
Counseling, even for those who
were not let go
Outplacement services
Benefit package
Publicize penalties for
malicious access
47
Layoffs
Don't delay the process
No negative comments about those who
left
If security people are laid off, stress
professionalism
Audit everything
48
Facility Closing
U. S. law - 60-day notice for plant closing
Invitation to sabotage?
everyone in the place loses his or her job
commiseration
blame the company
"we'll show them!!”
Networks, systems and data warehouses are
obvious targets to strike back at and assuage
feelings of helplessness
49
Facility Closing
Physical sabotage of
company equipment
is not uncommon
Physical violence is a
very real threat
“What are they going
to do, take away my
job?”
50
Facility Closing
Unpredictable behavior by traumatized,
long-term employees who know:
how the organization works
what is truly important
how to hurt it the most
how to inflict that hurt most quickly
how to make recovery difficult to impossible
Each one has a network-connected
workstation on his or her desk
Most can connect in from home
51
Facility Closing
Aggregation of sensitive information
by cooperative sharing of small pieces
Local security people are among those
losing their jobs
Can you expect dedicated, thorough,
professional, ethical performance from
workers who know they will be out of a
job in a short period of time?
52
What can we do?
Close the plant now
Pay people for at least 60 days
many firms have done so
send in team to close up
data security part of team
take financial hit up front
minimize chance for sabotage
or violence
53
What can we do?
Emphasize ethics and
professionalism
Set high expectations
of behavior
Offer bonuses, payable at the
end of the project, to those who
help complete a successful
shutdown
54
What can we do?
Step up security awareness activities
Stress the existence of controls and the
probability of being caught
Advertise punishments for malicious
access
administrative
financial
criminal
55
Exercise
Management has decided to close the
manufacturing plant in Kentucky. You
are in charge of making it go
well and managing the fallout
Outline the steps and timeline in your
plan for this plant closure
56
Outsourcing
Concepts
Managed Services
Variations
Security Issues
Protective Measures
57
MALWARE
Complex Information Security Environment
INTRANET
IPSEC
PKI
Intrusion
Prevention
COMPLIANCE VIRUS
MULTI-PROTOCOL
Forensics
ISO 17799
Wireless
PRIVACY
INTRUSION DETECTION
DENIAL OF SERVICE
NAS vs
SAN
.NET
HIGH
AVAILABILITY
SSL
Identity Management
Sarb-Ox
58
IT Security: Part of a Larger Job
Internet
Electronic Messaging
Security
Application Mgmt.
Storage Area Network
Intranet/Extranet
Wireless/Mobile
Computing
Survivability/Recovery
Enterprise Solutions
International Connections
Regulatory Issues
Platform Migration
………
Help Desk
Customer Relationship Mgmt
Mobile Computing
Governance
Electronic Commerce
Data Warehousing
Collaborative Computing
Supply Chain Mgmt.
Knowledge Management
Third Party Connectivity
Staff Development
Technology Evaluation
Social Networking
………
59
Staffing Alternatives
With the growing number of items falling into
the purview of “Information Security,”
chances are very slim that your
organization will either have enough
people or that they will be knowledgeable
enough to do the job effectively.
Note: This is not a knock on your
people; there are just too
many things, too
interrelated, ….. And they
change too quickly.
60
Concepts
Back to basics
Focus on widget making
Our expertise is in:
manufacturing
marketing
service
finance
?????
