War - WW Norton & Company
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Transcript War - WW Norton & Company
ESSENTIALS OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Chapter 8
War and Strife
War: The Data
• 14,500 armed struggles in history, depending on how
we define war
• Approximately 3.5 billion deaths
• Since 1816, between 224 and 559 international and
intrastate wars
• War incidence has declined after 1991.
• Number of battlefield deaths has declined by 80%
since 1991.
Is War Inevitable?
Realist Answers
• War can be managed but never eliminated due to
human nature.
• States exist in an anarchic system, with no
overarching authority to provide security or settle
disputes.
• States are thus insecure and must rely on self-help to
find security.
• Insecurity can lead to the “security dilemma.”
Irony of the Security Dilemma
• As one state seeks to ameliorate its insecurity, it
seeks power.
• Once state A gains power, it inadvertently makes state
B insecure.
• State B then seeks more power, which it might not
have otherwise done.
• As state B gains power, state A again becomes
insecure and seeks more power.
Irony of the Security Dilemma
• RESULTS: Vicious circle of power accumulation
Permanent condition of tension
Liberals: Is War Inevitable?
• Anarchy is a structural restraint.
• States can learn to cooperate because of self-interest
in the benefits of peace.
• International institutions act as cooperation enablers
by reducing transition costs and increasing cheating
costs—“cooperative competition.”
Liberals: Is War Inevitable?
• Benefits of cooperation will push more states to
become democratic.
• More liberal, democratic states = more peace
Radicals: Transcending War
• Capitalism turns human nature toward greed and
relentless, destructive competition.
• The state supports repressive forces of capitalism at
the expense of the majority of people, both
domestically and worldwide (imperialism).
• War will exist so long as capitalism exists.
• War can be eliminated through the triumph of
socialism, which fosters sharing of resources and
labor.
Constructivists: Reducing War
• Threats are socially constructed.
• Implications of material objects are socialized as
threatening.
• Different types of socialization can lead to different
outcomes.
Example: United Kingdom versus Iran owning
nuclear weapons
Causes of War
Individual Level of Analysis
• Individual(s)—realists and liberals
Personal characteristics of leaders
Misperceptions
Communications failures
Causes of War
Individual Level of Analysis
• Individual(s)—realists and liberals
Characteristics of the masses
• St. Augustine—act of self-preservation
• Niebuhr—war is inherent to humans
• War as the unusual event
Causes of War
State Level of Analysis
• State and society—liberal and radical views
• Struggles over internal structures and characteristics
of states cause war.
• Liberals—democracy restrains leaders, provides
outlets for opposing viewpoints.
Causes of War
State Level of Analysis
• Disagreement about effect of capitalist structure
Liberals say those states avert war, prefer trade.
Radicals say this leads to competition among
social groups, stagnation, collapse, or the search
for external markets in diversionary war.
International System
as the Cause of War
• International system—realist and radical views
• Anarchy, no final arbiter of disputes
• System in state of nature (Hobbes)
• Realists—war is caused by states challenging
international hierarchy due to
Changing state capabilities
Changing distribution of power among states
International System
as the Cause of War
• Radicals—dominant states need to expand, leading
to war over resources.
Explaining Iraq’s
Invasion of Kuwait
• Individual Level
Saddam Hussein was insecure and ruthless,
misinterpreted U.S. intentions, and miscalculated
Saudi Arabia’s interests.
• State Level
Iraq had historic claims on Kuwait and it was in
Iraq’s national interest to seize Kuwaiti oil fields;
authoritarian governments are more likely to
choose war as the means to settle disputes.
Explaining Iraq’s
Invasion of Kuwait
• International Level
Iraq believed invasion would not invoke a
response, UN Security Council lacked the
cohesion to act, and Arab League would not
condemn other Arab states’ actions.
War over South Ossetia, 2008
• Individuals
Promises of Saakashvili election—sought to
bolster Georgian pride
Putin promised force and aggressive diplomacy
• State/Society: no democracy
War over South Ossetia, 2008
• International
Russia sought to keep out competitors and
maintain its position as the regional power.
Georgia sought the greater power’s protection.
