Transcript Interagency Issues - Federation Of American Scientists

DSB Summer Study
on
Special Operations and Joint Forces in
Support of Countering Terrorism
Friday
August 16, 2002
Final Outbrief
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Sponsors
USD(AT&L)/Commander JFCOM
Special Operations & Joint Forces in Support of Countering Terrorism
Dr. Ted Gold
Mr. Don Latham
Prior CT Insights
MG Bob Scales
Dr. Wick Murray
Advanced CT Technologies &
Systems
Dr. Mim John
Dr. Ron Kerber
Future Force Capabilities
GEN Bill Hartzog
VADM Dave Frost
We drew on past DSB studies
Enduring Freedom
Intel Panel
Dr. Joe Markowitz
ADM Bill Studeman
Psyops
Managed Information
Dissemination
We leveraged current
DSB Studies
Unconventional Use of
Nuclear Weapons Against
U.S.
Dr. Rich Wagner
Dr. Bill Graham
Precision Targeting
Defensive Information
Operations
Others
Biological Warfare
Dr. Anna Skalka
Mr. Larry Lynn
Discriminant Use of Force
Dr. Ted Gold
Dr. Josh Lederberg
2
The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT): A Real War,
A New Type of Adversary
•
Committed, resourceful, globally dispersed adversary with
strategic reach
•
A long, at times violent, and borderless war
•
Requires new strategies, postures, and organization
This study only scratches the surface of what will eventually be needed
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Elements of a National Strategy: Orchestrate All
Instruments of National Power in a Global Campaign
•
Preemption/proaction/interdiction/disruption/quick-response capabilities
•
Be proactive in securing partners and help from allies, friends, and others
•
Hold states/sub-state actors accountable
•
Foster information sharing
•
Fight forward
•
Focus particular attention on WMD
•
Sophisticated, aggressive public diplomacy
All the above in parallel with consequence management and
protecting the homeland and DoD’s missions and forces
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Guidance From Our Terms of Reference
•
Focus is overseas military operations
– Military instrument is only part of the necessary capabilities
– Examined the role of intelligence in some detail
•
Did not address homeland defense explicitly
– But difficult to segment theaters in this war
– We did consider threats to US military force projection from the US
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The Toughest Challenge: Identify and Find Terrorist Networks
•
Very small “signals” hidden in massive clutter and noise
•
Some similarities with Cold War anti-submarine warfare (ASW) efforts
•
Extensive differences as well
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Conducting Military Campaigns in States Harboring Terrorists
OEF demonstrated substantial progress toward desired force capabilities
• From
– Air, land, sea, space
•
To
–
–
–
–
–
–
Robust connectivity
Horizontally integrated, pervasive ISR
Agile ground forces able to operate dispersed
Effective remote fires
Adaptive joint command and control
Assured access and supply (expeditionary mindset)
These emerging capabilities will be critical for
an effective military role in GWOT
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Characteristics of Afghan Campaign That Will Persist
•
A more central role for SOF and specialized capabilities
•
Joint integration at very low levels
•
Discriminant use of force
•
Interagency partners play major roles
•
Creative operational arrangements with coalition partners
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Recent DoD Initiatives in the GWOT
•
Expanded Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC) and Land Information Warfare
Activity (LIWA) initiatives
– Interagency
•
Operational net assessment (ONA) capabilities at Combatant Commands
– JFCOM
•
– CENTCOM
•
•
•
•
•
•
– NORTHCOM
New Campaign Support Group at Ft. Bragg
– Multi-agency
•
– Link analysis
– Joint
– Global perspective
– New analysis tools
– Multi-option analysis
Joint Program Office – Special Technology Countermeasures: Mission Assurance
Analysis
Counter-terrorism Technology Support Office – Technical Support Working Group
Physical Security Equipment Action Group
Special Operations Joint Interagency Collaboration Center
J8 Chem/Bio Warfare Requirements Section
DoD Support to DEA Special Intelligence
JFCOM Initiatives
– Standing Joint Force Headquarters – Joint Interagency Coordination Group
– Joint Enroute Mission Planning and Rehearsal System - Near Term
– Enhanced C4ISR Homeland Operations Center – Joint National Training Capability
•
•
•
USN Deep Blue (Navy Operations Group)
USN/USMC Expeditionary Strike Group Proof of Concept
USMC/SOCOM Integration Initiatives
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Recent DoD Initiatives in the GWOT
•
DARPA projects, e.g.:
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
•
Genoa
Evidence Extraction and Link Discovery
Translingual Information Detection, Extraction, and Summarization
Babylon
Human Identification at a Distance
Modern Internetted Unattended Ground Sensors
Foliage Penetration Radar (SAR and GMT I)
Standoff Precision Identification from 3D Data
Digital Radio Frequency Tags
Advanced ISR Management
ACTDs:
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
High-Altitude Airship
Pathfinder
