Transcript Iran`s Nuclear Program - The Swiss Global Economics

Iran’s Nuclear Program:
Competing Narratives, Hard Choices
August 29, 2012
On balance, Iran’s nuclear program is
most consistent with?
1. Peaceful purposes
2. Attaining nuclear
weapons
3. Other
33%
1
33%
2
33%
3
Elements of Iran’s nuclear program
Program element
Status
Safeguard
s
Uranium mining
operating
N
Uranium conversion
operating
Y
Uranium enrichment
operating
Y
Suitable plutonium reactor
constr.
Y
Reprocessing
no
n.a.
Conversion to metal
tested
Y
Casting to weapons shapes
docs.
N
Precisely timed detonators
exper.
N
Explosives arranged to crush sphere
exper.
N
Neutron initiator
materials
N
Missile reentry vehicle for warhead
docs.
N
Weaponization
Iranian Nuclear Facilities
Natanz Enrichment Facility
Fordow Enrichment Facility
The story so far: key moments in the history of
Iran’s nuclear program
8/2002: Opposition group reveals Natanz
5/2003: U.S.-led invasion of Iraq
10/2003: Iran-EU3 deal: suspension, Additional Protocol
2004: Partial suspension collapse, renewed deal
2005, January-March: Iran proposes series of measures in EU3
talks, but insists enrichment would continue
2005, June: Ahmadinejad elected Iranian president
2005, August: Iran rejects European incentive package, resumes U
conversion at Isfahan
2005, September: IAEA Board finds “non-compliance,” but
postpones reporting to Security Council
2005, October: Iran-EU3 talks resume, no progress
The story so far: key moments in the history of
Iran’s nuclear program (II)
2006, January: Iran resumes enrichment work
2006, February: IAEA Board refers Iran to Security Council; 1st
small cascades begin testing with UF6 at Natanz
2006, March: UNSC statement asks Iran to suspend
2006, June: UNSC resolution requires Iran to suspend
2006, June: P5+1 offer enhanced incentives package, talks with
U.S. participation, if Iran suspends (Iran says open to talks, but
declines to suspend)
2006, December: Security Council imposes 1st sanctions
2007, March: Security Council imposes add’l sanctions
2007, August: Iran and IAEA agree on “work plan” to resolve
outstanding questions – appears to limit opening of new
questions
The story so far: key moments in the history of
Iran’s nuclear program (III)
2007, December: U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) says
Iran stopped nuclear weapon design work in 2003
2008, June: EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana presents updated
incentives package, U.S. Undersecretary Burns takes part in
talks – no substantive progress
2009, Jan-March: Pres. Obama takes office, offers unconditional
talks, sends letter to Khamenei
2009, June: Disputed Iranian presidential election
2009, September: Iran offers package of proposals on various
international issues, barely mentions nuclear question
2009, September: Secret Fordow enrichment plant revealed
2009, October: U.S. Undersecretary Burns meets with Iranian
negotiators and others in P5+1; negotiators in Vienna reach
tentative deal on swap of LEU for TRR fuel
The story so far: key moments in the history of
Iran’s nuclear program (IV)
2009, Nov-Dec: After domestic controversy, Iran proposes changes
to TRR deal unacceptable to P5+1
2010, February: Iran announces it is enriching to 20%, ostensibly
to provide TRR fuel in absence of deal
2010, June: Iran-Brazil-Turkey propose fuel swap deal – U.S. and
others reject
2010, June: Additional UNSC sanctions (more U.S. and EU
sanctions during 2010 also; Russia agrees no S-300)
2010, Dec.: New Iran P5+1 talks, no substantive progress
2011, May: Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant begins operation
2011, Nov.: Comprehensive IAEA report, including annex on
“possible military dimension”
2012, Feb.: IAEA report on additional enrichment capacity,
including to 20% at Fordow
Building, slowdown, acceleration, while the
impasse goes on…
Source: Institute for Science and International Security
The U.S. narrative
• Iran’s “civil” nuclear programs is a figleaf for a weapons program –
otherwise no need for enrichment
• Iran threatens U.S. and world security – supports terrorism,
threatens Israel, sponsors militias that kill U.S. soldiers in Iraq and
Afghanistan, seeks to dominate the Gulf
• P5+1 offers are very generous – Iran’s rejection of P5+1 promise of
help on civilian nuclear energy makes clear that civil power is not
Iran’s real goal
• Iran has repeatedly violated its safeguards obligations, continues to
conceal its nuclear weapons work
• Iran has never been negotiating in good faith, has only “suspended”
when it wasn’t technically ready to move forward
• Iran is defying the entire international community
The Iranian narrative
• Iran’s nuclear program is entirely peaceful, within NPT
• Iran was forced into concealment by Western efforts to stymie
nuclear supply
• Iran needs nuclear power to avoid using up its valuable oil and
gas, needs enrichment to fuel reactor if there’s a cutoff of
supply – has post-79 experience with supply cutoffs
• Iran has given the IAEA transparency far behind what it is
obligated to provide, corrected all past issues – only
remaining disagreements are over Western fabrications, in
areas far beyond the IAEA’s mandate
• Iran voluntarily suspended its enrichment and reprocessing
activities – got nothing in return
• Iran has the same rights as all other NPT members
The Iranian narrative (II)
• Iran does not support terrorism; it supports legitimate social
movements (Hezbollah, Hamas…)
• Iran has not threatened or waged aggressive war against any
other state for centuries
• Much of the world supports Iran’s legitimate rights
• The United States will never accept the very existence of the
