Transcript Presentation Brussels 2013 - Federation of European Explosives
FEDERATION OF EUROPEAN EXPLOSIVES MANUFACTURERS 37
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ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING 5th JUNE 2013 BRUSSELS
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Item 1
Daniel Antille
CHAIRMAN’S OPENING REMARKS
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FEEM ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING
(DRAFT) AGENDA 1.
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Chairman's opening remarks Approval of the Agenda Compliance with Competition Regulations Minutes of the 36th AGM in Vienna Report of the Executive Committee Report of the Secretary General 7.
Coffee Break 30 minutes D. Antille H. Meyer H. Meyer H. Meyer D. Antille H. Meyer approx. 10h30 – 11h00
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FEEM ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING
(DRAFT) AGENDA 8. Security Issues at EU Level 9. IME Report 10. Reports of the FEEM Working Groups
Blasting Practise Working Group
Transport Working Group
H&S Working Group 11. 2012/13 Financial Report 12. 2012 Statistics 13. Election to the Executive Committee 14. Any other business 15. Date and place of the next meeting 16. Closure of the meeting J. Foley Ch. Ronay H. Meyer H. Meyer H. Meyer H. Meyer H. Meyer H. Meyer H. Meyer H. Meyer D. Antille
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Item 2
APPROVAL OF THE AGENDA
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Do I find your agreement to this Agenda?
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Item 3 COMPLIANCE WITH EUROPEAN COMPETITION REGULATIONS
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COMPLIANCE WITH EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW As an Association, FEEM operates in strict compliance with European competition Compliance laws. Respect for these laws is a core value applying to all FEEM activities.
All participants at the FEEM AGM have been informed by the Secretary General about prohibited discussion topics which apply not only during meetings but also to social gatherings before and after meetings. By signing the participation form, the participants declare their adherence to the Competition Compliance Programme and agree to comply with Competition Law. The CEFIC competition law checklist for meetings has been handed out to the delegates prior to this meeting.
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COMPETITION LAW COMPLIANCE (cont.) Pay attention!
1. It is applicable to all FEEM activities!
2. Ignorance is not an excuse!
3. It is not just what you do, but, WHAT YOU ARE SEEN TO DO that is important!
4. Competition authorities are very active in scrutinising cartels (e.g. when leniency occurs) regarding companies and organisations (they would not hesitate to open an inquiry).
5. They look for “traditional elements” of cartels but also increasingly issues regarding standardization, intellectual property, joint activities.
6. You see increasingly damage claims in Europe (collective redress) regarding competition cases.
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ITEM 4
MINUTES OF THE 36TH AGM Vienna, 31 May 2012
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The Minutes have been circulated to the Members in due course immediately after the Meeting.
Do I find your agreement to these Minutes?
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ITEM 5 REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE by Daniel Antille President of FEEM
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THE 2012/2013 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE Mr. D. Antille, President Mr. B. Pougny, Vice-President Mr. G. Facchinetti, Past President Mr. S. Connolly Mr. O. Greben (as of 27.2.13) Mr. V. Huelamo Mr. U. Sjöblom SSE Group, Switzerland EPC Groupe, France Pravisani, Italy Orica EMET, Germany Austin Detonators, Czech Maxam Group, Spain Forcit, Finland
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ITEM 6
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL
Hans H. Meyer
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FEEM AS AN AFFILIATE OF CEFIC FEEM is an affiliated Member of CEFIC the European Chemistry Federation. CEFIC is the Brussels based organization representing the European chemical industry. CEFIC represents directly or indirectly, about 29.000 large, medium and small chemical companies which employ about 1.3 million people and account for nearly a third of world’s Chemical production. CEFIC guides and advises FEEM in matters related to
EU Legislation & Integration Contacts to relevant EU General Directorates Transport & Logistics General legal matters and advocacy Competition compliance programmes
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PROGRESS OF EUROPEAN DIRECTIVES
(Up-date as per May 2013)
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PROGRESS OF EUROPEAN DIRECTIVES AGENDA 1.
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Directives 93/15 & 2008/43 - News since the last meeting REACH Up-date: Lead and lead compounds / substances Transport of ANFO in tank trucks
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Item 6 (Secretary General’s Report)
DIRECTIVES 93/15 & 2008/43 News since the last meeting
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Item 6 (Secretary General’s Report) STATUS OF PREPARATIONS BY PUBLIC AUTHORITIES, INCLUDING TRANSPOSITION OF DIRECTIVE 2012/4/EU At the beginning of 2013 only 14 Member States had fully transposed the amending Directive 2012/4; 4 Member States had partially implemented the Directive and 9 Member States have not yet communicated their measures to the Commission. The Commission strongly encouraged those Member States that had not yet transposed the Directive to do so urgently, otherwise formal infringement proceedings, which had so far been deferred, were likely to follow soon. To our knowledge no infringement proceedings have been started so far.
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Item 6 (Secretary General’s Report) UPDATE ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ACTION PLAN ON ENHANCING THE SECURITY OF EXPLOSIVES The Commission (DG HOME) is producing a progress report by the mid of 2013, which would contribute towards a review of the plan. In parallel a review of the CBRN ( Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear) action plan was ongoing with a view to developing a more coherent and streamlined approach with greater synergies between CBRN and explosives security policies at EU level in a future combined CBRNE STRATEGY. This had been discussed at a strategic EU level conference on 2-3 October 2012 in Malmo, the outcome of which would inform Council conclusions on a new CBRNE agenda later this year, leading to a Commission communication around mid 2013.
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Item 6 (Secretary General’s Report) RECAST OF DIRECTIVE 93/15/EEC Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the harmonization of the laws of the Member States relating to the making available on the market and supervision of explosives for civil uses. Council Directive 93/15/EEC of 5 April 1993 on the harmonization of the provisions relating to the placing on the market and supervision of explosives for civil uses has been substantially amended. In order to ensure the free movement of explosives it is necessary to harmonise the laws relating to making available explosives on the market. Presently a package of nine Directives is regulating the European Explosives Industry, e.g. 93/15, 96/82/EC of 9 December 1996 (control of major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances, 2008/43, 2012/4). You will find the complete revised text of the DRAFT DIRECTIVE on our website .
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Item 6 (Secretary General’s Report) UPDATE ON SCEPYLT, THE PAN-EUROPEAN INFORMATION SYSTEM ON EXPLOSIVES CONTROL TO PREVENT AND FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM, AND ITS FUTURE The SCEPYLT system has been operational since October 2011. Since then various functional, technical and documentary improvements had been introduced. Currently 11 Member States are connected to the system. However it was being used by only 3 Member States. Some indicating that they hoped to be ready to use the system, some others indicating that although they were ready they would not do so until their neighbours did. E.g. Spain was unable to use the system since its neighbours were not doing so. Spain also mentioned that it would like to see SCEPYLT linked with the unique identification and traceability required by DIRECTIVE 2008/43/EC.
