Transcript Water Policy

Water conflicten in een globale context
Onderken wederzijdse
afhankelijkheden!
Pieter van der Zaag
13 November 2010
Water conflict
1. between the haves and the have-nots
- 0.9 billion without clean water; 2.6 billion without basic sanitation
2. between water users within the same sector - e.g. irrigators
3. between different sectors
- agriculturalists vs. pastoralists
- urban water supply vs. irrigators
- distant energy consumers vs. riparian communities
4. between hydrological units - inter-basin water transfers
5. between different social/political entities - the transboundary dimension
6. at the global scale - e.g. the current land & water grab in Africa
photo: Eric Baran
Water conflict
Scheldt estuary Netherlands/Belgium
Cochabamba - Bolivia
Mekong
Omo river basin (Ethiopia)
and Lake Turkana (Kenya)
Manantali dam - Senegal river
Overview
1. The water asymmetry
2. Water allocation – local and national practices
3. Water allocation in transboundary river basins
4. Towards “water rationality”
•
benefit sharing
•
payment for environmental services
•
issue linking
5. Water conflict or cooperation?
6. Concluding remarks
1. The water asymmetry
boundary
up
down
sea
2. Water allocation
– local and national practices
Different historical regimes:
• Local (“customary”) water sharing arrangements;
principles of fairness, equity, respect for the
environment, respecting hydraulic property
• Imposed (colonial) national water laws
(e.g. riparian system, prior appropriation)
• Subsequently: comprehensive water sectors
reforms
2. Water allocation
– local and national practices
Emerging consensus:
• Access to water is widely considered a human right
• Environment is a legitimate water user
• Transboundary commitments are recognised
• Permits for non-primary (= economic) uses
• Equitable (proportional) allocation
3. Water allocation in
transboundary river basins
Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of
International Rivers (ILA, 1966)
UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational
Uses of International Watercourses (UN, 1997)
3. Water allocation in
transboundary river basins
Principles of the UN Watercourses Convention (1997)
Reasonable and equitable utilization (Article 5)
‘Watercourse States shall in their respective territories utilize
an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable
manner. …’ (Art. 5, s.1)
(borrowed from Helsinki Rules)
No significant harm (Article 7)
(new)
‘Watercourse States shall, in utilizing an international
watercourse in their territories, take all appropriate measures
to prevent the causing of significant harm to other
watercourse States.’ (Art. 7, s.1)
3. Water allocation in
transboundary river basins
Principles of the UN Watercourses Convention (1997)
Reasonable and equitable utilization (Article 5)
‘Watercourse States shall in their respective territories utilize
an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable
manner. …’ (Art. 5, s.1)
No significant harm (Article 7)
(new)
‘Watercourse States shall, in utilizing an international
watercourse in their territories, take all appropriate measures
to prevent the causing of significant harm to other
watercourse States.’ (Art. 7, s.1)
3. Water allocation in
transboundary river basins
Watercourses Convention (1997)
UN General Assembly vote (May 1997)
For:
Against:
104 countries
3 countries
Abstained:
27 countries
Absent:
33 countries
3. Water allocation in
transboundary river basins
Watercourses Convention (1997)
The formulation of the two principles regulating the use of
international water resources appears to be:
the best possible compromise between two opposing interests:
• the right to development
and
• defending existing uses
consistent with the Rio Declaration (1992)
3. Water allocation in
transboundary river basins
BUT: The Convention is not (yet) in force!*
As of October 2010, the 1997 UN Convention had been ratified,
or acceded to, by only 20 countries:
Finland, Germany, Guinea-Bissau, Hungary, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon,
Libya, Namibia, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Portugal, Qatar,
South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Syria, Tunesia and Uzbekistan.
(NB: Countries in italics did not vote in favour of the UN Convention, yet ratified it.)
Source: http://treaties.un.org; look for Status of Treaties, then Chapter XXVII Environment; then entry no. 12
* 35 countries need to ratify, accept, approve or accede to, the Convention before it comes into force.
