Transcript Slide 1

Deconflicting
Electronic Warfare in
Joint Operations
Col Art Huber, USAF
COL Gary Carlberg, USA
Col Prince Gilliard, USAF
CAPT David Marquet, USN
JCWS Class 06-04
Briefing Flow
• Background
• The Nature of the Problem
• How We Do It Today
• Some Ideas to Address the Challenge
• Summary
Background
• Briefing developed from paper co-authored to satisfy Joint
Professional Military Education Phase II requirements
• Joint Forces Staff College Faculty Advisors:
– COL Tom Snukis, USA; Mr. Karl Erickson
• Assignment was to research and write a paper covering a
topic that is of current issue to the joint community
• Research methodology: open literature survey, interviews
and e-mail correspondence with subject matter experts
• Shortened version of paper submitted to Joint Forces
Quarterly in hopes of publication
Disclaimer: The views presented herein do not necessarily reflect the official
policy of the US Government, the DoD, or any of its agencies.
Release: The paper on which this briefing is based was cleared by the
Commandant of the Joint Forces Staff College on 12 Oct 06.
Introduction
[I]t has become clear that in any future fighting, a significant electronic battle will also be
taking place.
Curtis E. LeMay, General, USAF (Ret), 1946
• Like air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace, the electromagnetic
spectrum has become a contested domain to attain the “high
ground” for control of this medium
• Like combat involving kinetic weapons, EW is no less immune
to the problem of fratricide
• More and more systems are vying for their place in an
increasingly crowded frequency spectrum
– Constant pressure to transfer military bands to the public domain
– Low tolerance for interference
– Rush to field emitters without frequency certification
We must better manage and deconflict the EM spectrum if EW is to remain a
weapon of choice for our warfighters.
The “Cocktail of EM Confusion”
• Fratricide has been a problem since the dawn of EW
• EW fratricide has occurred even in operations involving the most
modern equipment and well-trained, professional crews
• The problem extends to comm, sensors, data links, UAVs, etc.
• Two events from recent history serve to illustrate:
On one occasion I was on orbit conducting jamming operations, and we knew an EC130E Commando Solo aircraft was in the area putting out Psyops broadcasts to Iraqi
troops. But we didn’t know the frequencies or the times when it was operating. A
linguist misidentified a broadcast, we targeted it and we ended up jamming it. We
discovered the mistake only after we landed.
Chris Bakke, EC-130H Compass Call crewmember in Operation Desert Storm
Imagine trying to win an overseas air war where target intelligence can be gathered
only part of the day, where aerial refueling is hampered by inability to fly in close
formation under prevailing weather conditions, and where many newly developed
radio systems for air, sea, and land forces don’t work the way they did back in the
U.S. Sound unlikely? It isn’t - these constraints limited the U.S. forces’ ability to
operate to maximum efficiency during the Kosovo campaign.
Defense Science Board Task Force on DoD Frequency Spectrum Issues, Nov 00
The “Cocktail of EM Confusion”
• Experiences in Operations Enduring and Iraqi
Freedom show the problem has only gotten worse:
This is the first time that you and I have seen electronic fratricide reach the point that
it has. … When you take a look at data links and the number of jammers in place and
all the radios we have out there, [deconflicting] becomes a very difficult problem. …
We have a long way to go … I need to … determine when and where I’m going to
jam and how I’m going to affect the electronic medium.”
Lt Gen Walter Buchanan, former chief 9th AF and CENTCOM Air Forces, Nov 05
The ground guys are throwing out energy, the airborne guys are throwing out energy,
and the … bad guys are throwing out energy. So it’s a little hard to prevent guys
from stepping all over each other. … [I]t’s a big problem when [the] same frequency
you’re jamming on is the frequency someone else is datalinking on and someone
else is trying to communicate on.
Col Rick Rankine, HQ AF/A5RE, Sep 06
So what’s a warfighter to do?
