Safety culture

安全文化

Dr. Mark Fleming Saint Mary’s University [email protected]

V1.2

Outline

大纲



Introduction and overview

介绍和概述 

Safety culture

安全文化 

Characteristics of positive safety culture

积极的安全文化的特点 

Safety culture development

安全文化培育 

Conclusions

结论 V1.2

High Reliability Organisations

高可靠性组织

V1.2

Why Do Injuries Happen ?

职业伤害为什么会发生

？

HUMAN UNRELIABILITY concentration, memory DESIGN BOOBY TRAPS : hardware, procedures OPERATING ENVIRONMENT training, supervision, resources, culture COMMUNICATION assumptions, misunderstandings

人不可靠 注意力，记忆力 设计陷阱： 硬件，程序 经营环境 培训，监督，资源，文化 沟通 假设，误解

Piper Alpha Piper Alpha

钻井 平台 公众对

Piper Alpha

钻井平台灾 难的质询

V1.2

It won’t happen to me....

When anyone asks me how I can best describe my experiences of nearly forty years at sea, I merely say uneventful. I have never been in an accident of any sort worth speaking about....I never saw a wreck and have never been wrecked, nor was I ever in any predicament that threatened to end in disaster of any sort.“

当有人问我怎样才能最好地描述我在海上近

40

年的经历，我只是说平安无 事。在我身上从未发生过任何事故。。。我从未见过一个沉船事件，自 己的船也从未沉过，我也从未陷入任何让我生命受到任何形式灾难的威 胁的困境。

Edward J. Smith (Captain of the Titanic

泰坦尼克号船长

)

V1.2

Piper Alpha

It is essential to create a corporate atmosphere or

culture

in which safety is understood to be and accepted as, the number one priority”

对企业来说，营造一种氛围或文化是至关重要的 。在这种氛围或文化中，安全被理解为，并且 被接受为头等重要的大事。

(Cullen, 1990)

V1.2

Why focus on culture?

为什么要关注文化

         

Safety management system not effective unless accompanied by a “good” safety culture Wish to stay alert to potential risk factors that increase the risk of a major disaster Pro-active approach involving self-assessment and feedback of less visible elements of safety management system Desire to win “hearts and minds” to improve safety Alternative, leading safety performance indicator

安全管理系统不会有效，除非 有“良好的”安全文化相伴随 对会提高重大灾害的风险的潜在危险因素能一直保持警惕 前瞻式方法涉及到自我评估和对安全管理制度较少的不可见的元素的反馈 赢得“人心和智慧”的愿望推动安全改进 可选择的，引向安全绩效的指标 V1.2

Culture

文化

Culture has been defined as:

文化被定义为： 

A pattern of basic assumptions

一个基本假设的模型  

Invented, discovered or developed by a given group

由指定的一个团队发明、发现或开发    

Learnt from coping with problems of external adaptation and internal integration

从处理外部适应性问题和内部整合问题中学习

That has worked well enough to be considered valid

运行良好，足以被认 为是有效的。

Is taught to new members (as the)

传授给新成员

Correct way to perceive, think and feel in relation to problems

用正确的方法去感知、思考和感觉相关问题 V1.2

Schein 1990 p110

V1.2

Elements of the culture

文化的要素

  

Basic assumptions:

基本假设 –

Represent a system of shared meaning that is difficult to verbalize. Shared values that guide decision making.

– 代表一个难以用语言表达的共享意义的系统。共享价值观指导决策

Espoused values

信奉的价值观 – –

What people say is important expressed through stories and myths

人们通过故事和神话表达的内容是很重要的

Artefacts include:

人工制品包括 –

Physical symbols e.g. status symbols, buildings, expected clothing, equipment and safety policies

– – – 物理符号，如地位的象征，建筑物，预期着装，设备和安全政策

Behavioural norms e.g. greetings, gestures, ceremonies

行为规范，例如打招呼，手势，仪式

Iceberg model

冰山模型

人工制品 信奉的价值观 基本假设

Safety Culture: What Is It ?

安全文化，它是什么？

“The way we do things around here” CBI

我们做事情的方式

“Safety culture is that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations

and individuals which establishes that as an overriding priority, nuclear plant

safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance” p1 INSAG-4. 1991

安全文化是组织中特征和态度的集合，并且人们把它视为绝对优先的事情。核电厂的安全 问题由于其重要性得到重视。

“Organisations with a positive safety culture are characterised by communications founded on mutual trust, by shared perceptions of the importance of safety and

by the efficacy of preventive measures.” ACSNI

拥有积极的安全文化的组织拥有如下特征：建立在相互信任基础之上的沟通，对安全的重 要性有共同的看法，以及预防措施的有效性。 V1.2

Safety culture and outcomes

安全文化和结果

   

Safety culture questionnaire responses have been linked with accident rates in the following industries:

在下列行业中，安全文化问卷的回答与事故率相联系 – – – –

Nuclear power (Lee, 1998)

核电站

Offshore oil (Mearns, Flin, Fleming & Gordon 1997)

海上石油

Chemical industry, (Donald & Canter, 1994)

