Transcript PowerPoint-Präsentation

Norms and Institutions.
Origins, Change and Effects
Prof. Dr. Karl-Dieter Opp
Universität Leipzig, Institut für Soziologie (Emeritus)
University of Washington (Seattle), Dept. of Sociology (Affiliate Professor)
[email protected] / [email protected]
Power point presentation can be downloaded from:
http://www.uni-leipzig.de/~sozio/mitarbeiter/m29/
content/dokumente/527/OppVorlesungNormen.ppt
Basic articles can be downloaded from dropbox.com
(You will get an email that allows you to download the articles
and book chapters from a seminar about norms and institutions
held at the University of Washington (Seattle). The folder
includes the power point presentation.
Overview of Goals and Contents
This lecture is not intended as an inventory or
description of existing norms or institutions.
The goal is explanation:
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explanation of the formation (or origins) of norms and
institutions,
explanation of the stability and change of norms and
institutions, and
(only briefly) explanation of the effects of norms and
institutions.
Further, this is an introduction to, critical analysis and
extension of the most important extant theories .
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Content
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I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
Introduction
Basic Concepts
The Measurement of the Norm Dimensions
Are Explanations of Norms and Institutions Theories?
The Problem of Social Order: The Classical Explanation
of Norm Setting (Hobbes)
VI. Peaceful Cooperation without a State: Spontaneous
Norm Emergence in the State of Nature and beyond
(Axelrod)
VII. Resolving Disputes in Shasta County: Robert C.
Ellickson‘s Theory of Spontaneous Norm Emergence
VIII. Resolving Coordination Problems: The Origins of
Conventions
IX. Externalities and Second-Order Public Goods: Norms as
Solutions of Collective Action Problems (Coleman)
X. Private-Interest Sanctioning and the Emergence of
Norms (Opp)
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XI. Other Mechanisms: Some Suggestions
XII. The Origin of Norms by Design: Collective Norm Making
XIII. The Effects of Norms and Institutions
XIV. A Toolkit for Institutional Analysis
XV. Summary: An Inventory of the Mechanisms of Norm
Emergence
XVI. How to Get a Grade – Requirements for Papers
Problem: not clear how far we will come – I will probably drop
some themes!
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A Note: The Curse of Forgetting
Prediction: 90% of what you will have learned until Thursday
will be forgotten after – say – half a year!
Here is the curve of forgetting (Hermann Ebbinghaus):
Everything
Computer memory -- not possible for humans!
Stored in
memory
Curve with repetition
Nothing
Time of
learning
Curve without repetition
Time passed
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What can you do to achieve a higher curve – forget less?
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Repeat what you have learned in the afternoon.
Repeat everything next week – maybe everyday part of the
slides.
Read the basic readings about the theories presented!
Read more about norms!
Write a paper!
Why might this lecture be didactically less useful than a
seminar?
Time between the different topics is short, so there is no time
for repetition – in contrast to weekly seminars (???).
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I. Introduction
I.1. Norms in Everyday Life
Examples in everyday life – what are norms in this
lecture?
What is not regulated in this room?
Some examples for “spectacular” norms?
Are there norms about sanctions?
Are there norms about what reward are acceptable?
How would you define the concept of norm?
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I.2. Some Facts about Norms
The following facts should be explained by the theories (or
mechanisms) to be discussed:
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Norms change over time – examples?
Norms differ across societies – examples?
Norms are conditional – examples? (One must not lie – correct?)
There are relationships between norms – e.g.: constitutional law
and specific laws.
The specificity of what norms prescribe (= normative content)
varies across norms. E.g. the role of a father does not specify
every detail of what a father has to do. Compare this with the
detailed prescription of fines for the violation of traffic laws.
The precision of norms varies across norms. See paragraphs of
the constitutional law.
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I.3. Questions about Norms
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Descriptive questions – see the previous slide (what are
"facts" about norms). These are descriptive statements
about norms.
Explanatory questions about
 origins
 stability and change, and
 effects of norms.
Normative questions: "validity" ("Geltung") of norms –
what "is" justice, how should/must or should not/must not
one behave?
 Can such judgments be true?
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I.4. What Social Science Deals with Norms – and how
(Empirically or Normatively)?
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Sociology,
political science (e.g. norms about international
relations),
anthropology,
economics (property rights, law and economics …)
social psychology (internalization …),
jurisprudence,
philosophy.
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I.5. Institutions
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How would you define the term “institution”?
Examples for institutions?
Some basic facts about institutions – similar to those of norms:
 Institutions change over time – examples?
 institutions differ across societies and cultures – examples?
 institutions (i.e. the norms constitutions are made up of) are
conditional,
 there are relationships between the norms of an institution –
again: constitutional law ...;
 the specificity (normative content) of the norms of an institution
differ across institutions;
 the precision of the norms of an institution differ across
institutions.
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I.6. Questions about Institutions
These are the same questions as about norms:
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Descriptive questions
Explanatory questions
 Origins
 stability and change, and
 effects of norms.
Normative questions.
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I.7. What Social Science Deals with Institutions – and
how (Empirically or Normatively)?
Same answer as for norms:
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Sociology,
political science (e.g. norms about international
relations),
anthropology,
economics (property rights, law and economics …)
social psychology (internalization …),
jurisprudence,
philosophy.
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II. Basic Concepts
II.1. Norms
The following list consists of some definitions from the
literature. There are many more definitions!
Question: What are the criteria used in the definitions?
(Perhaps make notes when we go through the definitions.)
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(1) "A norm will be defined as an expectation about how one ought
to act, enforced by the threat of sanctions or the promise of reward"
(Kerr 1995: 33).
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(2) "In this model … social norm … is a term for behavioral
regularities that emerge as people interact with each other in pursuit
of their everyday interests" (Posner 2000: 26).
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(3) “ … a social norm is (i) a behavioural regularity that is (ii) based
on a socially shared belief how one ought to behave which triggers
(III) the enforcement of the prescribed behaviours by informal social
sanctions" (Gächter and Fehr 1997: 276 – italics in the paper).
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(4) R. H. McAdams (1997) summarizes the definitions of an
extensive literature (see the quotations on pp. 339-340): "Roughly
speaking, by norms this literature refers to informal social
regularities that individuals feel obligated to follow because of an
internalized sense of duty, because of a fear of external non-legal
sanctions, or both" (340).
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The definitional characteristics are:
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expectations of third parties that an action ought to be
performed (1); (NOTE: this is not a "cognitive" expectation =
prediction);
shared normative expectations (“oughtnes”) of third parties (3);
sanctioning (positive or negative) of norm violation (1)(3);
regularity of a behavior (2)(3) – no reference to beliefs…;
internalization of norm (“feel obligated”) (4);
felt obligation of the performance of an action (= internalization)
that is not formally prescribed (4);
fear of sanctioning (4) and – one could add – expectation of
rewards (positive sanctioning). PERHAPS IDENTICAL WITH
“SANCTIONING” (see before)?
Some definitions consist of several criteria (4).
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NOTE: no author provides any reason why he or she chooses
the definition he or she suggests!
NOTE: some definitions include causal statements (2, 3, 4).
Or are these separate empirical propositions (2)?
Two questions arise:
(1) Is a simple or complex definition (one consisting of
several criteria) preferable?
(2) What is the most useful dimension (property) or what are
the most useful dimensions to be included in a definition?
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I. Stipulating complex definitions
Causes
Acceptance
and
sanctioning
and
regularity
II. Explaining the dimensions of norms
Extent to
which an
expectation
is shared
Causes
Probability of
sanctioning
Behavioral
regularity
From: Opp, Karl-Dieter. 2001. "How Do Norms Emerge? An
Outline of a Theory." Mind and Society 2:101-128.
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What dimensions are most useful for a definition of norms?
Suggestion: oughtness should be the central criterion. Reason:
This is rarely addressed in the literature, as we will see, and its
explanation is of interest.
Thus:
A norm could (and should!) be defined as a statement that
one should behave in certain situations in a certain way or
that one should have certain attitudes, preferences or
cognitive beliefs.
Acceptance of a norm means the extent to which a statement
describing a norm (see definition before) is approved of.
(“Internalization” refers to a relatively strong acceptance.)
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Some implications:
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All other definitional characteristics could be dependent or
independent variables.
Conditionality is taken account of in the definition.
The norm does not only refer to behavior. Also cognitive
beliefs or attitudes or preferences may be subject to
oughtness – see religious beliefs.
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II.2. Institutions
Some examples for definitions:
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(1) "We define institutions as a system of human-made,
nonphysical elements – norms, beliefs, organizations, and
rules – exogenous to each individual whose behavior it
influences that generates behavioral regularities." (Greif
and Laitin 2004: 635)
(2) "In general, historical institutionalists work with a
definition of institutions that include both formal
organizations and informal rules and procedures that
structure conduct." (Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 2).
(3) "Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or,
more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that
shape human interaction" (North 1990: 3).
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Note that
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the definitions are very broad – see the first definition:
“institutions” refers to almost everything!
It is not clear why the definitions are so broad.
Organizations and norms are denoted as “institutions” –
why? Is this theoretically meaningful?
Suggestion:
We understand by institution phenomena for which there are
so far few convincing theories: these are “institutions” as
“rules of the game” (Definition 3 by D. North). Thus:
“Institutions” are, by definition, systems of norms.
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Examples for institutions:
Constitution of Germany, the US, and other “basic” laws
Inheritance laws of a country
Voting rights
Institution of the market
Health care system
Institutions for regulating common pool resources
System of rules for getting a Ph.D. or, in general, a doctorate
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II.3. Values
There are different definitions as well. A frequent definition
reads: values are relatively general norms such as human
rights.
Why do we need a concept that denotes relatively general
norms – if it is not clear how general a norm must be in order
to be called a value?
Why not distinguish simply between more or less general norms?
Sometimes “values” are defined as attitudes (evaluations) – here
the term attitude/evaluation is clearer!
Thus: we don’t need the concept of value! However, using it
in the above sense does not hurt either.
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II.4. Sanctions
There are different definitions as well, e.g.:
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(1) "Sanctions refer to any kind of reactions to a behavior,
positive or negative, that attempt to alter the behavior, or
decrease or increase its frequency" (Labovitz and Hagedorn
1973: 284).
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(2) "... people receive physical or psychological rewards and
punishments for their behavior, which encourages or
discourages them to conduct themselves in a similar way in
the future" (Labovitz and Hagedorn 1973: 284).
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(3) "The terms 'sanction' and 'effective sanction' will be used
interchangeably, indicating ... an action on the part of a norm
beneficiary that has some effect in moving the focal action in
the direction intended by the sanctioner" (Coleman 1990: 40).
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The definitional criteria are:
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Reactions to a norm violation with the goal to influence
future behavior (1) – intention of the sanctioner
relevant;
reward/punishment from the perspective of the
sanctionee – the person who is the target of the
sanction – for following a norm or for refraining from
norm violation (2);
reaction to norm violation that changes the sanctioned
behavior in the future (3 – also second part of
definition 1) – effect of the reaction relevant.
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We can thus distinguish the following definitions:
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intention definition (first definition before),
reward-punishment definition (second definition before),
effect definition (third definition before),
combination of the definitions.
Which definition is to be preferred?
One question social scientists are concerned with is to explain
when and how individuals react to norm violations. This
speaks in favor of the intention definition.
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Another interesting question is the extent to which behaviors
intended to change behavior actually reach their goal, i.e.:
when are sanctions effective? See questions of deterrence
or effectiveness of laws.
This speaks in favor of the effect definition and the reward definition (rewards are conditions for effectiveness).
Conclusion:
Each of the three definitions refers to theoretically interesting
phenomena: either their origins or effects or both are the subject
of explanations…
Important: when one speaks of “sanctions” one should
always tell what concept is used!
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Note the following implication of the definitions:
reactions to a norm violations that are only intended to
hurt the norm violator (“revenge”) are not sanctions! Useful?
(Example: instructor gives low grade!)
Perhaps the intention definition could be extended:
Sanctions = df. reactions to a norm violation with the
goal to influence future behavior or to hurt the
violator (i.e. to impose costs on the norm
violator).
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Question: Do the definitions imply that a sanctioner may be
Interested in influencing the behavior of non-violators (general
deterrence)?
Definitions seem to refer only to the target of the sanctions.
Whether there is general deterrence has to be determined
empirically. Alternative: extend definitions …
Question: Does our theme – explaining the origin and
effects of norms – violate the postulate of a value-free social
science?
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II.5. Cited Literature in II:
Coleman, James S. 1990. "The Emergence of Norms." Pp. 35-60 in Social
Institutions. Their Emergence, Maintenance and Effects, edited by Michael
Hechter, Karl-Dieter Opp, and Reinhard Wippler. New York: Aldine de
Gruyter.
Gächter, Simon, and Ernst Fehr. 1997. "Social Norms as a Social Exchange."
Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics 133:275-292.
Greif, Avner, and David D. Laitin. 2004. "A Theory of Endogenous Institutional
Change." American Political Science Review 98:633-652.
Kerr, Norbert L. 1995. "Norms in Social Dilemmas." in Social Dilemmas:
Perspectives on Individual Groups, edited by David A. Schroeder. Westport,
Conn.: Praeger.
Kuran, Timur. 1998. "Moral Overload and Its Alleviation." Pp. 231-266 in
Economics, Values, and Organization, edited by Avner Ben-Ner and Louis
Putterman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Labovitz, Sanford, and Robert Hagedorn. 1973. "Measuring Social Norms."
Pacific Sociological Review 16:283-303.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
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McAdams, Richard H. 1997. "The Origin, Development, and Regulation of
Norms." Michigan Law Review 96:338-433.
North, Douglass C. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic
Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Opp, Karl-Dieter. 2000. "Die Entstehung sozialer Normen als geplanter und
spontaner Prozeß." Pp. 35-64 in Normen und Institutionen: Ursachen und
Wirkungen, edited by Regina Metze, Kurt Mühler, and Karl-Dieter Opp.
Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag.
Posner, Eric A. 2000. Law and Social Norms. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press.
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III. The Measurement of the Norm Dimensions
In order to test hypotheses about norms (or institutions)
one needs to measure norms and institutions.
Question: Can norms be measured at all?
Interactionists claim that norms form in the process of interaction.
For example, whether a defendant has committed a crime such
as theft (§242 in the German StGB – see next slide), i.e. has
violated a norm, is negotiated in the court.
Is the argument correct? What is negotiated in the court?
How are decisions made if norms are vague – such as: one
should not harm others? Assume, you mention this norm if
somebody lights a cigarette next to you, and the smoker
thinks that this norm does not apply in this situation!
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§ 242 Diebstahl (1) Wer eine fremde bewegliche Sache
einem anderen in der Absicht wegnimmt, die Sache sich oder
einem Dritten rechtswidrig zuzueignen, wird mit Freiheitsstrafe
bis zu fünf Jahren oder mit Geldstrafe bestraft.
(2) Der Versuch ist strafbar.
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In order to measure norms, the following phenomena are to be
measured – all are components or dimensions of the existing
norms definitions:
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behaviors: regular behavior and sanctions as reactions to norm
violations and, thus, behaviors;
attitudes and motives: internalization = norm conformity is an
intrinsic motive (= acceptance of a norm);
kinds of oughtness (should/must/is allowed to) and degree of
oughtness;
cognitive beliefs about the conditions for a norm to hold
(conditionality) and about the probability of sanctioning;
intention to punish or reward behavior.
Thus, the measurement refers to phenomena external to an
individual (behavior) or internal (all the rest).
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Which methods are most appropriate to measure the norms
dimensions mentioned before and what are the problems of
these methods for measuring norms?
 Interview?
 Problems?
 Observation (participant or non-participant)?
 Problems? (E.g. measurement of sanctions or attitudes? SEE
SLIDE 39.)
 Analysis of documents?
 Problems? (What do people include in documents: always the
truth? Important: possibility of access to events of the distant
past! SEE NEXT SLIDE.)
 Qualitative or quantitative methods?
Thus: each method has its problems. In measuring norms, each
method should be checked in regard to its usefulness.
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Question: What are the problems of measuring norms if
documents are analyzed – such as diaries or minutes of a
parliamentary session where norms are reported?
Hint: writing a text is a behavior (or a sequence of
behaviors). What could be the motives or incentives to write a
text in a certain way? Is it always a goal of the writer(s) to tell
the truth? What about errors (misperception) – perhaps actors
want to tell the truth but they don’t know it!
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Question: To what extent can sanctions be measured by
observation?
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If sanctions are defined as actions with the intention to punish a
norm violation, then subjective phenomena must be ascertained
which cannot be directly observed.
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This holds also for sanctions which are defined as behaviors that are
rewarding for the targets of a sanction.
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If sanctions are simply defined as reactions to norm violation then
causality must be determined. For this one needs a theory or
experimental design!
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Question: Are there possibilities to avoid the measurement of
the norms dimensions because measuring subjective
phenomena is difficult? (Think of “revealed preferences”!)
One possibility might be to infer the existence of norms
from behavior. The assumption could be: the more frequent a
behavior is performed by the members of a group, the more
likely it is that the behavior is normatively demanded.
Correct? Are there examples for regularly performed behavior
where no oughtness is involved?
Taking a certain route to the bus every morning, taking the bus
instead of a tram, buying regularly the same yoghurt
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Contents of the rest of this section:
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Discussion of some “conventional” measurement, illustrated with the
procedure of J.M. Jackson:
 Jackson, Jay M. 1966. "Structural Characteristics of Norms." Pp. 113125 in Role Theory. Concepts and Research, edited by Bruce J. Biddle
and Edwin J. Thomas. New York: Wiley.
Some examples from existing research.
Discussion of the factorial survey, based on:
 Beck, Michael, and Karl-Dieter Opp. 2001. "Der faktorielle Survey und
die Messung von Normen." Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und
Sozialpsychologie 53:283-306,
 Opp, Karl-Dieter. 2002b. "When Do Norms Emerge by Human Design
and When by the Unintended Consequences of Human Action? The
Example of the No-Smoking Norm." Rationality & Society 14:131-158
(see also Opp 2000).
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III.1. The Procedure of J.M. Jackson
Jackson measures
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behaviors that are performed more or less frequently, and
evaluations of the behaviors: approval, attitudes, normative
expectations (= oughtness).
Those dimensions can be measured in a two-dimensional
coordinate-system:
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Das "Return Potential Model" Von Jay M. Jackson (1966: 114)
Example: frequency of raising your hand per session in this
lecture (or: hours per week reading).
Evaluation
dimension
Highly 4
approve
Return
potential
curve
3
E.g. evaluation
2
of one other
student or
average of
1
evaluation of
Indiffeclass
rent
overachiever
(Streber)
O
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
-1
slug
(Faulpelz)
-2
-3
Highly -4
disapprove
Range of tolerable or
approved behavior
What are other possible
curves – e.g. curve
of a „deviant“?
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Behavior
dimension
e.g. frequency of hand
raising of a student (may
range from 0 to 8 per
session = empirical
maximum value)
43
Questions:
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What does the curve mean? (Only oughtness?)
Which dimensions could be represented on the y-axis
and the x-axis?
Could the curve also describe the norm of groups?
(Example: students of this class evaluate different
frequencies of attendance and the average is
computed. What different forms of curves could exist?)
Is it possible to construct measures which describe
different properties of a norm?
Is there always a value of y for each value of x?
Can conditionality be represented in the coordinate
system?
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Can the change of norms over time be depicted in the
diagram?
Jackson constructs group properties, i.e. a group norm, on the
basis of individual properties. Could a group norm be defined
independently of an individual distribution of norms?
IMPORTANT: such measures are based on individual
properties!!!
Can the coordinate system be used for theoretical purposes?
(What hypotheses could be formulated? E.g. could network
density in a class affect the shape of the curve?)
How could these properties be measured in a questionnaire?
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Critique?
There is no theory so far!
But Jackson formulates some hypotheses, such as:
“… the greater the consequence behavior has for a group
and its central concerns, the narrower will be the range of
tolerable behavior” (p. 115).
The hypotheses are often not very clear (how can the
“consequence” and “the central concern” for a group be
measured?), not very informative, and they are formulated ad
hoc, i.e. without applying a theory!
There is so far no systematic attempt to use these measures
in a theory.
Thus: this is an example for a classification and measurement,
that may be used for descriptive purposes. But the theoretical
relevance is so far not clear.
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III.2. Some Examples from Research
From the DFG-project on the East German revolution – for details
see
Opp, Karl-Dieter, Peter Voss, and Christiane Gern. 1995. The Origins of a
Spontaneous Revolution. East Germany 1989. Ann Arbor: Michigan University
Press. This is a translation from German: „Die volkseigene Revolution“ (1993).
Items for the measurement of the acceptance of a protest norm:
Politics should be left to the elected representatives of the people.
A citizen should become politically active only if he or she believes
that he or she can achieve something.
Violence against persons to achieve political goals can be morally
justified.
If a state oppresses free expression and other basic rights of the
citizens then also violence of the citizens is justified.
Five answer categories, from “fully disagree” to “fully agree.”
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CONTINUATION
What do you think about the following statement(s):
“I think that violence against objects is morally justified. Does this
hold never, rarely, sometimes, most of the time or always?”
What are the situations when yourself would be willing to
use violence against objects:
If some highway is constructed near your apartment.
If the right to demonstrate will be restricted.
If the police uses firearms against demonstrators.
…. Answer categories “yes” or “no”
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THE FOLLOWING IS FROM: Opp, K.-D., K. Burow-Auffarth, P. Hartmann, Th. von
Witzleben, V. Pöhls, and Th. Spitzley. 1984. Soziale Probleme und Protestverhalten.
Eine empirische Konfrontierung des Modells rationalen Verhaltens mit
soziologischen Hypothesen am Beispiel von Atomkraftgegnern. Wiesbaden:
Westdeutscher Verlag (124-127):
If I wouldn’t do anything against nuclear power plants I would
have a bad conscience.
If I do something against the construction of nuclear power
plants I sometimes feel that I do something that I actually
should not do.
Five answer categories: fully agree, agree, indifferent,
disagree, fully disagree.
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III.3. The Factorial Survey
The measurement procedures discussed so far are not
appropriate to capture the complex conditions under
which norms hold (i.e. their conditionality). This is the
strength of the factorial survey – also called vignette
analysis.
Basic idea: possible situations are described where a norm
could hold. Respondents are then asked to tell to what extent
a certain behavior should be performed or to what extent an
attitude or cognitive belief should exist in the respective
situation (evaluation dimension).
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Example: you want to find out when it is allowed to smoke
in a restaurant. (Note: the research was conducted before there
existed a ban on smoking in Germany by law.)
First step: specify under what circumstances this norm may
hold (these are hypotheses), e.g.:
1. Class of the restaurant: pub, other;
2. number of persons in the restaurant who smoke.
Thus, two dimensions (= variables) may be important. These
are situational characteristics which could be relevant for the
norm to hold.
Each of these dimensions has certain values. E.g. class of
restaurant may consist of: pub/other = 0/1 (two values); number of
persons who smoke – possible values: none, few, many, almost all,
(four values).
Opp, Norms and Institutions
52
To describe all possible situations, the values of each dimension
(variable) are combined. That is to say, the Cartesian product
could be computed. In this case:
2x4=8
Thus, there are eight possible situations. Examples:
There is a pub where nobody smokes.
There is a restaurant where few people smoke.
These descriptions of situations are called vignettes.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
53
Here are the dimensions and their values from the research
reported in Opp 2002 (reference see below):
Situation 1: Restaurant
Each vignette begins with: Mr. Müller (or Mrs. Meier) goes to a restaurant.
Dimension 1: Gender of the actor in the vignette: (1) male, (2) female.
Dimension 2: Class of the restaurants: (1) top class restaurant; (2) ordinary restaurant; (3) pub.
Dimension 3: Smoking rule: (1) There is no indication whether smoking is allowed or prohibited. (2)
There is a sign saying that it would be nice if people refrain from smoking. (3) There is a sign
indicating that smoking is prohibited.
Dimension 4: Number of people in the restaurant who smoke: (1) No smoker; (2) one smoker;
(3) several smokers; (4) most people smoke.
Dimension 5: Duration of stay in the restaurant: (1) ... stays only for a short time to drink a beer.
(2) ... stays for some time to have a meal.
Dimension 6: Properties of the actor of the vignette: (1) ... smokes most of the time more than a
package of cigarettes per day; (2) ... smokes most of the time less than a package of cigarettes per
day; (3) ... is occasional smoker.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
54
Here is an example of a vignette from the study:
Mr. Müller goes to a restaurant. This is a top class restaurant,
in which smoking is prohibited. There is no one in the
restaurant who smokes. Mr. Müller stays only for a short time in
the restaurant in order to have a beer. He smokes most of the
time more than a package of cigarettes per day.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
55
Second step: the rating scale (evaluation dimension) has to be
specified which answers the question:
To what extent does a non-smoking norm hold in these
situations?
To answer these questions respondents are presented with
the following scale for each vignette on which they could mark
a value:
It is in any case
allowed to
smoke.
It is not at all
allowed to
smoke
-3
-2
-1
It is not allowed to smoke
+1
+2
+3
It is allowed to smoke
Opp, Norms and Institutions
56
Thus: in applying the factorial survey to measure norms the first
step is to devise descriptions of situations (= vignettes) –
combinations of values of the dimensions. These are the normrelevant situations.
Second, for each vignette a rating scale is presented in order
to find out to what extent a norm holds.
Third, a certain number of the possible (and meaningful – see
later) situational descriptions are assigned to each respondent
by chance. Each respondent thus gets a set of vignettes.
The size of the sets depends, among other things, on the
difficulty of answering the vignettes and on the length of the
questionnaire.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
57
Practical problems:
How many vignettes should a respondent be presented with?
How many dimensions are appropriate in a vignette?
How many values should each dimension have?
Example: number of persons. One could present percentages
from 0 to 100 with a distance of 1 (1, 2, 3...) – this would
result in a great number of vignettes – see next slide. Do
respondents discriminate between these values?
In any event: the dimensions and their values must be
theoretically useful!
Opp, Norms and Institutions
58
Are all combinations of the values of the dimensions
meaningful?
Example: dimensions are age and occupation. Let one
occupation be university professor, and let the age range
from 16 to 65. One possible vignette would include a
professor with age 16. Meaningful?
Statistical analysis
How is a factorial survey analyzed statistically?
Here is the data matrix for the non-smoking norm (Opp 2002):
Opp, Norms and Institutions
59
The data set has the following structure:
------------------------------------------------------------No. of
Class
Ban on
No.of
Judgm.
No.of
respond.
rest.
smok.
smok.
sit.1
friends
------------------------------------------------------------1
3,00
1,00
4,00
1,00
4,0
1
3,00
1,00
3,00
1,00
4,0
1
3,00
2,00
1,00
-2,00
4,0
1
3,00
3,00
2,00
-3,00
4,0
1
1,00
1,00
1,00
2,00
4,0
1
1,00
1,00
2,00
2,00
4,0
1
1,00
2,00
2,00
-2,00
4,0
1
3,00
3,00
3,00
-3,00
4,0
1
2,00
1,00
2,00
2,00
4,0
1
3,00
2,00
2,00
-2,00
4,0
-------------------------------------------------------------
(For the meaning of the codes see slide 54.)
Acceptance of the non-smoking norm is the average of the
judgments for the two situations per respondent.t
Opp, Norms and Institutions
60
Other examples for norms that could be measured by a factorial
survey?







