Transcript MajGen - Mine Warfare Association

UNCLASSIFIED
ENGAGE RESPOND
PROJECT
MINE WARFARE REQUIREMENTS
BRIEF
TO
MINWARA Spring Conference, May 11
MajGen T. C. “BT” Hanifen, USMC
Director, Expeditionary Warfare Division
UNCLASSIFIED
OPNAV N85
Director, Expeditionary
Warfare (N85)
Naval Special Warfare
Branch (N851)
•NSW Requirements
•Information Warfare
Mine Warfare Branch
(N852)
Amphibious Warfare
Branch (N853)
•Airborne
•Surface
•RMS
•ABS
•Unmanned MCM Vehicles
•Mining
•In-service Amphibious
Ships
•Future Amphibious Ships
•NBE
•NSFS
•MPF(F)
•LCAC/SSC/LCU/JHSV
Navy Expeditionary
Combat Command Branch
(N857)
•NECC
•NCF
•MESF
•EOD/JEOD
•COMCAM
•ECRC
•ELSG
•NEIC
•JNLW
•MCAST
• Resource Sponsor for all U.S. Naval Mine warfare
• CNO’s Staff Subject Matter Expert on Mine Warfare
• Expeditionary and Mine Warfare Advocate for the Fleet
Agenda
Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD)--“American Style”
-Stand Off
-Blockades
-UUVS/Submarines
-Advanced Underwater Weapon Systems (AUWS)
MCM In Support Of Maritime Homeland Defense
-LCS Transition
-Importance of MCM for Homeland Defense
-MCM for Homeland Defense Requirements
-“Fly Away” Capability
Mine Counter Measures—Thinking outside the box
-Additional Thoughts on MCM
-Guinea Pig Ships
-Budget
Opening Thought
“Oh, I am heartily tired of hearing
about what Lee is going to do. Some of
you always seem to think he is
suddenly going to turn a double
somersault, land in our rear, and on
both of our flanks at the same time…
Go back to your command, and try to
think what are we going to do
ourselves, instead of what Lee is going
to do!”
---U. S. Grant
A2/AD, “American Style”
Sub
Base
A2 / AD
Minefields
Sub Base
“Deploying smart mobile mines might prove
particularly effective in attriting submarines
and/or blocking them from access to their
bases” --AirSea Battle Concept
“The Navy should develop … smart mobile
mines capable of autonomous movement to
programmed locations over extended
distances” --AirSea Battle Concept
A2/AD “American Style”
•In time of conflict the USN must own the maritime domain
•The seas are ours; we must control our adversaries’ ability
to access that domain
Exit and chokepoint control techniques
Submarines
Airpower
Mining
 Boundaries and shielding techniques
Mining
• Investment and current capability is not aligned with level
of warfighting contribution of mining