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Item 6 (Secretary General’s Report) (SCEPYLT cont.) The Commission intends that the system eventually be made mandatory, but before that the system needed to be seen to be operating well and being more widely used than currently. The Commission had invested over 2 MILLION EUROS in the project and there was a danger that all this would be wasted if the project could not be taken further forward after the end of this year. There seemed to be three possible options: (1) A further grant if a Member State was willing to assume responsibility for future project coordination; (2) A contract between the system provider and individual user Member States covering software maintenance and a help-desk function; (3) In the longer term, the Commission taking over responsibility for the system.
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Item 6 (Secretary General’s Report) 1. BELGIUM is using the system for transfers with the Netherlands and Germany. 2. GERMANY explained that it was not using the system regularly due to some problems (for example, the transfer document can only be printed by the competent authority of the country of origin). 3. FRANCE expected to start using the system during 2013 and was arranging staff training with support from Belgium. 4. ITALY indicated that it had tested the system and that training of staff at prefecture level was ongoing. 5. PORTUGAL wants to use the system soon once the latest version had been installed. It would favour making a link with traceability. 6. SWEDEN would like to join the system and has inquired about the costs of joining the project (13.800 euros per participating Member State).
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Item 6 (Secretary General’s Report) 7. FINLAND has not yet decided whether it would join the project. It had only a very limited number of transfers and the existing paper system works well.
8. POLAND is ready to use the system, but would not do so until its neighbours did. It doubted whether an electronic system would be much quicker than a paper system and considered that a dual system of paper and electronic systems would be unduly burdensome. To be effective, the system should be made mandatory for all Member States. 9. UK wants to use the system shortly. It saw the main advantage of the system as improved security as it was easier to check the validity of electronic documents. 10.IRELAND is interested to use the system and has suggested that an impact assessment should be undertaken to assess the benefits compared with the existing approval system.
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CE MARKING OF ON-SITE MIXED EXPLOSIVES Compliance with essential safety requirements: Because of the specific nature of explosives, the Commission services (= Juridical Dept.) recommend to apply the relevant general and specific essential safety requirements to all ON-SITE MIXED EXPLOSIVES , whether they are placed on the market or not.
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CE MARKING OF ON-SITE MIXED EXPLOSIVES (EU Commission’s Recommendation) Compliance with essential safety requirements (cont.): AFFIXING THE CE MARKING: Pursuant to Article 2.2 (DIR 93/15) if a company places an explosive on the market, this explosive has to be CE marked. Article 2.2 prescribes that “Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that explosives falling within the scope of this Directive may be placed on the market only if they comply with on the provisions of this Directive, are provided with the CE marking described in Article 7 and their conformity has been assessed in accordance with the procedures referred to in Annex II (different approval modules). Therefore, if a company places an explosive on the market, this explosive has to be CE marked.
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CE MARKING OF ON-SITE MIXED EXPLOSIVES (cont.) Placing on the market is defined as “any first disposal against payment or free of charge of explosives covered by this Directive with a view to their distribution and/or use on the Community market”. According to the “guide to the implementation of directives based on the new approach and the global approach”, PRODUCTS BUILT FOR OWN USE ARE, GENERALLY, NOT CONSIDERED AS BEING PLACED ON THE MARKET.
The Commission therefore suggests the following distinction: In general, the explosives are placed on the market and have to be CE marked if the quarry or mine company is responsible for most aspects of the blasting operations while the explosives manufacturer for example only pumps the explosive down the holes and initiates the blast. In such a situation, the explosives are for the use of the quarry operator and therefore have been placed on the market;
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CE MARKING OF ON-SITE MIXED EXPLOSIVES (cont.) EXPLOSIVES ARE NOT DEEMED TO HAVE BEEN PLACED ON THE MARKET IF THE EXPLOSIVES COMPANY CARRIES OUT, AND HAS FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR, THE BLASTING OPERATIONS . In this case, the explosives are for the use of the explosives company in the provision of blasting services, rather than for the use of the mine or quarry operator (although the quarry operator receives the benefit). To use the industry expression the quarry operator buys 'rock on the floor / ground [of the quarry]'.
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CE MARKING OF ON-SITE MIXED EXPLOSIVES (cont.) CONCLUSION The general and the relevant special essential safety requirements should in all cases also apply to explosives manufactured on site which fall under the scope of the Explosives Directive. These explosives should also be CE marked except in the ‘own use’ case as explained above, where the CE mark is not required. As far as the CE mark is concerned, Article 7.1 of the Explosives Directive gives the possibility to affix the CE mark on an IDENTIFICATION PLATE. A practicable solution could therefore be to attach a REMOVABLE IDENTIFICATION PLATE to the mixing truck. It is also possible to carry the relevant documentation on the mixing truck.
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WHICH NOTIFIED BODY IS RESPONSIBLE FOR ALLOWING THE MANUFACTURER TO CE MARK THE PRODUCT?
The affixing of the CE marking is also primarily the manufacturer’s responsibility. However, when the CE marking appears on products with an IDENTIFICATION NUMBER OF A NOTIFIED BODY , the notified body also assumes responsibility. The CE marking must be affixed at the end of the production phase. The CE marking shall only be followed by the identification number of the notified body if the notified body is involved in the production phase. Thus, the identification number of a notified body involved in conformity assessment according to module B does not follow the CE marking. It is therefore the notified body that carries out module C, D, E or F (and whose identification number figures on the product together with the CE marking) that assumes responsibility.
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CAN CERTIFICATES [for the different modules] BE WITHDRAWN BY NOTIFIED BODIES, IF YES, AT WHICH OCCASIONS AND HOW?
There are several aspects that need to be taken into account when considering the validity and the possibility of withdrawing certificates:
- notified bodies are obliged to maintain themselves updated as far as the
development of the state of the art is concerned;
- notified bodies allow manufacturers to make use of the certificates not
only for the date when the certificate was issued;
- the manufacturer has the obligation to inform the notified body of all
modifications where such changes may affect conformity with the essential requirements and where therefore a further approval is needed. This obligation is also part of the ongoing licence agreement between notified body and manufacturer;
- according to national civil law certification bodies usually have an
obligation of due diligence vis-à-vis the validity of issued certificates.
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CAN CERTIFICATES BE WITHDRAWN BY NOTIFIED BODIES, if yes, at which occasions and how? (cont.) In all cases it needs to be stressed that when a Notified Body finds that requirements of the Directive have not been met or are no longer met, it has to restrict, suspend or withdraw certificates, approvals or other relevant conformity assessment results, taking into account the principle of proportionality and the risk involved, unless compliance is ensured through the implementation of appropriate corrective measures.