Active Denial System
Thermobaric
Adaptive Joint C4ISR Mode
Joint Blue Force Situational Awareness
Language and Speech Exploitation Resources
Cave and Urban Assault
Urban Reconnaissance
Hyperspectral Collection and Analysis System (HyCAS)
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Major Concerns
•
DoD should take the terrorist threat as seriously as it takes the
likelihood and consequences of major theater war
•
DoD still struggling to get joint C4 right
•
Pentagon processes overly focused on materiel
• Defense and Intelligence processes and cultures remain inputrather than product-oriented
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Achieving Decision and Execution Superiority Over
Terrorists and Their Sponsors
“Tools” to handle
tough environments and
difficult targets
Understanding
adversaries and
providing “actionable”
intelligence
Adaptive and
responsive
national-level
decision making
Tailoring forces for
more SOF-centric
operations
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Achieving Decision and Execution Superiority Over
Terrorists and Their Sponsors
“Tools” to handle
tough environments and
difficult targets
Understanding
adversaries and
providing “actionable”
intelligence
Adaptive and
responsive
national-level
decision making
Tailoring forces for
more SOF-centric
operations
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Not the focus of our
study
13
Achieving Decision and Execution Superiority Over
Terrorists and Their Sponsors
“Tools” to handle
tough environments and
difficult targets
2
1
Understanding
adversaries and
providing “actionable”
intelligence
A much more
responsive, flexible,
and effective military
capability
3
4
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Adaptive and
responsive
national-level
decision making
Tailoring forces for
more SOF-centric
operations
Operationalizing new approaches and capabilities
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Discussion Outline
•
Organization, context, and themes
•
Understanding new adversaries and providing “actionable” intelligence
•
“Tools” to handle tough environments and difficult targets and
understand our vulnerabilities
•
Tailoring forces for more SOF-centric operations
•
Operationalizing new approaches and capabilities
•
Recap
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A Much More Responsive, Flexible, and Effective Military Capability
1.
Understanding new adversaries and providing “actionable”
intelligence: deep penetration - understanding, finding, and tracking
the terrorists and their networks
2.
“Tools” to handle tough environments and difficult targets and
understand our vulnerabilities
3.
Tailoring forces for more SOF-centric operations
4.
Operationalizing new approaches and capabilities
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Understanding New Adversaries and Providing “Actionable” Intelligence:
Deep Penetration - Understanding, Finding, and Tracking the
Terrorists and Their Networks
- Key Initiatives –
• Transformation of HUMINT (and human-technical)
operations
• Aggressive, proactive, preemptive, operations
• Intelligence surge/unsurge capability
• Expanded analytical capabilities and throughput against
asymmetrical adversaries
• Understand adversaries as complex adaptive systems
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Transformation of HUMINT Operations
•
SecDef (working with DCI) expand overall Directorate of HUMINT
Services (DHS)/Service roles and explore SOF opportunities
•
Increase HUMINT forward/operational presence
•
Work with DCI to deploy new DoD clandestine technical capabilities
•
NSA/Combatant Commanders/Services pay more attention to support
of DoD HUMINT in the field
•
SOF continue to work Advance Force Operations (AFO)
•
Define HUMINT role in “Proactive” Ops; ensure Covert Action (CA) and
IW/IO connections
•
Explore development of USAF/Navy HUMINT capabilities (beyond
current compartmented programs)
•
A major covert HUMINT program needs to be made joint
•
Explore new and more varied HUMINT modes – described on next
chart
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Transformation of HUMINT Operations
Classified HUMINT Chart
Aggressive Proactive, Preemptive Operations Group (P2OG)
CLASSIFIED
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Aggressive Proactive, Preemptive Operations
•
Creation of a Proactive Preemptive Operating Group (P2OG) of creative
subject matter operational experts such as:
– IW/IO – Covert Action – Diplomacy – Cover & Deception
– Intelligence Operations – PSYOPS – HUMINT – SIGINT – SOF
•
Improves information collection by stimulating reactions
•
Enhance operational preparation of the battlespace to support
preemptive options and actions
•
Signal to harboring states that their sovereignty will be at risk
•
Vest responsibility and accountability for the P2OG to a “Special
Operations Executive” in the NSC* who shall:
–
–
–
–
Define the national strategy
Coordinate action
Enunciate policy
Execute to a plan coordinated with the SecDef and DCI and others as appropriate
* The position exists in the NSC and is called: “National Director and Deputy National Security Advisor for Combating
Terrorism”, NSPD-8, Oct. 24, 2001
