Lecture Slides on Chapter 20 of Mishkin and Serletis (5th Cdn. ed.)

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Transcript Lecture Slides on Chapter 20 of Mishkin and Serletis (5th Cdn. ed.)

Mishkin/Serletis
The Economics
of Money, Banking,
and Financial Markets
Fifth Canadian Edition
Chapter 20
THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
SYSTEM
Copyright © 2014 Pearson Canada Inc.
Learning Objectives
1. Describe central bank intervention in the foreign
exchange market and its effects on the money supply
and the exchange rate
2. Discuss international financial transactions and the
balance of payments
3. Summarize the arguments for and against capital
controls
4. Depict the role of the IMF as an international lender
of last resort
Copyright © 2014 Pearson Canada Inc.
20-2
Intervention in the Foreign Exchange Market
Bank of Canada
Assets
Foreign
Assets
Bank of Canada
Liabilities
-$1B Currency in
circulation
(International
Reserves)
Assets
-$1B
Foreign
Assets
(International
Reserves)
Liabilities
-$1B Deposits with
Bank of
Canada
-$1B
(reserves)
•
A central bank’s purchase of domestic currency and corresponding sale of
foreign assets in the foreign exchange market leads to an equal decline in its
international reserves and the monetary base
•
A central bank’s sale of domestic currency to purchase foreign assets in the
foreign exchange market results in an equal rise in its international reserves and
the monetary base
Copyright © 2014 Pearson Canada Inc.
20-3
Unsterilized Foreign Exchange Intervention
• An unsterilized intervention in which domestic
currency is sold to purchase foreign assets
• Leads to:
– a gain in international reserves
– an increase in the money supply
– a depreciation of the domestic currency
Copyright © 2014 Pearson Canada Inc.
20-4
Effect of an Unsterilized Purchase of Dollars and
Sale of Foreign Assets
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20-5
Sterilized Foreign Exchange Intervention
Bank of Canada
Assets
Liabilities
Foreign Assets
Monetary Base
(International Reserves)
-$1B (reserves)
Government Bonds
+$1B
0
• To counter the effect of the foreign exchange
intervention, conduct an offsetting open market
operation
• There is no effect on the monetary base and no effect
on the exchange rate
Copyright © 2014 Pearson Canada Inc.
20-6
Balance of Payments
• Current Account
– International transactions
that involve currently
produced goods and
services
• Trade Balance
• Capital Account
– Net receipts from capital
transactions
• Sum of these two is the
official reserve
transactions balance
Current Account + Capital Account = net change in
government international reserves
Copyright © 2014 Pearson Canada Inc.
20-7
Exchange Rate Regimes in the International
Financial System
• Fixed exchange rate regime
– value of a currency is pegged relative to the value of one
other currency (anchor currency)
• Floating exchange rate regime
– value of a currency is allowed to fluctuate against all other
currencies
• Managed float regime (dirty float)
– attempt to influence exchange rates by buying and selling
currencies
Copyright © 2014 Pearson Canada Inc.
20-8
Exchange Rate Regimes in the International
Financial System
• Gold standard
– fixed exchange rates
– no control over monetary policy
– influenced heavily by production of gold and
gold discoveries
• Bretton Woods System
–
–
–
–
fixed exchange rates using U.S. dollar as reserve currency
International Monetary Fund
World Bank
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
• European Monetary System (EMS)
– exchange rate mechanism
Copyright © 2014 Pearson Canada Inc.
20-9
How a Fixed Exchange Rate Regime Works
• When the domestic currency is overvalued, the central
bank must
– purchase domestic currency to keep the exchange rate fixed
(it loses international reserves), or
– conduct a devaluation
• When the domestic currency is undervalued, the
central bank must
– sell domestic currency to keep the exchange rate fixed (it
gains international reserves), or
– conduct a revaluation
Copyright © 2014 Pearson Canada Inc.
20-10
Intervention in the Foreign Exchange Market
Under a Fixed Exchange Rate Regime
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20-11
The Policy Trilemma
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20-12
How the Bretton Woods System Worked
• Exchange rates adjusted only when experiencing a ‘fundamental
disequilibrium’ (large persistent deficits in balance of payments)
• Loans from IMF to cover loss in international reserves
• IMF encouraged contractionary monetary policies
• Devaluation only if IMF loans were not sufficient
• No tools for surplus countries
• U.S. could not devalue currency
Copyright © 2014 Pearson Canada Inc.
20-13
Managed Float
• Hybrid of fixed and flexible
– small daily changes in response to market
– interventions to prevent large fluctuations
• Appreciation hurts exporters and employment
• Depreciation hurts imports and stimulates inflation
• Special drawing rights as substitute for gold
Copyright © 2014 Pearson Canada Inc.