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DUAL USE CONFLICT In accordance with Article 1(3) first indent, Directive 93/15/EEC does not apply to explosives, including ammunition, intended for use, in accordance with national law, by the ARMED FORCES or the POLICE . How should this exclusion be interpreted in the context of intra EU transfers to differentiate between commercial and military explosives, for example in cases where a commercial company supplies an explosive to another company for further processing and/or incorporation into a finished product destined for MILITARY USE?
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DUAL USE CONFLICT (cont.) It should be first underlined that the exclusion in Article 1(3) of the Directive refers to the 'intended use'. In that context a distinction needs to be drawn between immediate use and possible eventual use for military purposes . In particular, the eventual intended use may not always be evident so that in the example quoted above the first company may be unaware of the final use and may have no control over this or the finished product placed on the market or know the final consignee.
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DUAL USE CONFLICT (cont.) A basic starting point for determining whether the explosive falls within the exclusion in Article 1(3) would be whether or not the explosive falls within the COMMON MILITARY LIST OF THE EUROPEAN UNION* (the latest version of which was adopted by the Council on 27 February 2012 (2012/C 85/01) (equipment covered by Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing the control of exports of military technology equipment). In principle such explosives could be regarded as military explosives. However the possibility of possible dual use cannot be excluded and due regard should also be paid as to who the consignee is. If the immediate consignee is a commercial company, the rules of the Directive should apply up to the point that it becomes clear that the ultimate use is military.
*www.eeas.europa.eu/non-proliferation-and-disarmament/arms-export-control 37 37
DUAL USE CONFLICT (cont.) If the explosive is not on the Common Military List it should be regarded as a commercial explosive and treated accordingly unless the consignee is the armed forces or the police. If the immediate consignee is a commercial company, even if the explosive is expected to be for military use, it should be regarded as falling under the Directive until the point that it becomes clear the final consignee is the military.
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WHAT IS THE STATUS OF SHOCK TUBES UNDER THE DIRECTIVE? Shock tubes are used to deliver the ignition impulse over intermediate or short distances through a plastic tube, while the tube itself stays fully intact and does not rupture. Due to the low exterior effects of shock tubes upon ignition they are often excluded from class 1 under Transport of Dangerous Goods Regulations since, when not attached to a detonator, they are non hazardous. As such they cannot be used for a blasting purpose and do not show explosive properties and can be considered as similar to the lead wires of electric detonators. It follows that shock tubes as such should not normally fall within the Directive's scope. When attached to the detonator to form a detonator assembly (as a non-electronic detonator, for example) they would however fall within the Directive's scope (for example the proper functioning between the shock-tube and the detonator cap would be part of the conformity assessment).
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WHAT IS THE PROCEDURE FOR ATTRIBUTING MANUFACTURING SITE CODES TO NON-EU MANUFACTURING SITES UNDER COMMISSION DIRECTIVE 2008/43/EC, AS AMENDED BY DIRECTIVE 2012/4/EU?
Where manufacturing sites are located outside the EU, the procedures of Article 3(5) of Commission Directive 2008/43/EC should be followed. However, in cases where the overseas manufacturer is also established in the EU, he could contact the national authority of the Member State in which he is established or of first import and obtain a single code for the manufacturing site to be used for all imports into the EU. The manufacturer established in the EU would assume responsibility for compliance with the Directive for all those imports, including in particular the obligations of undertakings in relation to record-keeping.
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WHAT IS THE PROCEDURE FOR ATTRIBUTING MANUFACTURING SITE CODES TO NON-EU MANUFACTURING SITES UNDER COMMISSION DIRECTIVE 2008/43/EC, AS AMENDED BY DIRECTIVE 2012/4/EU?
In all other cases where the manufacturing site is located outside the EU, the importer of the explosives will have to obtain a code in accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 3(5) of the Directive.
To further reduce the administrative burdens, and also in cases where the overseas manufacturer is not established in the EU, the imports need not physically go through the location of the importer or of the EU legal entity of the manufacturer, but any point of entry, provided that they are handled in line with the single authorisation for simplified procedures (SASP)/centralised customs clearance used throughout the EU under customs legislation, whereby the import paperwork is submitted in one Member State, but the products can be shipped directly to another Member State or States (with the customs authorities there not requiring additional paperwork).
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HOW SHOULD THE TERM 'END-USER' BE UNDERSTOOD FOR THE PURPOSES OF COMMISSION DIRECTIVE 2008/43/EC?
Chapter 3 of the Directive relating to data collection and record keeping provides that undertakings in the explosives sector collect and maintain data relating to each explosive in their possession or custody throughout the supply chain and life cycle until it is transferred to another undertaking or used. The end-user would be the last undertaking to take possession or custody and to use the explosive, for example operating blasting on site. In certain cases this could be the sub-contracting company undertaking the blasting. In other words, those responsible for the last place of storage on a site prior to use should keep records from the time they take possession or custody of the explosive until it is used.
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HOW SHOULD THE TERM 'END-USER' BE UNDERSTOOD FOR THE PURPOSES OF COMMISSION DIRECTIVE 2008/43/EC (cont.)?
It should not however normally be necessary for records to be kept on the individual person, such as the individual shot-firer, to whom the explosive is given to use.
The end-user would not necessarily be the undertaking authorised to carry out blasting on site. This would depend on whether they have possession/custody when the explosive is used. In cases where a subcontractor is operating all the blasting process, including the bringing out and taking back of explosives from storage, that undertaking would be perceived as the end-user and assume responsibility for compliance.
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CARTRIDG ED EXPLOSIV ES MARKING OF VARIOUS EXPLOSIVES IN COMPLIANCE WITH DIRECTIVES 2008/43 AND 2012/4/EU ITEMS BIG ENOUGH TO FULLY MARK – 2008/43 ARTICLE 4 Mark full unique identification on the cartridge and associated label on the case (outer box).
No need to mark inner box.
SMALL ITEMS THAT CAN BE PARTIALLY MARKED – 2008/43 ANNEX PARA 3 Mark country ID letters, 3 digit site code and electronic readable ID on the cartridge and associated label on the case (outer box). No need to mark inner box.
MARKING IN ACCORDANCE WITH 2012/4/EU FOR SMALL (8.5MM OR LESS IN DIAMETER) OR ODDLY SHAPED ITEMS THAT CANNOT EVEN BE PARTIALLY MARKED IN COMPLIANCE WITH 2008/43 ANNEX PARA 3 Not included.
PLAIN DETONAT ORS Mark full unique identification on the detonator and associated label on the case (outer box).
No need to mark wrapper or inner box.
Mark country ID letters, 3 digit site code and electronic readable ID on the detonator and associated label on the case (outer box). No need to mark wrapper or inner box.
Mark detonator with country ID letters and 3 digit site code. Mark full unique identification and number of items on the smallest packaging unit (wrapper).