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Intelligence Surge/Unsurge Capability
•
Maintain a robust global cadre of retirees, reservists, and others who are
trained and qualified to serve on short notice, including expatriates
– Make investments now
– Exercise and engage (through gaming) at least annually
– Maintain a database of individuals and skills
– Focus on Tier 4 countries where CT operations may be necessary
– Contracted roles for industry, universities, and think tanks
•
Focus on analytic expertise and capabilities, CA/SOF issues, scientists
and engineers, linguists/area experts, and personnel recovery skills
•
Work with DoD and Congress on “unsurge” issues, particularly related
to callups
•
Develop innovative “data surge” capabilities
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Improving Analytical Capabilities and Throughput
•
Create a new and larger analytic workforce with skills and innovative tools
focused on counterterrorism (CT)
•
Focus on “actionable intelligence,” improved situational awareness, targeting
and reachback support and “connecting the dots” using JWAC-like analysis
approaches
•
Full-time collaborative connections between all the critical centers working CT
intelligence and support
•
Analysis components of national intelligence organizations physically or
virtually collocated to improve all-source multi-INT “analysis” collaboration
and production
•
Support for intelligence collection-related “target development”
•
Develop new security/sanitization concepts to aid analysts in protecting new
sources and methods
•
Identify roles for analysts in operational net assessment process/joint
experimentation, vulnerability analysis/Red Teaming, and CT-related gaming
and simulation
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Greatly Improving Customer Access to Intelligence
Counterterrorism Information
•
SecDef/DCI establish a group to define a future path to achieve a truly
joint interoperable CT Common Operating Picture (COP)
•
Improve chat windows and secure collaborative means/directories for
direct access to relevant analysts and related data environments
•
Converge large e-gov programs currently underway in SIGINT and
IMINT for improved customer access to intelligence data/collaboration
•
Pursue an integrated family of “small terminal programs” for
field/small unit access to intelligence data (data, imagery, etc.)—smart
push and pull
•
DCI/SecDef provide portals, tools and pointers for access to
unclassified open sources data bases, commercial sources etc.
•
Develop advanced visualization concepts for conveying intelligence
and situational information
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Understanding Adversaries as Complex Adaptive Systems
•
Further expand and enhance Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC)-like
capabilities
– Expand the number of countries/actors as well as the factors considered
– Address non-physical as well as physical dimensions
– Address money flow, cronies, family, intra-military, other
• The capabilities must be coupled closer to campaign planning and
execution (effects-based operations):
– To influence as well as respond
– Support information/influence ops in peace/crisis/war as well as more traditional
maneuver/fires
• These capabilities are also needed to:
– Focus information collection efforts
– Provide context to better understand collected data
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Recommendation: Proactive Operations
Recommendation
•
Lead Responsibility
Develop an entirely new capability to
proactively, preemptively evoke
responses from adversary/terrorist
groups
– Form a new elite Counter-terrorism
Proactive Preemptive Operations
Group (P2OG) at the NSC level
– Highly specialized people with unique
technical and intelligence skills such as
information operations, PSYOP,
network attack, covert activities,
SIGINT, HUMINT, SOF, influence
warfare/deception operations
– Reports to NSC principal level
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• NSC lead with DCI,
SecDef, State, Justice
participation
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“Cost”
• 100 “new” people
• $100M/yr for
operations and
support
26
Recommendation: Improve Intelligence
Recommendation
•
•
Develop new capabilities, sources, and
methods to enable deep penetration of
adversaries
– DO/DHS develop new modes and
methods for covert operations – See
classified chart on HUMINT
– Increase emphasis on CT CA to gain
close target access
– Develop new clandestine technical
capabilities
Create a surge capability in intelligence
to preempt and deal with rapidly
emerging crises in the GWOT
– Maintain a robust cadre of retirees
reservists and specialists, qualified to
serve on short notice
– Contract roles for industry universities
and think tanks
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“Cost”
Lead Responsibility
• DCI Lead SecDef/CJCS
• $1.7 Billion/FY
beginning in FY-04
and continuing
Supports CIA DO/DDS&T initiatives
• ASD(C3I) and DCI
Community
Management Staff
(CMS)
• DCI/DoD co-shared
lead
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• $100M/yr for
exercises,
engagement in the
form of gaming,
and real operations
27
Recommendation: Improve Intelligence (cont.)
