MAJOR HAZARDS CONTROL

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Transcript MAJOR HAZARDS CONTROL

MAJOR HAZARDS
CONTROL
Direktorat Pengawasan Norma K3
Kemenakertrans
MAJOR HAZARD
Danger of large accidents, with consequences not only on the
plant site, but also in the surroundings :
 Many dead or wounded
 Heavy damage to buildings
 Wide and unfavorable publicity: press, radio,TV
 Emotional public reactions
 Serious consequences for the company involved :
 Production loss
 Investigation
 Insurance procedures
 Additional safety requirements
 Shutdown, perhaps : PERMANENT
MAJOR ACCIDENT
A major accident is defined in the regulation as :
“A sudden occurrence at facility causing
serious danger or harm to :
- a relevant person or
- an at risk community or
- property or
- the environment
whether the danger or harm occurs immediately
or at a later time”.
(Australian Government – Comcare)
HARMFUL EFFECT ARISING FROM
MAJOR CHEMICAL HAZARDS
1)
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6)
7)
DEATHS – immediate and delayed
PHYSICAL INJURIES – disabling and non disabling
MENTAL INJURIES – short term or long term
SOCIAL TRAUMA – short term or long term
DISRUPTION OF PEOPLE’S WAY OF LIFE – short
term or long term
ENVIRONMENT DAMAGE – short term or long term
FINANCIAL LOSS; property damage; consequential
loss
INCIDENT BHOPAL,INDIA (3/12/84)
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Nature of occurrence : runaway reaction in
storage tank released ca. 30 tons of MIC
Fatalities : Immediate : > 2000; delayed : ??
Physical injuries : + 200.000; disabled : ??
Mental injuries : extreme shock & panic,
prolonged & extreme anxiety
Disruption of people’s way of live : ??
Environmental damage : ??
Financial loss : property damage £ 100 millions
INCIDENT MEXICO CITY (19/11/84)
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Nature of occurrence : 18 hours conflagration of
ca.6000 tons of LPG
Fatalities : Immediate : > 500; delayed : ??
Physical injuries : 7097; disabled : 100
Mental injuries : severe shock & panic
Disruption of people’s way of live : 39.000
homeless or evacuated; hundreds of houses up
to 300 meters destroyed
Environmental damage : ??
Financial loss : property damage >£ 13 millions
INCIDENT PIPER ALPHA OIL PLATFORM,
NORTH SEA (6/7/88)
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Nature of occurrence : explosion destroyed oil
production platform
Fatalities : Immediate : 167; delayed : nil
Physical injuries : 20; disabled : 7
Mental injuries : loss of public confidence; loss of
morale in workforce
Disruption of people’s way of live : relief fund £
millions
Environmental damage : 5 km oil slick formed
Financial loss : property damage + £ 500
millions
SPECIFIC FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO
MAJOR ACCIDENT (1)
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Poor management practices; e.g : inadequate
supervision
Pressure to meet production target
Inadequate Safety Management System
Failure to learn lessons from previous accident
Communication issues; e.g : between shifts, between
personnel and management
Inadequate reporting system
Complacency
Violation / non compliance behavior
SPECIFIC FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO
MAJOR ACCIDENT (2)
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Inadequate training, e.g : emergency response, fire
and safety
Lack of competency
Excessive working hours resulting in mental fatigue
Inadequate procedures
Modification /up date to equipment without operator
knowledge and/ or revised risk assessment
Inadequate /insufficient maintenance
Maintenance error
MAJOR HAZARD CONTROL
is
Prevention of Major Accidents
Factors Influencing Major Incidents
MAJOR ACCIDENTS OCCUR ALWAYS
UNEXPECTED