Close the smallest packaging unit with a seal so that disappearances in the supply chain can be easily noticed.
N.B.: In this case 'full unique identification' refers to the smallest detonator.
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MARKING OF VARIOUS EXPLOSIVES BOOSTERS ITEMS BIG ENOUGH TO FULLY MARK – 2008/43 ARTICLE 4 Mark full unique identification on the booster and associated label on the case (outer box).
No need to mark wrapper or inner box.
SMALL ITEMS THAT CAN BE PARTIALLY MARKED – 2008/43 ANNEX PARA 3 Mark country ID letters, 3 digit site code and electronic readable ID on the booster and associated label on the case (outer box). No need to mark wrapper or inner box.
MARKING IN ACCORDANCE WITH 2012/4/EU FOR SMALL (8.5MM OR LESS IN DIAMETER) OR ODDLY SHAPED ITEMS THAT CANNOT EVEN BE PARTIALLY MARKED IN COMPLIANCE WITH 2008/43 ANNEX PARA 3 Mark booster with country ID letters and 3 digit site code. Mark full unique identification and number of items on the smallest packaging unit (inner box).
Close the smallest packaging unit with a seal so that disappearances in the supply chain can be easily noticed.
N.B.: In this case 'full unique identification' refers to the smallest packaging unit, not the individual booster.
DETONATI NG CORD Mark full unique identification on the spool/bobbin/reel and on the cord every 5 metres.
Associated label on case (box) if used.
Mark country ID letters, 3 digit site code and electronic readable ID on the spool/bobbin/reel .On the cord repeat every 5 metres the minimum human readable part (no logistics information, no matrix/bar code). Associated label on case (box) if used.
Mark full unique identification on the spool/bobbin/reel and the smallest packaging unit (box).
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ASSOCIATED LABELS What should be on an “ASSOCIATED LABEL”? If a box contains 50 primers does the associated label have to state the unique identifications for all 50 or can the label simply state something like “Contains 50 primers”?
There is no need that the label contains all numbers of the items in the box. The matrix/bar code should suffice. The related information is available in the systems / database of the producer / distributor and is transferred to the buyer via XML file. If police stopped a truck and wanted to check a specific item number in connection with the box, they should be able to scan the box themselves or obtain information on the number and unique identifications of the items in the box from the manufacturer or distributor. There should be no need to print all item numbers on the box or the delivery documents.
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LABELLING OF SPUs If the primers are less than 8.5 mm in diameter and therefore the SPU needs to be labelled, do all 50 unique identifications have to be marked on the SPU? No!
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MANUFACTURER’S NAME ON UNIQUE IDENTIFICATION Does the manufacturer’s name need to be in full or can it be abbreviated (eg RHEMCO instead of Rhinoceros and Hippopotamus Explosives Manufacturing Co) to assist the marking of smaller items? This has benefits and in any event the Member State will be able to identify the manufacturer from their records using the 3 digit site code.
This is a matter for the competent authorities in the Member State issuing the code to judge on a case-by-case basis. If the abbreviated name is a commonly known and recognisable trade name, this should be acceptable; if the abbreviation makes it impossible to identify the manufacturer it would not be advisable.
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THE TRANSFER OF EXPLOSIVES FROM ONE NON-EU COUNTRY TO ANOTHER NON-EU COUNTRY THROUGH EUROPE. Have products got to be marked?
If the products are in transit only, i.e. if they do not enter the EU customs territory and are kept under customs control (bonded warehouse), the Directive clearly does not apply. In other cases where the products are imported into the EU customs territory, this would be regarded as placing on the market and the Directive's rules on marking would apply.
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VISIBILITY OF APPLICATION IDENTIFIERS (AI) FEEM has developed a Guidance Note for a HARMONIZED STANDARD CODING SYSTEM in order to minimise logistical problems throughout the explosives supply chains in Europe. The Coding System is primarily based on the GS1 STANDARD using so-called Application Identifiers (AI). The applied “Application Identifiers” will enable harmonisation by recognising the format of a database in which the information is being received in. This enables the explosives code structure to be flexible. Individual fields within the overall code at different positions with various lengths and combinations on alpha, numeric and alpha-numeric characters are possible. The Application Identifiers are not normally visible within a code, but if they were, they are recognised by being two, three or four digit numbers within brackets. These technologies are therefore recommended to enable each individual explosives item to be allocated a unique number for the purpose of tracing that item throughout its life cycle.
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VISIBILITY OF APPLICATION IDENTIFIERS
(cont.)
In the Annex to the Track & Trace concerning the Human Readable Part of the Identification there is no mention of Application Identifiers. Actually the Directive is very clear in this respect; the requirement for the readable number is an alphanumeric code containing details of the country, site number and unique number. There is no reference to any Application Identifiers being readable. However, some of our member companies print the AI on their labels in order to make it easier for a human to read the label and to facilitate key entry in the event that the symbol cannot be scanned. Other members are not printing the AI on the labels because they think that it is illegal to do so because it is not mentioned in the Directive.
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Is it illegal to print AI visibly on labels? NO!
In the text of the modified FEEM Guidance Note we have added:
AI may optionally be printed (i.e. visual) on the labels in order to make it easier for a human to read the label and to facilitate key entry in the event that the symbol cannot be scanned.
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REACH / LEAD COMPOUNDS
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REACH On 20 August 2012 FEEM received a new LISTING OF LEAD COMPOUNDS on the ROI* SVHC: (*Registry of intention) 1. Lead Salt 2. Lead Tetroxide (Orange Lead) 3. Lead Salts C16-18 4. Trilead Dioxide Phosphonate 5. Diibasic Lead Phthalate (Phthalate(2-dioxotrilead)) 6. Pentalead Tetraoxide Sulphate 7. Dioxobis(stearato)trilead 8. Tetralead Trioxide Sulphate 9. Lead Oxide (Lead Monoxide) 10.Basic Lead Sulphate (Lead Oxide Sulphate)
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REACH In December 2012 additional lead-compounds mentioned in the ROI list have been added in the CANDIDATE LIST:
LEAD MONOXIDE LEAD TETROXIDE LEAD DINITRATE
The date of inclusion was 19.12.2012 and the documentary support for inclusion is available at the Web of ECHA: http://echa.europa.eu/candidate-list-table
These compounds commonly called LEAD PRIMARY EXPLOSIVES are used in pyrotechnical mixtures and in fuze heads and have been identified as substances meeting the criteria of Article 57 (c) of Regulation (EC) 1907/2006 (REACH). This identification has been based on their classification as toxic for reproduction.