4. Towards “water rationality”
*
Principles of equity and fairness,
without causing significant harm
imply that water users have to respect the
needs of other users.
Thus, users will have to (be willing to) forego
some potential (and immediate) water benefits.
Why would water users
voluntarily accept to
forego immediate benefits?
* Alam, 1998
4. Towards “water rationality”
*
boundary
up
down
sea
* Alam, 1998
4. Towards “water rationality”
If water users acknowledge that they
depend on each other,
• not only in terms of water but also
otherwise
• not only now but also in future
it may be rational for them to cooperate
and forego some immediate benefits.
• Even for upstream users/countries
• Even in cases where powerdifferences are large
*
Strategy:
1. make explicit the
existing
interdependencies
between parties
2. actively seek to
increase mutual
dependencies
* Alam, 1998
4. Towards “water rationality”
If water users acknowledge that they
depend on each other,
• not only in terms of water but also
otherwise
• not only now but also in future
it may be rational for them to cooperate
Examples:
and forego some immediate benefits
1. Benefit sharing - joint infrastructure
• even for upstream users/countries
development
• even in cases where power2. Payment for Environmental Services
differences are large
3. Issue linking - beyond the basin,
beyond water
*
Strategy:
1. make explicit the
existing
interdependencies
between parties
2. actively seek to
increase mutual
dependencies
* Alam, 1998
4. Towards “water rationality”
1. Benefit sharing
boundary
sea
4. Towards “water rationality”
1. Benefit sharing
boundary
Joint infrastructure
development!
sea
4. Towards “water rationality”
1. Benefit sharing
international
NGOs
local
government
Joint infrastructure
development!
boundary
basin
commission
riverine
residents
local
NGOs
local
fisheries
riverine
residents
government
irrigators
sea
city
residents
4. Towards “water rationality”
1. Benefit sharing
Kariba dam - Zambezi river
Khatse dam - Orange river
boundary
Joint infrastructure
development!
Maguga dam - Incomati river
sea
Manantali dam - Senegal river
4. Towards “water rationality”
1. Benefit sharing
Kariba dam - Zambezi river
Khatse dam - Orange river
boundary
Joint infrastructure
development!
Maguga dam - Incomati river
sea
Manantali dam - Senegal river
4. Towards “water rationality”
1. Benefit sharing
Kariba dam - Zambezi river
Khatse dam - Orange river
boundary
Joint infrastructure
development!
1. Technically complex and
data intensive
2. Pre-supposes a consensus over basic
waterMaguga
entitlements
dam - Incomati river
3. Should encompass all costs and
all benefits across the entire
basin
4. Requires effective institutions to
re-distribute the benefits fairly
Manantali dam - Senegal river
sea
4. Towards “water rationality”
1. Benefit sharing
Blue Nile basin
Benefits of transboundary
coordination Blue Nile river basin
Source: Goor et al., 2010
4. Towards “water rationality”
1. Benefit sharing
Blue Nile basin
• More water for Egypt through reduced evaporation losses
(+1 - 2.5 x 109 m3/a)
• Increased hydropower in Ethiopia (+1650 %)
• Increased irrigation in Sudan (+5.5 %)
• Less hydropower from Aswan for Egypt (-9%)
• Total basin-wide benefits: ~ 1 - 3 x 109 US$/a
Source: Goor et al., 2010
4. Towards “water rationality”
2. Payment for Environmental
Services
downstream (blue) water users subsidise
upstream (green) water users
to promote soil and water conservation
measures
in order to decrease flood flows
and soil erosion
4. Towards “water rationality”
2. Payment for Environmental
Services
downstream (blue) water users subsidise
upstream (green) water users
to promote soil and water conservation
measures
in order to decrease flood flows
and soil erosion
Tana river - Kenya
Source: ISRIC, 2008
4. Towards “water rationality”
2. Payment for Environmental
Services
Requires:
- well defined rights to land and water
- voluntary transaction
- well defined environmental service
(unambiguous dose-response relationships)
- service providers
- service buyers
- transparent verification mechanism
4. Towards “water rationality”
3. Issue linking
Scheldt
Meuse
4. Towards “water rationality”
3. Issue linking
1585 - 1800: Dutch close Scheldt for access to the Port of Antwerp
1839:
Separation Treaty – NL commits to free access to the Port of
Antwerp (under pressure of London en Paris)
1967 - 1975: Cross-basin issue linkages and the Belgian-Dutch water conventions
1975 - 1985: A total deadlock
Scheldt
1985 - 1992: Laborious negotiations and a breakthrough
Meuse
1992 - 1995: New linkages and the conclusion of the water conventions
1995 - present: WFD & Negotiations on further deepening of the Western Scheldt
Source: Meijerink, 2008
4. Towards “water rationality”
3. Issue linking
- complex
- requires a broad
approach (space, time,
sectors)
