Private Key Cryptography

Transcript Private Key Cryptography

Lecture 5: Protocols - Authentication and Key Exchange*

CS 392/6813: Computer Security Fall 2008

Nitesh Saxena * Adopted from a previous lecture by Gene Tsudik

Course Admin

    HW#3 due at midnight of tomorrow (Friday) HW#4 will be posted very soon HW#2 is being graded  Thanks for your patience!

HW solutions will be posted soon  Sorry again for the delay, thanks for your patience!

4/28/2020 Module 4 - Protocols: Authentication and Key Exchange 2

Exam – you love it the most

  Midterm is in-class on 10/23/08 (thursday)  Includes lecture material until 10/16/06    Closed book, closed notes Emphasis, of course, is not on memorizing!

About 2 hour long 4/28/2020 Module 4 - Protocols: Authentication and Key Exchange 3

Outline of Today’s lecture

    Today we try to put everything together     Encryption (public-key/private-key) MACs Signing Key-Distribution Secure protocols (for secure communication)   Authentication  We studied it somewhat while talking about key distribution (Authenticated-) Key Exchange Designing secure protocols is hard – we’ll only be able to learn the basics today We’ll use the white-board extensively today – be prepared to take notes 4/28/2020 Module 4 - Protocols: Authentication and Key Exchange 4

Protocol

  A protocol is a set of rules using which

entities exchange messages

two or

It consists of

messages

and

rounds

4/28/2020 Module 4 - Protocols: Authentication and Key Exchange 5

 

Messages and Rounds

A message is a unit of information send from one entity to other A round is a basic unit of protocol time 1.

Wake up because of Alarm (or clock) Intial start or Receipt of message(s) from other(s) Compute something 3.

Send message(s) to other(s) Repeat 2-3 if needed Wait for message(s) or clock 4/28/2020 Module 4 - Protocols: Authentication and Key Exchange 6

Types of Adversaries

 Passive  Eavesdrop, delay, drop, replay messages  Active  Eavesdrop, delay, drop, replay and modify messages 4/28/2020 Module 4 - Protocols: Authentication and Key Exchange 7

Model

   N parties Any party can initiate the protocol with any other party Each party can be running a number of sessions with any other party at any point 4/28/2020 Module 4 - Protocols: Authentication and Key Exchange 8

Adversary and Security Model

    Different session should use different keys Compromise of one session should not lead to the compromise of any other session What exactly the adversary can do  It can engage any party to start a session (or more) with any other party “Simply forwarding” adversary is NOT an adversary  Why?

  Message authentication (m’) Key exchange 4/28/2020 Module 4 - Protocols: Authentication and Key Exchange 9

Properties of a Secure Protocol

  Correctness  If entities taking part in the protocol behave honestly, (and also if there are no transmission errors) the protocol achieves its desired goal  In other words, if everything works as expected, does the protocol satisfy its desired goal?

Security  No adversary can defeat the goal of the protocol (with a significantly high probability)   Adversary could be passive or active, depending upon the application (we consider the latter) We won’t consider denial-of-service attacks 4/28/2020 Module 4 - Protocols: Authentication and Key Exchange 10

Authentication

 Origin Authentication  Verification of the origin/source of the message  Entity Authentication  Verification of the identity of the sender of the message   We focus on the latter Authentication can be unilateral or mutual 4/28/2020 Module 4 - Protocols: Authentication and Key Exchange 11

Basis for Authentication

   Something you know  e.g., a PIN, a password Something you have  e.g., an access key or a card; a certificate; a smart card; an RFID tag Something you are  e.g., biometric (such as fingerprint) 4/28/2020 Module 4 - Protocols: Authentication and Key Exchange 12

  

Weak Authentication

   PINs, Passwords provide weak authentication Security is based upon how hard the the pin/password is to guess Usually, the passwords are short and weak Vulnerable to dictionary attacks  Widely used in practice Unix, kerberos, web emails,…… Protocol (A authenticates B using a password P, that A shares with B) 1.

A  B: B  A: A  B: Hi, this is A!

r (random challenge) H(p,r) Problem?