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REACH WHAT HAPPENS TO THE SUBSTANCES AFTER THEY HAVE BEEN ADDED TO THE REGISTRY OF INTENTION? The authorisation process is divided into four stages and the LEAD COMPOUNDS are now in the first stage which is the Registry of intention (ROI). ECHA has been compiling Annex XV dossiers for all the substances and after completion, it was followed by a Public Consultation in early September 2012. Stakeholders only had 45 days to respond and that is why it was critical to provide crucial information that can be used during this and other phases of the AUTHORISATION PROCESS. From the LEAD COMPOUNDS 3 have already been added into the Candidate List.
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REACH After the public consultation, comments received are sent to the MEMBER STATES COMMITTEE (MSC) and they will give an opinion as to whether a substance will be added to the candidate list based on scientific evidence available on whether the SVHC criteria* are met. If there is a unanimous agreement by the MSC then we can envisage that the Pb compounds will be added to the candidate list between December 2012 and February 2013 and if there is no unanimous agreement the date will be August 2013 since the Commission will need to be involved.
*Very Persistent and very Bio-accumulative & Persistent Bioaccumulative and Toxic 57
REACH LISTING OF LEAD COMPOUNDS ON THE ROI SVHC: LEAD TETROXIDE (Orange Lead) is being used in the explosives industry in pyrotechnic mixtures. This substance is mixed with silicon and other chemicals in order to obtain a redox reaction during use of these pyrotechnic mixtures. This kind of mixture is used in delay elements in civil electrical detonators around Europe and in the entire world. PB3O4 and silicon react during use of delay elements. After detonation, the chemicals inside the delay system react and the final products are silica (SIO2), metal lead (Pb) and unreacted silicon (Si).
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REACH BACKGROUND The FEEM HEALTH AND SAFETY WORKING GROUP has reviewed the Annex XV dossiers submitted by the European Chemical Agency at the request of the European Commission, concerning the above mentioned substances. These substances are lead compounds having explosive properties and applications. Some of FEEM member company members produce these substances and every company has expert judgement on the production, storage, transport and use of these substances. These lead compounds are incorporated in explosive items and the final products (detonators, primers, etc) are only sold for industrial applications.
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REACH 1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The risk to workers during manufacture is reduced by risk management measures. There is no exposure during handling and use of the final explosive items.
There is no release to environment during use. There are no significant emissions or releases from the manufacture. As a consequence of the above mentioned reasons, based on the criteria formulated in Article 58 (3) REACH and the corresponding score system prioritization, the inclusion of these compounds in the candidate List (article 58) is not justified. These substances do not meet the criteria because: 1.
They are not PBT nor vPvB substances.
2.
They have not wide spread dispersive uses.
3.
Their production volumes are quite small.
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REACH HOW FEEM REACTS!
Since the 1st publications of lead compounds in the ROI about 2 years ago FEEM had numerous contacts with representatives of ECHA, the MEMBER STATES COMMITTEE, the
International Lead Association
and CEFIC in order to prevent that lead compounds will be subject to the so-called “CANDIDATE LIST” or even worse that they will be subject for AUTHORIZATION with the consequence of a possible ban in the future.
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REACH REACH MEMBER STATE COMMITTEE After our last meeting FEEM has drafted a letter to explain why LEAD COMPOUNDS should not be subject to AUTHORIZATION. This letter has been distributed to the national members of the so-called REACH MEMBER STATE COMMITTEE. A list of the names and addresses of the relevant MEMBER STATE COMMITTEE members had been handed-out to the FEEM Working Group Members. All of our WG members contacted their national MSC delegate.
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REACH This action has been an enormous success because we have managed that ECHA has received numerous comments either dircetley by FEEM MEMBER companies or other European organisations or through their national member of the so-called Member State Committee: Here is a list of organisations which have actively supported our proposal:
63
REACH 1. National Authority, RIVM, Netherlands 2. Associação Técnica da Indústria de Cimento, Portugal 3. Orica, Germany 4. Gremi d'Àrids de Catalunya, Spain (1st letter) 5. Individual, Belgium 6. Maxam, Spain 7. EPC, UK 8. COMINROC, Spain 9. ANEFA, Spain 10.Industry Association, Spain 11.Mineral Products Association, United Kingdom 12.DynITEC GmbH, Germany 13.Gremi d'Àrids de Catalunya, Spain (2nd letter) 14.Individual, Belgium (excellent letter)
64
REACH E.g. the responsible UK officer Gary Dougherty , wrote in a letter to ECHA that he thinks the lead compounds issues in detonators was a done deal in that it was very unlikely that these lead compounds will be included in the next stage. Apparently he had attended an ECHA meeting in Helsinki where the lead issue was raised and it was suggested that they be excluded on the grounds of the small quantities involved, which gives rise to a low score; careful control during manufacture which also gives a low score; and the small quantities of oxides of lead produced after detonation were widely distributed and unlikely to cause harm. There was no adverse reaction to this suggestion from the other member states who attended.
65
REACH The results of the prioritization should be available sometime in June 2013 and unless there are drastic changes to the conditions of manufacture or use of these compounds in the future it is highly likely that will be excluded for the foreseeable future – 10 years or more.
66
REASONS FOR NO-INCLUSION IN CANDIDATE LIST 1) THERE IS NO WIDESPREAD DISPERSIVE USE 2) THE QUANTITIES USED ARE VERY LOW 3) NO SUBSTANCE CONTACT OF SUBSEQUENT USERS OF EXPLOSIVE ITEMS AND NO EXPOSURE DURING HANDLING AND USE OF FINAL EXPLOSIVE ITEMS 4) 5) NO SIGNIFICANT EMISSIONS OR RELEASES FROM THE MANUFACTURE WORKER HEALTH RISKS ARE MINIMIZED AND CONTROLLED BY REGULAR EXAMINATIONS 6) THE REPLACEMENT OF EXPLOSIVE LEAD COMPOUNDS IN CURRENT PRODUCTS IS VERY COST INTENSIVE AND REQUIRES A LOT OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
67
CONCLUSION NO SUPPORT FOR INCLUSION IN CANDIDATE LIST AND NO REASON FOR PRIORITIZATION 1.
According to prioritization criteria included in Article 58 (3) for Inclusion of Substances in the Candidate List of Substances Subject to Authorisation, the priority shall be given to substances with a) b) c) PBT or vPvB properties, or Widespread dispersive use, or High volumes.
68
CONCLUSION NO SUPPORT FOR INCLUSION IN CANDIDATE LIST AND NO REASON FOR PRIORITIZATION 2.
It is absolutely clear that Explosive Lead Compounds do not meet anyone of these priority criteria.
3.
Therefore, FEEM does not support the inclusion of Lead Explosive Compounds in the List of Authorisation Substances.
4.
Finally FEEM requested ECHA to give the lowest possible priority to Lead Azide, Lead Styphnate, Orange Lead and Lead Picrate, because these substances represent no risks to workers, users, and the releases to environment are quantitatively negligible during manufacture, storage and transport.