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At night
During the weekend
When the factory is stopped
During a power failure
In very bad weather
CONTROL MEASURES
Avoidance of Risks
 Prevention of Accidents
 Mitigation of Consequences
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Sitting of the plant
Lay out
Design
Construction
Start up
Operation
Maintenance
Repair
Modification
Decommissioning
AVOIDANCE OF RISKS
Small Inventories
 Safer Substances
 Lower Pressure
 Lower Temperature
 Etc
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REDUCE
POTENTIAL
PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS
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Ensure adequate control
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Site Layout
Operator training
Operation Maintenance
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instrumentation
Reduce Failures
Improve Detection
Improve Shutdown
Improve Relief
Work permit system
Inspection, testing
Accident - investigation
Etc
REDUCE
PROBABILITY
MITIGATION OF CONSEQUENCES
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Detection systems
Emergency action on site
Choice of site
Firefighting system
First aid kit
Personal service/ambulance
Control development nearby
Etc
REDUCE
IMPACT
ACCIDENT MODEL
HUMAN
FAILURE
Unsafe acts
INCIDENT
Latent
Errors
Unsafe Plant/
Condition
PERFORMANCE
INFLUENCING FACTORS
Fail to
recover situation
ORGANISATION
PERSON
JOB
Failure of
mitigation
ACCIDENT
ACCIDENT MODEL
ORGANISATION
PERSON
JOB
ORGANISATION :
• kharakteristik perusahaan
• sistem manajemen
• diklat
• pengawasan/supervisi
• pengupahan
• lingkungan sosial
• dll
PERSON :
• aptitude
• sifat
• sistem nilai
• kharakteristik
• minat
• motivasi
• usia
• jenis kelamin
• pendidikan
• pengalaman dll
JOB :
• mesin
• peralatan kerja
• bahan
• lingkungan fisik
• metode kerja
• dll
HUMAN FACTOR
HUMAN
FACTOR
(Health & Safety Executive -1999)
JOB
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The JOB – what people are ask to do
(task/workload/procedures/environment/equipment)
The INDIVUAL – who is doing it (competence/attitude/capability/risk
perception)
ORGANIZATION – how is the work organized
(leadership/resources/culture/communication)
EXAMPLES OF MAJOR HAZARD
WORKS
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Petrochemical Works
Chemical Works
LPG Storage
Fertilizer Works
Explosives Manufacture
Bulk Use of Chlorine
Pesticide factories
Etc
CONTOH
INDUSTRIAL MAJOR ACCIDENT
PELEDAKAN (Explosions)
I.
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Cyxlohexane (Mati : 28; Cidera : 89) Flixborough –UK, 1974
Propylene (Mati : 14; Cidera :107) Beek, Netherland, 1975
KEBAKARAN (Major Fires)
II.
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LPG (Mati : 650; Cidera : 2500) Mexico City, 1985
TOKSIK (Toxic Release)
III.
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Methyl Isocyanate (MIC) (Mati :2000;Cidera :20000 Bhopal,
India, 1984
MAJOR ACCIDENT
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BHOPAL – absence of system maintenance
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PIPER ALPHA – an error in work organization
and transmission of instruction
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CHERNOBYL – breach of safety regulation
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FLIXBOROUGH – a poorly designated
modification
DESIGNATION OF MAJOR
HAZARD PLANT
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List of Substances considered to be
dangerous
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Threshold Quantities for each of substances
on the list
PENETAPAN POTENSI BAHAYA
INSTALASI
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POTENSI BAHAYA BESAR :
Kuantitas Bahan yang Digunakan melebihi
Nilai Ambang Kuantitas (NAK)