DoD Spectrum Dependence
Ship-Shore-Ship
Link 11
Navigation Aids Over-the-Horizon
Radar
Perimeter Detection
Battlefield Sensor
Security Sensor
UGV
Intruder
MEDEVAC
UAV
Detection Radar
UAV
Beacons,
ATC
Range
Data
UAV EOD
Tactical HF
UAV/UGV
Position Location
MSRT
Tactical FM/SINCGARS
JTRS Clusters Implementation
100
kHz
10
MHz
20
MHz
30
MHz
40
MHz
50
MHz
60
MHz
70
MHz
80
MHz
90
MHz
UAV/Range
Search Radar,
Control, Weapons
ATC, REMBASS, Flight Deck
Flight Termination
Sonobuoy, Scoring,
Tactical PCS
Battlefield Soldier Intercom
Intrusion
Systems, Target
Target
Security
Sensors
Wireless Comm, Detection
Emergency
Control
Tracking
UGV D/L,
Battlegroup
Locator,
VIICS
RF Tags
Sonobuoy MEDEVAC
Cellular
Rescue
UAV
MSE/HAVEQUICK
UHF, AM
Tac VHF
Tactical UHF (Ter/SAT) EPLRS
Radar
Tactical MW Range Instrumentation
100
MHz
Radar,
MW Landing
JTIDS
TACAN
JTRS Clusters Implementation
100
MHz
200
MHz
300
MHz
400
MHz
500
MHz
600
MHz
700
MHz
800
MHz
900
MHz
1000
MHz
MSE, Tactical WB,
Acquisition/
Target Control,
Fire Control/Tracking Surveillance,
DSCS
Precision Munitions,
Surveillance/
Range Video Relay
Fire Control Radar
Radar,
UAV,
UGV
UAV
ATC Radar, Telemetry
MW, Data Link MW Sensor
EHF Radio,
Terrain
MW Landing
UGV, Missile DL, Telemetry
INMARSAT
IRIDIUM
MILSTAR, Radar
Sensor
BCIS
GPS
TACAN
Surveillance/Search/
GBS
Tropo
Range
GBS
MILSTAR
L2, L4/L3, L1
FC Radar
CDL, TCDL,
Control
Intrusion
Trgt Control
UAV
IFF,
Scoring
SCDL, WB DLs
Detection
Scoring
Search, Fire Control Radar
GPS L5
Challenge Athena
JTRS Clusters Implementation
1
GHz
2
GHz
3
GHz
4
GHz
5
GHz
6
GHz
21
GHz
30
GHz
40
GHz
DoD Spectrum Dependence
Observations on the Spectrum
• The US is unique among nations in that it lacks a
national spectrum policy
– In comparison to other countries, U.S. interests are not pursued
in a coherent and harmonious manner
• U.S. frequency allocations within the RF spectrum are
not necessarily mirrored around the globe
– Results in problems like refusal to allow some U.S. systems to
operate within foreign national borders
►E.g., German restrictions on the Enhanced Position Location and
Reporting System (EPLRS)
• Frequently, in the rush to field new systems, insufficient
attention is put on securing frequency certifications
Frequency management is important because it sets the bounds
for the freedom one has to operate within an EW environment
The Nature of Today’s Challenge
• How today is different:
– Threat and countermeasure ubiquity
 Proliferation of spectrum users/systems
– Battlespace dynamics
 Highly non-linear, rapid in tempo, chaotic
• Improvised Explosive Devices (IED)
– Have garnered a massive US effort to
develop Counter IED (C-IED) systems
 $3B allocated in FY06 … $378M spent on
C-IED jammers since 2003
– Radio Frequency IEDs (RFIED) variant are
numerous and varied
 Arming/detonation mechanisms include
remote control toys, electronic keychains,
garage door openers, radios, walkie-talkies,
cell phones, satellite phones, and long
range cordless phones
RFIEDs Have Added a New Dimension
to the Fratricide Problem
• Use of IED jammers has resulted in
kinetic and non-kinetic forms of
fratricide:
– Premature or inadvertent detonation
killing or injuring insurgents but also
civilians and friendly EOD personnel
– Interference with other friendly
(primarily comm) systems
Elisra EJAB
• Problem has been compounded by
coalition context
– E.g., Israel’s Elisra-built EJAB
(Electronic Jammer Against Bombs)
system used by Polish forces
Polish Troop Vehicle
The Dilemmas in EW Deconfliction
The Warlock is a jamming device used to hunt
up and down radio frequencies searching for
signals that could detonate a bomb. The Army
has worked heroically with the makers to
upgrade the short range and limited capability
of the Warlock. But in the field, competing
technologies kept getting in the way. The
Army uses a radio (called SINCGARS) that
also hops around frequencies. The radio
frequently interfered with the Warlock jammer.
Unable to communicate, troops began turning
off their jammers – thereby exposing
themselves to IEDs.