69
NO SUPPORT FOR INCLUSION IN CANDIDATE LIST AND NO REASON FOR PRIORITIZATION Last week FEEM has distributed another letter to ECHA and the INTERNATIONAL LEAD ASSOCIATION with technical information and comments concerning the non-inclusion of Orange Lead and explaining why the use of this substance in the explosive sector should not be prioritized by ECHA for inclusion in the Annex XIV (Authorisation List) of REACH. Even if Orange-lead is included in the future in the mentioned Annex, we propose that the use as “ingredient for delay elements in explosive production” should be specifically included under the heading “Exempted categories of use” of the Annex XIV.
70
Lead Compounds FEEM would like to acknowledge the excellent contribution from the Working Groups and its members. Special thanks go to Jose Castresana from Maxam who has contributed
71
72
TRANSPORT OF UN 0331 (ANFO 1.5D) IN ROAD TANKERS The BAM proposal to the UN PANEL FOR DANGEROUS GOODS (WP 15) to legalize transport of ANFO 1.5d (UN 0331) in tanks has been accepted and has been incorporated into the new 2013 ADR. However, the original proposal to carry up to 30 m³ ( ≈24 tons) was not accepted. The volume is now limited to 16 tons.
You can find detail under chapter 4.3 “ UN 0331 EXPLOSIVE, BLASTING, TYPE B in S2.65AN tanks”. The transport is subject to special provisions according to 4.3.4.1.3.
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TRANSPORT OF UN 0331 (ANFO 1.5D) IN ROAD TANKERS
The EUROPEAN EXPLOSIVES INDUSTRY has started a discussion process whether it could be worthwhile to investigate if there is a chance to increase the transport volumes of Class 1 products in general. The views of our members are controversial.
Initiated and financed by one of our members BAM, Germany has started research work based on ANFO / TNT equivalents to support the increase of ANFO volumes in tanks above the 16 ton tier.
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OTHER CHANGES IN 2013 ADR MEMUs 1.
CHAPTER 6.12
The requirements for bursting disks/pressure relief devices in 6.12.3.1.2 and 6.12.3.2.2 have been reworded so that they only apply to tanks for ammonium nitrate UN 1942 or 3375, not for the fuel oil. Also it is the Competent Authority of the country of use that must now approve the bursting discs. New transitional measure 1.6.5.14 allows continued use of tanks approved before 1 July 2013 according to the previous requirements.
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OTHER CHANGES IN 2013 ADR MEMUs 1.
CHAPTER 9 There have been editorial corrections to include reference to MEMUs in the definitions of AT vehicles and ADR approval. EN 15207:2006 has been added to the reference standards for electrical connectors. EX/III VEHICLE FIRE PROTECTION: A new Section 9.7.9 has been inserted to require that EX/III vehicles carrying tanks are equipped with automatic fire extinguisher systems for the engine compartment and the load is protected from tire fires by metal thermal shields. As no specific transitional measure has been inserted, the standard six month transitional period will apply.
76
Coffee Break 30 Minutes
77
ITEM 8
SECURITY ISSUES AT EU LEVEL
by Julian Foley
78
ITEM 9 IME Report by Chris Ronay
79
FEEM WORKING GROUPS
Item 10 THE FEEM WORKING GROUPS
80
FEEM WORKING GROUPS 4 FEEM Working Groups have been active in 2012:
HEALTH AND SAFETY
TRANSPORT
BLASTING PRACTICES
TRACK & TRACE TECHNICAL WG
81
HEALTH AND SAFETY WORKING GROUP Members
Francois-Xavier Dugres, Davey Bickford, France Jean-Paul Reynaud, Titanobel, France Maurice Delaloye, SSE, Switzerland Martin Klein, DynaEnergetics, Germany Jaroslav Konarik, Austin Detonators, Czech Republic Hans Karlström, Kimit, Sweden Jose Castresana, Maxam, Spain Pablo Guisante, Maxam, Spain Walter Panchyrz, Orica, Germany Thierry Rousse, EPC, France Janusz Drzyzga, Nitroerg, Poland David White, EPC, U.K.
Matti Vähäpassi, Forcit, Finland
82
HEALTH AND SAFETY WORKING GROUP The Group has met two times since the 2012 AGM
• •
on 26 September 2012 in Prague, Czech Republic on 13 March 2013 in Brussels, Belgium
83
HEALTH AND SAFETY WORKING GROUP The main subjects which were discussed are:
Trace & Track Directive
Hard & Software solutions in production & application The IPPC process & the impact on explosives sites
Elaborating the Best Available Techniques Reference (BREF) documents concerning H&S
Feedback on impact & consequences of IPPC to the production sites
New environmental requirements for IPPC production sites REACH & Lead Issue Learnings from incidents & unusual occurrences Obligations of a producer under the new CLP regulations Near misses & unusual occurrences
Exchange of experiences & Learnings
84
BLASTING PRACTISE WORKING GROUP Robert Farnfield Nello Contardi Frank Hammelmann Marcos Perena Knut Tanbergmoen* * as of September 2013 MEMBERSHIP EPC UK Orica, Belgium Orica, Germany Maxam, Spain Forcit, Norway
85
BLASTING WORKING GROUP The Blasting Practice Working Group has met twice since the last AGM 2012: 1.
2.
On 27 September 2012 in Prague, Czech Rep.
On 14 March 2013 in Brussels, Belgium
86
BLASTING PRACTISE WORKING GROUP The main working subjects were:
Finalization of a new Technical Bulletin “Safe Operation on the Bench” Learnings from blasting related near misses & unusual occurrences.
87
TRANSPORT WORKING GROUP Membership
Bengt Folkesson (Chairman), EPC Group, Sweden Marlies Becker, Orica Europe, Germany Francois-Xavier Dugres, Davey Bickford, France Marcin Slimak, Nitroerg, Poland Jon Jones, Austin International, UK Ivana Jakubkova, Austin Detonators, CZ Javier Lopez Amigo, Maxam, Spain Martin Klein, DynaEnergetics, Germany Jean-Paul Reynaud, Titanobel, France Janusz Drzyzga, Nitroerg, Poland Maurice Delaloye, SSE, Switzerland
88
TRANSPORT WORKING GROUP The FEEM Transport and Storage Working Group has met two times since the last AGM in 2012.
on 25 September 2012 in Prague, Czech Rep.