- may cause delays
- but may be the only way
of reaching stable and
enduring agreements
Scheldt
Meuse
5. Water conflict or cooperation?
research
papers
citations
water AND conflict NOT cooperation
91
317
water AND cooperation NOT conflict
30
96
water AND cooperation AND conflict
11
28
132
441
search term in title, 1998-2007
Web of Knowledge database
(isiwebofknowledge.com)
Source: Gupta and Van der Zaag, 2008
5. Water conflict or cooperation?
Source: Zeitoun & Mirumachi, 2008
5. Water conflict or cooperation?
Water may be a cause of conflict
Water may also be a cause for cooperation
Source: Wolf et al., 2003
5. Water conflict or cooperation?
Source: Zeitoun & Mirumachi, 2008
5. Water conflict or cooperation?
Source: Zeitoun & Mirumachi, 2008
5. Water conflict or cooperation?
Water may be a cause of conflict
Water may also be a cause for cooperation
Pressure on water is increasing sharply and rapidly:
- economic growth and diets (e.g. meat)
- biofuels require water
- other impacts of global and climatic changes
- land grab is also a water grab
5. Water conflict or cooperation?
Water may be a cause of conflict
Water may also be a cause for cooperation
What can we, as scientists,
professionals and educators, do?
We can, and should, promote
awareness of the
cooperation potential of water
Water may be a cause of conflict
Water may also be a cause for cooperation
“Since wars begin
in the minds of men,
it is in the minds of men
that the defences of peace
must be constructed”
Preamble of the UNESCO Constitution, November 1945
6. Concluding remarks
Peaceful cooperation between riparians is possible!
This requires an appreciation of:
 the entire river system;
 our own aspirations with respect to the river;
 how we are tied to, and depend on, neighbouring riparians;
 the aspirations and perspectives of neighbouring users;
 the benefits of cooperation, data sharing and joint
infrastructure development;
 training at river basin scale to build a new generation of
water professionals who adopt a basin perspective.
References
Dombrowsky, I., 2010. The role of intra-water sector issue linkage in the resolution of transboundary
water conflicts. Water International 35(2): 132-149.
Goor, Q., C. Halleux, Y. Mohamed and A. Tilmant, 2010. Optimal operation of a multipurpose
multireservoir system in the Eastern Nile River Basin. Hydrol. Earth Syst. Sci. Discuss. 7: 4331–4369
Grey, D., and C.W. Sadoff, 2007. Sink or Swim? Water security for growth and development. Water Policy
9: 545–571
Gupta, J., and P. van der Zaag, 2009. The politics of water science: On unresolved water problems and
biased research agendas. Global Environmental Politics 9(2): 14-24.
Meijerink, S., 2008. Explaining continuity and change in international policies: issue linkage, venue
change, and learning on policies for the river Scheldt estuary 1967-2005. Environment and Planning A
40: 848-866
Sadoff, C.W., and D. Grey, 2002. Beyond the river: the benefits of cooperation on international rivers.
Water Policy 4: 389-403.
