Transcript Panel discussion on: Developing a truly collaborative and tri

INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING
FORUM
(IBF)
INTRODUCTION
Pre-IBF Background
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1920-es: first ITF-ISF coordination around ILO maritime meetings
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Up to late 1940-es: relationship restricted to ILO business
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1948 – ITF FOC Campaign
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1978 - ISF/ITF “Understanding” on wage rates for non-dom seafarers on national flag ships (under
UK “pay parity” regime)
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1990-es: ITF-ISF consultations (inability to engage in pay negotiations; no mandate to discuss
wages on behalf of national federations; some national owners associations’ without sufficient
constitutional status; decisions not compulsory upon members)
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1993: ISF’s “London Committee for Asian Crews” changes name to “IMEC”, focuses on ITF FOC
standards
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1994: IMEC involved in ITF negotiations in India and Philippines
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1997: ISF rejects ITF pay increase and negotiations. IMEC takes over.
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2000: ITF - IMEC Joint Negotiating Forum; IMEC Model TCC Agreement
(with the ITF Benchmark still set unilaterally by ITF)
Year 2003
Expectations out of the new system:
For the ITF:
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Continuity of agreements
Real counterpart
in place of internal argument
Compliance / enforcement
New mechanisms to amicably settle with
companies
More vessels under ITF agreements
Inspectors to concentrate on other targets
Global scale
New areas of cooperation / mutual interest
For the Employers:
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Continuity of agreements
Equal participation in discussion in place of
‘take-it-or-leave-it’ offers
Competitive benefits / advantage for
members
Recognition of training and other costs
More members to join
Mechanisms to amicably resolve problems
with Inspectors / affiliates
Global scale
New areas of cooperation / mutual interest
Creation of the IBF
May 2003, Yokohama
Parties: ITF and JNG (IMMAJ + IMEC)
Parties to the IBF, as of 2013:
International Bargaining Forum
ITF
ITF
maritime
affiliates
worldwide
JNG
IMEC
ISEG
(IMMAJ+Evergreen)
KSA
IBF Settlements
(pay, contractual and partnership issues)
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November 2003 (San Francisco)
October 2005 (Tokyo)
September 2007 (London)
October 2009 (Manila)
July 2011 (Miami)
Model Ship (“Bag”) methodology: wages; company and union funding;
vertical & horizontal distribution parameters; complex central-to-local
transformations
No pay negotiations; DER (SEPF/SPF)
New methodology: only wages and union funding (part “A”);
each specific local agreement affected
Pay Outcomes:
• 2003 - 8% on IBF Model Ship for two years: 2004 and 2005
• 2005 - 5% on Model Ship in 2006, plus further 5% in 2007.
Also: extra $10 to ITF WFF in 2006, plus additional $10 in 2007.
• 2007 - 8% on Model Ship for two years: 2008 and 2009.
(Further extended throughout 2010 and 2011)
• 2011 - 2% in 2012; 2.5% in 2013 and 3% in 2014.
Applicable only upon part "A" of the scale
Contractual: amendments to terms and conditions envisaged by
CBA; Special Agreement and Employment Contract
Partnership: all MOU issues, incl. ILO; IMO; piracy, disputes,
training, welfare, manning agents, P&I, joint secretariats,
data exchange, administration and etc
OTHER FEATURES:
• POSSIBILITY OF HIGHER REBATE FROM ITF WFF
AS INCENTIVE TO ENROLL MORE VESSELS
(total number of fleets to increase: +2% in 2012; +2% in 2013 and + 1% in 2014)
• MINIMUM CRITERIA FOR NEW JNG MEMBERS / NEW IBF AGREEMENTS
• INDEXATION OF COMPESATION LEVELS
• ALL CBAs SUBJECT TO APPROVAL
• JOINT CBA VETTING MECHANISM
• JOINT WARLIKE OPERATIONS AREAS COMMITTEE / SOS CAMPAIGN
• JOINT OPERATION OF TRAINING AND WELFARE FUNDS
• CONSTANT INTER-SECRETARIAT COOPERATION
Balancing between “market” and “policy”
(ITF’s view, as example):
Benefits of having “real” counterparts: guarantee of implementation; argument outside ITF
Dangers: external market supply-and-demand rules
What is artificial / excessive
from employers point of view:
What is insufficient
from the ITF point of view:
•Ratings wages and compensations could be
lower.
•Some CBA benefits beyond P&I coverage.
•Wish to negotiate with labor supply only.
•Why pay beneficial unions and ITF?
•Why pay for “DER” needs?
•No need for MOUs,
talk onboard conditions only
•Ratings wages slow increase
•No uniform benchmarks
•Officers beyond the ITF’s scope
•CBA could be better
•MOU cooperation could be more
Balanced outcome:
•Ratings level maintained despite market and crisis and, steadily, increased.
•Officers wages still not reflected fully, but minimum figures guaranteed.
•ITF Beneficial Ownership and other policies – recognized and working.
•Improving wages, CBA and MOU slow and difficult, but happens regularly.
•No cuts or downgrading once a level is achieved.
•Vetting complicated by the variety, but possible.
IBF bargaining process
Central negotiations:
Claims consideration & settlement:
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Amicable
Prior paperwork / correspondence
Thorough discussion (working groups; experts)
Secretariats
Argument / Persuasion
Reference to objective data
Invite third-parties and sources
Counter-proposal
Counter-balance against other issues
Compromise
Local / National negotiations:
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Implementation of central outcome in existing agreements
Considerable flexibility
System may not be perfect, but time-tested, stable and working!
INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING FORUM
10 YEARS EFFICIENT!
IBF