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Qs > TQ
POTENSI BAHAYA MENENGAH : Kuantitas
Bahan yang Digunakan sama atau lebih kecil Nilai
Ambang Kuantitas (NAK)
Qs = TQ atau Qs < TQ
KEWAJIBAN PENGUSAHA ATAU PENGURUS
Persh. Potensi Bahaya Besar (I)
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Mempekerjakan Petugas K3 Kimia :
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Sistem Kerja Non Shift min. 2 orang
Sistem Kerja Shift min. 5 orang
Mempekerjakan Ahli K3 Kimia min. 1 orang
Membuat Dokumen Pengendalian Potensi
Bahaya Besar
Melaporkan Setiap Perubahan (bahan, kuantitas,
proses dan modifikasi instalasi)
KEWAJIBAN PENGUSAHA ATAU PENGURUS
Persh. Potensi Bahaya Besar (II)
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Melakukan Pemeriksaan dan Pengujian
Faktor Kimia min. 6 bulan sekali
Melakukan Pemeriksaan dan Pengujian
Instalasi min. 2 tahun sekali
Melakukan Pemeriksaan Kesehatan Tenaga
Kerja min. 1 tahun sekali
KEWAJIBAN PENGUSAHA ATAU PENGURUS
Persh. Potensi Bahaya Menengah (I)
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Mempekerjakan Petugas K3 Kimia :
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Sistem Kerja Non Shift min. 1 orang
Sistem Kerja Shift min. 3 orang
Membuat Dokumen Pengendalian Potensi
Bahaya Menengah
Melaporkan Setiap Perubahan (bahan,
kuantitas, proses dan modifikasi instalasi)
KEWAJIBAN PENGUSAHA ATAU PENGURUS
Persh. Potensi Bahaya Menengah (II)
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Melakukan Pemeriksaan dan Pengujian
Faktor Kimia min. 1 tahun sekali
Melakukan Pemeriksaan dan Pengujian
Instalasi min. 3 tahun sekali
Melakukan Pemeriksaan Kesehatan Tenaga
Kerja min. 1 tahun sekali
DOKUMEN PENGENDALIAN POTENSI BAHAYA BESAR
Berisikan :
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Identifikasi Bahaya, Penilaian dan
Pengendalian Risiko
Kegiatan Tehnis, Rancang Bangun,
Konstruksi, Pemilihan Bahan Kimia,
Pengoperasian dan Pemeliharaan Instalasi
Kegiatan Pembinaan Tenaga Kerja
Rencana dan Prosedur Penanggulangan
Keadaan Darurat
Prosedur Kerja Aman
DOKUMEN PENGENDALIAN POTENSI BAHAYA
MENENGAH
Berisikan :
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Identifikasi Bahaya, Penilaian dan
Pengendalian Risiko
Kegiatan Tehnis, Rancang Bangun,
Konstruksi, Pemilihan Bahan Kimia,
Pengoperasian dan Pemeliharaan Instalasi
Kegiatan Pembinaan Tenaga Kerja
Prosedur Kerja Aman
Faktor2 yg dipertimbangkan dlm
memilih lokasi MH Instalasi :
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Proximity to populated areas;
Proximity to public ways;
Risk from adjacent facilities;
Storage quantities;
Present and predicted development of
adjacent properties;
Topography of the site, including elevation
and slope;
Faktor2 yg dipertimbangkan dlm
memilih lokasi MH Instalasi :
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
Access for emergency response;
Availability of needed utility;
Requirement for the receipt and shipment
of products;
Local codes and regulation;
Prevailing wind condition;
IDENTIFICATION AND PRIOTISATION OF MAJOR
HAZARD CONTROL
1.
2.
3.
Factories
Installation
Plant Unit
PRIORITISATION OF MAJOR HAZARD
FACTORIES IDENTIFIED
FACTORY RANKING FACTOR (FRF) :
Consist of 5 rating factors :
1) Hazard Rating (HR)
2) Capacity Rating (CR)
3) Population Rating (PR)
4) Domino Effect Rating (DER)
5) Special Object Rating (SOR)
FRF = HR + CR +PR + DER + SOR
HAZARD RATING (HR)
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No.
The chemical & physical properties
The hazardous substances
Group of Hazardous Substances
Penalty
Point
1.
Extremely Toxic and Toxic Substances – gases (Cl2, NH3,
Phosgene)
25
2.
Flammable Substances (LPG, Butane, Propane, Propylene,
Hydrogen)
20
3.
Highly Reactive and Explosive Substances (NH4NO3,TNT)
15
4.