Recommendation
•
Lead Responsibility
Expand counter terrorism and
asymmetric adversary analytical
capabilities and throughput
– Increase Service and intelligence
agency analytic specialties, unique to
CT challenges, by 500 people over the
next 18 months to add depth of
expertise
– Focus on understanding effects of
globalization, radicalism, cultures,
religions, economics, etc., to better
characterize potential adversaries
– More virtual collaboration architecture
for analyst support and customers
interaction
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• CMS shared lead with
ASD(C3I)
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“Cost”
• $800M/yr for technical
capabilities
development and 500
new staff
28
Recommendation: Gain Deeper Understanding of Terrorist Organizations
and Their Supporters as Complex Adaptive Systems
Recommendation
Lead Responsibility
•
Establish additional “centers” of
• JFCOM
excellence to handle the greatly
increased work load and to augment
JWAC to support “targeting” (in the
broadest sense) of terrorist organizations
and their supporting infrastructure—
these activities will draw upon
intelligence feeds, Red Teaming, and a
great variety of subject matter experts
(regional, cultural, psychological, soft
and hard sensors)
•
Pursue and expand JFCOM’s operational
net assessment activity employed in
millennium challenge
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“Cost”
• Add to existing
initiatives up to $100M
per FY as appropriate
• $100M initiative at
JFCOM, CENTCOM,
NORTHCOM, and
DARPA
29
A Much More Responsive, Flexible, and Effective Military Capability
1.
Understanding new adversaries and providing “actionable”
intelligence: deep penetration - understanding, finding, and tracking
the terrorists and their networks
2.
“Tools” to handle tough environments and difficult targets and
understand our vulnerabilities
3.
Tailoring forces for more SOF-centric operations
4.
Operationalizing new approaches and capabilities
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30
“Tools” to Handle Tough Environments
and Difficult Targets and to Understand Our Vulnerabilities
- Key Initiatives •
Tough Environments: Urban Warfare
•
Counter-Weapons of Mass Destruction
- Theater and CONUS protection
- The consequence management challenge
• In-theater
• CONUS
- Finding terrorists and WMD—persistent ISR
- The Red Team
•
Asymmetric Adversaries and Force Projection
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Inadequate Attention and Resources Devoted to Improving
Capabilities to Operate in Urban Environments
•
URBAN OUR FOCUS: Most likely terrorism environment and the one for
which we are the least prepared
•
Shortfalls in doctrine, training, and technology for urban operations
–
Doctrine: JFCOM Executive Agent in FY03
•
–
Training: Current urban ops training facilities inadequate
•
–
Put priority and resources behind the effort to create joint urban operations doctrine and
address DOTMLPF challenges
Include an urban facility in the Joint National Training Capability Initiative
Technology: Develop urban-specific technologies including:
•
•
•
•
•
•
Knowledge systems
Movement capabilities
Precision fires
Special sensor systems
Communications unique to urban environment
Integrated system solutions
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Challenges for Military Operations in Urban Terrain
•
Urban terrain presents unique challenges in:
– Precision strike to avoid collateral damage
– Command and control communications limitations
– Need for diverse, manpower intensive operations
– Standoff weapons’ advantages diminish
– The need to call for and control supporting arms at platoon and squad
levels
•
To meet the unique urban challenge, we need better capabilities in:
– Ground and aerial surveillance (GPS-guided UAV helos)
– Situation awareness (persistent layered ISR)
– Urban training and development (dedicated center)
– Command, control and communications (DARPA SUO/SAS system)
– Low level combined arms maneuver
– Precision supporting fires
– Detecting and preempting WMD threats
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Progress – USMC “Project Metropolis”
•
USMC battalion-sized MAGTF experiment
•
Concept
– Penetration, thrust
– Combined arms to squad level (infantry, tank, helo, etc.)