4/28/2020 Module 4 - Protocols: Authentication and Key Exchange 13

    

Strong Authentication

An entity authenticates to the other by proving the knowledge of a secret associated with that entity, without revealing anything meaningful about the secret itself Can be achieved through:    Private/Public Key Encryption MAC Digital signatures Strong because the security reduces to the security of the underlying cryptographic primitive, which is assumed to be hard to break Our focus in the rest of the lecture We’ll study both private-key and public-key based authentication 4/28/2020 Module 4 - Protocols: Authentication and Key Exchange 14



Symm. Encryption-based authentication

Uses encryption to authenticate Alice to Bob (assuming Alice-Bob have established a shared secret K, say through Kerberos) 1.

A auth B

A  B  A  B: A: B: Hi Bob, this is Alice!

r (a challenge) Enc K (r,B) (response) Why not simply send Enc K (r) in msg 3?

4/28/2020 Module 4 - Protocols: Authentication and Key Exchange 15

Security of the previous protocol

  An attacker needs to come up with a valid response  Impossible if encryption is secure r must not be re-used by Bob  Why?

4/28/2020 Module 4 - Protocols: Authentication and Key Exchange 16

Freshness

  Assurance that message has not been used previously and originated within an acceptably recent timeframe Two methods:   Nonce (Number used once) Timestamps 4/28/2020 Module 4 - Protocols: Authentication and Key Exchange 17

Nonces

    One-time random number We depended on B to make sure r is a good nonce Main property is “one-time-ness”, so could use even a counter (but must keep state)  Starting value must still be random and unpredictable Choose nonces “randomly” from a large space (such as 2 128 ) to avoid re-use and for unpredictability – good RNG 4/28/2020 Module 4 - Protocols: Authentication and Key Exchange 18

Timestamps

   Inclusion of date/time-stamp in the message allows recipient to check it for freshness  Need to be protected with cryptographic means A   B: Enc K (T,B) Results in fewer messages But, requires synchronized clocks  hard to achieve in practice!

4/28/2020 Module 4 - Protocols: Authentication and Key Exchange 19

 

Encryption-based Mutual Authentication (1)

Run two copies of the uni-lateral authentication protocol  4 rounds We can piggyback common flows 1.

A  B  A  B: A: B: A, rA Enc K (rB, rA, A) Enc K (rA, rB) 4/28/2020 Module 4 - Protocols: Authentication and Key Exchange 20

Encryption-based Mutual Authentication (2)

A  B  B: A: A, Enc K (T,B) Enc K (T+1,A) 4/28/2020 Module 4 - Protocols: Authentication and Key Exchange 21

MAC-based Authentication

A  B  A  B: A: B: A, rA rB, HMAC K (rB, rA, A) HMAC K (rA, rB,B)  Faster than enc-based protocols (computationally) 4/28/2020 Module 4 - Protocols: Authentication and Key Exchange 22

Session Key Exchange with KDC – Needham-Schroeder Protocol

      A -> KDC ID A || ID B || N 1 (Hello, I am Alice, I want to talk to Bob, I need a session Key and here is a random nonce identifying this request) KDC -> A E KA ( K || ID B || N 1 || E KB (K || ID A )) Encrypted (Here is a key, for you to talk to Bob as per your request N 1 and also an envelope to Bob containing the same key) A -> B E KB (K || ID A ) (I would like to talk using key in envelope sent by KDC) B -> A E the key?) K (N 2 ) (OK Alice, But can you prove to me that you are indeed Alice and know A -> B E K (f(N 2 )) (Sure I can!) Last two steps - challenge-response. Commonly used to thwart replay attack.

4/28/2020 Module 4 - Protocols: Authentication and Key Exchange 23

   

Session Key Exchange with KDC – Needham-Schroeder Protocol (corrected version with mutual authentication)

A -> KDC: ID A || ID B || N 1 (Hello, I am Alice, I want to talk to Bob, I need a session Key and here is a random nonce identifying this request) KDC -> A: E KA ( K || ID B || N 1 || E KB (TS1, K || ID A )) Encrypted (Here is a key, for you to talk to Bob as per your request N 1 and also an envelope to Bob containing the same key) A -> B: E authenticator) K (TS2,B), E KB (TS1, K || ID A ) (I would like to talk using key in envelope sent by KDC; here is an B -> A: E K (TS2+1,A) (OK Alice, here is a proof that I am really Bob) 4/28/2020 Module 4 - Protocols: Authentication and Key Exchange 24

Version 4 summary

4/28/2020 Module 4 - Protocols: Authentication and Key Exchange 25



Public-key based authentication (Needham-Shroeder (NS) pk-based)

Assuming public keys are distributed through CA(s) 1.