化学工业

Manufacturing, (Brown & Holmes 1986), (Zohar, 2000)

制造业

Safety culture has been identified as a causal factor in:

在下列事件中，安全文化已被确定为一个原因因素： – – –

Chernobyl

切尔诺贝利

Bhopal

博帕尔

Space shuttle Challenger and Columbia

挑战者号和哥伦比亚号航天飞机 V1.2

Comparison of Chinese with US Nationals

中国人与美国人的比较

V1.2

Rules less important 规则没有那么重要 Importance of heirar 层级的重要性 Language Difficulty 语言困难 工作明确 Job clarity Work Pressure 工作压力 Reluctance to speak 不愿意说话 Productivity vs safe 效率与安全 Supervision 监督 Rules & Regulations 规章制度 Safety on rig 装备安全 Risk behaviour 冒险行为 -.6

-.4

-.2

0.0

.2

中国人 外国人 .4

.6

Nationality Chinese Expatriat

Main findings

主要发现

      

No difference in self reported risk taking behaviour

在自我报告冒险 行为方面没有区别

Chinese staff valued hierarchy to a greater extent than expatriate staff

与外籍员工相比，中国员工更加重视层级

Chinese staff indicated that rules were of less importance than getting the job done

中国员工指出，相对于把工作完成，规则没有那么重要

Findings indicated that safety could be improved by using hierarchical structures to reinforce the importance of following rules

结果表明，通过层级结构来强调遵守规则的重要性可以让安全得到改进 V1.2

IAEA five characteristics of a strong safety culture

强有力安全文化的五个特店 Safety is a clearly recognized value 安全是 被清楚认识到的价值观 Safety is integrated into all activities 安全被纳入所有活动

Characteristics of a strong safety culture

强有力安全文化的特征 Safety is learning driven 安全受学习驱动 Leadership for safety is clear 安全领导力明确 Accountability for safety is clear 安全责任明确

Safety is a clearly recognised value

安全是一个被清楚地认识到的价值观

  

It is clear to everyone that safety is the top priority.

每个人都清楚，安全是首要任务

The importance of safety is demonstrated by

安 全的重要性从如下两个方面得以展现 –

the decisions managers make and

管理者所做的决策 –

how managers allocate resources.

管理者如何分配资源 V1.2

Leadership for safety is clear

安全领导力是清晰的

  

Managers take every opportunity to demonstrate their commitment to safety.

Leaders across the organization are actively involved in safety and act as role models for others. Leadership skills are actively developed

 管理人员利用一切机会展示他们对安全的承诺。  整个组织的领导们都积极参与安全活动，并成为其他人的榜样。  领导技能得到积极开发 V1.2

Accountability for safety is clear

对安全的责任是清晰地

V1.2

       

There are clear lines of authority for safety Everyone is aware of their specific tasks and responsibilities. Everyone feels ownership for safety within their span of control. The independent and distinct role of the regulator is understood and respected.

安全的权限很清晰 大家都知道他们的具体任务和责任。 每个人都感到自己能要对其所控制范围的安全负责 监管者的独立和独特作用得到理解和尊重

安全要纳入到所有活动中

   

Safety is an approach to doing things rather than an activity; therefore it is part of all activities. An operation or task is only a success if completed safely. Factors that influence performance such as motivation are acknowledged to influence safety outcomes

与其说安全是一项活动，不如说安全是一种做事的方法，因此它是所有 活动的一部分。  一个操作或任务只有在安全完成的情况下才是成功的  影响绩效的要素，例如动机，被公认是影响安全结果的。

Safety is learning driven

安全是学习驱动

     

Striving for continuous improvement. Learning drives improvement. Actively seeking out lessons from operational experience and conducting self assessments. Seeking to understand both failure and success in order to improve. Encouraging reporting all failures

追求持续改进。 学习驱动改进。 积极从运行的经历中找出教训，并进行自我评估。 为了改进，争取对失败和成功都进行了解 鼓励报告所有失败 V1.2

Safety culture maturity

安全文化发展阶段

  

Safety culture development is broken down into five stages or levels of maturity, from poor to good A number of similar models currently in use (e.g. hearts and minds, shell) Once the level has been established sites identify the actions required to move to the next level

   安全文化的发展分为五个阶段或成熟水平，从差到好 目前有几个类似的模型在使用 一旦水平被确定下来，组织就需要确定要达到下一个水平所需要采 取的措施 V1.2

Pathological 病态的 Level 1 Reactive 反应式的 Level 2 Bureaucratic 官僚式的 Level 3 Proactive 前瞻式的 Level 4 Generative 内在的 Level 5 改善安全文化

Pathological

病态



Why waste our time on safety?