– 4-5 weeks intense training
– Packaged combat support teams
– Bounding overwatch
– Spherical security
•
Schedule
– Victorville, California – Summer 02
– Urban ground reconnaissance
• Rotary-wing tactics
• Command and control
• Small unit logistics
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The Way Ahead
•
Develop an urban strategy on the strategic and operational levels
– We don’t do cities
– We do cities into rubble
– We have some good ideas for new urban warfare operations
•
Develop a dedicated joint urban training and development center
– Part of joint West Coast training centers
– Subordinate to JFCOM
•
Develop specialized tools for urban environments
– Many good ideas
•
Develop joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) emphasizing:
– Urban intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) techniques
– Small unit action
– Leadership initiative and flexibility
– Low level call for and control of supporting fires
•
Develop a precise urban environment representation
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Urban Point Position Database
(CityMap)
Utility
Creation
• Gridlock sensor and report data for
fusion and handoff
• Theater-based sensors (LADAR,
IFSAR) update a priori maps
• Precisely locate targets for remote
fires
• Semi automated feature extraction
to model structures
• Perform accessibility analysis to find
routes in and around city
• Update/revisit rate much higher
than traditional maps
• Coordinate movement and position of
forces
• Urban context added to basic
geometry using other sources
(e.g., building plans, Integrated
Survey Program, …)
• Construct urban IPB
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• Precision 3D representation of
• Structures (windows and doors)
• LOCs (minor streets and alleys and underground)
• Obstacles (power lines)
• Critical infrastructure elements (water, power, comm)
• Database of supporting information
• Addresses, occupants, functions, more
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Urban OPS Are Enabled by Precise Environment Representation
Gridlock of sensor data
Gridlock of report data
• Enable HD multi-sensor
processes
• Locate and track targets
for long epochs
Mission planning and
rehearsal
• Critical node analysis
• Accessibility analysis
(ground and air)
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• Fuse disparate INT types
precisely
• Locate targets for remote
precision fires
• Precision 3D representation of:
• Structures
• LOCs (minor streets and alleys
and underground)
• Obstacles (power lines)
• Critical infrastructure elements
(water, power, comm)
• Database of supporting information
• Addresses
• Occupants
• Functions
• More
Urban C2
• Coordinate movement
• Select / prioritize targets
for remote precision fires
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Finding the Enemy and WMD in Complex Environments
Engagement Chain
Critical Required Capabilities
• Intelligence for target engagement
Intelligence Data to
Focus Engagement
Engagement Region
Monitoring
• Very smart sensor management
• Understanding the asymmetric adversary and
his tactics
• Sensors for detecting and locating people and
WMD weapons – especially in urban areas
• Achieving local high density persistent ISR
coverage
• Communications for difficult environments
Target Detection and
Identification
Target Preparation,
Precision Strike and Kill
Assessment
• Data processing and fusion for target
detection, ID, and precision location
• Precision location of sensor and shooter assets
to minimize collateral damage and aid precision
strike
• Integrated systems solutions for strike and kill
assessment
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The Integrated Battlespace
Space:
ISR: SIGINT & Imagery of Earth’s Surface
Navigation / Position Fixing
•
•
•
Precision Time
Ballistic Missile Launch Warning
•
•
Weather
Air:
•
•
•
•
ISR: SIGINT & Imagery of
Ground and Sea
Airborne Object Detection /
Tracking / ID
Atmospheric Sampling
Localized Weather
Terrestrial / Ocean Surface:
•
•
•
ISR: SIGINT, EO / IR, Acoustic, Seismic, Magnetic
Terrain & Man-made Feature Data
Weather
•
•
Oceanographic Data
Internet & World Wide Web
•
Weapons of Mass Destruction Data & Warning
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Undersea:
•
ISR
•
•
Oceanographic Data
Other
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Improved and Persistent Battlefield ISR Capabilities
•
Capable of search, synoptic coverage, and space, air, ground sensor
dwell (persistent ISR)
– Balanced space, air and ground capabilities to create a layered
capability and an integrated ISR battlespace
– Optimize resource allocation to achieve localized, persistent, high
density coverage
– Address the unique urban ISR problems
– Include ground-based improved tagging, tracking, locating (TTL), close
and clandestine technologies
•