Conditions for self-defence (Notwehr),
conditions for lying or telling the truth – white lie (Notlüge) ...,
when should one keep promises?
When is it allowed to break a law or when should or must a law be broken
– such as participating in an illegal demonstration, blocking streets,
occupying buildings (like university offices)?
When do people think they should get a divorce? (See Diefenbach and Opp
2007 – reference next page)
What is “sexual harassment”?
What sanctions are allowed for a given behavior?
Possibility for term paper!
Opp, Norms and Institutions
61
What are the strengths and weaknesses of the factorial
survey to measure norms?




Problem: the situations are hypothetical. Often answers may not be
very reliable. Pretest is important. Among other things, one should
explore to what extent the situations in the vignette resemble real
situations for the respondents.
Strength 1: the factorial survey allows the detailed measurement of
the conditionality of norms.
Strength 2: it is possible to determine the weight of the dimensions,
i.e. how strong their effect is on the rating of the “oughtness.”
Other problems or strengths?
Opp, Norms and Institutions
62
References for the Measurement of Norms with the Factorial Survey
Beck, Michael, and Karl-Dieter Opp. 2001. "Der faktorielle Survey und die
Messung von Normen." Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und
Sozialpsychologie 53:283-306.
Diefenbach, Heike, and Karl-Dieter Opp. 2007. "When and Why Do People
Think There Should Be a Divorce? An Application of the Factorial Survey."
Rationality & Society 19:485-517.
Opp, Karl-Dieter. 2002. "When Do Norms Emerge by Human Design and
When by the Unintended Consequences of Human Action? The Example of
the No-Smoking Norm." Rationality & Society 14:131-158.
Opp, Karl-Dieter. 2003. "Die Evolution sozialer Normen." S. 139-205 in
Evolution in den Natur-, Sozial- und Geisteswissenschaften, hrsgg. Von
Andreas Diekmann and Rupert Moser. Bern: Paul Haupt. (Ausführlichere
Fassung von Opp 2002 – siehe vorangegangenen Literaturhinweis.)
Jasso, Guillermina. 2006. "Factorial Survey Methods for Studying Beliefs and
Judgments." Sociological Methods & Research 34:334-423.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
63
Recent contribution on the factorial survey in general –
with further references:
Auspurg, Katrin, Thomas Hinz, and Stefan Liebig. 2009.
"Komplexität von Vignetten, Lerneffekte und Plausibilität im
Faktoriellen Survey." Methoden - Daten - Analysen 3:59-96.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
64
IV. Are Explanations of Norms and
Institutions Theories?
We will discuss the major theories about the emergence of
norms and institutions.
Question: What is the relationship between these
theories? Do they contradict each other? Are some derivable
from others?
Thesis: The “theories” describe different processes of norm
emergence (= mechanisms). In other words, the “theories”
describe different constellations of conditions under which
different processes of norm emergence arise.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
65
In order to explain the different processes a general theory of
action must be applied. This ensures that causal statements
are not ad hoc.
Most existing explanations of norms and institutions apply –
often implicitly – a wide version of the theory of rational
action.
We should ask for each “theory” of norm emergence to be
discussed what the background theory is that is applied!
An important question that we will address throughout
this lecture is under what conditions which processes
obtain. This is not discussed in the literature!!!
Opp, Norms and Institutions
66
In general, what are the theories that could be applied in
explaining processes of norm emergence?




Rational choice theory – includes game theory
 important: distinguish wide and narrow version;
functionalism,
power theories,
marxist hypotheses ...
For a discussion of some of the theories see: Mahoney, James,
and Dietrich Rueschemeyer. 2003. Comparative Historical Analysis
in the Social Sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
67
V. The Problem of Social Order: The Classical
Explanation of Norm Setting
A good starting point for an introduction to the explanation
of norms and institution is a general question: What are
the origins of social order?
If this question is answered and if (!) “social order” refers
to a system of norms, then all questions about the
emergence of norms are answered!
Opp, Norms and Institutions
69
V.1. The Solution of the Problem of Social Order by
Thomas Hobbes
The most famous answer to the question of the origin(s)
of social order or “how social order is possible” is by
Thomas Hobbes (1588 to 1679):
Leviathan Or the Matter, Forme and Power of a
Commonwealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil, first 1651.
See in particular chapters 13 and 17.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
70
The initial situation is a state of nature which is characterized in
the following way:






there are no internalized norms,
all individuals are pure egoists,
individuals are in a conflict situation, i.e. there is competition for
goods;
this leads to hostility and the attempt to subjugate others;
there is no organization or state that prevents violence or issues
laws;
individuals behave “rationally,” i.e. they try to maximize their
utility by enhancing their material welfare.
The consequence is a war of all against all (“where
every man is enemy to every man”). Hobbes characterizes the
effects of this situation in the following way:
Opp, Norms and Institutions
71
„In such condition, there is no place for industry; because the
fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the
earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be
imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of
moving, and removing, such things as require much force; no
knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts;
no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear,
and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary,
poor, nasty, brutish, and short“ (chapter 13).
The last part after the (last) semicolon is a famous text and not
printed in bold in the original!
Question: why is there no infrastructure, culture etc.? (For
details see later.) Think of “function” of property rights!
Opp, Norms and Institutions
72
How does “social order” originate in such a situation?
The basic idea is that a “Leviathan” (translation is "sea monster"),
i.e. a state, is created. How does the state originate? Hobbes’s
argument can be reconstructed in the following way:




(1) Men love (their own) liberty and dominion over others (which
is a condition for the war of all against all); (= motive 1)
(2) men want their own “preservation” and a “more contented
life”; (= motive 2)
(3) there is a belief ("foresight") that (only?) "restraint“ (= state)
leads to realizing the second motive by imposing fear of
punishment for pursuing the first motive;
(4) individuals are willing to transfer rights to a central authority
(= motive 3).
Opp, Norms and Institutions
73
Assumption seems to be that the second motive is stronger
than the first one – otherwise people would not be willing to
sacrifice power in order to gain a “more contented life”!


(5) establishing order is not possible by
 covenants without a sword (why?), by
 "the joining together of a small number of men," (why?) and
 being "governed, and directed by one judgment, for a limited
time“ (why? think of stability.)
(6) Consequence: A “Leviathan” originates.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
74
The causal structure of the argument thus is:
Preference for
domination
Preference for
peace
- (weak)
+ (strong)
+
Belief that establishing
a state is most effective
for realizing preference
+
for peace
Readiness (preference)
to transfer rights to
authority
Opp, Norms and Institutions
Creation of
a state (central
authority)
+
Alternative means
for “order” not
promising
75
What could happen, if conditions 1 and 2 – motives 1 and 2 –
(and perhaps other conditions?) are given? Could there be
other “solutions” than the origin or creation of a state?





Nothing – the state of war remains stable;
small groups form who loot and kill others; the physically
strongest – gain power (similar to alternative 2 by Hobbes);
small groups unite to form a sort of authoritarian organi-zation
like a Mafia (similar to alternative 2 by Hobbes) etc.
neighborhoods form an association to protect each other (like
neighborhood watch in the US);
"spontaneous" cooperation: e.g. somebody begins to "cooperate"
in the sense that he or she builds up a peaceful relationship with
his neighbor who reciprocate etc. (like the Axelrod model – see
later);
CONTINUED NEXT PAGE
Opp, Norms and Institutions
76


individuals hire others and pay them for protection – see countries
with a high crime rate where guards are hired;
Hobbes’s solution: individuals transfer rights to a central authority.
THIS IS THUS ONLY ONE POSSIBLE SOLUTION!
Opp, Norms and Institutions
77
What are the central problems of Hobbes’s solution?

It is not clear what the "mechanism,“ i.e. the process, of the
emergence of a state is. Assume there is a large group. Who initiates
state foundation? Who gets which position in a government etc.?

Under what conditions will people be willing to transfer rights, and
act to found a state? Think of the problem of collective action (free
rider problem). Common interest of the members of a large group
does not suffice to realize the goals (Olson). It is not clear under
what conditions certain “passions” (motives) and “reason” (beliefs)
lead to peace.

Who controls the state?

Hobbes’s argument implies that there are no stateless societies.
Empirical research does not confirm this implication.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
78



It is assumed that the state realizes the common good. See
“common good fiction” in public choice theory.
Is only external punishment for order relevant? Think of
internalization of social norms.
Hobbes’s model includes beliefs. Can beliefs be biased (= wrong)?
For example, citizens may believe that others will reciprocate
cooperation (see later Axelrod). Or they may not believe in the
“common good fiction” (i.e. they do not believe that the state acts in
the interest of the citizens). This might lead to unwillingness to
transfer rights to a "Leviathan."
Opp, Norms and Institutions
79
What is meant by “social order”?

“Social order” may refer to cooperation in a “prisoner’s
dilemma” – will be discussed later. Intuitively: refraining from
behavior that hurts others like fraud, stealing, using violence. Thus,
order means a certain class of regular behaviors.