Extremely Toxic and Toxic Substances – powder/solid
(Parathion Methyl)
10
5.
Liquid Flammable Substances – solvent (Toluen, naphta)
5
CAPACITY RATING (CR)
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Max. quantity
Threshold quantity
No.
Capacity ratio
Penalty Points
1.
CR < 10
4
2.
10 < CR < 50
8
3.
50 < CR < 100
12
4.
CR > 100
16
CR =
Max. Capacity
ILO Threshold Quantity
POPULATION RATING (PR)
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Population in within a circle of 1 km
No.
Number of People
Penalty Points
1.
PR < 1000
3
2.
1000 < PR < 5000
6
3.
PR > 5000
9
DOMINO EFFECT RATING (DER)
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Major Hazard Installation
No.
Domino Effect Rating
Penalty Points
1.
1 MH Installation
0
2.
2 MH Installation
2
3.
> 3 MH Installation
4
SPECIAL OBJECTS RATING
(SOR)
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Object such as : schools, hospitals, cinemas, markets,
supermarkets etc
Within a circle of 1 km
No.
Categories
SOR points
1.
No special objects
0
2.
1 Special objects
1
3.
> 2 Special objects
2
FACTORY RANKING FACTOR
(FRF)
No.
Factories Categories
FRF
I.
Important MH Factories
12 < FRF < 27
II.
More Important MH Factories
27 < FRF < 41
III.
Most Important MH Factories
41 < FRF < 56
CONTOH 1
PT. X Jakarta, Informasi :
LPG : 37.000 tons
Penduduk lebih dari 10.000 orang, tidak
terdapat MH instalasi lainnya dan tidak ada
spesial objek
Jawaban : HR = 20; CR = 37.000 : 25 = 1480 =>
CR > 100, CRp = 16; PR = 9; DER = 0 dan
SOR = 0
Jadi FRF = 20+16+9+0+0 = 45 (Category III)
CONTOH 2
PT. X Cikampek, Informasi :
Chlorine : 113 tons
Penduduk lebih dari 1000 orang, tidak
terdapat MH instalasi lainnya dan spesial objek
sekolah dan rumah sakit
Jawaban : HR = 25; CR = 113 : 10 = 11
=> CRp = 8; PR = 6; DER = 0 dan SOR = 2
Jadi FRF = 25+8+6+0+2 = 41 (Category II)
IDENTIFICATION AND PRIORITISATION OF
MAJOR HAZARD INSTALATION
Calculation of Designation Factor (DF) of a
Major Hazard Installation :
DF = Q x CF/DQ
DF = Designation Factor of Major
Hazard Installation.
Q = Max. Quantity of Major Hazard
Substance in kg
CF = Condition Factor
DQ = Designation Quantity of Major Hazard
Substance in kg
CONDTIONS FACTOR (CF)
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A measure for the conditions under which a Major Hazard Substances
is present in the installation
Condition deviations and corrections
No.
Condition
Correction
Factor
a
Installation for Processing
Installation for storage
1
0.1
b
Installation out of doors
Installation in enclosure
1
2
c
Substance is in the gaseous phase
Substance is in the liquid phase (see table 1)
10
0.1 -10
0.1
Substance is in the solid phase (respirable powder only)
d
If the process temperature is equal or higher than ambient
If the process temperature is lower than ambient (see table 2)
0
0-3
CONDITIONS FACTOR
(CF)
CF = a x b x (c + d)
DESIGNATION QUANTITY (DQ)
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Quantity of hazardous substance when released suddenly,
can result in extreme danger for a worker within a radius of
100 m from the point of emission
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The designation Quantity :
Flammable Substances :10.000 kg
Extremely Toxic Substances : 1 kg (based on
LC < 20
mg/kg)
Toxic Substances; reference = 300 kg Chlorine
Explosive Substances; reference = 1000 kg TNT
a.
b.
c.
d.
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See list of Dangerous substances and Threshold Quantities
CORRECTION FACTOR c FOR LIQUIDS (I)
Table 1 :
No Process Temperature (Tp – Tbp)
1.