on 12th March 2013 in Brussels, Belgium
89
TRANSPORT WORKING GROUP The main working subjects were:
Directives 93/15 & 2008/43 and its impact on the Supply Chain Processes FEEM Guidance Note & XML fields & ISO Code Modifications to XML File Structure Modification of sub-levels of packaging in the FEEM Standard Code Marking of Intermediates Requirement for Transporters to Maintain Records CLP Process & related Directives and Regulations Learnings from transport related incidents and accidents
90
ITEM 11 – 2012/13 Financial Report & Statistics
91
THE 2012 MEMBERSHIP 4 MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES
AUSTIN POWDER EPC GROUPE ORICA EMEA MAXAM GROUP
92
THE 2012 MEMBERSHIP 15 INDIVIDUAL COMPANIES 1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
DAVEY BICKFORD, France DYNAENERGETICS, Germany EURENCO, Sweden EXPLOSIA, Czech Republic KEMPHOS OY, Finland KIMIT AB, Sweden NITROERG SA , Poland MSW Chemie, Germany OY FORCIT, Finland POUDRERIE D’AUBONNE, Switzerland PRAVISANI SPA, Italy SOCIETE SUISSE DES EXPLOSIFS, Switzerland SPREWA, Germany TITANOBEL, France WEATHERFORD, Romania
93
THE 2011 MEMBERSHIP 2 Federations
1 AFFILIATE: EASSP (European Association for Study of Safety Problems in the Production and Use of Propellant Powders)
1 ASSOCIATE: IME (Institute of Makers of Explosives)
94
FEEM 2012 RESULTS
95
Income
Membership fees Other income
Total Expenses
CEFIC Affiliation FEE Working Groups & General Administration AGM Expenses
Total
Current year result
2012 Finances
2011 159.200
2.148
161.348
15.000
116.109
19.850
150.959
Budget 2012 152.700
2.300
155.000
15.000
120.000
20.000
155.000
Actual 2012 156.000
1.290
157.290
15.000
118.542
21.450
154.992
(+ 2.298) 96
INCOME
Membership fees Other income
Total Expenses
CEFIC Affiliation FEE Working Groups & General Administration AGM Expenses
Total
Current year result
2012/2013 Finances
BUDGET 2013 152.700
2.300
155.000
ACTUAL 2012 156.000
1.290
157.290
15.000
120.000
20.000
155.000
(+ - € 0,00) 15.000
118.542
21.450
154.992
97
2012 Finances As budgeted and forecasted the 2012 financial situation is again healthy and balanced. Consequently, the Executive Committee has decided that the membership fees will remain unchanged in 2013.
98
ITEM 12 OF THE AGENDA
Statistics 2012
99
Explosives & Detonator Statistic 2012 For several years FEEM has managed a confidential statistics service for its members. It acts as a trustee company in compliance with competition laws. In order to estimate accurate annual sales per product in Europe we need from you all your best sales estimates from all the countries your are represented in. We will consolidate your data and give global figures of the European sales estimate per product only to those companies which provided figures.
The numbers are based on FEEM member’s input and represent the arithmetic average of the reported country numbers.
100
Explosives 2012
101
Explosives Statistic 2012 The volume of explosives consumed (not manufactured!) in Europe (EU27 + Norway & Switzerland) in 2012 amounted to 553.000 tons This is 11,5% lower compared to 2011.
102
TOTAL EXPLOSIVES EUROPE IN 2011/ 2012 (1.000 TONS) 640 620 600 580 560 540 520 500
624,8
Year 2011
- 11,5 %
553,0
Year 2012
103
700
EXPLOSIVES DEVELOPMENT 1995 – 2012
(1.000 TONS)
600 500 400
385 353 399410 442 439440450 477 497 561 587584 602586 588 621 553
300 200 100 0 Year 1995 Year 1997 Year 1999 Year 2001 Year 2003 Year 2005 Year 2007 Year 2009 Year 2011 104
EXPLOSIVES MARKET 2012 BY SHARES
ANFO 31% (34%) Others 4% NG 8% (10%) Pack. EMS 10% (11%) Bulk EMS 47% (41%) 105
Explosives Consumption 2012 by Countries %
Norway 11% Austria 1% Bulgaria 6% Estonia 5% United Kingdom 8% Finland 9% France 8% Sweden 19% Spain 9% Romania 1% Portugal 2% Poland 7% Italy 2% Germany 12% 106
Total Explosives 2012 by Countries Deviation % 30,0 20,0 10,0 B E I F D I T 0,0 -10,0 -20,0 -19,8 -9,3 -5,7 -11,2 -5,4 -6,6-6,8 -22,7-21,0 P O R -30,0 -40,0 -35,5 -40,2 S W 6,4 -50,0
Austria Estonia France Ireland Poland Spain
-14,1 22,8 -17,5
United Kingdom
N O R
Switzerland 107
60 20 10 0 50 40 30
NG Products 2011/2012 (1.000 tons)
60 44,7
Year 2011 Year 2012 108
NG Products 2012 by Countries (%)
Switzerland; 1 Czech Republic; 5 Austria; 2 Norway; 15 Denmark; 2 Finland; 5 France; 5 Sweden; 11 Germany; 15 Spain; 12 Poland; 12 Italy; 3
109
Bulk Emulsions (1.000 tons)
258,1
260 250 240 230 220 210 200
219,5
Year 2011 Year 2012
110
Pumped Explosives 2011 by Countries (%)
Switzerland 1% Norway 15% Belgium 1% Bulgaria 7% United Kingdom 10% Estonia Finland 13% 4% Sweden 29% Spain 2% France 3% Germany 5% Poland 6% Ireland 2% Portugal 2%
111
Cartridged Emulsions / Water Gels 2012 (1.000 tons) 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 70,5 54,8 Year 2011 Year 2012
112
Cartridged Emulsions / Water Gels 2012 by Countries (%)
Switzerland; 1,6 Sweden; 2,4 Spain; 3,7 Portugal; 7,6 Austria; 5,9 Bulgaria; 2,6 Belgium; 2,8 Czech Republic; 5,1 Poland; 6,7 Estonia; 8,2 Italy; 10,3 Germany; 8,3 Finland; 4,4 France; 13,4
113
ANFO 2012 / 2012 (1.000 tons) ANFO (1.000 tons) 250
+ 0,6 %
217,2
200 150 100 50 0 Year 2011
172,7
Year 2012
114
ANFO by Countries 2012 (%)
Belgium; 1,9 Bulgaria; 4,6 United Kingdom; 4,6 Norway; 5,5 Estonia; 4,5 France; 10,4 Spain; 16,9 Poland; 4,9 Greece; 7,3 Germany; 19,1
115
Others 2011/2012 (Ammonites, Permissibles, Black Powder et cetera) (%)
Spain; 19,6 Bulgaria; 7,1 Poland; 7,7 Italy; 9,8 Germany; 10,1 Czech Republic; 25,4
116
Detonators 2012
117
Explosives Statistic 2012 The amount of detonators consumed (not manufactured!) in Europe (EU27 + Norway & Switzerland) in 2012 amounted to 61.132 units This is 18% lower compared to 2011.