Categorizing Wars
• Interstate war—between states, as they have
recognizable leadership and locations and formal
militaries
• Intrastate/civil war—between factions within state
over control of territory or institutions; many have
international repercussions; can last decades; high
human costs
Categorizing Wars
• Total war—massive loss of life, widespread
destruction; many participants, including multiple
powers; all available weapons utilized; civilians and
military targeted
• Limited war—may be limited by goals pursued, type
of weapons used, amount of resources used; targets
Explaining the Decline
of Total War
• Memories of World War II
• Nuclear war too costly
• Development of security communities
Realists: rise of U.S. hegemony
Liberals: democratic peace, economic
interdependence, international organizations
Constructivists: people socialized into attitudes,
values, and beliefs in peace
How Wars Are Fought
• Conventional warfare—weapons can be limited in
time and space; precise targeting; easily available
Problems: chemical weapons; indiscriminate
• Weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—nuclear,
chemical, biological
Problems: radiation, indiscriminate
How Wars Are Fought
• Unconventional warfare—ignores conventions of
war
Guerilla warfare, revolutionary guerilla warfare,
asymmetric conflicts, terrorism
Going Nuclear: The View from Iran
• Iran has an “inalienable right” to develop nuclear
energy technology for peaceful purposes via Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty.
• Oil and gas will run out and refining capacity is very
limited; thus, an alternative energy source is needed.
• But Iran’s legitimate security threats from neighboring
countries (Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel) plus fear
of U.S. invasion may push nuclear development.
Going Nuclear: The View from Iran
• Iran’s decision was propelled by U.S. invasion of Iraq
and its identification of Iran as part of “axis of evil,”
even after post-9/11 intelligence information
suggested otherwise.
• Based on historic U.S. interference in Iran’s domestic
politics, the population supports government policy.
Asymmetric Conflicts:
Battle Tactics
• Asymmetric warfare—between parties of unequal
strength; weaker party seeks to neutralize opponent
strengths by exploiting weaknesses
• Guerilla war—a “small war” often inspired by
nationalism
• Revolutionary guerilla war—defeat technologically
superior and well-equipped foe by exploiting
weaknesses; civilians protect guerillas; traditional
warfare concepts eliminated; win hearts and minds of
the people
Terrorism as Asymmetric Warfare
• Elements of terrorism
Act is political by nature or intent
Committed by non-state actors
Combatant or non-combatant targets
Use unconventional means at unpredictable
places and intervals
Terrorism as Asymmetric Warfare
• Motivated by political, religious, or economic goals
• Seek to instill fear to attain goals
Terrorism’s Transformation
since the 1990s
• Attacks have become more lethal.
• Choice of weapons has become more diverse.
• More efficient infrastructure for terrorist networks
Example: electronic money laundering; funding via
illegal activities; Internet recruiting
Terrorism’s Transformation
since the 1990s
• Wider range of groups: nationalist, radical religious,
neo-Nazi, left-wing and right-wing
• State sponsors, such as Cuba, Iran, North Korea
Responses to Terrorism
• International level: conclusion of 12 conventions
designed to punish hijackers; protect infrastructure,
diplomats, and nuclear materials; and block financial
transfers
• State level: information sharing among states;
monitoring of financial flows; USA PATRIOT Act
Just War Tradition—
Jus ad Bellum
Just conditions for going into war
• Just cause: self-defense; defense of others; massive
violation of human rights
• Declaration of intent by appropriate authority
• Have intentions of ending abuses and establishing a
just peace
Just War Tradition—
Jus ad Bellum
Just conditions for going into war
• Must have exhausted all other alternatives
• Forces must be removed quickly after objectives are
achieved.
Just War Tradition—
Jus ad Bellum
Just conduct in war
• Distinguish between combatants and noncombatants
• Noncombatants protected from harm
• Violence proportionate to ends
• Undue human suffering avoided
• Individual responsibility for actions taken
Banning Landmines—
Evolution of Norms
• International campaign began in 1992
• Spearheaded by non-governmental organizations
(NGOs); coordinator was Jody Williams
• Argued weapons are indiscriminate and have an
unfair destructive impact on innocent noncombatants
• From arms control issue to human rights issue
• Constructivists: demonstrates impact of norms and
socialization in altering behavior of state and nonstate
actors
Key Questions about
Humanitarian Intervention
• How massive do human rights abuses have to be
before intervention is just?
• Who decides when a humanitarian intervention is
necessary? The United Nations? A coalition within the
region? Any powerful state?
• Is the humanitarian intervention occurring for
legitimate reasons or as an excuse to achieve other
objectives?
Key Questions about
Humanitarian Intervention
• Do states have a responsibility to protect (R2P)?
• How can some interventions be justified while other
situations cannot?
Can Military Intervention
Stop Genocide?