Newsweek, Mar 06
SINCGARS
HMMWV equipped with C-IED Jammer
Warlock Green / Red
Warlock “S”
EW Deconfliction “By the Book”
• “Bible” is Joint Pub 3-51, Joint Doctrine for Electronic Warfare
• Joint Freq Mgt Office (JRMO) under COCOM J-6
–
–
–
–
–
Establishes policy and procedures
Develops and distributes spectrum-use plans
Exercises frequency allotment and assignment authority
Coordinates spectrum use with international/host nation authorities
Prepares and updates the JRFL
• Joint Restricted Frequency List (JRFL) is first line of defense
– A time- and geographically-oriented listing of functions, nets, and
frequencies that must not be jammed or interfered with by friendly
forces
• COCOM J-3 ultimate authority for frequency deconfliction
EW Deconfliction “By the Book”
• EW part of Information Operations (IO) so EW Officer
(EWO) typically assigned to IO cell
– Responsible for planning, synchronizing, coordinating,
deconflicting EW
– Supervises EW planning and preparation of EW appendices in
operations plans
– Monitors EW execution in on-going operations and exercises
– EW a form of “fires” so EWO also works with Fire Support
Coordinator and Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB)
• Tools available to the EWO include:
– Databases (providing friendly and enemy EW related data)
– Planning process aids
– Graphics analysis tools (e.g., visualization models for
electromagnetic propagation)
EW Deconfliction “By the Book”
• The EW Coordination Center (EWCC)
– An ad hoc staff coordination element often formed to facilitate the
EW coordination function
– Managed by the J-3 EWO and includes other EWOs
– If the Task Force involves a coalition, participants include EW
officers from supporting allied and/or coalition forces
– Identifies conflicts between the JRFL and friendly electronic
attack operations and requests changes
• Joint Spectrum Center (JSC)
– Serves as DoD center of excellence for electromagnetic
spectrum management matters
– Supports COCOMs, Military Departments, and Defense agencies
– Manages Joint Spectrum Interference Resolution program
The EWCC and JSC have become absolutely critical to the
EWO to get the deconfliction job accomplished
The Process in Action
When exercised properly, the process can work well:
One of the first tasks … given … was
denying enemy C2 … [while] at the same
time … limit[ing] collateral damage. …The
electronic warfare assets could have
jammed the GPS [Global Positioning
System] signals. Fortunately, [the Director
of Space Forces] recognized the potential
for EW fratricide. He worked with the EW
coordination cell, mission planners of all
services and implemented an EW energy
management scheme to preclude the GPS
interference. … The bottom line was a
successful attack … to bring in fire on
sniper positions and navigate through the
city of Fallujah.
General Lance Lord, former Commander, Air
Force Space Command, describing an instance
of successful EW deconfliction in OIF
Freeing Up the Jam
Our “suggestions for improvement:”
1. Develop better mechanisms to formulate and pursue
national spectrum policy
2. Adopt a resource perspective for the frequency spectrum
and apply the joint strategic planning process to its
management
3. Adhere with greater discipline to doctrine and be creative
within its confines as regards existing joint frequency
management processes
4. Insert relevant technological improvements
5. Hold acquisition efforts accountable to secure allocation
approval for desired operating frequencies and to best
practices for characterizing new systems through testing
Develop a National Spectrum Policy
A national spectrum policy would:
• Better balance U.S. security and safety requirements with new
commercial uses of the frequency spectrum
• Work to ensure military spectrum needs are protected and interests
advanced to meet burgeoning req’ts to achieve “information dominance”
• Account for both domestic and international environments as well as
government and commercial considerations
• Build new mechanisms to promote unity of effort between the:
– State Dept (lead for international spectrum allocation negotiations)
– Commerce’s National Telecommunications and Information
Administration (charged with federal government allocations)
– FCC (administers non-federal government and civil/commercial uses)
• Orchestrate a single, consistent voice at international forums (e.g., the
International Telecommunications Union and World Radiocommunication
Conference) which govern international spectrum allocations
Apply Joint Strategic Planning to
Spectrum Management
• Warfighters have a process to prepare for and conduct
military operations known as Joint Strategic Planning
– Process provides:
Authoritative direction
Assignment of missions, tasks, forces and resources
Assumptions and objectives
Operational limitations including rules on the use of force and
rules of engagement (ROE)
Policies and concepts to be integrated into subordinate or
supporting plans
• Frequency Spectrum is NOT currently treated as a
resource within this framework
– Instead, spectrum is treated like a logistics “commodity”
Results in JSC having a role like DLA
Needs greater priority and visibility