为什么要在安全上 浪费我们的时间？  

Effort is focused on avoiding getting caught

努力的重点是避免被抓到  

Loyalty and conformity is maintained through intimidation

通过恐吓保持忠诚和一致性

Reaction to problems

对问题的反应 –

Suppression

抑制 –

Encapsulation

封装 V1.2

Reactive

反应式的

        

We do something when we have an incident Information is controlled

–

Information is manipulated to ensure we conform to organisational standards (e.g. target incident rate) We focus on finding who is at fault and using appropriate discipline Incidents appear to be random

当有事故发生时，我们才做一些事情 信息被控制 信息被操纵，以确保我们符合组织标准（例如事故发生率目标） 我们关心的是发现是谁的错，并且使用相应的惩罚措施 事故的出现是随机的 V1.2

Bureaucratic

官僚式的

   

We have systems in place to manage all likely risks Information supports departmental interests,

–

to make the department look good, to support departmental objectives Information flow is managed Reaction to incidents

–

Local fix: treats symptoms not root cause

我们已建立各种制度来管理所有可能的风险 信息支持部门利益， 使该部看上去不错，支持部门目标 信息流被管理 对事故进行反应 局部整改：治标不治本 V1.2

Proactive

前瞻式的

   

We are always on the alert for risks that might emerge Information is important and we work hard to capture it and understand what is going on.

Our outcomes are better that our industry average Still surprised by some events

    我们对可能出现的风险总是很警惕 信息是重要的，我们总是很努力掌握信息，并了解正在发生的事情。 我们的结果比行业平均水平要好 对一些事件仍感到吃惊 V1.2

Generative

内在的

      

We know why we do not have incidents Information supports the mission Information flows freely, honesty is valued Response to incidents:

–

Global fix: try to fix every example of a problem, share information with other stakeholders

–

Inquiry: Get to the root cause of problem

我们知道我们为什么没有事故 信息支持使命 信息自由流通，诚实得到欣赏 对事故的反应： 全方位整改：尝试整改一个问题的每一个例子，与其他利益相关者共享信息 调查：寻找问题的根源 V1.2

Culture and Safety

文化和安全

V1.2

Safety Culture 安全文化 Norms and Behaviour 规范和行为 Safety 安全 Enabler/ Barrier 促成要素

/

障碍要素 Safety Interventions 安全举措

Where are you?

你在哪里 Generative

内在的 Improvement Orientated 以改进为导向的

Pathological

病态的

mountain Bureaucratic

官僚的

Reactive

反应的

Status Quo

现状 V1.2

Review systems that drive culture

审视驱动文化的制度

V1.2

  

SCM Improvement Process (SCMIP) developed to assess culture without the need to survey workers SCM

改进过程

Rational for SCMIP

–

Employee perceptions are based in reality

i.e. perceptions of management commitment reflect their interactions with managers – –

Organisations with different cultures have different practices Safety culture improvement involves system change

e.g. perceptions of management commitment is improved through training and evaluating leadership practices 所开发的

SCM

改进程序可以评估文化，不需要对工人进行调查

SCMIP

的合理性

-

员工的认知是基于现实 例如对管理层承诺的认知 反映了他们与管理者之间的互动关系 组织文化不同，做法就不同 安全文化的改善涉及制度变革 例如管理层承诺的理念通过培训和评价领导力的实践得到提升

Sample: Commitment to safety

范例：对安全的承诺

Managers Visiting the Worksite

Managers do not visit worksite to specifically discuss safety Managers visit worksite regularly to discuss safety as specified by a formal policy/ program (e.g. STOP ） There is a formal manager worksite visit program that specifies the number of visits to be conducted by each manager and tracks completion.

There is a comprehensive program that specifies how to perform a worksite visit, trains managers how to conduct a visit, evaluates managers to ensure they are competent and tracks frequency of visits and close out of actions.

Select level

打分 0 1 2 3 There is a comprehensive program described above plus the quality of the managers’ visits is evaluated by workers and anonymous feedback is provided.

4 V1.2

Sample: Commitment to safety

范例：对安全的承诺

管理人员访问工作场所 管理人员不访问工作场所来专门讨论安全问题 管理人员定期访问工作场所来讨论由正规政策

/

计划规定的安全问题 有一个正式的管理者工作场所访问计划，计划规定了每个管理者的访问次数，并 记录完成情况 有一个全面的计划，计划规定如何进行工作场所访问、培训管理人员如 何进行访问、评估管理管理人员以确保他们有能力并记录访问频率和完 成的活动

Select level

打分 0 1 2 3 除了有上面描述的全面计划外，工人对管理者的访问质量进行评估，并且匿名反 馈被提供。 4 V1.2

SCMIP exercise SCMIP

练习

       

Review the SCM assessment form For each element select the most level that most closely describes the situation within your part of the organisation For each element review the practices at the next highest level of maturity Select practical improvement strategies for each element

审视

SCM

评估表 对与每一个要素，选择与你所在组织情况最为接近的等级水平 对与每一个要素，审视在下一个成熟度最高等级水平上的做法 对每一个要素选择务实的改善策略 V1.2

Conclusion

结论



Safety culture is complex and is difficult to change

安全文化是复杂的，并且很难改变   

It will only changes in response to actions talking does not help!

只有在付诸实际行动的情况下才会变化，光说没有用

Improvement plan:

改进计划 –

Assess culture

评估文化 –

Change management systems to support the desired culture

支持 理想文化的变革管理体系 –

Re assess to see if change worked

再次评估来看变革是否有效 V1.2