Taylor 1982, Community …, p. 44: “In the most restrictive of its
common usage, ‘social order’ refers to an absence, more or less
complete, of violence, a state of affairs in which people are
relatively safe from physical attack. On a somewhat broader
view, “social order” is security of property (against theft and
damage at the hands of other individuals) as well as of persons.
This is the order Hobbes was concerned with and he called it
Peace.” (emphasis not in the original) = refraining from certain
behaviors.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
80

Implication: order in the above sense is a quantitative
variable that is dichotomized. Why not distinguish degrees
of order – more or less orderliness?
What is the PROBLEM of social order?
(1) It could mean in general: how does “social order” originate?
(2) In regard to the state of nature (war of all against all) it
could mean:
 How does “order” emerge in such a state of nature? (This
is an explanatory question)
 How could a “war of all against all” be avoided? (This is a
technological question – not identical with explanation of
order)
Opp, Norms and Institutions
81
Does Hobbes address the EXPLANATION of norms and
institutions?
Transfer of (or assignment of) rights to a central authority is
addressed: this is a change of norms (rights = kind of norms).
Thus: Citizens are no longer allowed to do certain things
such as taking the law in one’s own hand – the state sets
“restraints.” Not clear what exactly these norms are.
A central authority exists, and there are norms specifying
what the members of this authority are allowed and not
allowed to do. But these norms are not addressed in detail!
Thus: explaining of the emergence of a state is equivalent to
explaining norms. But what these norms are is not specified.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
82
If cooperation emerges then a regular behavior is explained.
This is one meaning of “norm.”
Sanctioning (of the state – only?) is included in Hobbes’s model
as well – this is another dimension of the norm concept.
Thus, Hobbes addresses several dimensions of the norms
concept, but he does not provide detailed, informative
propositions.
Question: Is it possible to explain the kind of norms – does
Hobbes’s model imply certain propositions?
Hobbes would probably predict that those norms will be
issued that are expected to solve the problem of social order.
Question: what happens if there are different expectations –
how are they reconciled?
Opp, Norms and Institutions
83
What can we learn from Hobbes about the emergence of
norms and institutions?



The “state of nature” is a situation with strong externalities. This suggests
that a central condition for the origin of norms and institutions might be
externalities. As we will see later, this is a central variable in all theories of
norm emergence.
However, if there are externalities, there could be different reactions by
those affected. It is not clear what exactly happens if there are externalities.
Thus, the question is: if there are externalities, what are the conditions for
the emergence of which kind of norms?
Hobbes applies a general background theory: individual preferences like
egoism, constraints like the behavior of others and maximization of utility
are conditions for the emergence of norms. This theory could be applied to
explain the origin and effects of norms in general.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
84
V.2. The Normative Solution: Talcott Parsons
The so-called normative solution is advanced especially by
Talcott Parsons. Here are some quotations:



“Essentially that men ‘being reasonable’ ought to, and in
general will in pursuit of their ends subordinate their actions,
whatever these may be, to certain rules. The essential content
of these rules is to respect the natural rights of others, to
refrain from injuring them” (Structure, 96).
“… the basic condition on which an interaction system can be
stabilized is for the interests of the actors to be bound to
conformity with a shared system of value orientation
standards” (The Social System, 38)
“… without the attachment to the constitutive common values
the collectivity tends to dissolve” (The Social System, 41)
Opp, Norms and Institutions
85
Question: What are the major problems of this “solution”?




There is no theory that explains when the required norms will emerge.
The normative solution could be interpreted as a technological
statement: if there are norms then there will be “peace.”
BUT: is this technological statement correct?
 In general, norms are not sufficient to guarantee that the regulated
behavior is performed.
 Not clear what the other conditions for conformity are.
The free rider problem is not addressed: it is well known (at least
since M. Olson’s theory of collective action) that especially in a large
group “reasonable” behavior is not carried out (i.e. doing something to
realize goals cannot simply be taken for granted). See as an example
environmental pollution.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
86
V.3. The General Mechanism of Norm Emergence in
Hobbes’s “Leviathan”: the Transfer and Centralization
of Rights
We can describe the process (or “mechanism”) outlined by
Hobbes that leads to social order in a general way: individuals
transfer rights to a collectivity (or to a group of other individuals).
These individuals then make rules and enforce them.
This happens not only in a state of nature but in real societies
as well. Examples?
 Foundation of clubs (e.g. a chess or tennis club), associations etc.
(see the “Vereinsrecht” – law of associations);
 informal groups: friends may develop a division of labor so that
certain tasks and rights – organizing weekend trips or dinners in
restaurants – are transferred and centralized;
 formal organizations like firms: employees transfer rights to the firm
(i.e. to managers, the board etc.).
Opp, Norms and Institutions
87
Question: Under what conditions will this mechanism be
chosen? Some brainstorming ..
Transfer of rights may occur spontaneously – step by step:
a member of a friendship group offers to organize the next visit
to a restaurant. The other friends like the choice and assign the
task alternately. Again, this works well and is repeated.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
88
Conditions for voluntary transmission to a central authority
(spontaneously or by design):




There exists a central authority (a group or an individual) rights
may be transferred to.
The “central authority” fulfills the needs of the members, and it is
expected that this will happen in the future.
Expected costs of failure are relatively low, compared to the
benefits of the transfer of rights.
Perceived alternatives to transferring rights are regarded as more
costly, such as voting on restaurant proposals or voting on every
decision in a sports club. These are transaction costs.
Note: perception of alternative institutions or norms is
important – see the creation of constitutions such as the US
constitution: not all alternatives were known.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
89


There are political entrepreneurs – individuals who bear the
costs of setting up the organization and run it. This is a
condition for founding a central authority if there is none and
for initiatives to transfer rights.
Those kinds of rights will be transferred that are least likely
to hurt members – e.g. one will usually not transfer the right
to use all of one’s assets! However, this happens sometimes:
Parliaments sometimes renounce their constitutional rights. See the
enabling law („Ermächtigungsgesetz“) under Hitler-Germany
in 1933. (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enabling_act and the
article in the German version).
See in particular: Ivan Ermakoff. 2008: Ruling Oneself Out. A Theory of
Collective Abdications. Durham: Duke University Press.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
90
Concluding note
This is the first time we ask the general question:
What are the conditions for a given mechanism of norm
emergence? The different theories or mechanisms – like the
one by Hobbes – outline mechanisms but they never state
the conditions that are relevant for the origin of this and
not of alternative processes!
We will ask this question for each mechanism!
Another question will be: what exactly are the differences
between the different mechanisms?
Opp, Norms and Institutions
91
VI. Peaceful Cooperation Without a State:
Spontaneous Norm Emergence in the State
of Nature and Beyond
An important extension of Hobbes‘s approach is Robert
Axelrod‘s „The Evolution of Cooperation.“
The starting point is that the state of nature is a prisoner’s
dilemma.
I will first explain what this means and then turn to Axelrod’s
theory.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
92
VI.1. The State of Nature as a Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD)
What is a prisoner’s dilemma? Here is the original story:
Behavioral alternatives
of prisoner A
Behavioral alternatives of prisoner B
Not confess
Confess
Not confess
1 year prison /
1 year prison
10 years prison /
Free
Confess
Free /
10 years prison
8 years prison /
8 years prison
First entry is “payoff” for A, second is payoff for B
Opp, Norms and Institutions
93
The general structure of the situation is the following:
Behavioral alternatives
of person A
Behavioral alternatives of person B
Cooperate ( C )
Defect (D)
Cooperate (not confess)
3, 3
1, 4
Defect (confess)
4, 1
2, 2
A graph that again depicts the structure of the payoffs:
Lower
payoff 3
Highest
payoff 4
Lowest
payoff 1
Lower
payoff 2
Opp, Norms and Institutions
94
What has all this to do with Hobbes’s problem of social
order?
Here is the PD matrix again:
Behavioral alternatives
of person A
Behavioral alternatives of person B
Cooperate (C)
Defect (D)
Cooperate (not confess)
3, 3
1, 4
Defect (confess)
4, 1
2, 2



Defect = war
Cooperate = peace (any kind of making a contract, trust
etc.)
Warfare is the dominant alternative for everybody
Opp, Norms and Institutions
95
Let’s look again at the PD:
Behavioral alternatives
of person A
Behavioral alternatives of person B
Cooperate (C)
Defect (D)
Cooperate (not confess)
3, 3
1, 4
Defect (confess)
4, 1
2, 2
Assume now the game is not played once, it is repeated
(iterated). Does this change the situation?
Example: You need daily a yoghurt, and a shop owner puts
the yoghurt at a certain place in front of your door; you
promise to bring the money to the shop after work.
Questions: (1) There is a one-time purchase, (2) you buy
every day. Would it “pay” to cheat?
Opp, Norms and Institutions
96
Assume there is cooperation for some days – both get 3.
Then you defect at day 10, whereas the shop owner gives
you the yoghurt (i.e. he cooperates):
You earn 1 additional point (4 instead of 3).
But then the shop owner will defect as well and your payoff is 2.
Does it pay to cooperate? If you cooperate – say – 5 days,
you get five times 3 = 15.
If you defect immediately – you get 4 (the first defection on day 1)
+ (4 x 2) (defection for four days), i.e. a payoff of 12.
Thus, in repeated PDs defection is not always profitable.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
97
Question: Can you imagine situations where even in an
iterated PD defection pays?
(1) The payoff for defection is huge, compared to
cooperation (not 4, but – say – 4000). AND you need the
money:
2, 2
0, 4000
4000, 0
1, 1
(2) The play is repeated only a finite number of times, i.e. it is
a finite game.
(3) You think that the partner is not trustworthy (he will not
sustain cooperation – you heard bad rumours about him).
Thus, in repeated PDs cooperation is not always profitable.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
98
VI.2. How Can Cooperation Emerge in a Prisoner’s
Dilemma Situation? The Theory of Robert Axelrod
The basic idea in Robert Axelrod’s theory (for references
see at the end of this section) is: if the prisoner’s dilemma is
repeated, cooperation will be likely – under certain
conditions.
Note how Axelrod formulates the problem at the beginning of
his book “The Evolution of Cooperation” (1984: 3):
“Under what conditions will cooperation emerge in a world
of egoists without central authority?”
What is the difference to Hobbes’ problem?
Opp, Norms and Institutions
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There is no “Nirwana approach” – who is interested in a
utopian situation as Hobbes describes it? Axelrod assumes
egoistic actors, there are no internalized norms and there
is no enforcement agency. This is the case in many real
situations so that Axelrod’s theory can be applied.
Axelrod’s procedure
The question of how cooperation can emerge in a world of
egoists can be formulated in the following way:
What strategy of the actors is best to generate
cooperation in the long run?
For example: one strategy could be: if you meet somebody,
choose C and D by chance. Other possibilities:
Opp, Norms and Institutions
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





Play always C.
Play always D.
Begin with C and then by chance choose C and D.
Begin always with C and then do what the other player did on the
previous move. This is TIT FOR TAT.
Begin with C; if the opponent defects twice then defect as well: TIT
FOR TWO TATs.
Play C as long as the other player plays C. Then play always D.
The payoffs of each of the two players can be computed,
based on the game matrix, e.g.:
3, 3
4, 1
1, 4
2, 2
Opp, Norms and Institutions
101
To answer the question of what strategy yields the best results
Axelrod invited game theorists to a computer tournament and to
submit programs.
The program that won was submitted by Anatol Rapoport:
TIT FOR TAT:


choose C on the first move,
imitate the player on the previous move. Thus, as long as the other
player chooses C, play C. If he/she chooses D, choose D etc.
Then a second tournament was organized. Again, TIT FOR TAT
made it: it was the strategy that in general was most successful, i.e. it yielded the best results in many different situations (i.e.
when it meets many different strategies).
Opp, Norms and Institutions
102
Axelrod’s “principles” and theory
Based on the results of the tournament, Axelrod formulates some
principles for a successful strategy, i.e. a strategy that yields
cooperation with a high probability.




Be NICE, i.e. never defect before an opponent does. This implies:
always begin with C.
Be FORGIVING, i.e. defect only once and never “hold a grudge
once you have vented your anger.” Thus, be not too harsh.
Be PROVOCABLE, i.e. one should get “mad” immediately after
the defection of an opponent and not, e.g., continue with C several
times.
Be CLEAR, i.e. your opponent should recognize that you play C or
D (clarity is often absent in situations with many players – e.g. if
you save energy nobody will probably notice it.)
Opp, Norms and Institutions
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Implication:
Cooperation is possible without a central authority!!!
Opp, Norms and Institutions
104
Axelrod refers to pairs of players, i.e. dyads (two-person game
theory). The theory could thus be formulated more generally:
If there are two players who interact:




if a player never defects first (“nice”),
if a player defects only once after the defection of the
opponent (“forgiving”),
if a player defects immediately after the defection of the
opponent (“provocable”),
if the opponent perceives the reaction of a player,
then cooperation emerges between the players.
Consequence: if cooperation is to be predicted in a large group,
the overall cooperation rate depends on what happens among
dyads. (This is actually how Axelrod proceeds!)
Opp, Norms and Institutions
105
Some illustrations – always examine whether the following
illustrations are consistent with the theory – PERHAPS SKIP
AND LEAVE AS HOMEWORK.
As a memory aid: relevant is being
NICE, FORGIVING, PROVOCABLE, CLEAR.






Firms who want a long-lasting relationship with customers – but if the
market is very large (globalization, EU): does crime pay? Exit option is
given?
Customer (you) and a firm: you buy books (Amazon could defect).
Axelrod: trench warfare during World War I.
“Spontaneous” disarmament.
Defection of player A occurs due to an error which A does not notice
(e.g., A does not pay a bill …). Other player B defects. A thinks B is a
cheater … (but here verbal communication could help – which is not
included in Axelrod’s model!).
Other examples? (IS EBAY AN ILLUSTRATION?)
Opp, Norms and Institutions
107
Questions

Isn’t the whole theory a purely logical exercise, a “tautology”? Can a
computer tournament really generate a valid theory of cooperation?
 The procedure is to “make assumptions about individuals and
deduce consequences for the behavior of the entire system” (1984:
6). This is not a test but a derivation of a model (or of theorems).
Of course, the model has to be tested empirically.
 The background theory used to make predictions is a wide version
of rational choice theory (18: no “rationality” assumed!)
 If this theory is accepted as valid then, under the assumptions, the
outcome of the process is compatible with a theory and, thus, not
only a logical exercise!
Opp, Norms and Institutions
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
Axelrod makes several assumptions (1984: 11-19):
 there are interactions only between two players;
 each player “is also assumed to recognize another player and to
remember how the two of them have interacted so far” (thus:
there is no change of names, and it does not happen that the
same people set up new firms to cheat or dress up (sich
verkleiden));
 it is not possible to make enforceable threats or
commitments;
CONTINUED NEXT SLIDE
Opp, Norms and Institutions
109

there is no way to change the other players payoffs;

there is no verbal communication, the players can communicate only
“through the sequence of their own behavior”;

the players may meet again (i.e. choices made today may influence
choices of tomorrow);

there is no way to know what the other player will do on a given move,
i.e. no reputation can develop;

there is no exit option (run away from the interaction);

the future maybe discounted (future is less important than the present:
“the discount parameter must be large enough to make the future loom
large”…15).

There are no norms (this is implicit in the formulation of the problem:
only egoism is relevant). BUT: in his example of trench warfare
Axelrod mentions “ethics” that is “new to the theory” ( 84) Thus,
norms of cooperation enhance the likelihood of C.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
110
How can these (too restrictive?) assumptions – or at least
some of them – be integrated into a theory?
The “assumptions” are conditions that increase or decrease
cooperation. Thus, we could set up a causal model that
includes at least some of these variables.
The conditions are scope conditions (“Geltungsbedingungen”) – such as that the model is restricted to two players
(two-person PD).
Weakness of a causal model: processes are not modeled.
This would be the next step – based on the variables
of the model. However, a causal model is a useful first step for
a dynamic model!
Opp, Norms and Institutions
111
Here is a preliminary list of factors that have a positive or negative
effect on cooperation (indicated by a + or – sign after the factor).
Let’s briefly browse through the list – you may improve it at home:











Use of a nice strategy … +
Number of past contacts remembered that resulted in cooperation (=
frequency of interaction in the past) +
Possibility to enforce contracts and promises +
Possibility of verbal communication +
Number of expected encounters in the future +
Size of discount factor (“shadow of the future”) +
Internalized fairness/cooperation norm +
External negative sanctioning of peers in case of defection +
Preexisting beliefs in regard to trust (“pessimism”/”optimism”)
Interest in longstanding relationships +
High likelihood and low costs of finding other “attractive” partner Opp, Norms and Institutions
112
There may be causal relationships between the independent
variables – example: trust may increase if the number of
successful encounters in the past is high.
Does Axelrod’s theory explain norms and institutions?
Let’s check the different dimensions of the definition of norms/
Institutions:

Norms are sometimes defined as regular behavior. Is there
an explanation of regular behavior?
Yes, cooperation or defection are regular behaviors in the
iterated PD.

