Transcript Security of Peer-to-Peer Systems - Information Systems and Internet

ODISSEA
Security Issues
Mehdi Kharrazi
Kulesh Shanmugasundaram
SYN
 SYN
 P2P Security Basics
 Introduction to ODISSEA
 Security Issues in ODISSEA
 Trust via Reputation
 FIN
P2P Basics
 All nodes are created equal. Not really!
 Network classification based on network
connectivity
– Exponential Networks:
Homogenous network, [average] node
connectivity is equally distributed
– Scale-free networks:
Follows power-law for connectivity, that is there
are some highly connected nodes and many not
too highly connected nodes
 Current P2P systems are scale-free networks
Network Maps
 Partial map of Gnutella Network
 Note the hierarchical structure of the network
Network Maps…
 Gnutella Neighborhood Map
Failure vs. Attack
 Failure:
– Random failure of nodes and/or infrastructure
elements
 Attack:
– Systematic failure of nodes and/or infrastructure
elements
 Scale-free networks are failure-tolerance
 Exponential networks are attack-tolerance
 Why?
 Most P2P systems give priority for failure-
tolerance over attack-tolerance
Possible Targets
 Underlying protocol layers
 P2P routing mechanism
 Nodes themselves
 Trust system
 Homeostasis (of the system)
 Applications/Application Protocols
 Users
More on that: “Security Issues in Peer-to-Peer Systems ”
http://vip.poly.edu/kulesh/skunk/talks/
ODISSEA: A p2p Search Engine
 A p2p search engine
 Applications:
– Search in p2p networks
– Search in intranets
– Web search
– Middleware
 How the search engine works?
ODISSEA: A p2p Search Engine
Security Issues
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Three Categories:
1. P2P Search Engine Related
2. P2P Network Related
3. General Security Issues
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Search Engine Related:
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Content Poisoning:
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Protocol Security
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Protection against MIMs
Truthful Execution of Ranking Algorithms
Compartmentalization
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Crawler
Parser
Query Processor
Search on a multi-level security network
Anonymity
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P2P networks are used for anonymity
Content Poisoning
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Crawler:
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Crawler associates wrong URL with some document
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E.g.: Associates playboy.com/index.html with ODISSEA web site!
Suggested solutions:
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Random Re-Crawling:
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At random re-crawl a URL
Simple but has re-crawling overhead
No verification from the source!
2. Signed Documents:
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Have the web server sign the document (Just another header)
Parser verifies the signature prior to parsing
No re-crawling overhead
Requires PKI and web server needs to support signatures
Content Poisoning
 Parser:
– Malicious parser associates wrong keywords
– E.g: Associates ODISSEA with porn!
 Suggested Solutions:
– TruthSayer for XML documents (Oakland ’01)
 Query Processor:
– Censorship by query processors!
Protocol Security
 ODISSEA Search Protocol
– Has no security primitives at all
– MIM a good and easy possibility
• Queries, query results can be altered
• Postings and documents can be altered
• E.g. Integrity of copies
 Ranking Algorithms
– Users have the option to send their own algorithm
– There is no way to assure proper algorithm is used
– I say “PageRank” query processor uses
“PigeonRank”
ODISSEA for Multilevel Security Architecture
 Ideal Setting: NSA Information Processing Facility
 Environment:
– Large secure intranet (100,000 nodes)
– Multi-level security (from Unclassified to Umbra)
– Users/nodes move between levels
 Design Goals:
– Optimal use of resources across levels
– Enforces multi-level security via compartmentalization
– Allows for a fast, scalable search engine
– Agile enough to allow users move back and forth
– Withstand malicious users, nodes etc.
 Simple, Stupid, Scheme:
– Assign a key (bit string) to each level
– XOR every token of a document with the corresponding key
– Search for (keyword XOR key)
– Trivial to break and not scalable
Trust
Local Trust
 Local trust value (ebay):
 Problems:
Does not get a wide view about the peer’s reputation
Or
It aggregates the whole network and causes congestion
 Solution
Transitive trust, if I trust you, then I would trust the one you
trust
Aggregate Local Trust
 Normalized local trust
 Aggregate local trust values
 If C = matrix [cij] :
ti=CTci
 To get a wider view peer i would ask his friend’s
friend: ti=(CT)2ci ....and so on …. ti=(CT)nci
 For large n, the trust vector converges to same vector
for every peer i
Distributed EigenTrust
 Each node can calculate it’s eigen trust value by:
 Were p is a distribution over pre-trusted peers
– Pre-trusted peers are essential for breaking malicious
collectives
– For example the very first nodes in the network i.e.
designers
Distributed EigenTrust
Algorithm
Distributed EigenTrust
Algorithem
 Fast convergences
Secure Eigentrust
 Calculate the trust value of each peer by more
than one peer (score managers)
 If there is difference of opinion then vote!
 Use DHT to assign score managers, using
different hash functions.
 Upsides:
– Anonymity (can’t tell who’s trust your computing)
– Randomization (can’t make yourself your own
score manager)
– Redundancy (more than one score manager)
Load distribution
 Deterministic algorithm
– Chose the responding peer with highest trust value
 Probabilistic Algorithm
– Choose peer i with probability
. With probability of
10% select a peer j with zero trust value.
– Why 10%?
• A balance between allowing new users to gather trust, at the
same time not granting malicious users a high chance of
providing inauthentic files
FIN
Questions, comments, concerns?