Government and the Provision of Public and Collective Goods
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Transcript Government and the Provision of Public and Collective Goods
Public Goods
Goods that are normally provided by Governments
Goods that are not provided by the private market or
are insufficiently provided by the private market
Goods that are non-rivaled: consumption of good
does not reduce availability of good for consumption
by others
Goods that are non-exclusive: no one can be easily or
effectively prohibited from using the good
Type of Goods
Excludable
Non-Excludable
Rivalrous
Private Goods: food,
Clothing, cars, homes,
furniture, toys
Common goods: water,
fish, hunting game
Non-rivalous
Collective good: Cable,
Phone, Access to Internet
Public Goods:
National defense,
national parks, clean air,
clean oceans
Collective versus Individual Interests
Global Politics revolves around one key problem:
How can a group – such as two or more states – serve its
collective interests when doing so requires its members
to forego their national interests?
Example: Problem of global warning. Solving it can only be
achieved by many countries acting together.
Collective goods problem
The problem of how to provide something that benefits all
members of a group regardless of what each member contributes
to it
Free Rider Problem
Free riders are those who consume more than their fair
share of the public good yet do not contribute their fair
share in providing it
1. National Defense: no one individual can be
excluded from being defended by a state’s military
forces
2. Public Parks: no one individual can be
excluded from its use regardless of his/her
contribution to its up-keep
Small Groups Versus Large Groups
In general, collective goods are easier to provide in
small groups than large ones.
Small group: defection (free riding) is harder to conceal and
has a greater impact on the overall collective good, and is
easier to punish.
Collective goods problem occurs in all groups and
societies
Particularly acute in global politics
No central authority such as a world government to enforce on
individual nations the necessary measures to provide for the
common good
Also acute for domestic politics of a state when de facto
sovereignty is weak, the state is failed, or widespread
corruption at the level of government
How can we assure that a Collective
Good is Provided Internationally
Three basic principles offer possible solutions for this
core problem of getting individuals or states to
cooperate for the common good without a central
authority to make them do so.
Dominance
Reciprocity
Identity
Table 1.1
Dominance
Solves the collective goods problem by establishing a power
hierarchy in which those at the top control those below
Status hierarchy
Symbolic acts of submission and dominance reinforce the hierarchy.
Hegemon
The advantage of the dominance solution
Forces members of a group to contribute to the common good
Minimizes open conflict within the group
Disadvantage of the dominance solution
Stability comes at a cost of constant oppression of, and resentment
by, the lower-ranking members of the status hierarchy.
Conflicts over position can sometimes harm the group’s stability
and well-being.
Reciprocity
Solves the collective goods problem by rewarding
behavior that contributes to the group and
punishing behavior that pursues self-interest at
the cost of the group
Easy to understand and can be “enforced” without any
central authority
Positive and negative reciprocity
Disadvantage: It can lead to a downward spiral as each
side punishes what it believes to be the negative acts of
the other.
Generally people overestimate their own good intentions and
underestimate those of opponents or rivals.
Identity
Identity principle does not rely on self-interest.
Members of an identity community care about the
interests of others in the community enough to
sacrifice their own interests to benefit others.
Family, extended family, kinship group roots,
citizenship, ethnic/national identity
In domestic and international politics, identity
communities play important roles in overcoming
difficult collective goods problems.
Non-state actors also rely on identity politics.
Mancur Olsen and the Problem of
Collective Action
The Logic of Collective Action (1968):
Mancur Olson argued that people have no reason to
join groups when the fruits of the group’s efforts are
available to nonmembers as well as members.
F.ex.: Why should a worker join a union when the wage
rise it negotiates goes to all employees? Why should a
company pay a fee to join an industry association when
the benefits the group obtains will help all the firms in
that sector?
Smart move: to free-ride
Problem of Collective Action
Olson suggests that free riders do hinder collective
organization. He argues that interest groups will only
emerge in specific conditions.
Membership is compulsory: closed shop
When groups offer selective benefits, marked
members only, rather than collective goods for the
constituency at large
Olson’s analysis poses the problem of collective
action—the difficulty of organizing rational actors to
achieve what is in their collective interest.