Is oughtness explained – does cooperation become a norm
or is cooperation a norm?
There is no explanation of oughtness. Mechanism could be:
what is becomes ought – see later.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
113

Is sanctioning explained?
In TIT FOR TAT the choice of D after the partner’s D is a
punishment of the partner – the expression “TIT FOR TAT”
already suggests this: it means
“repayment in kind, as for an injury; retaliation”
(http://www.answers.com/topic/tit-for-tat.
C/D is thus a regular behavior and in certain situations a
sanction.
If C/D is explained, then this implies the explanation of
sanctioning.
In what sense is sanctioning explained – remember the
intention definition, reward definition, effects definition?
Opp, Norms and Institutions
114

Under certain conditions widespread defection leads to
institutions (systems of norms) that prevent defection.
Example: Ebay, laws against pollution. Is the emergence of
such institutions explained?
No!
This question is addressed in the theory of externalities
that will be discussed later!
Opp, Norms and Institutions
115
VI.3. The General Mechanism of Spontaneous Norm
Emergence in Axelrod’s Theory
The mechanism of norm emergence, based on Hobbes’s
work was called transfer and centralization of rights
(section V.3, slide 84).
Two questions should be discussed in regard to Axelrod’s theory:


How could the process Axelrod outlines be described in a
general way?
Under what conditions does this process obtain?
Opp, Norms and Institutions
116
Perhaps the mechanism could be called:
Cooperation through decentralized private interest
(mutual) sanctioning
or
decentralized sanctioning to pursue private interest
(Is there a better expression?)
Question: What are the differences and commonalities
between the two processes – transfer and centralization of
rights and decentralized sanctioning? Which dimensions or
properties do they have in common and which ones are
different?
Opp, Norms and Institutions
117
Possible differences
Transfer and
centralization of rights
(Hobbes)
Decentralized
sanctioning …(Axelrod)
Transfer of rights and creation of
central authority most beneficial
+
-
Political entrepreneurs available for
setting up an organization/institution
(including interest groups) …
+
-
+
Not clear: Who is
sanctioned by whom?
+
There is only a private interest in
preventing defection of one's partner
-
+
Externalities
+
+
Private sanctioning
Are there other differences and commonalities?
NOTE: the suggested causal model on slide 112 is not included
because this is not explicitly Axelrod’s theory!
Opp, Norms and Institutions
118
VI.4. References
Axelrod, Robert. 1984. The Evolution of Cooperation. New York:
Basic Books.
Hofstadter, Douglas R. 1983. "Metamagical Themas. Computer
Tournaments of the Prisoner's Dilemma Suggest How Cooperation
Evolves." Scientific American:14-20. (A very good summary of Axelrod’s project.)
Taylor, Michael. 1976. Anarchy and Cooperation. London & New
York: Wiley. (He was the first who has shown that in in iterated
PD cooperation is possible.)
This is a free software for the simulation of the Axelrod’s models
(iterated PDs) which can be downloaded from:
http://www.eckhartarnold.de/apppages/coopsim.html. See also
NETLOGO!
There is meanwhile a vast literature on cooperation!
Opp, Norms and Institutions
119
VII. Resolving Disputes in Shasta County:
Robert C. Ellickson‘s Theory of Spontaneous
Norm Emergence
A widely discussed attempt to explain spontaneous norm
emergence is Robert C. Ellickson‘s explanation of how
farmers in Shasta County (California) deal with the problem of
trespassing livestock.
Ellickson’s work is interesting because
 he uses the literature of several disciplines (jurisprudence,
sociology, economics),
 he provides an empirical case to illustrate (test? generate?)
his explanatory hypotheses, and
 he suggests a general hypothesis about norm emergence.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
120
VII.1. The Setting of the Study: Shasta County
Introduction
The study was conducted in Shasta County (California)
with extensive cattle industry.
The problem Ellickson addresses is the trespassing of
cattle to adjacent land.
Where is Shasta County?
See the “A” in the following two maps: from maps.google.com
First map: California with Shasta County
Second map: a section of the first map
Opp, Norms and Institutions
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Opp, Norms and Institutions
122
Opp, Norms and Institutions
123
Shasta County and its cattle industry
Short description in Ellickson 1998 – see references later.
The following is based on this article.
Physical Environment





Location at northern end of the four-hundred-mile-long Central
Valley of California (see first map).
Sacramento river divides the area (runs from Redding to
Stockton, via Sacramento, along the main highway – on map).
Redding is largest city.
Mountain peaks lie around the valley.
There is rain in the winter season, it is dry and hot in summer,
the surrounding mountains block cooling wind.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
124

16 % of the county is “land in farms,” no significant agriculture
is possible (poor quality of land). The bulk of the agricultural
land is unirrigated and used only as seasonal pasture for
livestock – principally cattle, the county’s major agricultural
product.
Social Environment



Most of the grassy plains and lower foothills remains divided
into ranches.
Half of the ranches are owned by families over several
generations.
Many recent settlers live on the cooler foothills and are
retirees. There are further some ranchette owners who keep
an animal or two as a hobby as neighbors.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
125
Modes of cattle ranching
Ellickson distinguishes two types of ranchers: the Traditionalists
and the Modernists.
Traditionalists




let their cattle roam in unfenced mountain areas during the
summer (severity of dry season requires large areas of land),
lease large tracts of mountain forest in summer; in winter (after
October) animals are returned to a base ranch at a lower
elevation and feeded with hay.
To reduce risk of livestock trespassing on contiguous lands
leasehold boundaries are drawn to follow natural barriers.
Traditionalists let their cattle roam in the mountains.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
126
Modernists


keep their livestock behind fences at all times and
install ditches and sprinklers to irrigate base ranch pastures.
“Members of both groups believe that the life of the
cattleman is the best possible in western America” (55).
Important: There were “open range” areas where a cattleman
is not liable for trespass damages – in contrast to “closedrange” areas.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
127
The problem of trespassing





“Every landowner interviewed, including all thirteen ranchette
owners, reported at least one instance in which his lands had
been invaded by someone elses’s livestock.”
“A victim’s vegetation is always at risk”;
victim’s fences are damaged;
"cattle sometimes wander onto rural highways and ravage hay”;
"rural residents fear trespasses by bulls" (56): they are heavy
and they leave deep hoof marks and they are sometimes
dangerous (56).
In general: "Trespass incidents are minor irritations" (47).
Nonetheless, trespassing was a problem and the question
Ellickson addresses is: How was this problem solved in
Shasta County?
Opp, Norms and Institutions
128
Fencing
Why not fence land? This would prevent trespassing and thus
would avoid the costs of trespassing for the victims
(owners of the land that is trespassed).
And there would be beneficial effects of fencing for owners
of livestock: predators, rustlers, winter snows, and poisonous
plants all pose potentially lethal threats to cattle roaming
unfenced countryside” (54).
Further, “a wandering cow will be impregnated by a bull of
worthless pedigree” (54).
Opp, Norms and Institutions
129
Costs of constructing and maintaining fences and renting
fenced land



“Barbed-wire fence has been the standard” – costs money!
“In 1982, fenced land in the Northeastern Sector rented for
about ten dollar per animal unit month, whereas unfenced
land rented for about three dollars.”
Periodic maintenance is necessary and costly because of
trespassing hunters or deers that damage fences.
Thus, fencing is not a general solution of the
problems of trespassing because it is rather costly.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
130
VII.2. The Resolution of Trespassing Disputes in
Shasta County
Possible solutions
Question: Assume your land is trespassed several times.
What could and what would you do?





Do nothing!
Ask those whose cattle trespass to take measures to avoid
future incidents.
If cattle continues to trespass you could sue the owners.
Build fence.
Kill animal, slaughter it, keep it and sell it ... + other illegal
measures (damage owner’s house ...) – similar to Axelrod’s
punishment by defection.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
131
How disputes were NOT settled in Shasta County and why


Even in closed-range areas the law was in general not applied!
In addition, the law was largely unknown!
Ellickson’s explanation is that there was an “overarching norm
of cooperation among neighbors” (56). This was apparently
inconsistent with appealing to authorities and applying the law.
There are costs of going through the formal claims process.
If suing is not a normal option there is no incentive to learn
the law! (“Rational ignorance” – see Anthony Downs about
information of voters about party programs).
“’Pride’ of being able to resolve their problems on their
own.” (Is this a norm?)
Norm against and aversion to hiring an attorney.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
132
Other Examples for refraining from appealing to the law:
Macaulay, Stewart. 1963. "Non-Contractual Relations in
Business: A Preliminary Study." American Sociological Review
28:55-69.
—. 1977. "Elegant Models, Empirical Pictures, and the
Complexities of Contract." Law and Society Review 11:507-528.
When is the law invoked in everyday conflicts?
Example: there are numerous lawsuits between neighbors.
(Perhaps this is only a last resort after long “negotiation”?)
Firms whose aim is to collect debts ...
Thus: formal law is only invoked in particular situations. What
are these situations?
Theme for terms paper!
Opp, Norms and Institutions
133
How disputes WERE settled in Shasta County: informal
norms and sanctions
Disputes are solved by applying informal norms:
Again: “Most rural residents are consciously committed to an
overarching norm of cooperation among neighbors" (59).
This implies: an owner of livestock is responsible for the acts
of his animals, i.e. has to avoid trespassing.
Ellickson describes these norms of “neighborliness” in great
detail, along with the sanctions applied if norms are violated.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
134
The norm of “neighborliness” and applied sanctions imply,
among other things:


a rural resident should “lump” (schlucken) minor
damage from isolated trespass incidents; the
residents keep track of those minor losses in a mental
account. “Eventually, the norms entitle him to act to
remedy any imbalance” (see below). There thus
seems to be a tolerance threshold.
The response to such incidents is an “exchange of
civilities”: one should notify the animal owner and
help him in retrieving the stray stock. This is regarded
as a service and not as a complaint.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
135

There are few “deviants” who cause incidents that do not
balance the informal accounts. There are four types of
countermeasures to discipline deviants, that can be ordered
according to seriousness (61):
 self help retaliation,
 reports to county authorities,
 claims for compensation informally submitted without the
help of attorneys,
 formal legal claims to recover damages – as a last resort.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
136
VII.3. What Could Be a General Explanation of the
Dispute Solutions in Shasta County?
What is to be explained or what could be explained?



The “dispute solutions” are regular behaviors – one
dimension of current norms definition.
There are norms of how one should behave toward owners
of trespassing animals (oughtness).
There are sanctions that are typically applied and norms
about sanctions: certain sanctions are adequate in certain
situations.
Thus, the “dispute solution” can be called an institution = system
of norms.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
137
It seems that this institution emerged spontaneously.
How can the emergence of this institution be explained?
Ellickson suggests “A Hypothesis of Welfare Maximizing
Norms” (1991: chapter 10),
“that members of a close-knit group develop and maintain
norms whose content serves to maximize the aggregate
welfare that members obtain in their workaday affairs
with one another” (1991: 167).
Problem?
Opp, Norms and Institutions
138
The hypothesis is a macro proposition. Unclear, how the
norm originates (similarly Hobbes).
Close-knit
groups
Correlation?
Causal effect?
?
Micro-level
causes
??
Aggregate welfaremaximizing norm
?
Micro-level
effects
??
Let us be more specific and formulate the conditions that
exist in Shasta County and that could in general be causes
for the institution of settling disputes.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
139
Relevant features of the initial situation




Animal trespassing is an externality, i.e. costly for those
whose land is trespassed and for the cattle owners.
The costs of the externality are low and symmetric:
 in general, trespass incidents “are minor irritations” (47).
 most residents have animals (including dogs) and are
causing as well as suffering damages through animals
(= symmetric damages).
Reduction of the externalities (= „internalization“) is not too
costly.
There is a general rule about the severity of sanctioning:
sanctions should match the perceived seriousness of the
sanctioned behavior. E.g., killing a straying animal would
be “inadequate.”
Opp, Norms and Institutions
140


There is an “overarching norm of cooperation” (56) – i.e. a
pre-existing norm of cooperation.
There are intense and multiplex relationships between
neighbors: “They interact on water supply, controlled burns,
fence repairs, social events, staffing the volunteer fire
department and so on” (60).
Why are such relationships relevant?
In such a social structure there are extensive possibilities of
sanctioning. E.g., a “deviant” will be sanctioned in different
social contexts – which adds up to a relatively high total cost
of sanctioning for the “deviant.”
There is a strong “shadow of the future”: “most residents
expect those interactions to continue far into the future” (60).
There is thus also an interest in long-standing smooth
interactions. These would be jeopardized for “deviants.”
Opp, Norms and Institutions
141
Reconstruction of the – implicit – model:
Low costs of externalities
and of internalization
Norm of “neigborliness”
Preexisting norms
of cooperation and
sanctioning
Kind of sanctioning
(“exchange of civilities”)
Close social relationships
(with interest in future interactions) available sanctions
(Institution of)
Informal settling
of disputes
Plausible?
Are other “arrows” or variables plausible?
Are norms (oughtness) really explained?
Perhaps externalities and close relationships suffice?
Is there a general background theory applied?
142
To ponder:
How can this model be reformulated as a
micro-macro model – see slide 141?
Term paper?
Opp, Norms and Institutions
143
VII.4. Some Notes on the Model
What is the role of a central authority?
What would happen if a central authority would not
exist? In most cases law is not invoked so the disputes are
resolved spontaneously.
Perhaps the role of the central authority is a looming sword in
case of extreme deviance!
Thus, even if institutions emerge and work spontaneously, a
central authority as a possible sanctioner might be a
(necessary?) condition for the stability of a spontaneous
order.
OR the ranchers would use agreed-upon retaliatory measures
against extreme deviants – in case of a missing state?
Opp, Norms and Institutions
144
What is the difference to the Axelrod model?
Could we extend the previous table: new column for Ellickson,
new lines? What is the relevance of “old” properties?
Possible differences
Transfer and
centralization of rights
(Hobbes)
Decentralized
sanctioning … (Axelrod)
Transfer of rights and creation of
central authority most beneficial
+
-
Political entrepreneurs available for
setting up an organization/institution
(including interest groups)
+
-
+
Who is sanctioned by
whom?
+
There is only a private interest in
preventing defection of one's partner
-
+
Externalities
+
+
Private sanctioning
Opp, Norms and Institutions
145
Here is a suggestion. Problems?
Possible differences
Hobbes
Axelrod
Ellickson
Transfer of rights and creation of central
authority most beneficial
+
-
-
Political entrepreneurs available for setting
up an organization/institution (including
interest groups)
+
-
(?)
*+
+
+
There is only a private interest in preventing
defection of one's partner
-
+
(?)
Externalities
+
+
+
Preexisting norms of cooperation and
sanctioning
-
-
+
Intense multiplex relationships (shadow of
the future –> sanctioning possibilities)
-
-
+
Verbal communication possible
+
-
+
Private sanctioning
* Open question here is: who is sanctioned by whom? / ? means: variable is not in the model, but
might be relevant OR it is not clear whether the variable is part of the model.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
146
Could the model be applied to other types of settling
disputes?
What about conflicts between neighbors in an apartment
house or neighbors in neighborhoods with single-family
homes? SEE VARIABLES IN PREVIOUS TABLE!
BUT think of the many lawsuits about conflicts between
neighbors!
Opp, Norms and Institutions
147
The mechanism described by Axelrod was called:
Decentralized sanctioning to pursue private interests
This is actually the process in the Ellickson model as well, but
other variables play a role as well such as internalized norms.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
148
VII.5. References
Ellickson, Robert C. 1986. "Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute
Resolution among Neighbors in Shasta County." Stanford Law
Review 38:623-687.
— . 1989. "A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidence
from the Waling Industry." Journal of Law, Economics, and
Organization 5:83-97.
—. 1991. Order without Law. How Neighbors Settle Disputes.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
—. 1998. "Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among
Neighbors in Shasta County." Pp. 46-76 in The New
Institutionalism in Sociology, edited by Mary Brinton and Victor
Nee. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
—. 2001. "The Evolution of Social Norms: A Perspective From the
Legal Academy." Pp. 35-75 in Social Norms, edited by Michael
Hechter and Karl-Dieter Opp. New York: Russell Sage
Foundation.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
149
VIII. Resolving Coordination Problems: The
Origins of Conventions
VIII.1. Introduction
There is one type of norm that can be characterized in the
following way – take as an example driving on the right:

There is no internalization, i.e. it is not morally important to do what
the norm demands. Thus, the norm is only useful.

Other norms would work as well (or almost as well), i.e. another
norm may be a little better or worse (such as driving on the left.)

Whatever the norm is: it is only useful to a group if all group
members adhere to the norm (like driving on the right).

There are cognitive expectations that everybody follows the norm.

Individual members who violate the norm incur costs (try to drive on
the right in Great Britain!). The norm is thus self-enforcing, i.e. no
central authority or internalization necessary to enforce a norm.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
150
This situation can be presented as a game – take “driving on
the right” as an example: What could a matrix look like?
Person A
Person B (or: all others)
Driving on the right Driving on the left
Driving on the right
3, 3
0, 0
Driving on the left
0, 0
3, 3
Note:


There are two equilibria;
There are only two options – there may be many more in other
examples (e.g.: driving in the middle of a road! – why is this never
taken as a third alternative in the standard example?).
Opp, Norms and Institutions
151
Other examples?
Here are the characteristics of the norm again:
No internalization, other norms work (almost) as well, general
conformity important for usefulness of the norm, expectations of general
conformity, self-enforcement.






Measurement units (meter vs. inches/feet/yards) – meters are easier to use
and, thus, there are higher payoffs than using inches/... ?;
DIN norms,
kind of language one uses (“cultural value” – foreigners should speak
language ...). Are there norms and intrinsic values involved? (For a model
explaining language emergence see Nowak and Krakauer 1999.)
Numeral systems, e.g. Arabic or Roman,
keyboards, e.g. QWERTY or MALTRON keyboards (see
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/QWERTY),
street signs may be different (for one-way streets, stop signs etc.).
More examples in Lewis 1969: 5-8, Schelling 1978: 119-124.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
152
VIII.2. What “is” a Convention?
There are different definitions in the literature.
Ullmann-Margalit 1977: 78: “Coordination problems are ...
situations involving two or more persons, in which each has to
choose one from among several alternative actions, and in
which the outcome of any person’s action depends upon the
action chosen by each of the others. So that the best choice
for each depends upon what he expects the others to do,
knowing that each of the others is trying to guess what he is
likely to do.” A choice of one alternative would thus be a
convention. (Question: Is the PD a convention?)
Young 1996: 105: “... we may define a convention as an
equilibrium that everyone expects in interactions that have
more than one equilibrium.”
Opp, Norms and Institutions
153
Lewis 1969: 42: “Our first, rough, definition is: A regularity R in
the behavior of members of a population P when they are
agents in a recurrent situation S is a convention if and only if,
in any instance of S among members of P,
(1) everyone conforms to R;
(2) everyone expects everyone else to conform to R;
(3) everyone prefers to conform to R on condition that the
others do, since S is a coordination problem and uniform
conformity to R is a proper coordination equilibrium in S.
Mackie 1996: 1007: “Any game with two or more proper
coordination equilibria represents a coordination problem.” A
convention is thus the equilibrium option chosen.
Question (for home work): which of the following games describe
coordination problems (i.e. games with two equilibria): battle of the
sexes? Chicken game? Assurance game? Other games?
Opp, Norms and Institutions
154
What is the “best” definition?
No author gives detailed reasons why he or she chooses the
definition that is chosen!
It seems that the authors have the examples mentioned in
mind and try to find a definition that describes these
examples.
Consequence of the definition: explaining conventions would
mean to explain a complex set of phenomena – see, e.g. the
definition by Lewis – with one stroke!
It would be preferable to have a simple definition – such as
one dimension and use the others as dependent or
independent variables – see our previous discussion of the
norms concept.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
155
Suggestion – similar to Mackie’s definition:
A coordination problem is defined as a situation in which at
least two actors have at least two options and where at least
two equilibria exist. A convention is the equilibrium that is
chosen by the actors.
Other characteristics in the previous definition could then be
explained, e.g.:



When do cognitive and normative expectations emerge that
every one chooses behavior B?
When is a behavior self-enforcing?
When does a convention spread, i.e. is more or less
frequently accepted by the members of a group?
It seems more fruitful and interesting to explain these
phenomena than including them in a definition!
Opp, Norms and Institutions
156
VIII.3. Are Conventions Norms?
Criterion “behavioral regularity”? Conventions are norms.
Criterion “sanctioning”? Costs in case of deviation from
regularity = sanctioning according to the rewards definition.
Criterion “normative expectations”? If they exist – do
they? – then conventions are norms.
Criterion “oughtness”: to what extent is there internalization
– bad conscience in case of violation?
Example of footbinding or infibulation? Language
(“cultural heritage” that should be spoken?)
E.g., assume there is no traffic, no police, no other person
at a pedestrian crossing: do people have a bad conscience
if they jaywalk?
Thus, some conventions have „intrinsic values“!!!
Opp, Norms and Institutions
157
Implication: „our“ definition of conventions implies that
conventions may have properties (like intrinsic value) that are
not consistent with the description of „basic“ characteristics at
the beginning!
Sugden (1989: 95) argues that a convention (in the sense of
an established pattern of behavior) “can” become a norm:
“people can come to believe that they ought to act in ways
that maintain these patterns: conventions can become norms.”
Thus, some conventions are and some are not norms –
depending on what dimensions of the norms concept.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
158
VIII.4. Examples for the Origin of Conventions:
Evolution or Design?
Example 1: The Invention of the QWERTY keyboard
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/QWERTY:
“The QWERTY keyboard layout was devised and created in
the early 1870s by Christopher Sholes, a newspaper editor
and printer who lived in Milwaukee. ... In 1873 Sholes' backer,
James Densmore, succeeded in selling manufacturing rights for
the Sholes-Glidden "Type Writer" with E. Remington and Sons,
and within a few months the keyboard layout was finalised by
Remington's mechanics” (bold print not in the original).
= “Normative entrepreneurs” relevant?
Note: there is a debate about whether QWERTY is most
efficient.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
159
Example 2: Driving on the Right or Left Side by Decree
or Spontaneous Emergence
France: “Following the French Revolution ... it was decreed
that horse-drawn carriages in Paris should keep to the right.
The previous custom had been for carriages to keep left and
for pedestrians to keep right, facing the oncoming traffic.
Changing the custom was symbolic of the new order: going on
the left had become politically incorrect because it was
identified with the privileged classes; going on the right was
the habit of the common man and therefore more
‘democratic’” (Young 1996: 106, bold print not in the original).
Britain: “In Britain, by contrast, there seems to have been no
single defining event that gave rise to the dominant
convention of left-hand driving. Rather, it grew up by local
custom, spreading from one region to another” (Young
1996: 106, bold print not in the original).
Opp, Norms and Institutions
160
Sweden: In continental Europe only Sweden was driving on
the left. In 1967, Sweden changed to driving on the right by
law, i.e. by government decision.
See the section “Rules of the Road” in Young 1996, and
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Right-_and_left-hand_traffic
Opp, Norms and Institutions
161
Example 3: Money
Money may originate spontaneously (see cigarette currency
after World War II).
Currency reform on June 20, 1948, was a central decision.
Conclusion
Conventions may originate spontaneously or by design.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
162
VIII.5. How Can Conventions Emerge Spontaneously?
Vanberg (1986. 92-93) describes such a process in the following
way (see also Young 1996):





(1) There is repeated interaction and a coordination problem;
(2) by chance (see next slide!), one alternative action becomes more
often practiced;
(3) the more often an alternative is chosen, relative to others, the
stronger are the incentives to practice it (positive feedback loop);
(4) a cumulative process emerges that finally leads to a wide-spread
behavior;
(5) there are no incentives to deviate from this practice, i.e. the
practice is self-enforcing.
The mechanism could be called “gradual accretion by precedent”
(Young 1996: 106) or dispersion of norms by precedent or by
imitation.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
163
Questions to Step 2
Step 2: (= by chance, one alternative is practiced more often):
do actors really decide by chance – do they throw a coin?
Example 1: “two horse-drawn carriages are rapidly
approaching one another from opposite direction” (Young
1996: 107). Assume there is no rule of driving on the right or
left. What will happen? (See also Sen and Airiau 2007.)



Signaling (hand sign or call) – what will be accepted? (Is there a
“cultural basis” for kinds of signals etc.?)
Both stop, talk to each other and collectively decide: what will be the
outcome? Perhaps the alternative that is first suggested will be
accepted?
Do the actors throw a coin?
164
Example 2: Assume there is no tape measure and you want
to buy fabric of a certain length and width at a shop. What will
happen?
Example 3: Language change: American abbreviations: 4you,
Xing, gender-neutral style (she/he or only she), University of
Washington becomes YouDub for UW (in German: JuDab).
Opp, Norms and Institutions
165
First step seems to be that someone makes a suggestion
that is accepted immediately (low-cost situation) – sort of
first come first served!
Such suggestions are activities and thus depend on incentives.
Possible incentives are:



existing resources (knowledge of local language if
carriages meet),
pre-existing norms (path dependence – see later):
existing rules of language in abbreviations,
in general: culture relevant. Example: kind of money
depends on “saleability” (Absatzfähigkeit) of a good
(Menger 1982).
Opp, Norms and Institutions
166
Other Questions
Could inventions (QWERTY) or the activities of normative
entrepreneurs be integrated into the model?
They could enter in step 2 – “by chance, one alternative
becomes more often practiced”: inventions or mobilizing
activities lead to a spread of information about a convention.
Is it possible that DIFFERENT behaviors (conventions?) in
a given group emerge and remain stable?
See VHS and BETA, but APPLE and MICROSOFT, CDs and
memory sticks, Internet BROWSERS (Explorer, Firefox, Chrome).
See further: local dialects, local foods, different manners ...,
WordPerfect ...
Opp, Norms and Institutions
167
Are these conventions? Two equilibria ... (perhaps for different
groups of people ...?)
How can these differences be explained? Some brainstorming!
Costs ...
Are externalities relevant for the emergence of conventions?
A coordination problem is an externality. E.g., if one drives on
the right the other on the left, an externality emerges.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
168
Are all conventions (according to our definition) selfenforcing – like driving on the right – or are there degrees of
self-enforcement?




Language (to some extent one can understand different
dialects)
Internet browsers – Mozilla, Chrome, Internet Explorer etc.
Local foods (conventions?)
Traffic signs like stop signs (see the huge number of traffic
accidents).
Thus, it is of interest to explain the extent of self-enforcement.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
169
VIII.6. The Emergence of Conventions by Human
Design and by Spontaneous Action
A convention is said to arise by “human design” if it is decreed
by law or similar devices of a central authority. See the
example of driving on the right in France and Sweden.
When will a state (or politicians) intervene and take
initiative to issue a law?



There are relatively costly (how much?) externalities (driving
on the left in Sweden was costly...),
there is no spontaneous emergence of a convention (or of a
“desirable” convention);
a central authority can gain political support by imposing a
convention.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
170
VIII.7. Mixed mechanisms
Young 1996: 106: Often there are informal processes of
accretion, and codification into law follows later.
Examples?
Language: Orthography reform in Germany: Language develops
spontaneously. But then the state issues a “reform” which
changes the “spontaneous order.” Why? (See the conditions on
previous slide!)
E.g. “Inconsistencies” (Aufwand – aufwendig, nun
aufwändig) were regarded as a problem – by whom? I.e.
spontaneous emergence was regarded as unsatisfactory.
There could be a term paper on the German
orthography „reform.“
Opp, Norms and Institutions
171
VIII.8. Are there Coordination Problems without
Coordination?
Are there situations where there is a need for coordination
but no convention (or norm) originates?
Assume, there is a narrow door and only one person
can pass, but two persons want to pass – a very frequent
situation. Who gives way?
Why is there no convention?
Other examples? Perhaps EU? Is there a need for „coordination“ – or „homogenization“?
Opp, Norms and Institutions
172
VIII.9. What Is the Difference between the Process of
Norm Dispersion by Precedent and the Other
Mechanisms?
Let us extend the “master table” by one column for this
spontaneous process (not for the decree of conventions)
and check how to complement the table.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
173
Possible differences
Hobbes
Axelrod
Ellickson
Transfer of rights and creation of central authority
most beneficial
+
-
-
Political entrepreneurs available for setting up an
institution (including interest groups)
+
-
- (?)
Private sanctioning
+
+
+
There is only a private interest in preventing
defection of one's partner
-
+
- (?)
Externalities
+
+
+
Preexisting norms of cooperation and sanctioning
-
-
+
Intense multiplex relationships (shadow of the
future –> sanction possibilities)
?
?
+
Verbal communication possible
+
-
+
Opp, Norms and Institutions
Conventions
174
Here is my table:
Possible differences
Hobbes
Axelrod
Ellickson
Conventions
Transfer of rights and creation of central
authority is most beneficial
+
-
-
- (?)
Political entrepreneurs available for setting up
an institution…(including, e.g., "normative"
entrepreneurs for conventions)
+
-
- (?)
+?
Private sanctioning / self-enforcement for
conventions
+*
+
+
+
There is only a private interest in preventing
defection of one's partner
-
+
- (?)
-
Externalities
+
+
+
+
Preexisting norms of cooperation and
sanctioning
-
-
+
?
Intense multiplex relationships (shadow of the
future –> sanction possibilities) / repeated
interactions for conventions
?
?
+
?
Verbal communication possible
+
-
+
+
* Open question here is: who is sanctioned by whom? / ? … see previous table
175
VIII.10. References
Helbing, Dirk. See http://www.soms.ethz.ch/research/gametheory,
point 2. The references there refer to the coordination of the behavior
of pedestrians.
Lewis, David. 1969. Convention. A Philosophical Study. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press.
Mackie, Gerry. 1996. "Ending Footbinding and Infibulation: A
Convention Account." American Sociological Review 61:999-1017.
Nowak, Martin A. and David C. Krakauer. 1999. "The Evolution of
Language." Proceedings of the National Academy of Science USA
96:8028-8033.
Schelling, Thomas C. 1978. Micromotives and Macrobehavior. New
York & London: W.W. Morton and Company.
Sen, Sandip and Stéphane Airiau. 2007. "Emergence of Norms
Through Social Learning." International Joint Conferences on Artificial
Intelligence:1507-1512.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
176
Sugden, Robert. 1989. "Spontaneous Order." Jorunal of Economic
Perspectives 3:85-97.
Ullmann-Margalit, Edna. 1977. The Emergence of Norms. Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 74-133.
Vanberg , Viktor. 1986. "Spontaneous Market Order and Social
Rules. A Critical Examination of F.A. Hayek's Theory of Cultural
Evolution." Economics and Philosophy 2:75-100.
Young, H. Peyton. 1996. "The Economics of Convention." Journal
of Economic Perspectives 10:105-122.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
177
IX. Externalities and Second-Order Public
Goods: Norms as Solutions of Collective
Action Problems
In all situations discussed so far externalities were a
condition for the emergence of norms.
There are two theories that explicitly address the question of
when externalities generate norms: the theories by
Harold Demsetz (1967) and
James S. Coleman (1990a, 1990b)
Both theories will be presented and discussed in this section.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
178
IX.1. The Theory of Harold Demsetz
Perhaps skip this
section. Continue 186.
Basic concepts
Demsetz defines property rights in the following way:
They “are an instrument of society and derive their significance from
the fact that they help a man form those expectations which he can
reasonably hold in his dealings with others. These expectations find
expression in the laws, customs, and mores of a society. An owner
of property rights possesses the consent of fellowmen to allow him
to act in particular ways. An owner expects the community to
prevent others from interfering with his actions, provided that
these actions are not prohibited in the specifications of his rights. ...
property rights specify how persons may be benefitted and harmed
and, therefore, who must pay whom to modify the actions taken by
persons” (347 – emphases not in the original).
Opp, Norms and Institutions
179
Furubotn and Pejovich suggest the following definition (1974: 3):
“’Property rights’ are understood as the sanctioned behavioral
relations among men that arise from the existence of goods
and pertain to their use. These relations specify the norms of
the behavior with respect to goods that each and every
person must observe in his daily interaction with other
persons, or bear the cost of non-observance. The term ‘good’
is used here for anything that yields utility or satisfaction to a
person” (emphases in the original, except blue print).
In other words, “property rights” are norms in the sense
of oughtness and sanctioning, which refer to the use of
goods. As the authors state, “property rights” include “rights
over material things (to sell my typewriter) as well as ‘human’
rights (the right to vote, to publish, etc.).”
Opp, Norms and Institutions
180
Two other concepts:
Externalities are behaviors of (individual or collective) actors
that are costly or beneficial to other actors and do not bear on
the decisions of the former actors.
Examples: firm pollutes river without paying for this; theft,
noise, shopping center that is built next to a building and
increases prices of property and there is no compensation to
the shopping center; bees of a neighbor fertilize his or her
flowers and there is no compensation to the bee owner.
Thus, there are positive and negative externalities.
Important: externalities in this definition presuppose that the
costs and benefits are not borne by the actors.
For example, firm A’s pollution impedes fishing of actors B.
This is costly for B. If A does not bear the costs (compensate
B), an externality exists according to the previous definition.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
181
Internalization of an externality means that the costs of an
action are borne by those who cause them and the benefits
accrue to those who cause them. Thus, costs and benefits
become “internal” to those who cause them.
Note: do not confuse this concept with the sociological
concept of internalization (following a norm becomes an
intrinsic motive).
Opp, Norms and Institutions
182
The Theory
Actors affected by negative externalities have an interest to
reduce or eliminate them.
The victims of soot from smoke are interested to stop pollution
Actors who cause positive externalities have an interest to
be compensated.
The TV station whose talk masters get much money from
advertising is interested to get some portion of the money
because they made the talk master attractive.
There is thus an interest in internalizing external effects.
NOTE: Those who profit from a positive externality have an
interest that it remains, without paying for it! But this interest
is not addressed by the theory!
Opp, Norms and Institutions
183
One of Demsetz‘s hypotheses reads:
“A primary function of property rights is that of guiding
incentives to achieve a greater internalization of
externalities” (348 – emphasis not in the original) .
E.g., if the residents living close to a factory have the right
to be free of smoke they could prevent the firm from polluting
and the externality would be internalized (the firm would bear
the costs of pollution).
If the TV station had a right to force the talkmaster to transfer some of
his/her earnings from advertisements to the station, the positive externality
would be internalized.
Question: What is a major problem with this proposition?
(Think of the critique of functionalism!) Is this really an
explanation of property rights?
Opp, Norms and Institutions
184
From the critique of functionalism we know: a positive or
negative function of a norm (or some other phenomenon)
does not mean that the norm emerges.
Example: The „function“ of a ban on smoking is to prevent
lung cancer. Nonetheless, laws prohibiting smoking in
Germany exist only since 2007 in the different states.
The question thus is:
When do property rights emerge that reduce externalities?
Opp, Norms and Institutions
185
Demsetz theory reads:
“ ... property rights develop to internalize externalities
when the gains of internalization become larger than the
cost of internalization” (350).
Not clear: what means “... to internalize ...”? Suggestion:
Actors create property rights with the goal to
internalize externalities if the gains of internalization
are larger than the costs of internalization.
Examples – according to Demsetz – that support his hypothesis:
the development of air rights, renters’ rights, rules for liability in
automobile accidents, the development of private property rights
in the land among American Indians (based on Leacock 1954). In
all these cases – Demsetz argues – externalities were
internalized.
186
The latter example refers to the Indians of the Labrador
Peninsula (Canada) at the beginning of the 18th century.
It is an intuitively plausible illustration of the theory (for a
discussion see Eggertsson 1990: 250-280.)
Here is the example of Leacock – as a causal diagram (from
Opp 1983, Die Entstehung sozialer Normen, S. 65)
Opp, Norms and Institutions
187
Initial situation:
No private
property in
game and land
Large stock of
game
Little hunting
(only for private
use)
Commercial
fur trade
arises
Increase
of hunting
Increase of value
of animals
Higher external
effects
Property
rights in
land
Low value of an
animal
Gains of
internalization
higher than costs
No internalization
Gains of
internalization
low
Opp, Norms and Institutions
188
Problems of the Theory

How do new property rights emerge: spontaneously (e.g. by
negotiation, marking land as the Labrador Indians did) or by
design (who sets the rules in what way)? What is the
mechanism of emergence? Note: The externality proposition
is a macro proposition. Micro foundation is missing!

What kinds of property rights emerge? Common property,
individual property – see the great variety of rules about the
use of natural resources in Ostrom 1990.


Idea: expected (and not real) payoffs are relevant – that
may lead to “inefficient” norms!
Does the theory hold for norms in general: table manners,
non-smoking norm?
Opp, Norms and Institutions
189




