Transcript CURRENT AMPHIBIOUS FORCE LEVELS
CURRENT AMPHIBIOUS FORCE LEVELS
OVERSEAS DEPLOYMENT
► TWO TO THREE ARGS FORWARD DEPLOYED ONE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN / ARABIAN GULF-INDIAN OCEAN AREA ONE OR TWO IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC AREA. ONE ARG/MEU IS FORWARD BASED IN SASEBO AND OKINAWA JAPAN.
Amphibious flexibility is the greatest strategic asset that a sea power possesses.
BHLiddell Hart
CRITICALITIES
► ► ► TRANSITION FROM SEA TO LAND, INVOLVING NAVAL, GROUND AND AIR FORCES MOST DIFFICULT.
COMMANDS AND CONTROL OF MULTI- SERVICE, MULTI ENVIRONMENT ACTIVITIES COMPLEX CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS IN RESTRICTED WATERS INCREASES VULNERABILITY TO HOSTILE ATTACK, PARTICULARLY DURING EARLY PHASES WHEN SUPPORT OF OWN HEAVY WEAPONS NOT AVAILABLE
RECENT EMPLOYMENT
► FRENCH AND THEN US FORCES FOR OVER 25 YEARS IN INDOCHINA ► ANGLO-FRENCH ASSAULT IN SUEZ, ► FALKLANDS CONFLICT ► US LANDINGS IN GRENADA ► COALITION LANDINGS DURING GULF WAR IN 1992 ► AUSTRALIAN LANDINGS IN EAST TIMOR ► US/ALLIES OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN
EARLY DEVELOPMENTS
► INTRODUCED SINCE EARLY DAYS OF INCEPTION OF INDIAN NAVY ► RECOMMENDATION TO POSSESS A SMALL EXPEDITIONARY FORCE CAPABLE OF PROTECTING INDIA’S REGIONAL INTERESTS SUGGESTED IN 1946 WHEN INDEPEDENCE ON HORIZON. ► CURRENT CAPABILITY BRIGADE MINUS
INDIAN NAVAL HISTORY
► LST INS MAGAR, OF W W II VINTAGE ACQUIRED IN 1949 ► APPROVAL ACCORDED IN 1958 TO ESTABLISH A PRESENCE IN A& N ISLANDS ► POST INDO CHINA WAR DEBACLE RESIDENT NAVAL OFFICER WAS APPOINTED IN PORT BLAIR.
► INCREASED INDONESIAN INTRUSIONS IN NICOBAR ISLANDS IN 1965
EARLY DEVELOPMENTS
► ORDER PLACED FOR TWO LST (M) FROM RUSSIA IN 1965 ► INDONESIAN THREAT AND INDONESIAN – PAK BONDING OF 1965 ► BOTCHED UP AMPHIBIOUS LANDING AT COX’S BAZAAR IN OPERATION BEAVER AS A PART OF 1971 OPERATIONS . ► LESSONS HOISTED IN IMPORTANCE OF AMPHIBIOUS ASSETS ESTABLISHED
AMPHIBIOUS OPS OF INDIAN NAVY ► SRI LANKA IN 1988, SOMALIA IN 1995, ► CYCLONE RELIEF IN SAURASHTRA IN 1998 /ORISSA IN 2000. ► AS A ‘FORCE IN BEING’ ON WEST COAST’ DURING OP PARAKARAM.
► PAKISTAN DIVERTED ONE DIVISION FROM LAND BORDERS TO MAKRAN COAST.
SCOPE
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CURRENT TRENDS IN US NAVY, ROYAL NAVY, PLA NAVY AND AUSTRALIAN NAVY
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FOCUSED ATTENTION ON ‘SHIP TO SHORE MOVEMENT’
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TASKS OF INDIAN NAVY
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ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT FORCES
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DEFINING CREDIBLE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE FOR INDIAN NAVY
ROLES OF US NAVY
► SEA CONTROL ► MARITIME SUPREMACY ► POWER PROJECTION ► STRATEGIC DETERRENCE ► FORWARD NAVAL PRESENCE ► STRATEGIC SEALIFT
ORGANISATION
► AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE (ATF) ► RANGE FROM A SINGLE AMPHIBIOUS READY GROUP/MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT (SPECIAL OPERATIONS CAPABLE) [ARG/MEU (SOC)], TO A LARGER ORGANIZATION CAPABLE OF EMPLOYING A MARINE EXPEDITIONARY BRIGADE (MEB) OR EVEN A MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
ROLES/ TASKS
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MAINLAND OPERATIONS MAKRAN COAST BANGLADESH
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ASSAULT LANDINGS TO RETAKE LOST
TERRITORY.
AMPHIBIOUS RAIDS TACTICAL DECEPTION.