20-14
European Monetary System (EMS)
• 8 members of EEC fixed exchange rates with one
another and floated against the U.S. dollar
• ECU value was tied to a basket of specified amounts of
European currencies
• Fluctuated within limits
• Led to foreign exchange crises involving speculative
attack
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20-15
Foreign Exchange Market for British Pounds in
1992
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20-16
Capital Controls
• Controls on outflows
–
–
–
–
promote financial instability by forcing a devaluation
controls are seldom effective and may increase capital flight
lead to corruption
lose opportunity to improve the economy
• Controls on inflows
– lead to a lending boom and excessive risk taking by financial
intermediaries
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20-17
Capital Controls (cont’d)
• Controls on inflows (cont’d)
– controls may block funds for productions uses
– produce substantial distortion and misallocation
– lead to corruption
• Strong case for improving bank regulation and
supervision
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20-18
The Role of the IMF
• Emerging market countries with poor central bank
credibility and short-run debt contracts denominated
in foreign currencies have limited ability to engage in
this function
• May be able to prevent contagion
• The safety net may lead to excessive risk taking (moral
hazard problem)
Copyright © 2014 Pearson Canada Inc.
20-19
How Should the IMF Operate?
• May not be tough enough
• Austerity programs focus on tight macroeconomic
policies rather than financial reform
• Too slow, which worsens crisis and increases costs
• Countries were restricting borrowing from the IMF until
the recent subprime financial crisis
Copyright © 2014 Pearson Canada Inc.
20-20
GLOBAL The Global Financial Crisis and the IMF
• When the global financial crisis became more virulent
in October 2008, a number of emerging market
countries found that foreigners were pulling funds out
of their financial systems
• The IMF created a new lending program at the end of
October 2008, called the Short-Term Liquidity Facility,
with $100 billion of funds to distribute loans where
needed
Copyright © 2014 Pearson Canada Inc.
20-21
International Considerations and Monetary
Policy
• Balance of payment considerations:
• Current account deficits in the U.S. suggest that
American businesses may be losing ability to compete
because the dollar is too strong
• U.S. deficits mean surpluses in other countries large
increases in their international reserve holdings
world inflation
Copyright © 2014 Pearson Canada Inc.
20-22
International Considerations and Monetary
Policy (cont’d)
• Exchange rate considerations:
– A contractionary monetary policy will raise the domestic
interest rate and strengthen the currency
– An expansionary monetary policy will lower interest rates
and weaken currency
Copyright © 2014 Pearson Canada Inc.
20-23
To Peg or Not to Peg
• Exchange-Rate Targeting as an Alternative Monetary
Policy Strategy
• Advantages of Exchange-Rate Targeting:
– contributes to keeping inflation under control
– automatic rule for conduct of monetary policy
– simplicity and clarity
Copyright © 2014 Pearson Canada Inc.
20-24
To Peg or Not to Peg (cont’d)
• Disadvantages of exchange-rate targeting:
• Cannot respond to domestic shocks and shocks to
anchor country are transmitted
• Open to speculative attacks on currency
• Weakens the accountability of policymakers as the
exchange rate loses value as signal
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20-25
When Is Exchange-Rate Targeting Desirable for
Industrialized Countries?
• Exchange-rate targeting for industrialized countries is
desirable if:
– domestic monetary and political institutions are not
conducive to good policy making
– other important benefits such as integration arise from this
strategy
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20-26
When Is Exchange-Rate Targeting Desirable for
Emerging Market Countries?
• Exchange-rate targeting for emerging market countries
is desirable if:
– political and monetary institutions are weak
– strategy becomes the stabilization policy of last resort
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20-27
Currency Boards
• Solution to lack of transparency and commitment to
target
• Domestic currency is backed 100% by a foreign
currency
• Note issuing authority establishes a fixed exchange rate
and stands ready to exchange currency at this rate
• Money supply can expand only when foreign currency
is exchanged for domestic currency
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20-28
Currency Boards (cont’d)
• Stronger commitment by central bank
• Loss of independent monetary policy and
increased exposure to shock from anchor
country
• Loss of ability to create money and act as lender
of last resort
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20-29
Dollarization
• Another solution to lack of transparency
and commitment
• Adoption of another country’s money
• Even stronger commitment mechanism
• Completely avoids possibility of speculative attack on
domestic currency
• Lost of independent monetary policy and increased
exposure to shocks from anchor country
Copyright © 2014 Pearson Canada Inc.
20-30
Dollarization (cont’d)
• Inability to create money and act as lender of last
resort
• Loss of seignorage
Copyright © 2014 Pearson Canada Inc.
20-31