Tp>90˚c below the boiling point
80-90
below the boiling point
70-80
below the boiling point
60-70
below the boiling point
50-60
below the boiling point
40-50
below the boiling point
30-40
below the boiling point
20-30
below the boiling point
10-20
below the boiling point
<10 below or above boiling point
Correction
Factors
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
CORRECTION FACTOR c FOR LIQUIDS (II)
No Process Temperature (Tp – Tbp)
10 - 20˚c above the boiling point
20 - 30 above the boiling point
30 - 40 above the boiling point
40 - 50 above the boiling point
50 - 60 above the boiling point
60 - 70 above the boiling point
70 - 80 above the boiling point
80 - 90 above the boiling point
Tp> 90 above the boiling point
Correction
Factors
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
CORRECTION FACTOR d
Tabel 2 :
- 25˚C < boiling point < ambient ˚C : 0
- 75˚C < boiling point < - 25˚C
:1
- 125˚C < boiling point < - 75 ˚C
:2
boiling point < -125 ˚C
:3
MH INSTALLATION CATEGORIES
Designation Factor ( DF)
No.
MH Installation Categories
DF
I.
Important MH Installation
0 < DF < 100
II.
More Important MH Installation
100 < DF < 500
III.
Most Important MH Installation
DF > 500
CONTOH 1
Instalasi produksi yang tertutup, berisikan 2.100
kg bahan kimia beracun Chlorine dalam bentuk
cair pada temperatur proses 35˚C
Boiling Point Cl2 : - 34˚C
Threshold Quantity Cl2 : 300 kg. DF = ?
DF= (Q x CF)/DQ
CF = 1 (processing)x2(enclosed)x7(69˚C above
atm bp) = 14
DF = (2100 x 14)/300 kg = 98 (Category I.
Important MH Instalation )
CONTOH 2
PT.X Jawa Barat – LPG Instalasi penyimpanan yang di
lapangan terbuka, berisikan 37000 ton;
DQ = 10 ton
LPG mixture : 80% butane; 20% propane
Tbp butane : - 2˚C; Tbp propane : - 45˚C
Storage & ambient temp. (max. 35˚C)
T proses antara 30 – 40˚C diatas utk Tbp butane dan 70
- 80˚C utk propane. DF = ?
DF= (Q x CF)/DQ
DF = 80%x37000x0.1(4+0) + 20%x37000x0.1(8+0)/10
DF = 1776 (Category III. Most Important MH Instalation )
CLASSIFICATION OF PLANT
ELEMENT
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DOW INDEX
FIRE, EXPLOSION & TOXICITY INDEX
(FE&T INDEX)
CLASSIFICATION OF PLANT
ELEMENT
Category
Fire and Explosion
Index
Category I
F < 65
Category II
65 < F < 95
Category III
F > 95
Toxicity Index
T<6
6 < T < 10
T > 10
SURVEY SAFETY STUDIES
Category
Checklist 1
I
II
x
x
Checklist 2
III
x
Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOPS)
x
Accident Data
x
x
x
Emission of Safety Devices
x
x
x
CHECKLIST 1
Causes (internal and external) that may lead to loss of
containment of a hazardous material in the installation
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Failure in
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The supply/discharge of
process substances
The electric power
supply
The cooling water supply
The process water or
common water supply
Air supply
Steam supply
Inert gas supply
Fuel supply
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Explosion and/or fire in
the area
Extreme high open air
temperature
Extreme low open air
temperature
Flood
Soil subsidence
Stroke of lightning
Mechanical impact
CHECKLIST 2
Causes that may lead to loss of containment of
the hazardous substances from the installation
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Exceeding safe limits
Corrosion (internal)
Corrosion (external)
Erosion
Mechanical stress,
fatigue
Fouling and clogging
Failure of seals
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Thermal expansion
Contraction
Decomposition
Incorrect sampling
Stratification
Control errors
Fire in the observed
plant element
SEKIAN