ROLES/ TASKS
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DEFENCE OF ISLAND TERRITORIES -1197 ISLANDS
POACHING, SMUGGLING, TRAFFICKING OF WOMEN AND GUN RUNNING PENETRATION BYOF FUNDAMENTALIST IN LAKSWADWEEP ISLANDS WITH THE PREDOMINANTLY MINORITY POPULATION AIRPORT/PORT/ KEY FACILITY SEIZURE
OUT OF AREA CONTIGENCIES
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IN SUPPORT OF UN /COALITION OPERATIONS
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EVACUATION OF CIVILIANS
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SHOW OF FORCE/ REINFORCEMENT
OTHER TASKS
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CONDUCT LANDINGS IN SUPPORT OF WITHDRAWING TROOPS
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LIMITED OFFENSIVE ATTACK
► HOSTAGE RECOVERY. ►
GAS AND OIL PLATFORM OPERATIONS.
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HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
LIMITATIONS AMPHIBIOUS FORCES
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SHIP TO SHORE MOVEMENT
LST(L), LST(M) AND LCUs LACK SPEED CAPACITY TO CARRY OUT VERTICAL ENVELOPMENT MINIMAL. HARD BEACHING TO DISCHARGE ARMOUR VULNERABLE
ARMY COMPONENT/ NEED FOR RAISING MARINES?
► MOUNTAIN BRIGADE MINUS OF THE INDIAN ARMY IS DESIGNATED AS THE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE. ► BASED IN PORT BLAIR UNDER ANC ► BATTALIONS CHANGED/ REPLACED EVERY TWO YEARS ON A STAGGERED BASIS ► ANOTHER BRIGADE IS KEPT STAND BY ON THE MAINLAND TO AUGMENT THE PORT BLAIR BRIGADE SHOULD THE NEED ARISE.
LIMITATIONS AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS
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LIMITED STAND OFF CAPABILTY 1-2 NM
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LCAS/GEMINIS VULNERABLE IN SURF ZONE
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LIMITED SITES FOR HARD BEACHING BY LST(L)
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UNDERLOADING OF ENGINES
LIMITATIONS - AAV
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AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT VEHICLE-BMP AND BDR FROM MECHANIZED INFANTARY
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INADEQUATE SEA KEEPING ABILITY
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VULNERABLE IN SURF ZONE
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LIMITED OTH CAPABILTY
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GUN TOO LIGHT
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CG HOVERCRAFT – LCAC?
ARMY COMPONENT/ NEED FOR RAISING MARINES?
► STRETCHED ARMY - OP PARAKRAM, THE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE MOBILIZED TO THE WESTERN COMMAND. ► THE TWO YEARLY CHANGES EFFECTS TRAINING.
► TIME FOR CHANGE OVER BY THE TIME, INCOMING BATTALION GOES THROUGH THE TRAINING AND BECOMES PROFICIENT ►
AMPHIBIOUS TRAINING
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NEED YEAR-ROUND TRAINING.
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TRAINING SEASONAL- WEATHER DEPENDENT
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HIGH SKILLS- NEGOTIATION OF ‘SURF ZONE’ BY BMPS OR LCA
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MUSTERING VARIED ASSETS OF COMPONENTS DIFFICULT.
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NEED FOR DEDICATED AMPHIBIOUS SCHOOL.
INTELLIGENCE
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MOST CRITICAL AIR RECONNAISSANCE BY ARC, IAF, IN, CG RESOURCES INCLUDING UAV SATELLITE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES LIKE RAW, IB , DIA AND SBS/NAVAL LIAISON TEAMS SUBMARINE RECONNAISSANCE SIGNIT AND COMINT
COMMAND CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS
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SUCCESS DEPENDENT ON C3
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‘LESSONS LEARNT ‘ FILES OF AMPHEXES
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INABILITY OF INDIVIDUAL SERVICES TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION LATERALLY
OPS- MAKRAN COAST
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FAVORABLE SEA/ AIR SITUATION ROA OF FLEET AIR DEFENCE PAKISTANI SURVEILLANCE FALKLAND’S CAMPAIGN LOW SPEED- AMPHIBIOUS UNITS- A CONSTRAINT RAIDS, DECEPTION, OR OPENING A NEW FRONT FOR ONGOING LAND OPERATIONS HIGH WASTAGE FORCE IN BEING
NAVAL GROWN MARINES ?
IS IT THE ANSWER
CREDIBLE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE
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TREND- MODERN AMPHIBIOUS FORCES
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TASKS
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MARITIME INTERESTS GULF TO MALACCA.
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BRIGADE STRENGTH
CREDIBLE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE
► TWO LPD CAPABLE OF CARRYING FOUR LCACS/ LCUS ► THREE LSL (L) WITH IMPROVED SPEED AND SHIP SIDE MEXEFLOTES ► DETERMINE- LST (M) / LCUs AS PER A BRIGADE LEVEL TABLE ► MODERN MEDIUM LIFT HEPTR (10 TONS)
FOOD FOR THOUGHT
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VIRAAT- EX HERMES- HELO CARRIER
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OPERATE HEAVY/ATTACK HELOS OF IAF
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PLAN AN EXERCISE IN A&N ?