but not information systems
especially not IT security
61
Concepts
Save money
Cheaper
offshore labor
Educated, dedicated, workers
Language not a problem
Communication technology
simplifies it
Must stay competitive
Everyone else is doing it
May
be viewed as a matter of survival
62
Concepts
Save money
Fewer
weird, expensive systems or
security gurus
Drop out of the “latest
upgrade” rat race
Stop interdepartmental
“bleeding edge” warfare
Dam up the constant stream of
security add-ons
63
Concepts
Better financial planning
Multiple recent surveys have questioned
the amount saved; but outsourcing and
cloud migration still seem to provide:
Contractually
stipulated amount
for IT or IT security budget
Even if no appreciable savings,
predictable IT and security costs
Fewer surprises
Long term stability
64
Concepts
Better service
Experts provide our IT Security services
more people
focus on the area
broader experience base
true experts who do this every day
focus on best technology
Contractual obligations
Contractual penalties for failure to
produce
65
Managed Security Services
Full
Outsourcing (or full Cloud
Migration)
Included
Separate
in facilities management
contract
Your
people still spell out “owner”
decisions to be implemented
Contracted
firm does all the security
functions
66
Managed Security Services
Full
Outsourcing
Contracted
firm does actual hands-on
administration
You still need a knowledgeable liaison
You still need to know enough to:
Plan
Analyze
Make
security-related decisions
67
Managed Security Services
Partial
Outsourcing
Might
be stipulated in facilities
management contract
Probably
separate contracts for specific
outsourced items (usually)
Menu
of items
Different
Not
vendors
all eggs in one basket
Specialty
areas - “Boutiques”
68
Case Study
Large North American Bank
Excellent technical skills on staff
Internal tech staff already heavily loaded
Opinion that “builders” and “maintainers”
wouldn’t find holes in systems they built
and maintained
Outsourced penetration testing to a known,
recommended boutique firm
69
Case Study
Technical controls (e.g., firewalls) were
excellent; penetration team couldn’t get
through
Social engineering of executive assistant in
remote area got a server password
Financial executive’s remote
password was “Password”
Firm had specific stop points
Bank used firm’s reports to close
holes
70
Managed Security Services
Partial
Outsourcing
Mixed
staff
Full-time
employees
Part-timers
Contractors
Different
You
Vendors
still need to manage them
71
Variations: Cloud Migration
Software as a Service
Platform as a Service
Infrastructure as a
Service
72
Variations: IT Security Outsourcing
Consulting
Risk Assessment
Administration
Implementation
Policy Writing
Awareness
Training
73
Variations: IT Security Outsourcing
Security Architecture Design
Firewall Implementation
PKI
Physical Security
Auditing
Background Checks
Patch Management
74
Variations: IT Security Outsourcing
Product Evaluation
Monitoring
Network Management
Intrusion Detection and
Response
Penetration Testing
Forensics
75
Case Study
Insurance and Financial Services
Company
Northeastern USA
Built outstanding forensics capability
internally, using employees
In court, for lawsuits or prosecutions,
use outsourced forensics capability,
not the internal recognized expert
Credibility of witness calls for a nonemployee
76
Security Issues
Ownership of data
Access approval authority
Disclosure of sensitive information
Security controls at vendor site
77
Security Issues
Partitioning
of customer data
by vendor
Network
security
Customer
policies vs. vendor
policies
Laws
in venues where
outsourcing is performed
India,
Philippines, China, etc.
78
Security Issues
Loss of control
Security and privacy of the
customer's customers
Staff IT & IT Sec personnel
Quality assurance
In the 21st Century, you are in the
Information business
79
Security Issues
Non-outsourced
Standalone
items:
PC’s
Notebooks
Netbooks
Smart
phones
Palmtops
LAN's
"Special" systems
Wireless
80
Outsourcing Issues
Vendor
Lack
personnel
of in-house expertise
analysis
of proposed changes
problem
resolution
incident
investigation
future
plans
Possible
union problems
81
Case Study
International Cosmetics Firm
Good Information Security Staff
Manager & Technical staff
Long-term employees
Outsourced management of Info Security
Employees reported to Managed Services
firm person – Director of IT Security
Manager and most senior (and best) tech
person quit
82
Outsourcing/Cloud Issues
Level of
commitment
Audit rights and
procedures
Violation reporting
and follow-up
Security
awareness
83
Outsourcing/Cloud Issues
Viability
of vendor
What if they merge?
What if they get bought?
What if there’s a Board of
Directors insurrection?
What do you do if they go “belly-up”?
What is your “bring it back in-house” plan
84
Outsourcing/Cloud Issues
Viability
of Vendor – Offshore
What if the government changes and the
incoming one is hostile?
What if they go to war?
What if significant laws relating to
your business being done there change?
What if one of their citizens, in the employ of
the outsourcer you contracted with, commits a
crime against your customers?
85
Outsourcing/Cloud Issues
Positive
Cost
savings
Predictable
Focus
on core business
Experience
Fewer
cost
and expertise of service firms
employees (productivity)
Insulation
from internal politics (???)
Contractual
obligations and penalties
86
Outsourcing/Cloud Issues
Positive
Extend
your IT Security staff
Stay
aware of newest
and most dangerous threats
Keep
up with latest security technology,
techniques and products
Might
not be inexpensive, but could be
cost-effective
87
Outsourcing/Cloud Issues
Positive
Probably a better chance of getting help
handling massive or multiple rapidly
occurring problems:
….unless they’re swamped, too
88
Security Outsourcing Issues
Negative
Loss
of control
Total
cost might be higher
Loss
of in-house expertise
Increased
dependence on outsourcer
89
Security Outsourcing Issues
Negative
Customer
Service Concerns
Language
Accents
Idioms
Dialects
Lack
of flexibility
Strictly scripted responses
No deviations
No concessions
Product
knowledge
90
Security Outsourcing Issues
Negative
Political
fallout from offshore
outsourcing
Privacy
concerns
Abrogation
of responsibilities (?)