Van der Zaag, P., 2007. Asymmetry and equity in water resources management; critical governance
issues for Southern Africa. Water Resources Management 21 (12): 1993-2004
Wolf, A.T., 1999, Criteria for equitable allocations: the heart of international water conflict. Natural
Resources Forum 23: 3-30
Zeitoun, M., and N. Mirumachi, 2008. Transboundary water interaction I: reconsidering conflict and
cooperation. International Environmental Agreements 8: 297–316
Useful websites:
http://www.unesco.org/water/wwap/pccp/index.shtml
http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/database/
http://faolex.fao.org/faolex/
www.unesco-ihe.org
Scheldt
1585: Fall of Antwerp against the Spanish
1648: Peace of Münster
1839: Separation Treaty – NL commits to free access to the Port of Antwerp (under pressure by London
en Paris)
1967: Belgium proposes the construction of Baalhoek and Bath canals, allowing greater and faster
access to Port of Antwerp
1968: NL link Baalhoek and Bath canals to:
water quantity and water quality of the Meuse
water quality of the Scheldt
1974: Regionalisation of the Belgian water policy
1975: Package deal: the three draft Belgian-Dutch water conventions on the five issues
1975: Wallonia opposes draft conventions: it would pay while Flandres would benefit
1977: Belgium proposes to discuss deepening of the navigation channel in the Western Scheldt
1983: NL links deepening of the Scheldt to the water quality and quantity issues of the Meuse
1985: Belgian and Dutch ministers agree to start simultaneous negotiations on: water quantity and
water quality of the Meuse, construction of Baalhoek canal, and deepening of the Western
Scheldt (Bath canal and the Meuse reservoirs are removed from the negotiations)
1992: Talks on linking the negotiations to the modernisation of Albert canal; Flanders disagrees.
NL considers compensating Wallonia
1992: UN-ECE convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Water courses and Intl. Lakes
1992: Belgian regions receive treaty-making competency
Source: Meijerink, 2008
1992: Dutch decide to de-link Scheldt- and Meuse issues
Scheldt
1992: Establishment of a multilateral negotiation commission on water quality conventions on Scheldt
and Meuse
1992: Establishment of a bilateral Flemish-NL negotiation commission on deepening of the of the
navigation channel in the Western Scheldt and the distribution of the Meuse water (Flandres
diverts Meuse water to Antwerp via Albert Canal)
1993: Both commissions reach agreements on draft conventions
1993: Flandres proposes to link deepening to the negotiations on the alignment of the HSL train
1995: After almost 30 years, all conventions are signed, including an agreement on the HSL
1997?: Flandres requests NL to a further deepening of the navigation channel of the Western Scheldt
NL links the further deepening to outstanding HSL issues
Environmentalists demand an EIA for the deepening
2000: European Water Framework Directive leads to a new Scheldt Convention in 2002 replacing the
1995 Convention, covering the entire basin (including tributaries)
2001?: Environmentalists consider ontpolderen an adequate compensation measure for loss of
ecological values caused by the further deepening of the navigation channel.
2002?: Innovation: “morphological dredging” limits the negative ecological impact of dredging
2003?:Ontpolderen is made part of the agreement to deepen the navigation channel
2005: Agreement over four new Scheldt Conventions
2006: Flemish government approves Scheldt Conventions
2007: Ratification by the Flemish parliament; approval by NL parliament (Tweede Kamer)
2008: Ratification by the NLparliament (Eerste Kamer)
2008: NL MP proposes to drop the requirement of Ontpolderen from the agreement
2009: NL Administrative Court forces the Dutch government to abide by the earlier agreement
2010: ????
Source: Meijerink, 2008
5. Water conflict or cooperation?
Water may be a cause of conflict
Water may also be a cause for cooperation
Mekong River Commission Summit,
5 April 2010
Mekong River
4. Towards “water rationality”
3. Issue linking
Pangani river Tanzania
Source: Mul et al., 2010
Source: Komakech et al., submitted
4. Towards “water rationality”
3. Issue linking
Source: Mul et al., 2010
Source: Komakech et al., submitted