Islamic Republic – so no value to Iran of nuclear deal
• The United States and Israel have waged an unrelenting
campaign of threats and intimidation, and have manipulated
the IAEA and the Security Council
• The EU3 and the P5+1 have never negotiated with Iran in
good faith – incentives package proposes to “discuss” benefits
for Iran after Iran gives up all its cards
The European narrative
• With 2003-2006 suspension, Europe had a major success in
showing it can pull together as a team, play a leading
international role
• While hoping for more active U.S. participation, EU-3 secured
U.S. backing for proposals
• Iran negotiated in bad faith, simply strung out the talks to get
maximum benefit while giving nothing up
• Tougher sanctions are essential to get Iran to back down
• Issues related to Iran’s other foreign policy behavior are more
complex than the United States makes them out to be
• Military strikes should be considered, but only as a last-ditch
option
The Russian narrative
• Iran, while sometimes annoying, is a legitimate player in the
international system, with its own rights and interests that
have to be addressed – and a legitimate recipient of arms
sales and civil nuclear sales
• Nuclear cooperation with Iran increases Russia’s ability to
influence Iran not to pursue nuclear weapons
• Iran should stop enrichment and buy a share in the
International Enrichment Center at Angarsk, so that it can take
part in the profits of enrichment without gaining any access to
the technology
• Sanctions are not likely to be effective – the only solution is a
real deal that addresses Iran’s interests, as well as those of the
United States and others
• Unilateral U.S. military action (like Iraq) is unacceptable
The Chinese narrative
• All issues between Iran and the West should be resolved through
dialogue
• The key issue is compliance with the NPT. While China would prefer
that their be no enrichment in Iran, if Iran complies with the NPT, all
other issues can be addressed through compromise
• Sanctions are not likely to be effective; China opposes them
• Unilateral U.S. military action (like Iraq) is unacceptable
• The real solution is for the United States and Europe to offer Iran
strong security guarantees and economic incentives, so it no longer
feels it needs nuclear weapons
• China, as a major player in the international system, supports
nonproliferation, has supported the UN resolutions, and has
participated in the P5+1 effort
Key questions for negotiators
• What should you demand initially?
• What should you be prepared to settle for?
• What should you offer – or threaten – to convince the other
side to give you some or all of what you want? Can you put
together a package of carrots and sticks that’s big enough, and
believable enough, to convince the other side?
• What issues should you focus on, in what order?
– Nuclear issue?
• NPT compliance
• Enrichment capability
• Transparency/verification
– Issues where there are common interests?
• Counter-narcotics
• Incidents at sea
• Possibly Iraq, Afghanistan
– Terrorism, Israel, human rights, U.S. sanctions and threats…
Facts any policy must cope with
• Iran has ~8,000 centrifuges installed at Natanz
• 20% enrichment is expanding
• Iran has substantial enrichment knowledge – can’t be
destroyed or negotiated away
• Intense U.S.-Iranian hostility, distrust
• U.S. has many issues with Iran – Iraq, Afghanistan, terrorism,
Israel, etc. – going well beyond nuclear issue. And Iran has
many issues with the United States
– Limits what can be offered for nuclear deal (e.g., diplomatic
recognition, security assurances)
• Many other states – Europe, Russia, China, Israel, Gulf states,
etc. – also have major interests at stake
• Iran has huge reserves of oil and gas – impossible to completely
isolate, exclude from world economy
Facts any policy must cope with (II)
• Israel, Gulf states have major concerns over growing Iranian
power, will push hard for their preferred outcomes
• All outcomes will have an impact on nonproliferation regime,
credibility of Security Council, and more
• Iranian government is sclerotic, factionalized, legitimacychallenged, has immense difficulty making hard choices
– Negotiated deal would require giving Iranian advocates of
compromise enough to convince Ayatollah Khamenei to say “yes”
– No faction can afford to be seen as buckling to foreign pressure
– Some factions do not believe compromise would bring any benefit
– Iranian government has succeeded in framing issue as “colonial
powers trying to take away our God-given right to technology” –
makes compromise difficult
• U.S. government also likely to face domestic (and international)
difficulties making hard choices
Balancing objectives
• U.S. objectives:
– No Iranian nuclear weapons
– To the extent still practicable, broad and verifiable gap between
permitted nuclear activities and a nuclear weapons capability
– Addressing – or at least not making worse in a nuclear deal – Iranian
behavior on Iraq, terrorism, Israel, etc.
• Iranian objectives:
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
Preserving regime, avoiding attack
Status and prestige as leader of developing, Islamic worlds
Recognition of its regional power and role
Economic development
Civilian nuclear energy
Nuclear weapons option (or more?)
Improving relations with Europe, the United States, others
What’s the alternative to a deal?
• “BATNA”
– Best alternative to a negotiated agreement
• What is the U.S. BATNA?
• What is the Iranian BATNA?
BATNA Applied in the Iran Case
(Chart from Sebenius and Singh)
On balance, Iran’s nuclear program is
most consistent with?
1. Peaceful purposes
2. Attaining nuclear
weapons
3. Other
33%
1
33%
2
33%
3