A  B  A  B: A: B: Enc pkb (rA, A) Enc pka (rA, rB) Enc pkb (rB) 4/28/2020 Module 4 - Protocols: Authentication and Key Exchange 26



Attack and fix on PK-based NS protocol

Attack:  Fix: 1.

A  B  A  B: A: B: Enc pkb (rA, A) Enc pka (rA, rB,B) Enc pkb (rB) 4/28/2020 Module 4 - Protocols: Authentication and Key Exchange 27

Signature-based authentication (assuming public keys are distributed through CA)

A auth B

 A  B:   B  A  A: B: Hi Bob, this is Alice!

r (a challenge) Sig SKa (r,B) (response) A auth B, B auth A (run two copies; piggyback common flows)    A  B  A  B: A: B: A, rA (could sign this too) rB, Sig SKb (rB, rA, A) Sig SKa (rA,rB,B) 4/28/2020 Module 4 - Protocols: Authentication and Key Exchange 28

 

Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE)

Public-key operations are costly 1.

Why not use public-key mutual authentication protocols to exchange a symmetric key 2.

use this symmetric key with a symmetric encryption to secure subsequent communication 4/28/2020 Module 4 - Protocols: Authentication and Key Exchange 29

Security Notion for AKE

   Launch protocol between any pair Reveal all session key except one Try to distinguish the key of the unrevealed session from random  This captures: the compromise of other sessions should not lead to the compromise of any other session 4/28/2020 Module 4 - Protocols: Authentication and Key Exchange 30

A B A    B: A, rA, Enc PKb (K) (must sign this too??) A: rB, Sig SKb (rB, rA, A) B: Sig SKa (rA, rB, B) A and B output K as the authenticated key   Such a protocol can be instantiated using RSA encryption/signing  The way SSL/SSH establishes key But, generally only the server authenticates the client, not vice versa 4/28/2020 Module 4 - Protocols: Authentication and Key Exchange 31

X.509 Authentication – One-way.

 Establishes the following    Identity of A and message was generated by A Message was intended for B Integrity and originality of message.

4/28/2020 Module 4 - Protocols: Authentication and Key Exchange 32

X.509 Authentication – Two-way.

 One-Way plus the above which establishes the following    Identity of B and message was generated by B Message was intended for A Integrity and originality of message.

4/28/2020 Module 4 - Protocols: Authentication and Key Exchange 33

X.509 Authentication – Three-way.

4/28/2020 Module 4 - Protocols: Authentication and Key Exchange 34

Diffie-Hellman (DH) Key Exchange

A  B  B: A: K a K b = g a mod p = g b mod p 3.

A outputs K ab = K b a B outputs K ba = K a b  Note K ab = K ba = g ab mod p 4/28/2020 Module 4 - Protocols: Authentication and Key Exchange 35

Security of DH key exchange

   No authentication of either party Secure only against a passive adversary  Under the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption  Given (g, g a ,g b ), hard to compute g ab Not secure against an active attacker  Man-in-the-middle attack… 4/28/2020 Module 4 - Protocols: Authentication and Key Exchange 36

Authenticated DH Key Exchange aka: Station-to-Station Protocol

A  B  B: A: A  B: K a = g a mod p Cert b , K b = g b mod p Sig SKb (K a , K b ) Cert a , Sig SKa (K b ,K a ) 4.

A outputs K ab = K b a B outputs K ba = K a b 4/28/2020 Module 4 - Protocols: Authentication and Key Exchange 37

Summary

  Designing secure protocols is not easy   Becomes harder in a concurrent setting, where there are multiple parties, executing multiple instances of the protocols simultaneously Becomes even harder as the number of parties increase; n party or group setting Use the protocols that are well-studied and standardized  While designing a protocol, consider    Reflection attacks Replay attacks Eliminating any symmetry in the messages 4/28/2020 Module 4 - Protocols: Authentication and Key Exchange 38