Is oughtness explained?
Empirical evidence in regard to Leacock’s example: Eggertsson
mentions historians claiming that the beaver populations were
sharply reduced after introduction of the fur trade. According to
Demsetz, the beaver population should have stabilized or
increased due to the introduction of property rights (correct?).
Free-riding is not considered (see later). Perhaps this is included
in the costs of internalization (example: many residents of a city
are affected by the pollution of many factories ...).
The political process (influence of interest groups etc.) is not
modeled. (See previous point: the mechanism of norm emergence
is not described.)
Eggertsson (1990: 249-280) calls the theory the “naive” theory
of property rights that can nonetheless be applied to certain
situations – he mentions the three previous points.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
190
Note: the differences between Demsetz’s theory and the
Theories discussed before are discussed after Coleman
– which is an extension of Demsetz’s theory.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
191
IX.2. James S. Coleman’s Theory
See Coleman 1990a and 1990b (references at the end of
section 10). The following references refer to Coleman 1990a.
Coleman intends to explain social norms: “They specify what
actions are regarded by a set of persons as proper or correct,
or what actions are improper or incorrect” (37).
NOTE: This is the oughtness-definition.
Coleman uses the following explanatory strategy. The first
question he addresses is the explanation of the demand for
norms. In a second step he tries to explain the realization of
norms.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
192
What is the meaning of the basic terms?
Demand: does it mean that each member of a group WANTS
all (or only a percentage of) members to accept the norm? Or
do they want a joint decision, i.e. an explicit commitment of all
members of the group, that one should engage in certain
behaviors? The demand could thus vary in a group!
Realization could mean, accordingly, that others accept the
norm OR that a joint decision has been made.
Realization does NOT mean that the demanded behavior
is carried out, this would be then the provision of the
first-order public good.
Example: Pollution. There could be a demand of a norm to refrain
from pollution,and the realization of this norm. Demand and
realization may vary – a different number of members could
demand and realize the norm.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
193
Conditions for the demand for norms
Coleman’s first “principle” reads:
“... interests in a norm arise when an action has similar
externalities for a set of others, when markets in rights of
control of the action cannot easily be established, and when
no single actor can profitably engage in an exchange to gain
such rights” (42, emphases not in the original).
In case of negative externalities (example: a non-smoker
sits next to a smoker), the social problem is “how to limit the
action (and how much to limit it) that is harming others” (41).
Question: Illustrate this with a „right“ to ban smoking.
(Can there be exchanges … ? Can I offer you money to stop
smoking?)
Opp, Norms and Institutions
194
In case of positive externalities (example: passers-by who
benefit from the householder’s cleaning snow from his
sidewalk), the problem is “how to encourage and increase the
action” (41). In addition, from the perspective of the
householder, the interest is to get some compensation for his
effort (41).
Coleman emphasizes: externalities “create a basis, a
demand for a norm on the part of those experiencing
externalities” (42). There is thus no guarantee that a norm
really emerges.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
195
Comments
Why is it necessary for the demand of a norm that there are
SIMILAR externalities for a set of others?
Perhaps the idea is that only if many persons are affected the joint
interest generates processes (such as sanctioning) that lead to a
joint interest?
What is the meaning of “when markets in rights of control
of the action cannot easily be established ...”? It is possible
that actors reduce externalities by “wholly individualistic means”
(41): an actor who suffers from externalities may offer something
to eliminate the externality. Thus, “rights of control” may be
purchased. But this is not possible (=high transaction costs) if the
externalities are widespread. (Illustrate with smoking example.)
The concept “externalities” is not defined. The examples
suggest that externalities are actions that cause costs or benefits
to third parties (regardless of internalization!).
Opp, Norms and Institutions
196
Question
Do these conditions really suffice for generating a demand
for (or interest in) a norm?
In case of externalities that are regarded as minor, there is
no interest in a norm. Examples: sometimes noise of a
neighbor, noisy people in a train compartment, crying
children, ringing cellphones in trains, ... this is tolerated!
Idea: only if externalities exceed a certain threshold, an
interest in (or demand for) a norm arises.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
197
Conditions for the realization of norms
Coleman’s “second principle” explaining the realization of
norms is based on the theory of collective action (basic
reference: Olson 1965).
This theory addresses the question under what conditions a
group acts in order to achieve its common goals. E.g. a
community wishes to reduce pollution by a group of factories.
When will the residents act to achieve this common goal?
The common goal is a preference for a public good. This is
defined as any good that, if it is provided, can be consumed
by every member of a group. (There is thus no possibility
of exclusion.)
Opp, Norms and Institutions
198
Examples: the householder’s cleaning of the sidewalk provides
a public good (as Coleman notes). Other examples: pollution,
noise, overgrazing of the commons (Coleman 41) provide
public goods with negative utility and are called public bads.
Question: What are public goods in a shared apartment?
Question: Are norms and laws public goods (or bads)?
Yes! ...
The problem of providing a public good is that nobody can be
excluded from its consumption. Therefore, there is an incentive
to wait until others provide the good because, if it is provided,
everyone can consume it. This is the free rider problem.
As Olson argues, this problem is particularly salient in large
groups if the single individual does not have an influence on
providing the good. Example: participation in elections.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
199
Question: What has all this to do with externalities?
Coleman’s answer is that externalities are public goods or
public bads. Therefore, the theory of collective action can be
applied.
Question: is this always the case, i.e. are there externalities
which are not public goods?
Pollution, noise, the householder’s cleaning the sidewalk
are public goods.
Effects in dyadic interactions: two persons sit at a table
and one lights a cigarette – this is an externality that is not
a public good! (There is no joint interest ...)
However, the major externalities are public goods or bads.
For those kinds of externalities the theory can be applied.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
200
Question: What has the realization of norms to do with
externalities?
Here is Coleman’s argument (in particular 52-53):
A major condition for a contribution to the provision of a public
good is to sanction contributors and non-contributors, i.e. to
reward contributors and punish non-contributors.
For example, if there is no incentive to do something against
pollution (e.g. in a large group), then encouraging others to
protest or to approach legislators and punish non-contributors
will increase the likelihood of contributions.
NOTE: sanctioning is a dimension of a norm.
Sanctioning thus generates a public good: If A sanctions B,
then an effective (!) sanction benefits all (52), it leads to a norm.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
201
There are thus two types of public goods:


first-order public goods (such as pollution or cleaning the
sidewalk) and
second-order public good (norms, generated through
sanctioning).
The second-order public good is instrumental to provide the
first-order public good.
Implication: the free rider problem holds for first-order as well
as second-order public goods!
If the second-order free rider problem can be solved, then
this makes the solution of the first-order free rider problem
more likely (but does not guarantee it – if the sanctions are not
effective!).
Opp, Norms and Institutions
202
Coleman suggests a solution to the second-order public
goods problem – this is his “second principle” (53):
Sanctioning becomes likely if there are close social
relationships between the members of a group.
“If there is a social relationship between actors, ... then this
overcomes the second-order free rider problem” (53).
Why? Idea: if – say – two persons are members of different groups,
there are many possibilities to sanction. E.g., they (the potential
beneficiaries of a norm) may decide to sanction jointly a third person to
contribute. If A does not contribute, B and C may sanction A as a
member of different groups. (see Ellickson – but here the sanctioning
was likely to be effective!)
Let us first look at the relationships between first and secondorder public goods:
Opp, Norms and Institutions
203
Relationships between sanctioning and contributing to first- and
second-order public goods (Coleman 1990, see in particular
pp. 52-53)
Public good
(first-order public good)
First-order
public goods
(e.g. clean air)
problem
(how to
provide the
Contribution to first-order public good public good)
(e.g. refrain from polluting, protest)
?
Sanctioning
= second-order public good
?
Social relationships
Second-order
public goods
problem
(how to bring
about
sanctioning)
Dotted arrows: indirect effects
Question: Where are the norms that Coleman intends to explain?
Question marks: under what conditions will these effects hold?
Always?
NIVorlesungENG_Le ipzig_First*.wpg
SeatNI_E xte rnalitie sFirstSec ondOrde rPG_new.wpg
204
A Modification of Coleman’s solution of the second-order public
goods problem (Coleman1990): Adding NORMS
Public good
(first-order public good)
First-order
public goods
problem
(e.g. clean air)
?
Contribution to first-order public good
(e.g. refrain from polluting, protest)
?
?
Norm to contribute
(second order public good)
Second-order
public goods
problem
?
Sanctioning - contribution
to second-order public good
?
Social networks (= solution of
both public goods problems)
Dotted arrows: indirect effects.
Question marks: under what conditions will these effect shold?
Always?
NIVorlesungENG_Leipzig_First*.wpg
SeatNI_E xternalitiesFirstSecondOrderPG.wpg
Opp, Norms and Institutions
205
Coleman’s causal model can be reconstructed in the following
way (based on 1990a):
Opp, Norms and Institutions
206
Similar externalities
for members of a
group G
? +
No market for
control rights/no
individual actor
can eliminate
externality
+
+
Demand
for norm
+
Realization
of norm
+
Social relationships
between norm
+
beneficiaries, and
between them and
norm addressees
(targets)
Sanctioning
of norm
addressee
Note: beneficiaries are those who profit from the “internalization” of an externality,
whereas addressees (or targets) are those whose behavior is to be regulated
(example pollution).
From: seatNI_ExternaliCOLEMAN3.wpg
Opp, Norms and Institutions
207
There are other plausible relationships between the variables,
e.g.: all exogenous variables affect “realization of a norm”:
Similar externalities
for members of a
group G
+
+
+
No market for
control rights/no
individual actor
can eliminate
externality
+
Demand
for norm
+
Realization
of norm
+
+
Social relationships
between norm
+
beneficiaries, and
between them and
+
norm addressees
Sanctioning
of norm
addressee
Opp, Norms and Institutions
208
Problems of the theory



Does the theory explain norms – in the sense defined by
Coleman (=oughtness, see slide 183)?
 Only if the empirical assumption is made that sanctioning
leads to a norm to participate. Can this be assumed?
Relevance of Networks: Do I sanction a friend (or a close
acquaintance) more severely than somebody I do not know so
well? What about “tolerance”? (Or does “sympathy” not exist
in close social networks?) Thus, relationships provide the
opportunity to sanction, but perhaps lowers frequency and
intensity of sanctioning!
Under what conditions do social relationships lead to more
sanctioning?
Opp, Norms and Institutions
209
Assume there is no chance that joint action of a group will
provide the public good – e.g. students want a fixed income
of 2000 € for every student per month. Would a person
A encourage his friend B to become active for this cause?
Thus, B would be expected to invest time and money for an
absolutely hopeless and futile cause!
This would probably be the end of the friendship or of any
relationship between the two persons.
This will be particularly the case if the sanctioner A does not
participate himself (hypocritical sanctioning – Heckathorn).
Conclusion: Especially if sanctioning is badly needed for
contributions to a public good – if the other incentives to
contribute are very low – it seems that sanctioning is unlikely,
it will provoke strong counter-reactions.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
210
Nonetheless, sanctioning is common in many situations where
it is actually costly. It seems that there is some evolutionary
basis of sanctioning. (Nasty note: if you do not have an
explanation for a behavior, try to find the explanation in the
evolution!)
The basic idea is that in earlier times groups were small. In
this situation, sanctioning and sanctioning norms (!) were
likely to increase “fitness” or, in modern terms, were likely
to contribute to the provision of the desired public goods
for the group. Such a sanctioning trait may thus have become
part of our genes and is transmitted to present day homo
sapiens. And – perhaps – sanctioning is even accepted in
situations where directly participating in the provision of a
public good is not very promising.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
211
For the contribution to the provision of public goods there
are many other incentives, such as (for a summary see Opp
2009):





intensity of public goods preferences AND
perceived influence (which is often overestimated!),
participation norms,
status gain in group by participating,
sanctioning of cooperation (often measured by membership in
social networks that encourage contributions) .
Sanctioning is thus only one incentive
for contributing!
Opp, Norms and Institutions
212
Do norms emerge if there exist neither positive nor negative
externalities? Did table manners, rules of politeness, norms
of fashion, and language emerge due to externalities?
Table manners: lower classes imitate higher classes.
Rules of politeness (take the smaller part of a pie…)
Language rules: groups create special words to be different
(= creation of positive externalities for the group?).
Norms of fashion: firms create fashion to earn money! Or
could one say there were externalities? (Lower classes
suffered from not dressing or eating like the upper classes?
The latter thus causes externalities?) Are these behaviors
that cause costs and benefits?
Perhaps: groups often want to create new positive (or
negative?) externalities for themselves or others.
This would be an extension of the theory!
213
What is the mechanism of norm emergence: if norms are
realized, does this happen spontaneously or by design?
Since the theory of collective action is applied it seems that
there is some joint decision.
General conclusion: Coleman’s “solution” is hardly convincing
as a general explanation of social norms!
Opp, Norms and Institutions
214
IX.3. How Are the Demsetz/Coleman Models Related to
the Previous Models?
Possible differences
Ho.
Ax.
Ell.
Convent.
Demsetz
Col.
Transfer of rights and creation of central authority
most beneficial
+
-
-
-
-
-
Political entrepreneurs available for setting up an
organization… (including interest groups) /
"normative" entrepreneurs for conventions and for
public goods provision
+
-
-?
?
?
+
Private sanctioning / self-enforcement for conventions
+*
+
+
?
+
+
There is only a private interest in preventing defection
of one's partner
-
+
-?
-
?
-
Externalities
+
+
+
+
+
+
Preexisting norms of cooperation and sanctioning
-
-
+
?
+
?
perhaps
perhaps
+
?
-
+
+
-
+
+
+
+
Intense multiplex relationships (shadow of the future
–> sanction possibilities) / repeated interactions for
conventions
Verbal communication possible
* Open question here is: who is sanctioned by whom? ? means: variable is not in the model, but might be relevant
Opp, Norms and Institutions
215
IX.4. References
Coleman, James S. 1990a. "The Emergence of Norms." Pp. 35-60 in
Social Institutions. Their Emergence, Maintenance and Effects,
edited by Michael Hechter, Karl-Dieter Opp, and Reinhard Wippler.
New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
Coleman, James S. 1990.b Foundations of Social Theory.
Cambridge, Mass., and London: Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press.
Demsetz, Harold. 1967. "Toward a Theory of Property Rights."
American Economic Review 57:347-359.
Eggertsson, Thráinn. 1990. Economic Behavior and Institutions.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Furubotn, Eirik G., and Svetozar Pejovich. 1974. The Economics of
Property Rights. Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Company.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
216
Horne, Christine. 2009. The Rewards of Punishment. A Relational
Theory of Norm Enforcement. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Leacock, Eleanor. 1954. "The Montagnais "Hunting Territory" and the
Fur Trade." American Anthropologist 56, No. 2, part 2, Memoir 78.
Olson, Mancur. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Opp, Karl-Dieter. 1983. Die Entstehung sozialer Normen. Ein
Integrationsversuch soziologischer, sozialpsychologischer und
ökonomischer Erklärungen. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.
Opp, Karl-Dieter. 2009. Theories of Political Protest and Social
Movements. A Multidisciplinary Introduction, Critique and Synthesis.
London and New York: Routledge
Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Governing the Commons. The Evolution of
Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
217
X. Private-Interest Sanctioning and the
Emergence of Norms
There are two types of situations.

In the Coleman model
 there was sanctioning in order to provide a first-order
public good (= reduction of externalities) and a joint
coordinated effort – see Coleman’s ideas about the
importance of social networks.
 There was thus a collective interest (i.e. not only a
private interest) in norm formation.

Are there situations where
 there is sanctioning but NO joint, coordinated effort to
bring about a norm that reduces the externalities, and
 there is only a private interest in being free of
externalities?
Opp, Norms and Institutions
218
Characteristics of the situation
Situation in
Coleman model
Alternative
situation
Sanctioning
+
+
Joint effort to provide the
second-order public good
+
-
Collective interest to remove
externalities
+
-
Look at these examples:


establishing a norm against pollution from several factories –
Coleman model can be applied (but: think of spontaneous boycott,
if, e.g., the polluting firms are food factories?);
establishing a non-smoking norm – Coleman model might not
hold.
What could be the mechanism of norm emergence in this alternative situation – take the example of the non-smoking norm.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
219
This section is based on:
Opp, Karl-Dieter. 2002b. "When Do Norms Emerge by Human Design
and When by the Unintended Consequences of Human Action? The
Example of the No-Smoking Norm.“ Rationality & Society 14:131-158.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
220
X.1. Theory
The mechanism applies to situations of the following type – let
the example be exposure of non-smokers to smokers:




There are externalities in interaction situations, and the
externality is caused by the partner in the interaction.
Those affected by the externalities do not intend to create a
general norm that reduces the externalities, but only wish to
reduce the externality in the interaction situation.
Individuals are able to control the externality at low costs.
There are positive incentives to sanctioning (sanctioning
smokers in order to avoid the harassment is often less costly
than being exposed to the smoke).
Opp, Norms and Institutions
221
The mechanism could be:




Individuals who are exposed to an externality (such as smoke)
utter statements demanding that the “perpetrator” should
refrain from the behavior (negative verbal sanctions).
The stronger the externality is, the more likely normative
statements are uttered (oughtness is expressed).
If this happens often to a perpetrator, the costs of continuing to
impose externalities on others increase (stimulus
generalization).
Assumption: increased frequency of sanctioning raises the
costs of performing the action disproportionally (logistic
relationship), but this assumption is not needed (although it
seems plausible):
Opp, Norms and Institutions
222
Costs of performing the
sanctioned
behavior
(smoking)
Which curve
is plausible?
Frequency of
sanctioning (of
smoking)


The behavior (smoking) will be performed less frequently.
Smokers will acquire a negative attitude towards
smoking (Fishbein-Ajzen Theory).
Opp, Norms and Institutions
223

A positive attitude toward a non-smoking norm emerges
as well, i.e. it is accepted that smoking in the presence of
others is “not right” (again: Fishbein-Ajzen theory implies this
– positive effects of following the norm...).

Implication: the norm will be conditional – it will hold for the
situations where it is sanctioned (discrimination learning).

If the externality is strong, there is a demand for regulation.

IMPORTANT: this implies that a strong informal norm will
lead to incentives for politicians to engage in law-making –
see later.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
224