118
Total Detonators Europe 2012 (1.000 units)
70.000,0 65.000,0 60.000,0 55.000,0 50.000,0 74.202
2011 61.132
- 18% 2012
119
Total Detonators Europe 2012 (1.000 units)
45.000
40.000
35.000
30.000
25.000
20.000
15.000
10.000
5.000
0 Year 2011; 34.224
Year 2012; 25.088
Year 2011; 39.407
Year 2012; 35.078
Year 2012; 966 Year 2011; 572 Electric Non-Electric Electronic
120
Total Detonators Europe 2012 by shares
Electronic 2% (1%) Electric 41% (46%) Non-Electric 57% (53%)
121
All Detonators by Countries 2012 (1.000 units)
Switzerland; 681 Austria; 1.554
Bulgaria; 808 Czech Republic; 330 Norway; 7805 Estonia; 2.078
Finland; 5.020
United Kingdom; 2.277
France; 1.640
Germany; 7.449
Sweden; 6.511
Greece; 800 Spain; 6.514
Hungary; 266 Romania; 1.980
Ireland; 128 Portugal; 1.872
Poland; 10.716
Italy; 1.750
122
ELECTRIC DETONATORS 2011/ 2012 (1.000 UNITS) 34.224
35.000
30.000
25.000
20.000
15.000
10.000
5.000
0
25.088
-26,7%
Year 2011 Year 2012
123
Electric Detonators by Countries 2012 (1.000
units)
Austria; 849 Norway; 1.557
Sweden; 1.392
Spain; 1.835
Bulgaria; 150 Estonia; 1.909
Finland; 2.500
France; 800 Romania; 1.500
Portugal; 250 Germany; 5.475
Poland; 4.751
Italy; 1.000
Greece; 200 Hungary; 255
124
Electric Detonators 2011/2012
Deviation from 2011 (%)
20,0 10,0
14,1
0,0 -10,0 Au st ria
5,1 -4,6
Es to ni a F in la nd F ra nc e
-24,5
G erm an y -20,0 Ita ly
-44,4
Po la
-6,8
nd Po rt ug al
-47,4
Sp ai n
-54,1
Sw ed U ni en te d Ki ng do m ay N orw
-35,1
-30,0 -40,0 -50,0 -60,0 125
Non-Electric Detonators 2011 /2012
units) (1.000
39.407
40.000
39.000
38.000
37.000
36.000
35.000
34.000
33.000
32.000
35.078
- 11 % Year 2011 Year 2012
126
Non-electric Detonators by Countries 2012 (1.000 units) 7.000
6.000
5.944
6.138
5.000
4.000
4.569
4.954
3.000
2.500
2.000
1.809
1.607
1.992
1.000
694 648 203 0 A us tr ia B ul ga C ria ze ch R ep ub lic Fi nl an d 700 600 Fr an ce G er m an y G re ec e 750 Ita ly P ol an d P or tu ga l 600 S pa in S w U ed ni en te d K in gd om N or w ay S w itz er la nd 127
Non-electric Detonators by Countries 2012 (%) Deviation from 2011 60 41 37 40 23 20 14 14 5 0 -20 A us tri a -40 C ze ch R ep ub lic F in la nd F ra nc e G er m an y -10 G re ec e -25 Ita ly P ol an d -9 P or tu ga l -29 S pa in -35 S w U ed ni en te d K in gd om N or w ay S w itz er la nd 50 -60 -64 -63 -80 128
ELECTRONIC DETONATORS 2011 / 2012 (1.000 UNITS)
966 1.000
900 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 572 + 69 % Year 2011 Year 2012
129
ELECTRONIC DETONATORS BY COUNTRIES 2010 (1.000 UNITS)
180 160 140 140 165 120 100 80 60 40 20 11 42 10 0 A u st ri a B el g iu m B u lg ar C ia ze ch R ep ub lic 10 Fi n la nd 20 Fr an ce G er m an y Ir el an d 22 21 P o la nd P o rt ug al 15 110 S p ai n 165 123 S w ed U n en ite d K in gd
130
om
70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
Detonating Cords 2012
60,9 47,1
Year 2011 Year 2012 131
Boosters & Primers 2012
6.000.000,0 5.000.000,0 4.000.000,0 5.000.000
3.000.000,0 2.000.000,0 1.900.000
1.500.000
1.200.000
1.000.000,0 10.000
0,0 Au stri a 5.000
Be lgi um 10.000
Bu lga ria 10.000
De nma rk Fi nla nd 1.000.000
150.000
Fra nce Ge rma ny Po lan d 450.000
335.000
8.000
Sl ova kia Sw ed en Un ite d Ki ng do m No rw ay Sw itze rla nd 132
6000
Explosive Production Sites & Staff 2012
Staff; 5.475
Staff; 5.430
5000 4000 3000 2000 1000 0
Year 2011 Sites; 102 Year 2012 Sites; 92
133
Item 13 of the Agenda ELECTION TO THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
134
ELECTION TO THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE The FEEM President CARL-ANDERS LINDGREN from Austin Explosives has stepped down from the Committee for personal reasons. Austin has suggested co-opting OTTA GREBEN from Austin Detonators to the Executive Committee according to Article 7.2 of FEEM’s Constitution (CO-OPTION TO THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE). The Executive Committee has agreed to this process at their meeting on 27 February 2013 in Brussels. According to the Constitution Otta Greben has to step down at this meeting and is offering himself for election at this meeting.
135
ITEM 14 Any other business ?
136
NEW FEEM HOMEPAGE FEEM has started into 2013 with a new, up-dated web site. It is professional, has got a modern design and web architecture and looks very nice. It is easy to operate and to navigate. You find the site under www.
feem-europe.com feem-europe.eu feem-europe.org feem.info
137
NEW FEEM HOMEPAGE Hit Counter (22.05.13) Hits Today Last 24h Last 7d Last 30d Total Visitors 34 95 326 1.443
2.602
More than 50 countries have visited our homepage. Surprisingly China and Ukraine are on the hit list. But also countries like India, Azerbaijan, Ethiopia, Iran and many African countries are regular visitors.
138
Countries US Germany China Ukraine CZ Spain UK France Australia NEW FEEM HOMEPAGE Amount 465 272 251 222 194 119 115 108 101 % 18 11 10 9 7 5 4 4 4
139
ITEM 15 DATE AND PLACE OF THE NEXT ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING in Warsaw, Poland (in conjunction with the XVIII SAFEX Congress) on Wednesday, 21 May 2014 & a Gala Dinner on Tuesday, 20 May 2014 at Warsaw Marriott Hotel Al. Jerozolimskie 65/79 00-697 Warsaw, Poland Tel: +48 22 630 5240 Fax: +48 22 630 7332 Email: [email protected]
Web: WarsawMarriott.com
140
Item 16 on the Agenda CLOSURE OF THE MEETING
by our President
DANIEL ANTILLE
141
2013 AGM Brussels Thank you very much for your kind attention and see you next year in Warsaw again!
142