• YES—Genocide Convention approves state action
Force is the sufficiently fast response
Warns others
Coupled with humanitarian aid, most effective
Can Military Intervention
Stop Genocide?
• NO—Rarely involve state’s national interests
Complex organization, costly
Can be misinterpreted as neocolonialism
Nearby countries better informed but unprepared
Not effective deterrent, nonmilitary aid more
effective over long term
Realist Approaches 1:
Managing Insecurity
Balance of Power—states, as rational actors, make
decisions to increase their own capabilities and
undermine those of others
• Use of alliances to balance power both internationally
and regionally (external balancing)
• Increase military and economic capabilities to counter
potential threats (internal balancing)
Realist Approaches 1:
Managing Insecurity
Balance of Power
• Emphasis on relative versus absolute gains
• Most important technique for realists
Problems of Managing Insecurity
with Balance of Power
• The balance of power favors the status quo.
• When fundamental change occurs, the appropriate
response may provide balance.
• When power transitions are occurring, balance of
power is problematic.
Changes in NATO with Decline of
the Soviet Threat
• Increase in membership to 28 states
2009: Croatia, Albania
• Enhance operational capabilities with new technology
• Create a rapid reaction force for crises
• Diversify tasks
• Engage in out-of-area operations
NATO’s Successful
Transformation
• Realists—achieved relative gains over Russia and
increased Western security
• Liberals—strengthened democracy in postcommunist states; institutional membership increased
security, improved economic and diplomatic
cooperation, and opened the door to other institutions;
institutionalized dialogue with Russia
• Constructivists—confirmed independent identity of
post-communist states; shows acceptance of, and
means to, further norms
Realist Approaches 2: Managing
Insecurity through Deterrence
• Goal
Prevent the outbreak of war by credible a threat of
the use of force.
• Assumptions
Decision makers are rational.
The threat of destruction from nuclear warfare is
too great.
Alternatives to war are available.
Deterrence in Practice
• States must build arsenals for a credible threat.
If an alliance, such as NATO, is part of that threat,
the alliance must prove its cohesion.
• Information about the threat must be communicated.
• Leaders must be able to make rational decisions.
Deterrence in the
Twenty-first Century
• The rise of nonstate actors decreases the possibility
that deterrence will work.
• Nonstate actors do not hold territory, so a threat to
destroy territory is not effective.
• The presence of flexible, geographically spread
groups makes eliminating networks difficult.
Deterrence in the
Twenty-first Century
• Willingness to use suicide terrorism undermines
deterrence logic
• U.S. nuclear primacy may mean deterrence against
the United States is impossible.
Liberals Managing Security 1:
Collective Security
Assumptions of Collective Security
• Wars are caused by aggressive states.
• Aggressors must be stopped.
• Aggressors are easily identified.
• Aggressors are always morally wrong.
• Aggressors know ahead of time that the international
community will act against them.
Weakness of Collective Security
in Practice
• There is lack of commitment by some nations to act in
concert.
• Never works against permanent members of UN
Security Council due to veto power
• Difficulty of identifying aggressor
• It’s difficult to determine whether the aggressor is
always wrong.
Arms Control and Disarmament
Assumptions
• Fewer weapons means greater security.
• Regulate arms proliferation (arms control) or reduce
amount of arms and types of weapons (disarmament)
• Costs of security dilemma are reduced.
• Major agreements include bilateral, regional, and
global treaties covering conventional, nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons.
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT )
• Signed in 1968; in force since 1970;189 signatories
• States without nuclear weapons agree not to acquire
or develop them.
• States with nuclear weapons promise not to transfer
technology to non-nuclear states and to eventually
dismantle their own.
• International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is
“guardian” of the NPT, by means such as inspection
teams and information gathering.
Limitations of NPT
• Nuclear states outside the treaty
Cuba, India, Israel, Pakistan
• Inspections by IAEA can be difficult to conduct and
inspectors have been asked to leave.
• States can pull out of the treaty: North Korea
• Liberals acknowledge complete disarmament of all
types of weapons is unlikely (due to cheaters), but
pursue incremental disarmament.
Challenges to State-Centered
View of Security
• More intrastate violence and advancing technology
means that contain war are becoming less likely.
• Role of more private actors
Piracy
Outsourcing security tasks to private companies
“Soldier-employees” do not always have national
ties to “state-employer.”
Rethinking Security
Are we moving from state (national security) to
human security?
• Human security includes
Economic and social well-being
Literacy
Adequate health care
Clean environment
General personal safety