More centralized planning and coordination of architectures,
technology, and capabilities – Joint SIGINT Avionics Architecture
(JSAA) program
•
Acquisition of system-of-system (strategic-operational-tactical) ISR
architectures and systems – Multimission Command and Control
Constellation (MC2C)
•
New approaches to acquisition, architecture development and
systems engineering – capabilities-based approach being used in the
MDA
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An Integrated Joint C2/BM Capability Supported Through A
Network Centric Information Infrastructure (NCII)
Synchronous Orbit Relay Satellite
Optical
Link
Communications
Node with MultiBeam Antenna and
Data Switching
Capability
Intel Data /
CONUS Commands
Optical
Links
Broad-Area
Surveillance
Radar UAV
Covert Uplink
Multiple RF
Circuits
Low-Altitude
UAVs
Ground/Maritime
Sensors
Airborne Command
Center
Forward
deployed data
to everyone
Forces
Attributes: •All entities: people, platforms, sensors, weapons are interconnected
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•All entities can pull data in real time
•All entities have access (as appropriate) to relevant data at all times
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New Sensor Capabilities Are Needed for Locating
People and WMD
Four Tiers of Sensors Needed
Sensor Tier
I.
Space
II.
High-Altitude
Surveillance Radar
Role
New Technology
• Global reference data
• Coherent change detection
• Automated urban feature extraction
• Sensor interoperability across tiers
• Detecting fixed and moving
targets
• Cueing lower-tier sensors
• Foliage and building penetration
• People detection with differential
imaging radar
• Precision real-time tracking and EO/IR
imaging techniques of moving objects
• Identification of fixed and
moving targets
• Tracking targets including
people
• Airborne platforms with long-range
and endurance
III. Medium-Altitude
Optical Imagers
IV.
Netted Tactical
Sensor Arrays
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• Ultra low-power sensors and data
processors
• Energy for long-term power
• LPI communications
• Sensor Network Fusion
• WMD
sensors
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• Determining terrorist
objectives with persistent
close-up surveillance
• Provide tactical commander
“a look over the next hill”
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Tracking Individuals
•
Many ideas are in the laboratory phase
– Passive/active
– Line of sight/non-line of sight
– Cooperative/non-cooperative
•
Emphasis is on tags vs. systems/emplacement/environment
•
Spectrum of ideas/options
– Short term (6 mos.)/long term (years)
– Physical tags
– Remote biometrics
•
Need coordinated program to provide a toolkit of capabilities and
operationalize concepts, especially in placement and exfiltration
schemes
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43
Priority Challenge for Counter-WMD Warfare: Detecting,
Identifying, and Localizing WMD
Nuclear detection
•
•
Chemical Detection
•
•
Biological Detection
•
WMD Sensor Systems •
7/7/2015 4:55 PM
State-of-the-Art
No operational stand-off
capability
No clandestine stand-off
capability
“Shoe box” size requiring
agent collection with limited
agent list capability, in
development
No operational standoff
capability
Bio assays requiring agent
collection/contact for
detection
Nothing yet to support
clandestine operations
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Needed
Standoff detection and tracking at
kilometer ranges
Active interrogation; highresolution, high-efficiency devices
Passive spectral systems with
km’s stand-off range for detection
Low false alarm
Remotely emplaced sample
collection and retrieval
Handheld units for ID
characterization in seconds to
minutes with low false alarms
Emplacement, networking, data
processing, exfiltration – all
clandestine
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44
WMD—The Way Ahead
•
Remote sensing has not proved out—seems to require in place
sensors
•
Sensor systems should be considered end-to-end, but initial work
should focus on phenomenology and sensing techniques
•
Network monitoring and analysis of inferential signatures (e.g.,
deliveries, manifests, people movement) should be undertaken
•
Stimulated emissions may hold promise for nuclear choke point
monitoring
•
Energize followup on the Zebra Chip recommendation
•
No matter the sensing, “agent defeat” is critical and requires
additional resources
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45
WMD—The Way Ahead
Chem
Nuclear
Consider
Provocative
Deployment
CONOPS
Proposed
Relative
Investment
Among N, C, B
Bio
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46
An Expanded In-Theater and CONUS Counter-WMD
Consequence Management Capability
•
The Counter-WMD Force Element: expanding on today’s capabilities
– A joint, deployable counter-WMD force element, trained and equipped for