Current stockpile of mines only covers the shallow water
No significant S&T investment in recent years
USN proficiency in mining has declined
Give the A2/AD problem to our Potential Adversaries
Concepts for the Future
Long-range
Weapons
Unmanned
Vehicles
Expendable Target
Detection Devices
Encapsulated
Weapons
From Current Mines to an Advanced Underwater
Weapon System (AUWS)
•
Weapons
– Wide Area Coverage
– Stand Off Delivery
– High Volume Placement
•
Legacy Weapons (QuickStrikes)
Current
Sensors
– Target Detection
– Target Discrimination
•
UUV
– Delivery / Re-position
•
Autonomous Weapons w/ Mobile Warheads
Near-Term
On Demand Command & Control
– RECO, Change Mission, IFF
– Dual Mode weapons
•
Long Duration
– Rechargeable Power source
– In theatre rearming
LD-UUV Weapons with Mobile Warheads
Far-Term
Reduces number of weapons---Increases utility
Value of an AUWS
Traditional Mining
Transformational AUWS
(strategic, autonomous)
(tactical, controlled)
Quickstrike
SHALLOW
SLMM (through FY12)
INTERMEDIATE
DEEP
LD-UUV w/ Mobile
Mines or Torpedoes
UAV, USV, UUV, UGV
INTERMEDIATE
SHALLOW
DEEP
Distributed Sensors
1 Transformational Mine
400 Traditional Mines
Adapt to new Goal
Decide
Days
Deliver
Arm / Engage
Sterilize/
Destruct
Days - Months
Risky Delivery &
Extensive Clean-up
Clear
Months
Decide
Deliver
Days
Hours
Arm
Minutes+
Engage
Minutes+
Destruct/
DisArm
Minutes+
Eases Delivery & Clean-up;
Provides Tactical Flexibility
Extract
Hours
Transition from Mining to an AUWS
Now
Next
Future
Manned delivery,
Estimated emplacement,
Ambiguous engagement
Unmanned delivery,
Precision emplacement,
Controlled engagement
Autonomous delivery,
Precision positioning, Cooperative
engagement
Quickstrike
Improved
Standoff / Precision
AUWS
UAV
Improved
Standoff / Precision
SLMM
AUWS
Capability
USV
UUV
Technology
Distributed Sensors / TDDs
CDV
SDV
LWT
LCS
LD-UUV
Next Gen Mine
Transition to Smart Mobile Mines and Unmanned Vehicles
SSN/SSGN
MineMCM
Countermeasures
Roadmap
Force in Transition
Removing the Sailor from the Minefield
To Increase Clearance Rates
• Distributed and Netted
• Unmanned Operations
• Cooperative Behavior
• Computer Aided Detect/Classify
• Common Operational Picture
• Sea Warrior Transformation
• Slow
• Heavy
• Large footprint
• Stovepiped
• Primarily CONUS-based
• Manpower Training
Intensive
MCM VISION:
Field a Common Set of Unmanned,
Modular MCM Systems Employable from
a Variety of Host Platforms or Shore Sites
that can Quickly Counter the Spectrum of
Mines to Enable Assured Access with
Minimum Risk from Mines
• Fast and Agile
• Precise
• Lethal
• Modular
• Organic
• Optimized Manpower
Requirements
Mine
Countermeasures
Concept
LCSLCS
Mine
Countermeasures
Concept
Detect, Classify & Identify
Engage (Neutralize)
Engage (Sweep)
LCS 2 (GD)
LCS 2 (GD)
MQ-8B
Fire Scout
VTUAV
LCS 1 (LM)
MH-60S
MH-60S
MH-60S
ALMDS
LCS 1 (LM)
MH-60S
MH-60S
UISS
AMNS NEAR SURFACE UPGRADE
AMNS
RMMV
AQS-20A
AQS-20A
OASIS: Organic Airborne and Surface Influence Sweep / AMNS: Airborne Mine Neutralization System
RMMV: Remote Multi Mission Vehicle / UISS: Unmanned Influence Sweep System / ALMDS: Airborne Laser Mine Detection System
OASIS
Organic/LCS-Based Mine Countermeasures (OMCM)
LCS Based
MCM
System
Mission
Package
(MP) Components
Systems
Laser (Hunt)
Minefield Detection and Neutralization
Assault Breaching
System
Airborne Laser Mine
Detection System
IOC: FY13/FOC: FY22
IOC: FY13/FOC: FY25
Propelled Expendable Neutralizer (Kill)
Airborne Mine
Neutralization NearSurface Upgrade
IOC: FY13/FOC: TBD
Buried Mine –
Promising Potential
with Low Frequency Broad Band
Remote Minehunting System
& MH-60S AN/AQS-20A
Surface Mine Countermeasures
Unmanned Underwater Vehicle
and Low Frequency Broadband
Airborne Mine
Neutralization System
Propelled Expendable
Neutralizer (Kill)
Sonar (Hunt)
IOC: FY13/FOC: FY25
IOC: FY15/FOC:
Unmanned Surface Sweep System /
Organic Airborne and Surface Influence
Sweep
Magnetic/Acoustic Influence
Sweep
Buried Mine Detection
RMS
AN/AQS-20A
UISS
OASIS
IOC: FY16/FOC: FY24
IOC: FY15/FOC: FY25
IOC: FY12/ FOC: FY25
IOC: FY16/FOC: TBD
IOC: FY14/ FOC: FY26
MCM for Maritime Homeland Defense:
Why is this important?
• In 2008, U.S. ports imported and exported nearly 7.6
billion tons of cargo
• International trade via our ports accounts for more than
32 percent of the U.S. GDP
• There is $3.8B worth of goods moving in and out of U.S.
seaports each day
• All U.S. ports are “minable”
MCM for Maritime Homeland Defense
• Responsibilities for defending our ports is prescribed in Presidentially
directed and validated Maritime Operational Threat Response
(MOTR)


USCG lead in port defense against terrorist attack
 DOD support for MCM
 Navy is only DOD MCM capability
DOD lead in port defense against state actors
 Navy is only DOD MCM capability
• Response time, capacity and prioritization being defined by
NORTHCOM
• N85 is studying and resourcing UMCM forces with rapid fly-away
capabilities to counter this threat
Looking for additional ideas and cost-saving COTS solutions…
UMCM Capabilities
for Maritime Homeland Defense Mission
Fielded Capability
Mid-Term UMCM Capabilities
for Maritime Homeland Defense Mission
Delivered through the FYDP
Other Thoughts on MCM
• In-Stride Neutralization
• Non-traditional methods
• Rapid clearance enablers/Assault Breaching Systems
• Real Time Communications to allow for real time MIW
analysis
• UxV decoy systems
Mine Resistant Vessel
a.k.a. “Guinea Pig”
• COTS solution?
• Command and Control
Solution?
•Hardening of Existing
Vessels for Use
• We can do this with an out of service tanker?
• Can we do it with a USV or autonomous vessel?
Ahead of the force, validates MCM clearance, reduces risk
Navy Budget
• PB12 is currently on the “Hill”
• Navy TOA for PB12 is $161.4B, $.8B more than FY11
• N8 Warfare Sponsors control $54B; 33% of Navy TOA
• N85 PB12 TOA is $6.2B in 76 Programs of Record which is 4%
of overall budget
• Mine Warfare budget is $930M across 14 programs, which is
.6% of Navy TOA*
*LCS Ship SCN/MH-60S APN Costs excluded
• N852 allocated 33% of FY11 budget to legacy systems; this
decreases to ~20% by FY17 as organic systems enter fleet
Questions
21
Backup
22
Small Diameter UUV Schedule - POM-12 Basis