CURRENT AMPHIBIOUS FORCE LEVELS

Download Report

Transcript CURRENT AMPHIBIOUS FORCE LEVELS

CURRENT AMPHIBIOUS FORCE LEVELS

OVERSEAS DEPLOYMENT

► TWO TO THREE ARGS FORWARD DEPLOYED  ONE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN / ARABIAN GULF-INDIAN OCEAN AREA   ONE OR TWO IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC AREA. ONE ARG/MEU IS FORWARD BASED IN SASEBO AND OKINAWA JAPAN.

Amphibious flexibility is the greatest strategic asset that a sea power possesses.

BHLiddell Hart

CRITICALITIES

► ► ► TRANSITION FROM SEA TO LAND, INVOLVING NAVAL, GROUND AND AIR FORCES MOST DIFFICULT.

COMMANDS AND CONTROL OF MULTI- SERVICE, MULTI ENVIRONMENT ACTIVITIES COMPLEX CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS IN RESTRICTED WATERS INCREASES VULNERABILITY TO HOSTILE ATTACK, PARTICULARLY DURING EARLY PHASES WHEN SUPPORT OF OWN HEAVY WEAPONS NOT AVAILABLE

RECENT EMPLOYMENT

► FRENCH AND THEN US FORCES FOR OVER 25 YEARS IN INDOCHINA ► ANGLO-FRENCH ASSAULT IN SUEZ, ► FALKLANDS CONFLICT ► US LANDINGS IN GRENADA ► COALITION LANDINGS DURING GULF WAR IN 1992 ► AUSTRALIAN LANDINGS IN EAST TIMOR ► US/ALLIES OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

EARLY DEVELOPMENTS

► INTRODUCED SINCE EARLY DAYS OF INCEPTION OF INDIAN NAVY ► RECOMMENDATION TO POSSESS A SMALL EXPEDITIONARY FORCE CAPABLE OF PROTECTING INDIA’S REGIONAL INTERESTS SUGGESTED IN 1946 WHEN INDEPEDENCE ON HORIZON. ► CURRENT CAPABILITY BRIGADE MINUS

INDIAN NAVAL HISTORY

► LST INS MAGAR, OF W W II VINTAGE ACQUIRED IN 1949 ► APPROVAL ACCORDED IN 1958 TO ESTABLISH A PRESENCE IN A& N ISLANDS ► POST INDO CHINA WAR DEBACLE RESIDENT NAVAL OFFICER WAS APPOINTED IN PORT BLAIR.

► INCREASED INDONESIAN INTRUSIONS IN NICOBAR ISLANDS IN 1965

EARLY DEVELOPMENTS

► ORDER PLACED FOR TWO LST (M) FROM RUSSIA IN 1965 ► INDONESIAN THREAT AND INDONESIAN – PAK BONDING OF 1965 ► BOTCHED UP AMPHIBIOUS LANDING AT COX’S BAZAAR IN OPERATION BEAVER AS A PART OF 1971 OPERATIONS . ► LESSONS HOISTED IN IMPORTANCE OF AMPHIBIOUS ASSETS ESTABLISHED

AMPHIBIOUS OPS OF INDIAN NAVY ► SRI LANKA IN 1988, SOMALIA IN 1995, ► CYCLONE RELIEF IN SAURASHTRA IN 1998 /ORISSA IN 2000. ► AS A ‘FORCE IN BEING’ ON WEST COAST’ DURING OP PARAKARAM.

► PAKISTAN DIVERTED ONE DIVISION FROM LAND BORDERS TO MAKRAN COAST.

SCOPE

CURRENT TRENDS IN US NAVY, ROYAL NAVY, PLA NAVY AND AUSTRALIAN NAVY

FOCUSED ATTENTION ON ‘SHIP TO SHORE MOVEMENT’

TASKS OF INDIAN NAVY

ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT FORCES

DEFINING CREDIBLE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE FOR INDIAN NAVY

ROLES OF US NAVY

► SEA CONTROL ► MARITIME SUPREMACY ► POWER PROJECTION ► STRATEGIC DETERRENCE ► FORWARD NAVAL PRESENCE ► STRATEGIC SEALIFT

ORGANISATION

► AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE (ATF) ► RANGE FROM A SINGLE AMPHIBIOUS READY GROUP/MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT (SPECIAL OPERATIONS CAPABLE) [ARG/MEU (SOC)], TO A LARGER ORGANIZATION CAPABLE OF EMPLOYING A MARINE EXPEDITIONARY BRIGADE (MEB) OR EVEN A MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

ROLES/ TASKS

►  

MAINLAND OPERATIONS MAKRAN COAST BANGLADESH

► ► ►

ASSAULT LANDINGS TO RETAKE LOST

TERRITORY.

AMPHIBIOUS RAIDS TACTICAL DECEPTION.