Apply Joint Strategic Planning to
Spectrum Management
• If frequency spectrum was treated like other strategic
resources in the joint planning process, then it would:
– Assign spectrum to the COCOMs for use during peacetime in the
“Forces for Unified Commands” memorandum issued by the Secretary
of Defense
– Apportion spectrum to the COCOMs through the Joint Strategic
Capabilities Plan issued by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, for use
in developing operational plans
– Allocate spectrum to the COCOMs for use in actual operations
• Benefits that would then accrue might include:
–
–
–
–
Proactive ID of potential and actual theater spectrum conflicts
Pre-conflict reservation of spectrum blocks and system reprogramming
Detailed planning for spectrum order of battle (in time and space)
Institution of a frequency tasking order (FTO) to enable enhanced
situational awareness and tracking of spectrum use
– Better ID of shortfalls for translation into acquisition requirements
Discipline and Creativity
within Doctrine
• A survey of recent history uncovers
lapses in application of doctrinal
precepts for EW deconfliction
– Coordination between freq mgt
entities has been overlooked
– JRFLs have been violated
– EW environment analyses were
incorrect having used obsolete data
– Standup and continuous manning
of EWCCs on combatant
commander and task force staffs
were neglected
– Those assigned EW duties lacked
training and/or expertise
– Poorly planned personnel rotations
have degenerated handoffs and
increased spin-up times
Disciplined adherence to doctrine and best practices will
improve EW deconfliction mission accomplishment
Discipline and Creativity
within Doctrine
Doctrine provides plenty of leeway for new ideas on
how to best execute the deconfliction process
• Example 1: CENTCOM’s new EW Concept of Operations
– Delegates EW Coordination Authority to the Joint Forces Air
Component Commander (1st time placed in a single commander)
– Creates Combined Theater EW Coordination Cell (CTEWCC)
 Charged to integrate and satisfy req’ts for pre-planned operations
 Develops and synchronizes plans to employ EW assets
 Explicitly charged with mitigating EW fratricide
• Example 2: Joint Fires Board employed by Combined Joint Task
Force 76 (Afghanistan)
– Charged with ensuring unity of effort and synchronizing fires
– Coordinated efforts of task force staff/cells using ATO as baseline
– Increased knowledge of EW
– Provided forum for discussion of deconfliction issues
Technology Can Help Too
• Improvements in environment & spectrum mgt tools
– Current primary tool is JSC’s SPECTRUM XXI
 Limited network integration
 Can’t facilitate frequency assignments for time slots < 24 hours
– Proposed replacement is GEMSIS
 Global Electromagnetic Spectrum Information System
 Will integrate spectrum mgt on the Global Information Grid (GIG)
 Will enable “spectrum on demand,” real-time deconfliction in time and space
• Improvements in system capabilities
–
–
–
–
–
Expanded transmit/receive bands
Expanded hardware and software (re)programmability
Digitally modulated waveforms
Channel sharing via multiplexing and frequency “sniffing”
Precision (cleaner signals and electronically steerable arrays)
But never forget advanced technologies must be
accompanied by complimentary TTPs and training!
If You Want It Bad …
• The record shows a number of developmental and upgrade programs
have failed to secure certification for their operating frequencies
At least 89 telecommunications systems were deployed within the European, Pacific,
and Southwest Asian theaters without proper frequency certification and host-nation
approval.
1998 DoD IG Audit Report
For the longest time we couldn’t get the names of the [C-IED] systems, let alone
what frequency they were operating on. We need someone … to work out these
frequency conflicts before the equipment comes into country.
CDR Kevin Robinson, officer assigned to Task Force Paladin in OEF
• This problem is quite prevalent with systems procured in an “urgent
and compelling” manner
• Testing that would uncover frequency issues is often short-circuited
or has failed to provide warnings and caveats to system operators
Disciplined adherence to acquisition process rules and the
frequency certification process will help avoid spectrum conflicts
The Need to Be Resolute
• EW has made incredible strides since Gen LeMay made his
prophetic remarks to become indispensable to modern combat
• The benefits of new technologies have come with a price …
growing reliance on spectrum-dependent systems
• We have recognized the complexities inherent in our current
situation and have created mechanisms and processes to cope
• However, …
We often fail to do what we know must be done to succeed!
If we are to slay the demon of EW fratricide –
i.e., stop being our own electronic enemy –
we must not only understand the trends
and develop appropriate responses,
but be ruthless in our follow-through
Parting Admonition:
EW Deconfliction is Critical!
Proper coordination
of systems like this…
IED
Countermeasure
Equipment
(ICE)
Scopes of Radars
Jammed by other
Radars
Helps prevent this!
HMMWV
Destroyed by IED