Vulnerability
to disgruntled or
dishonest vendor personnel
91
Case Study
Citibank
Striving to save money in
a competitive environment
Outsourced call center operations to
Mphasis BPO, a firm in India
3 Mphasis employees took credit card #’s
and pins of 4 users they had access to and
withdrew $350,000 from accounts
Indian police (city of Pune) very cooperative
Indian laws strong and enforced
14 arrests
92
Security Outsourcing Issues
Pro
and Con
Your
firm gets as much security as
it wants and is willing to pay for
You
are not constantly annoying
people about security issues
Politics
overrides cost savings
93
Case Study
State of New Jersey
Like all governments, trying to do
more with less – needed to save money
Outsourced NJ State Welfare
Department call center to a firm in India
Callers heard Indian accents,
called their local politicians … and newspapers
Political firestorm
NJ had been saving substantial dollars ($1m/mo.)
Politicians complained of “Long-term costs” to New
Jersey citizens
Now -severe limits on any State jobs being
outsourced, especially sent offshore
94
Protective Measures
Choose a reputable vendor (not
necessarily the least expensive)
Third party security reviews – not
by your primary audit firm
Stepped-up security
awareness efforts
Rigorous security testing of any
changes to the environment
95
Protective Measures
Detailed security checklist(s) for outsourcer
to fill out and your security people to
analyze prior to signing contracts
Solid legal representation in the country
where the work is being done
Specialization
in local contract law
Input to recovery plans
Participation in recovery planning exercises
96
Protective Measures
Contractual
commitments on:
Troubleshooting
response
Disaster
recovery
Violation
follow-up
Personnel
Depth
change notification
and length of incident tracking
Remedies
and penalties for noncompliance
97
Protective Measures
Transition teams
Phased implementation
Bonuses for those who stay
through specified milestones
Joint access approval authority
Inspections by customer auditors of
vendor processing site
Involving users in implementation
plans
98
Protective Measures
Use
different vendors for different
specialties
Problem
It
with ‘one size fits all’
doesn’t
99
Protective Measures
Have a back-out plan in place
Make sure that all security
knowledge hasn’t migrated
out of the organization
Contract for independent
reviews of security
architecture and elements
If it’s not in the contract,
it doesn’t get done
100
Exercise
Your outsourced, offshore
application development firm
says it needs access to your
production files for volume
testing
Design a questionnaire/checklist
for them to fill out before they
get access to your environment
101
Personnel Issues
Any significant
organizational
change can
cause security
problems
102
The Unholy Triangle
Fear
Uncertainty
Doubt
103
Concern for Loss of:
Income
Status
Social group
Corporate identity
Benefits
104
Concern for Loss of:
Power
Opportunity
Time Investment
Effort
105
What Must an Organization do?
Reduce stress
Ease the trauma of job loss or status
reduction
Help people maintain positive attitudes
Discourage retribution
HOW to do these things will vary with
the situation
106
Major Reorganization
Massive turnover
Finding replacements
Screening new hires
Timing of changes
Fixing mistakes
107
Major Reorganization
Removal of old access profiles
FOR
NOW
For now = Forever
108
Countermeasures
Visible support from the top
Clear lines of authority and
responsibility
Specified ownership
of resources
Advertised punishments for violations
109
Countermeasures
Security/Audit
involvement
Site visits
Security reviews
Rigorous audits
110
Countermeasures
Centralized Quality
Assurance group
Thorough and
mandatory change
control procedures
Systems cutover
standards, procedures
and teams
111
Countermeasures
Coordinated risk analysis
Combined contingency plan
Multi-unit disaster tests
Education and Training
112
Countermeasures
Emphasis on
physical security
Visible deterrents
to malicious actions
Outplacement
counseling
113
Summary
We have covered:
I. Merging
II. Hunkering Down
III. Outsourcing
IV. Personnel Issues
in any Reorganization
V. Potential Countermeasures
114
Summary
Keys to success
In periods of large-scale organizational change,
security people must be flexible and adaptable
For better or for worse,
the old organization is gone
Focus on making the new one work
115