ROLES/ TASKS

DEFENCE OF ISLAND TERRITORIES -1197 ISLANDS

  

POACHING, SMUGGLING, TRAFFICKING OF WOMEN AND GUN RUNNING PENETRATION BYOF FUNDAMENTALIST IN LAKSWADWEEP ISLANDS WITH THE PREDOMINANTLY MINORITY POPULATION AIRPORT/PORT/ KEY FACILITY SEIZURE

OUT OF AREA CONTIGENCIES

IN SUPPORT OF UN /COALITION OPERATIONS

EVACUATION OF CIVILIANS

SHOW OF FORCE/ REINFORCEMENT

OTHER TASKS

CONDUCT LANDINGS IN SUPPORT OF WITHDRAWING TROOPS

LIMITED OFFENSIVE ATTACK

HOSTAGE RECOVERY. ►

GAS AND OIL PLATFORM OPERATIONS.

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

LIMITATIONS AMPHIBIOUS FORCES

SHIP TO SHORE MOVEMENT

   

LST(L), LST(M) AND LCUs LACK SPEED CAPACITY TO CARRY OUT VERTICAL ENVELOPMENT MINIMAL. HARD BEACHING TO DISCHARGE ARMOUR VULNERABLE

ARMY COMPONENT/ NEED FOR RAISING MARINES?

► MOUNTAIN BRIGADE MINUS OF THE INDIAN ARMY IS DESIGNATED AS THE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE. ► BASED IN PORT BLAIR UNDER ANC ► BATTALIONS CHANGED/ REPLACED EVERY TWO YEARS ON A STAGGERED BASIS ► ANOTHER BRIGADE IS KEPT STAND BY ON THE MAINLAND TO AUGMENT THE PORT BLAIR BRIGADE SHOULD THE NEED ARISE.

LIMITATIONS AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS

LIMITED STAND OFF CAPABILTY 1-2 NM

LCAS/GEMINIS VULNERABLE IN SURF ZONE

LIMITED SITES FOR HARD BEACHING BY LST(L)

UNDERLOADING OF ENGINES

LIMITATIONS - AAV

AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT VEHICLE-BMP AND BDR FROM MECHANIZED INFANTARY

INADEQUATE SEA KEEPING ABILITY

VULNERABLE IN SURF ZONE

LIMITED OTH CAPABILTY

GUN TOO LIGHT

CG HOVERCRAFT – LCAC?

ARMY COMPONENT/ NEED FOR RAISING MARINES?

► STRETCHED ARMY - OP PARAKRAM, THE AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE MOBILIZED TO THE WESTERN COMMAND. ► THE TWO YEARLY CHANGES EFFECTS TRAINING.

► TIME FOR CHANGE OVER BY THE TIME, INCOMING BATTALION GOES THROUGH THE TRAINING AND BECOMES PROFICIENT ►

AMPHIBIOUS TRAINING

NEED YEAR-ROUND TRAINING.

TRAINING SEASONAL- WEATHER DEPENDENT

HIGH SKILLS- NEGOTIATION OF ‘SURF ZONE’ BY BMPS OR LCA

MUSTERING VARIED ASSETS OF COMPONENTS DIFFICULT.

NEED FOR DEDICATED AMPHIBIOUS SCHOOL.

INTELLIGENCE

► ► ► ► ► ►

MOST CRITICAL AIR RECONNAISSANCE BY ARC, IAF, IN, CG RESOURCES INCLUDING UAV SATELLITE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES LIKE RAW, IB , DIA AND SBS/NAVAL LIAISON TEAMS SUBMARINE RECONNAISSANCE SIGNIT AND COMINT

COMMAND CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS

SUCCESS DEPENDENT ON C3

‘LESSONS LEARNT ‘ FILES OF AMPHEXES

INABILITY OF INDIVIDUAL SERVICES TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION LATERALLY

OPS- MAKRAN COAST

► ► ► ► ► ► ► ►

FAVORABLE SEA/ AIR SITUATION ROA OF FLEET AIR DEFENCE PAKISTANI SURVEILLANCE FALKLAND’S CAMPAIGN LOW SPEED- AMPHIBIOUS UNITS- A CONSTRAINT RAIDS, DECEPTION, OR OPENING A NEW FRONT FOR ONGOING LAND OPERATIONS HIGH WASTAGE FORCE IN BEING

NAVAL GROWN MARINES ?

IS IT THE ANSWER

CREDIBLE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

TREND- MODERN AMPHIBIOUS FORCES

TASKS

MARITIME INTERESTS GULF TO MALACCA.

BRIGADE STRENGTH

CREDIBLE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

► TWO LPD CAPABLE OF CARRYING FOUR LCACS/ LCUS ► THREE LSL (L) WITH IMPROVED SPEED AND SHIP SIDE MEXEFLOTES ► DETERMINE- LST (M) / LCUs AS PER A BRIGADE LEVEL TABLE ► MODERN MEDIUM LIFT HEPTR (10 TONS)

FOOD FOR THOUGHT

VIRAAT- EX HERMES- HELO CARRIER

OPERATE HEAVY/ATTACK HELOS OF IAF

PLAN AN EXERCISE IN A&N ?