Role of social networks:
 Sanctioning smokers is not a “heroic” action, and
smoking is not like a serious deviant behavior. Thus,
sanctioning will not be a topic in everyday conversations,
and one will not expect status if one reports sanctioning of
smokers. Therefore, social networks will not be of
major importance for sanctioning.
 Effect of the externality on choosing networks: one will
choose networks with non-smokers.
IMPLICATION: The norm is an unintended by-product of
individual action that aims at achieving private goals.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
225
Based on this mechanism I tested the following causal model:
Externality
+ strong
through smoking
+
+
strong
+
strong
Informal +
non-smoking +
norm
+ weak
Demand to +
prohibit
smoking
Sanctioning
of smokers
weak
+
Number of friends +
who do not smoke
weak
Opp, Norms and Institutions
226
X.2. A test of the theory
Sample: 366 undergraduate students filled out a written
questionnaire in introductory seminars (details in Opp 2002).
Questionnaire items (examples):
Number of friends who do not smoke: "Think of those people
who are particularly important to you. How many of these people
smoke?” (almost all, many, about half, few, nobody)
Demand to prohibit smoking: Additive scale from the following
items: (a) Smoking in the presence of nonsmokers should be
prohibited; (b) it should be prohibited to smoke in public
buildings. Possible answers from "fully disagree" (1) to
"fully agree" (4).
Opp, Norms and Institutions
227
Sanctioning of smokers: Additive scale from the following items:
(a) I have ostentatiously cleared my throat and coughed;
(b) I have talked to others about the disturbance so that the
smoker could hear it; (3) I told smokers that they disturbed me;
(4) I urged smokers to refrain from smoking.
Answer categories: never (1), once (2), several times (3).
Private non-smoking norm: Measurement by the factorial survey:
SEE THE PREVIOUS SECTION ON MEASUREMENT.
In two types of situations (restaurant, student party) it is
ascertained to what extent smoking is more or less regarded
as allowed or forbidden for different aspects of each type of the
two situations. The acceptance of a private non-smoking norm is
the average of all judgments of a given respondent.
Here is again the slide we saw already (section “Factorial
Survey”).
Opp, Norms and Institutions
228
Restaurant example: the following dimensions (i.e. variables) might
be important for a no-smoking norm to hold in a restaurant (the
values of the dimensions are put in parentheses) for a person P - the
protagonist of the situation:
Gender of P in a restaurant ((1) male, (2) female);
Class of the restaurants ((1) Top class restaurant, (2) ordinary
restaurant, (3) pub);
Smoking rule ((1) no indication ..., (2) .. sign that it would be nice to
refrain from smoking ..., (3) sign that smoking is not allowed);
Number of people in the restaurant who smoke ((1) No smoker;
(2) one smoker; (3) several smokers; (4) most people smoke);
Duration of stay in the restaurant ((1) ... stays only for a short time
to drink a beer. (2) ... stays for some time to have a meal);
Addiction of the person P in the restaurant: ((1) ... smokes most
of the time more than a package of cigarettes per day; (2) ... smokes
most of the time less than a package of cigarettes per day; (3) ... is
occasional smoker).
Opp, Norms and Institutions
229
Example for a vignette:
Mr. Müller goes to a restaurant. This is a top class restaurant
in which smoking is prohibited. There is nobody in the
restaurant who smokes. Mr. Müller stays only for a short time
to drink a beer. He smokes most of the time more than a
package of cigarettes per day.
The respondents are presented with a rating scale with two
extremes: they indicate to what extent it is not at all allowed
to smoke (-3) and it is in any case allowed to smoke (+3). The
other values were: -2, -1, +1, +2.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
230
Rating scale: Respondents are asked to rate each vignette on the
following scale:
It is not at all
allowed to
smoke
-3
It is in any case
allowed to smoke
-2
-1
+1
It is not allowed to smoke
+2
+3
It is allowed to smoke
Opp, Norms and Institutions
231
Table 2: Sanctioning Behavior: How Smokers and Non-Smokers Sanction Smokers
Kinds of sanctions
Percentage of those who sanctioned at least once
(in parentheses: average frequency of sanctioning)1
Non-smokers
Occasional
smokers
Less than 1
package daily
More than
1 package
daily
All
respondents
(1) I have ostentatiously cleared my
throat and coughed
53.5%
(1.92)
36.2%
(1.60)
19.4%
(1.25)
4.0%
(1.04)
40.6%
(1.67)
(2) I have talked to others about the
disturbance so that the smoker could
hear it
36.8%
(1.59)
15.5%
(1.21)
14.7%
(1.18)
0.0%
(1.00)
26.4%
(1.41)
(3) I told smokers that they disturbed
me
79.3%
(2.43)
56.9%
(1.97)
46.2%
(1.78)
28.0%
(1.48)
65.7%
(2.16)
(4) I urged smokers to refrain from
smoking
52.7%
(1.91)
27.6%
(1.50)
25.4%
(1.45)
20.0%
(1.36)
41.0%
(1.72)
58
67
25
N2
200
351
1 Answer categories: never (1), once (2), several times (3).
2 N refers to the minimal number of respondents in the respective column.
The means per item for non-smokers are significantly different from the value 1 (signifying no
sanctioning) at least on the .0001 level.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
232
Table 4: The Effects of the Vignette Dimensions on the Acceptance of a Non-Smoking Norm (Standardized
Regression Coefficients)
Dependent variable: Acceptance of a non-smoking norm1
Independent Variables
(Vignette dimensions)
1
Gender (female)
Restaurant
Student party
All
Nonsmokers
Smokers1
All
Nonsmokers
Smokers2
2
3
4
5
6
7
.02
.03
.01
-.04**
-.06**
-.01
.55**
.54**
-.02
-.01
-.02
hosts request not to smoke
.63**
.59**
.73**
hosts tell they don't care about
smoking
.07**
.09**
.02
no statement by hosts, but it is known
that they don't smoke
.50**
.53**
.47**
no statement by hosts, but it is known
that they are smokers
.04*
.02
.04*
.16**
.20**
.11**
Class of the restaurant
No smoking in restaurant
.63**
No smoking at student party3:
no statement
Number of smokers
-.21**
-.18**
-.27**
-.22**
-.24**
-.22**
Duration of stay
-.02
-.01
-.04
-.05**
-.02
-.07**
Actor in the vignette is occasional smoker
.03**
.05**
.04
.04**
.01
.10**
Adjusted R2
.35**
.33**
.43**
.48**
.44**
.62**
Notes on next slide.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
233
* Significant at the .05 level; **significant at the .01 level, one-tailed tests.
1 The original rating scale (with high positive values indicating that smoking
was allowed--see Table 3) was recoded so that high positive values
indicate that smoking is not allowed, i.e. that a no-smoking norm is
accepted.
2 Smokers are respondents who smoke at least one package of cigarettes
per day.
3 The reference category is: the hosts tell that smoking is allowed.
N, the number of judgments, is at least 3626 for all judgments, 2056 for nonsmokers and 981 for smokers.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
234
Conditions for the Sanctioning of Smokers (Bivariate Correlations and Standardized Regression
Coefficients)
Independent Variables
Dependent variable: Extent of Sanctioning
r
Model 1
Model 2
.23**
.31**
Model 3
Model 4
.38**
.40**
Externality through smoking
Smoking is disturbing
.48**
Smoking is no pleasure in life
.36**
.04
Passive smoking is not harmless,
compared to other health risks
.34**
.11*
Passive smoking unhealthy
.20**
.02
Low intensity of smoking
.43**
.11
Composite scale
.52**
.14**
Number of friends who do not
smoke
.27**
.007
.02
Informal non-smoking norm
.33**
.009
.03
Demand to prohibit smoking
.44**
.13*
Adjusted R2
.27**
.16**
.26**
.15*
.28**
.17**
.28**
The test of the model
Externality
through smoking
.38**
.49**
.53**
.51**
.14**
Informal
non-smoking
norm
R2 =.36**
.26**
.10*
Demand to
prohibit
smoking
.15*
.02
.03
Sanctioning
of smokers
R2 =.28**
R2 =.54**
Number of friends
who do not smoke
Opp, Norms and Institutions
236
X.3. The process of norm emergence
What could be the process of the emergence of a general
non-smoking norm?





In a period 1 smoking is accepted and non-smokers don’t
care if they are exposed to smokers.
 This is the situation in the 1950s and 1960s.
Scientific research and media reports spread the view that
active and passive smoking is dangerous for health.
The costs of being exposed to smokers increase.
The incentives of sanctioning smokers in interaction
situations (including normative utterances that smoking is
“bad”) as an instrumental act to stop the smoker and, thus
sanctioning increase.
The costs of smoking in interactions with smokers increase
disproportionally.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
237


Smoking decreases.
Acceptance of a non-smoking norm increases (on the
smokers’ side: dissonance of being sanctioned ...). BUT
smoking will not disappear – why?
NOTE: This is a micro-macro model – here is the sketch:
Scientific
research
Correlation
Incentives for
sanctioning etc.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
Social
Norm
Sanctioning
238
X.4. What is the Difference to the Previous Models?
Possible differences
Ho.
Ax.
Ell.
Con
De
Col
SM
Transfer of rights and creation of central authority
most beneficial
+
-
-
-
-
-
-
Political entrepreneurs available for setting up an
organization … (including interest groups) /
"normative" entrepreneurs for conventions and for
public goods provision
+
-
-?
?
?
+
-
Private sanctioning / self-enforcement for
conventions /at low costs (smoking – only?)
+*
+
+
?
+
+
+
There is only a private interest in preventing
defection of one's partner
-
+
-?
-
?
-
+
Externalities
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
Preexisting norms of cooperation and sanctioning
-
-
+
?
+
?
+
perhaps
perhaps
+
?
-
+
+
+
-
+
+
+
+
+
Intense multiplex relationships (shadow of the
future –> sanction possibilities) / repeated
interactions for conventions
Verbal communication possible
LAST COLUMN: SM for smoking norm. * Open question here is: who is sanctioned by whom?
means: variable is not in the model, but might be relevant.
239
X.4. Questions
Should there be a row with „informal norms lead to demand
for regulation“ – this is a difference to all other models.
Another row could be “externalities affect the choice of
networks” – this is another difference to all other models.
Does the process described hold for other norms – and
not only the non-smoking norm?
Noise of neighbors, if it is not too loud? Table manners?
Is there a “critical event” such as research on cancer?
Why are there anti-smoking movements in the US?
(http://www2.tobaccodocuments.org/pm/2503001914-1927.html)
General question – for all the mechanisms dealt with before: can
systems of norms be explained – like a constitution or a law?
Opp, Norms and Institutions
240
XI. Other Mechanisms: Some Suggestions
I will sketch some mechanisms that will not be discussed – for
limitation of time. This is for your term paper!
XI.1. The Is-Becomes-Ought Mechanism
Example customary law (Gewohnheitsrecht): assume person P has
crossed the land of his neighbor to catch the bus to work for several
years. All of a sudden the neighbor’s new wife wants to forbid P to
cross the premises. But P has acquired the right to cross the land.
(see http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gewohnheitsrecht).
Question: when does a behavioral regularity lead to a norm that one
has a right or is entitled to perform the respective behavior?
Opp, Norms and Institutions
241
The mechanism is:



a behavior has been performed for some time;
a norm develops that one should (or is allowed to) perform this
behavior;
if somebody wants to prevent the behavior he or she is sanctioned.
Examples:





A husband brings his wife regularly flowers – in general: somebody
always gives a (big) present and then suddenly stops this (or gives
smaller presents);
a father takes his child regularly to the zoo and then stops it;
a man regularly steals something if he buys in a shop, and then
stops this;
a person takes regularly route A to a bus and not route B, and then
changes routes.
High social welfare payments are cut (in general: state benefits are
reduced).
Opp, Norms and Institutions
242
Idea: might externalities be relevant? Stopping activities that
generate positive externalities lead first to cognitive, then to
normative expectations to continue providing the benefits.
Perhaps one of the previous models could be applied?
Opp, Norms and Institutions
243
XI.2. Subversive Attenuation of Norms
Assume there is a norm that has been followed for a long time.
Then there is a slow erosion of the conformity to the norm,
then the norm continuously attenuates until it disappears.
Examples from Germany:
Engagement (Verlobung): presents could be claimed back in
case the couple splits up.
Unfaithfulness of a married partner (adultery) was punished if
reported to the police.
Pocket money paragraph: wife could only spend little amounts of
money without permission of the husband. Otherwise the
purchase was invalid.
Other “outdated” norms: manners (children stand up for adults ...)
Opp, Norms and Institutions
244
The mechanism is:



At some point in time a norm is generally accepted (i.e. there
is oughtness and sanctioning).
Then an increasing number of people do not adhere to the
norm, i.e. norm-conforming behavior decreases.
The norm attenuates and, finally, is no longer accepted and
adhered to.
Why does non-conformity diminish oughtness?
Opp, Norms and Institutions
245
XI.3. How Norms May Spread
There are two other mechanisms that focus on the spread of
norms (the norms thus exist already):


Imitation, e.g. norms of the upper class are adopted by the
lower class (table manners, fashion);
internalization (norms become motives of their own –
especially when children learn norms).
Note: in the transmission process norms may change – see
the norms of children and their parents.
When are norms imitated and internalized, and to what extent
do they change? When do actors invest to internalize norms
in others (like parents)?
Opp, Norms and Institutions
246
XI.4. Norms by Contract
Examples:
Businessmen make explicit contracts.
In everyday life there are many implicit contracts (mutual
promises).
The contracting parties generate a norm that holds only for
the parties.
What are the conditions for what kinds of contracts?
Sometimes norms are “generalized,” i.e. adopted by the same
partners for different contracts or by other parties. (See general
business conditions – Allgemeine Geschäftsbedingungen.) See
commercial code (Handelsgesetzbuch). WHY?
See the vast literature in “law and economics.”
Opp, Norms and Institutions
247
XII. The Origin of Norms by Design:
Collective Norm Making
Many norms and systems of norms (institutions) emerge by
design, i.e. by collective decisions: a group of individuals (a
parliament, a government, the board or the member assembly of
a sports club) vote on some issue, according some decision
rule like a simple majority rule, a qualified majority or unanimity.
This decision is then implemented.
How can such collective decisions about norms or institutions
be explained? (I.e. when does “the group” choose rule A or B?)
I will present some propositions. As an illustration I use:
Riker, William H. 1995. "The Experience of Creating Institutions: The Framing
of the United States Constitution." Pp. 121-144 in Explaining Social
Institutions, edited by Jack Knight and Itai Sened. Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
248
XII.1. Some Facts About the Creation of the American
Constitution
July 4, 1776: declaration of independence of the United States
of America.
“On September 17, 1787, the Constitution was completed in
Philadelphia at the Federal Convention ... The Convention submitted
the Constitution to the Congress of the Confederation, where it
received approval according to Article 13 of the Articles of
Confederation.
In March 4, 1789, the government under the Constitution began
operations.” I.e. the US constitution went into effect.
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Constitution)
Riker explains the voting of the Federal Convention in 1787.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
249
XII.2. The Actors’ Goals
The members of a group who want to make a collective decision
have goals they want to achieve.
The higher the intensity (or importance) of the goals, the
more likely they determine the outcome of a vote.
E.g., the goal that each single state in the US has a say in the
decisions of the government, the goal of “checks and balances”
were determinants of the votes of the members of the assembly.
The lower the intensity of goals the more likely they are
changed in negotiations.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
250
To what extent are externalities relevant for the votes?
Actors’ goals could be to remove or internalize existing or
expected negative or positive externalities in the population
or of the president (if he becomes too powerful).
Actors’ goals could be to create positive externalities for the
population or groups (financial support for young families).
Opp, Norms and Institutions
251
Another condition for the outcome of a vote is the possibility of
logrolling (Stimmentausch): is there a chance for “trade-offs” – I
give up a less important goal if you vote for a more important goal of
mine. If this is is possible it is likely that goals of lower importance to
the actors are given up so that a collective decision becomes more
likely.
Person A
Person B
Rule 1 Rule 2
Rule 1
Rule 2
Vertical lines: evaluation
from low (below) to high
(above)
Arrows: valuation of rules
by Person A and Person B
Thus, person A could ask B to vote on 1, and promise to vote on 2, in
return. (Will both believe each other?)
This distribution of the goal intensities allows logrolling.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
252
The outcome of a vote further depends on ideas about new
rules that satisfy all (or the required number of) parties, i.e.
on finding compromises.
Compromises are often difficult to find. Often somebody has an
idea after a long negotiation that is immediately accepted!
This indicates that it is difficult to predict collective decisions!
Opp, Norms and Institutions
253
XII.3. Beliefs About the Empirical Effects of Norms
Actors will choose those norms that in their opinion realize
their goals to the highest extent.
There are thus beliefs about what kind of norms will have
which empirical effects.
Example: a decentralization of the school and university system
in Germany (i.e. schools and universities are a matter of the
“Länder”) was supposed to lead to competition between the
states for “better” schools and universities.
This was the belief after the Nazi rule. What happened?
Thus, a vote for a norm will be likely if the norm is supposed
to have relatively positive consequences (= externalities).
Opp, Norms and Institutions
254
Among the empirical effects of creating a norm are also the
effects on the support of those who make the norms.
See political decisions before an election!
Thus, two kinds of consequences can be distinguished:


consequences for those for whom the norm is costly or
beneficial (see scrap premium – Abwrackprämie – in Germany;
pollution: there are those who benefit from a law diminishing
pollution and those who have to bear costs);
consequences for the support of the norm makers (extent to
which the voters like the rule and to which the rule leads to higher
support such as a higher number of votes for the party).
What are the primary goals? Public choice theory: commongood fiction! Politicians want support and re-election! See “neue
Energiepolitik” in Germany!
Opp, Norms and Institutions
255
XII.4. Decision Rules as Major Constraints for
Decision Outcomes
The decision rule with the highest cost is unanimity (or a low
blocking minority). Depending on the distribution of goals
and their intensity only extensive bargaining leads to a joint
decision, and perhaps no unanimity is ever achieved.
A simple majority rule (the rule that receives most of the votes is
passed) is less costly.
Thus, the higher the required unanimity of a rule, the less
likely a collective outcome will come about or the longer
negotiations will last.
Buchanan, James M., and Gordon Tullock. 1965. The Calculus of
Consent. Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
256
XII.5. The Influence of Predecessor-Institutions: the
Role of Path-Dependence
“ ... no institution is created de novo. Consequently, in any
new institution one should expect to see hangovers from the
past” (121).
There is a vast number of constitutions that preceded the
American one, such as those from the colonial governments
or the Dutch Republic (from 1570 and still existing in 1787).
What are the factors that influence the impact of pre-existing
norms and institutions?
Opp, Norms and Institutions
257



Those institutions influence a new institution that one had
experienced personally (123),
institutions that are “significant” for the framing (123), i.e.
relevant for achieving the goals of the actors,
accessibility (“no framer could read Dutch” – 124).
In general: The actors’ goals and the accessibility of preexisting constitutions determine which constitution is
considered and which single rules are used.
Question: which constitution would the framers of the German
constitution of 1949 (“Grundgesetz”) consider?
What about the Nazi laws?
These are questions for a possible term paper!
Opp, Norms and Institutions
258
Conditions for Collective Norm Making: A Preliminary Summary
Intensity of goals
realized by rule (R)
Likelihood of negotiation about goals
+
+
+
Positive evaluation of
consequences for
lawmakers through R
+
Likelihood of finding
an acceptable compromise
Constraints imposed
by decision rule
Heterogeneity of goals
(NEW)
Collective decision about
accepting rules R
-
How can path
dependence be
included?
Perhaps a cause of
Independent variables
259
XII.6. What is the Difference to the Previous Models?
Possible differences
Ho
Ax
Ell.
Convent.
Demsetz
Cole
man
Smoking
Coll
dec
Transfer of rights and creation of central authority
most beneficial / collective dec. change rights
+
-
-
-
-
-
-
+
Political entrepreneurs available for setting up an
organization…/ "normative" entrepreneurs for
conventions and for public goods provision /
politicians for collective decisions
+
-
-
?
?
+
-
+
Private sanctioning / self-enforcement for
conventions / at low costs (smoking) / not
sufficient for collective decisions
+*
+
+
?
+
+
+
?
There is only a private interest in preventing
defection of one's partner
-
+
-
-
?
-
+
-
Externalities (or beliefs about consequences of
norm – collective decision making)
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
Preexisting norms of cooperation and sanctioning,
including path dependence
-
-
+
?
+
?
+
+
per
hap
s
per
ha
ps
+
?
-
+
+
?
+
-
+
+
+
+
+
+
Intense multiplex relationships (shadow of the
future –> sanction possibilities) / repeated
interactions for conventions
Verbal communication possible
260
XII.7. Questions and Comments on the Table
Important for all processes of norm emergence:


Path dependence: was that included in previous theories? (Vast
literature – see last section)
Beliefs about the consequences of norms are relevant – to be
included under “externalities” – see big table.
Does centralized norm making suggest how in general systems
of norms (= institutions) can be explained by the other “theories”?
Will be discussed later.
NOTE: collective decisions are explained by explaining individual
behavior!
Opp, Norms and Institutions
261
Perhaps only general
model 272
XIII. The Effects of Norms and Institutions
So far the origin of norms was addressed.
Most of the literature deals with the effects of norms. Thus,
norms or institutions are regarded as given.
This is the topic of this section.
I will present some general propositions and some illustrations.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
262
XIII.1. The Possible Effects of Norms and Institutions
Norms and institutions may have effects on:





Behavior
 conformity to or violation of the norm
 side effects (e.g. discriminatory effects of antidiscrimination laws – e.g. dismissal of handicapped);
preferences or attitudes (e.g. toward the regulated behavior
or toward the norm makers);
cognitive beliefs (e.g. expectations about the regularity of
the demanded or prohibited behavior);
other norms/institutions (path dependence – see US
constitution);
change of the respective norm itself at a later time
(feedback effects – e.g. if a norm does not work it may be
changed).
Opp, Norms and Institutions
263
In what follows I will concentrate on behavior which is most
often addressed in the literature as well.
A necessary condition for norms to have any effect is that
individuals recognize that a norm holds in a certain situation.
It does not always happen that the norm is activated.
See, with further references: Stroebe, Wolfgang. 2008. "Warum und wie
beeinflussen Normen das Verhalten: Eine sozial-kognitive Analyse.“
Pp. 101-118 in Rational Choice: Theoretische Analysen und empirische
Resultate. Festschrift für Karl-Dieter Opp zum 70. Geburtstag, edited by
Andreas Diekman, Klaus Eichner, Peter Schmidt, and Thomas Voss.
Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
Intuitive example: it often happens in everyday life that one asks
oneself: shouldn’t one have behaved in another way in a certain
situation (e.g. apologized for a behavior – one should have
sent a Christmas card ...)
Opp, Norms and Institutions
264
XIII.2. Which Theory Could and Should Be Applied to
Explain the Effects of Norms or Institutions?
Methodological assumption: it is useful to apply a theory and not
try ad hoc to explain effects of norms.
Question then is: what theory could an should be applied?
Sociological role theory
Biddle, Bruce J. 1986. "Recent Developments in Role Theory." Annual Review
of Sociology 12:67-92.
Biddle, Bruce J., and Edwin J. Thomas (Eds.). 1966. Role Theory: Concepts
and Research. New York: Wiley.
Symbolic interactionism
Swidler, Ann. 1986. "Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies." American
Sociological Review 51:272-286.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
265
Rational choice theory (RCT)
Most of the literature applies this theory – difference between
narrow and wide version.
Basic problem: can norms/institutions be included as independent variables in RCT? This is controversial.
Elster, Jon. 1989b. "Social Norms and Economic Theory." Journal of
Economic Perspectives 3:99-117.
Opp, K.-D. (2013). "Norms and Rationality. Is Moral Behavior a Form of
Rational Action?" Theory & Decision 74(3): 383-409.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
266
How do norms fit into rational choice theory?
Do the norms dimensions refer to costs and benefits and,
thus, can explain behavior?
Internalized norms / acceptance of norms: these are preferences for following a norm, i.e. following a norm is intrinsically
rewarding, deviation is costly (bad conscience, shame).
Existing normative expectations of others: they are not costs
or benefits per se, but only if others are reference persons
(then they diminish the realization of goals such as having a
good reputation in the opinion of the reference persons).
Sanctions are reactions to norm conformity or deviations.
They need not be costs or benefits – only if they reduce the
realization of goals (then they are constraints).
Opp, Norms and Institutions
267
Why could norms not fit into rational choice theory?
“Rational action is concerned with outcomes. Rationality says: If
you want to achieve Y, do X. By contrast, I define social norms by
the feature that they are not outcome-oriented. The simplest social
norms are of the type: Do X, or: Don´t X. More complex norms say:
If you do Y, then do X ... Rationality is essentially conditional and
future-oriented. Social norms are either unconditional or, if
conditional, are not future-oriented” (underlining not in the original).
Elster, Jon. 1989. "Social Norms and Economic Theory." Journal of
Economic Perspectives 3:99.
Thus, there are two types of action: rational and normative action.
Question: What do you think about this argument?
Opp, Norms and Institutions
268
Critique of the argument:
1. Why define “rationality” in this way? What has this to do with
rational choice theory? There are numerous other definitions of
rationality.
2. Why are norms defined as not outcome-oriented? Instead
of simply defining something, it should be analyzed whether a
normative statement “if you do Y, then do X” is outcomeoriented.
Of course, people follow or violate norms because this is
beneficial or costly. In other words: following or violating
norms has consequences – either in terms of external
sanctions or in terms of internal sanctions (shame etc.) or
in terms of side effects (see before).
Opp, Norms and Institutions
269
3. Is normative behavior not future-oriented?
If an actor behaves in order to avoid internal sanctions, he/she
wishes to avoid certain consequences that are expected to
occur in the future. Thus, the costs and benefits of following or
violating norms occur in the future.
In fact, ELSTER supports this analysis when he acknowledges
that norms are “sustained by the feelings of embarrassment,
anxiety, guilt and shame that a person suffers at the prospects of
violating them. A person obeying a norm may also be propelled
by positive emotions, like anger and indignation” (1989: 99-100).
In other words, the “prospect” of norm violation is relevant for
the decision to conform to or to violate a norm.
Thus, norms can be included as possible costs and benefits
in a rational choice explanation!
Opp, Norms and Institutions
270
XIII.3.The Basic Model for Explaining the Effects
of Norms on Behavior
See in more detail
Opp, K.-D. (2011). Wie kann man die Wirkungen von Normen
und Werten erklären? Werte in der Begegnung.
Wertgrundlagen und Wertperspektiven ausgewählter
Lebensbereiche. H. T. Krobath. Würzburg, Königshausen
und Neumann: 293-318.
See figure on next page.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
271
S o c i a l
c o n t e xt
Internalized
External
norms/institutions (e.g. owner- normative
expectations
ship rights)
Likelihood/
severity of
sanctions
Collective norm
or institution
effects on at least
one of the following
factors (= there are
incentive effects)
Perception of norm N,
expectations, expected
sanctions of N
Acceptance or internalization of norm N /legitimacy of
norm senders or of the norm
making procedure
Costs/benefits of following or
breaking external norm N
Other costs/benefits for
compliance/deviance (e.g.
benefits of polluting)
Behavior – following
norm(s) N (e. g.
exchange, production)
(Attitudes? Beliefs?)
Example: rule of turning
lights on all day in Chech
Republic.
SeatNI_EffectsInstitut ions1 .wpg
Comments
The arrows to the independent variables indicate that other
factors are relevant. I.e. there may be pre-existing internalized
normative phenomena.
The basic theoretical idea is that a change of norms and
institutions affects incentives for individual action – but only
under certain conditions, namely if norms are accepted or
enforced.
Norms/institutions are only one set of incentives that influence
behavior – see the “other costs and benefits.”
Depending on the situation norms may be more or less
important. Example: exceeding speed limits if you are in a hurry and if you
wish to enjoy the surroundings.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
273
In contrast to the sociological role model the rational choice
model can explain very detailed kinds of action, and can take
into account not only norms as determinants of behavior.
Norms or expectations may be misperceived (e.g. percentage of crimes detected).
Only if external norm factors are incentives they will have
any effect (e.g. the law may sometimes unknown, known
laws are not adhered to – speed limits, if there are no
flashes; parking rules if they are not enforced).
Opp, Norms and Institutions
274
XIII.4. Examples for the Effects of Norms
The tragedy of the commons – private vs. common property
Assume there is one large meadow and, say, 20 farmers. The
meadow is common property.
Effects: over-consumption (and destruction of the meadow),
under-investment.
Compare this with private property: each farmer gets a piece
of land = private property.
Effects: each has an incentive not to consume too much because
he or she bears the costs if no grass grows.
Investment pays: one can exclude third parties from consumption.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
275
See Demsetz 1967.
There are other possibilities to remove the problems of common
property. E. Ostrom shows various ways of how groups dealt with
common pool resources.
Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Governing the Commons. The Evolution of
Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
The example illustrates: changes of property rights that are
enforced change the incentives for various kinds of activities.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
276
Numerous other examples show that norms provide
incentives that affect behavior – more or less:







norms of language
table manners
rules of politeness
traffic rules
patents
employment protection
markets vs. central planning: incentives for producing
according to consumer preferences, incentives for
behavior of managers (act according to plan ...),
incentives for innovations ...
Themes for term paper!
277
Opp, Norms and Institutions
XIV. A Toolkit for Institutional Analysis
XIV.1. Explaining the ORIGIN of Norms and Institutions
Task is to explain the emergence, stability or change of
certain norms or institutions. Question: what is an adequate
procedure?
In what follows the phenomena to be explained are statements
about what ought to be the case and their acceptance,
sanctioning behavior (in the sense of a behavior that is
intended to punish or reward conformity to or violation of a
norm (= ought statement)), and behavior that conforms to or
violates a norm (accords with normative statements).
In what follows I will suggest “rules” of how to proceed.
Note: the “rules” are not moral imperatives but technological
statements: if you wish to achieve good explanations, do X.
278
The first step should be:
Rule 1: Specify what you want to explain.
In terms of “norms,” this could be




a new statement of a norm – e.g. a new law is suggested;
change of acceptance of a statement that something ought
or ought not to be the case;
change of sanctioning behavior
change of norm-related behavior – conformity to or violation
of a norm.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
279
Rule 2: Apply a theory referring to individual actors that is
capable of accounting for the explanandum.
Those who accept a norm or sanction or perform a norm-related
behavior are individual actors. If collective norm making is the
explanatory problem, one should look at the decisions of the
individuals who make up the collective – see lawmaking and the
section about collective norm making.
Rule 2 thus seems useful.
Possible candidates for such a theory are a wide version of
rational choice theory and other social psychological theories
such as the Fishbein-Ajzen theory.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
280
For an alternative qualitative approach see Swidler, Ann.
1986. "Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies.“ American
Sociological Review 51:272-286. Problem: low explanatory
power!
Explaining norm-related phenomena often involves two steps:


How did the incentives of the actors change?
 example of the non-smoking norm: costs of being exposed
to smoking increased; or someone joins a new social
network by moving to another place.
Why did the incentives change?
 example non-smoking norm: macro factors changed such
as spread of scientific findings. In general: macro events
are the relevant factors (see also Demsetz 1967:
technological developments etc.)
Opp, Norms and Institutions
281
Thus, explaining norms often means that there are some macro
events that change incentives which lead to norm-related
behavior. Consequently:
Rule 3: Try to set up a micro-macro model.
Macro
changes
correlation
Change of
norm-related
incentives
Norm/institution
Individual
behavior
seatNI_HowToDoInstitutionalAnalysis.wpd
Opp, Norms and Institutions
282
The models in the previous sections include a list of factors that
may be relevant for explaining the emergence and effects of
norms and institutions.
See the “big tables” and the causal model in the section about
Axelrod. Accordingly, a useful rule is:
Rule 4: Check the relevance of the factors listed in the
previous table.
This includes “path dependence” – which is emphasized as a
major factor in the recent literature.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
283
Notes on path dependence
Basic idea in regard to norms and institutions:
past norms and institutions may determine what later norms
and institutions look like.
This is an orienting statement: we may use it as a heuristic rule:
Rule 4a: If you explain norms and institutions, look at
the effects of previous norms and institutions.
Examples: QWERTY keyboard, US constitution (see before),
language, table manners (general use of chopsticks unlikely in
Germany).
Opp, Norms and Institutions
284
Why could past norms/institutions affect later norms/institutions?
Answer from a rational choice perspective: earlier norms/
institutions impose certain costs/benefits on the acceptance or
adoption of later norms/institutions.
There is a vast literature where these costs and benefits are
spelled out for specific kinds of institutions that are to be
explained.
Rule 4b: If you explain norms and institutions, look at
the costs and benefits that previous norms and
institutions have on the norms and institutions to be
explained.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
285
NOTE 1: the extensive literature on path dependence is not
a unified theory but a set of case studies with many orienting
statements!
NOTE 2: the idea of path dependence implies that
norms/institutions need not be “efficient” (from a subjective or
objective perspective): see QWERTY. Reason: costs of
change to an “efficient” norm may be too high.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
286
Some references on path dependence
Basic references are:
Arthur, Brian W. 1989. "Competing Technologies, Increasing
Returns, and Lock-in by Historical Events." The Economic Journal
99:116-131.
—. 1994. Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy.
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
See further:
Mahoney, James. 2000. "Path Dependence in Historical Sociology."
Theory and Society 29:507-548.
Pierson, Paul. 2004. Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and
Political Analysis. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
287
Critical junctures
“Critical junctures are characterized by the adoption of a
particular institutional arrangement from among two or more
alternatives. These junctures are ‘critical’ because once a
particular option is selected it becomes progressively more
difficult to return to the initial point when multiple alternatives
were still available” (Mahoney 2000: 513).
Example: change of the welfare state! Qwerty keyboard.
This is again an orienting hypothesis which may be
reformulated as a heuristic rule:
Rule 4c: If you explain why norms and institutions do not
change, examine whether the costs and benefits of change
depend on previous changes of the norm/institutions.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
288
Explanations of institutions often follow a simple two-time
cause and effect pattern. E.g.: what are the causes for the
decline of smoking after the introduction of a non-smoking law?
Many scholars are not satisfied with such short-term
explanations. If there is a process where a norm or institution
assumes the present shape after a longer time, it is useful to
take a longer period into account:
Rule 5: Try to model a process of norm emergence
This may also include hypotheses about the effects of norms:
a new law – lowering costs of health care – may lead to a
strong demand for health services, which leads to a change of
the law.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
289
Explaining institutions as unified entities
It was said before that institutions are systems of norms.
Example: inheritance laws.
Can such a system of norms be explained as a unified
entity, i.e. is it possible to explain “the” institution as a whole,
or is it necessary to explain the single norms an “institution”
consists of?
At one extreme, it is possible that a whole system of rules is
preferred by a group of actors to a whole system of other rules.
In this case “the” institution can be explained.
Another extreme is that each single rule must be explained:
each rule emerges separately due to different incentives.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
290
Example: inheritance rights
Beckert, Jens. 2004. Unverdientes Vermögen. Soziologie des Erbrechts.
Frankfurt/New York: Campus.
—. 2008. Inherited Wealth. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Beckert investigates the development of inheritance rights in
Germany, France and the US.
He does not explain “the” inheritance rights, but discusses
four conflictual areas (“Konfliktfelder”): (1) the rights of a
person to determine what happens with his wealth after his
death, (2) the rights of the relatives of a bequeather
(especially of the spouse and the children), (3) the goods that
must remain in the family (“Fideikommisse”) and cannot be
divided, and (4) the taxation of the heritage.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
291
These are again four complex sub-institutions (like taxation).
The question arises, whether they have to be further broken
down. This question can only be answered by looking at the
case in detail. See, as another example, the explanation of the
US constitution.
The following rule seems useful:
Rule 6: In explaining institutions try to begin simple:
check how each rule can be explained. Whether
explaining an institution as a whole is useful must be
decided during the explanation.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
292
XIV.2. Explaining the EFFECTS of Norms and
Institutions
The “rules” are similar to those of explaining the origin of
norms and institutions:
Rule 1: Specify what the norms or institutions are whose
effects are to be explained.
Rule 2: Apply a theory referring to individual actors and
specify which actors might be affected in what way by the
norms or institutions.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
293
Rule 3: Try to set up a micro-macro model – see the general
model of the effects of norms before.
Rule 4: Decide which dimensions of the norm concept are
to be addressed – oughtness, sanctions, regular behavior.
Rule 5: Try to model a process of the effects of norms and
institutions.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
294
XV. Summary: An Inventory of the
Mechanisms of Norm Emergence
In explaining norms or institutions one might make use of
the mechanisms described before. The question could be to
what extent these mechanisms can be applied.
Further research is needed to specify the conditions when each
of these mechanisms apply.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
295
Here is a list of the mechanisms addressed before:











transfer of rights to a central authority (Hobbes – 76);
cooperation through decentralized private interest (mutual)
sanctioning 102, 129 (Axelrod, Ellickson);
cumulative dispersion of norms by precedent (conventions) 146;
the creation of norms by collective action (Demsetz, Coleman) 149
ff.;
norm emergence by private interest sanctioning (Opp) 195;
the is-becomes-ought mechanism (212);
subversive attenuation of norms (213);
imitation (215);
internalization (215)
norms by contract
collective norm making.
Opp, Norms and Institutions
296
Questions:
Are there more mechanisms?
Are there other differences between these mechanisms?
Opp, Norms and Institutions
297
XVI. How to Get a Grade – Requirements for
Papers
Scheine können durch Verfassen einer Hausarbeit erworben
werden.
Themen: Einzige Bedingung für die Wahl eines Themas ist,
dass es sich mit der Entstehung und/oder den Wirkungen von
Normen befasst. „Normen“ umfassen hier auch Gesetze.
Dabei kann z.B. eine konkrete Norm herausgegriffen
und erklärt werden – etwa die Entstehung der NichtRauchergesetze. Es können auch die Wirkungen bestimmter
Normen erklärt werden. Weiter können Theorien diskutiert
werden.
Wichtig: Eine rein deskriptive Arbeit reicht nicht. Es
muss sich um ein Erklärungsproblem handeln.
284
Wenn Sie ein Thema gewählt haben: bitte schreiben Sie mir
eine Email, die ich sofort beantworten werde:
[email protected]. Ich werde sofort antworten!
Theorien oder Sachverhalte, die in der Vorlesung behandelt
wurden, brauchen nicht im Einzelnen dargestellt zu
werden.
Umfang: bei einem Verfasser bzw. einer Verfasserin der
Hausarbeit lautet die Daumenregel: ca. 15 Seiten. Hausarbeiten
mit bis zu 3 Personen – mit entsprechend größerem Umfang –
werden akzeptiert.
Englischsprachige Literatur. Leider kommt es immer wieder
vor, dass Hausarbeiten nur oder überwiegend deutschsprachige
Literatur enthalten. Normalerweise liegt zu jedem Thema eine
umfangreiche englischsprachige Literatur vor, die
selbstverständlich zu benutzen ist.
285
Zitieren aus zweiter Hand: Es kommt leider immer wieder
vor, dass eine Theorie dargestellt wird, und dass dabei nicht
das ursprüngliche Werk, sondern eine andere Quelle wie z.B.
ein Lehrbuch zitiert wird. Es versteht sich eigentlich von
selbst, dass Zitieren aus zweiter Hand nicht akzeptable ist.
Rechtschreibung und Zeichensetzung. Arbeiten mit vielen
Fehlern nehme ich nicht an.
Abgabe der Arbeit: Bitte geben Sie eine gedruckte Fassung
Ihrer Arbeit bei Frau Apelt (meine ehemalige Sekretärin) ab, sie
schickt sie mir (mit dem zugehörigen Schein) zu. Bitte
vermerken Sie ihre Email-Adresse auf der Arbeit, ich werde
Ihnen zur Bewertung schreiben.
Es gibt keinen festen Abgabetermin!
Zeitraum für Korrektur: drei Wochen.
Fragen?
286
This is the end!
Thanks for your
patience!