CONUS or overseas: force/base protection, quarantine ops, WMD ISR, helping
to plan counter-WMD offensive ops, search and render-safe
• Must address consequence management capabilities and serious
shortfalls
– CONUS
• National Guard has civil support teams in 32 locations today
• Greatly expand role of National Guard and Reserves and improve training and
equipage
• The 50 states need to define their roles and budgeting for this mission and
other disaster relief missions
– Overseas
• Any use of WMD in-theater directly impacts host nation as well as US forces
• A coalition developed plan for consequence management is needed – country
by country – with US assistance
• No plans, and little capability, in place today
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Counter-WMD Mission and Relation to CONUS Protection
•
Create a special WMD “Red Team” dedicated to planning, as terrorists
might, ways to attack the US homeland and forces overseas
– Establish specialized sub teams with knowledge in WMD mischief
making and terrorist cultural beliefs
– Scenarios are made widely accessible to analysts and collectors who
derive “observables” from scenarios and focus collection on these
– Major reach out to creative people outside government for their ideas,
scenarios, and postulated adversary capabilities
– Major intelligence analytic support on counter-terrorism, counterproliferation, and WMD
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Assessing DoD Force Projection Vulnerabilities
in a GWOT Environment
•
DoD GWOT force projection capabilities are highly dependent on both
commercial and Defense Department infrastructure
– Approximately 450 DoD bases involved in some aspect of force projection
– (Unknown numbers) of commercial sites are involved as well
• No systematic mapping of this infrastructure and associated
vulnerabilities to mission requirements exists
– Currently multiple DoD entities have some responsibility for assessing site-by-site
vulnerabilities:
• Local installation/base commanders
• Joint Program Office-Special Technology Countermeasures (JPO-STC) at Dahlgren with
NIMA and DTRA in support
• Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (JSIVA) with DTRA in support
– Others responsible based upon the attack vector
•
The responsibilities for DoD force projection risk assessment effort
must be clarified
– DoD asset vulnerabilities must be ranked in importance and reported to the
appropriate levels within DoD
– The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and NORTHCOM must add the DoD
critical commercial infrastructure required for force projection to their critical
national infrastructure protection priorities
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Responsibilities for Force Projection Risk Mitigation
•
Responsibilities for mitigation of identified force projection risks
must be clarified
– The Combatant Commander does not have the resources to fix the problem
– Resources must flow from who “owns” the site day to day, not the “gaining
command”
– At the base level, risk assessment and mitigation funding competes with other
installation sustainment demands
•
SecDef should consider establishing a new line item in each Service
and Agency budget for force projection risk mitigation
– Segregates the funding
– Enables assessments to be matched against mitigation efforts
– Provides senior DoD leadership better visibility into this issue
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Missiles Made in Tucson
The following list of missiles are manufactured in Tucson, Arizona:
• AIM-9X
• AMRAAM
• EKV (Exo-atmospheric Kill
Vehicle for the BMD system)
• ESSM (Evolved Sea Sparrow)
• Javelin
• Maverick
• Phalanx
•Phoenix
•RAM
•Sparrow
•Standard Missile
•Stinger
•TOW (anti-tank missile)
•Tomahawk
All of Raytheon’s missiles except Hawk and Patriot
(Massachusetts)
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51
Sustainability Enables Force Projection
Classified
Recommendation: Take Urban Environment Seriously
by Building on Emerging Activities
Recommendation
•
Create infrastructure to enable new
capabilities in urban operations
–
New urban-like facility able to support battalionsize forces to train, exercise, and experiment
realistically
•
•
•
•
•
–
–
–
•
Lead Responsibility
•
•
•
JFCOM with Army,
USMC
DARPA
NIMA
“Cost”
$300M/yr for POM
period
Replicates different types of urban environments
Large numbers of structures – some high rise
Networked to other ranges/facilities
Mission rehearsal capability
Equipment evaluation
Develop urban-unique modeling and simulation
tools
Develop the Urban Point Positioning Database
DARPA develop a major R&D thrust
Provide guidance and resources to JFCOM
in their new role as Executive Agent for
Joint Urban Operations
–
–
–
–
Develop new concept at operational level
Integrate Service efforts
Conduct and sponsor experiments, exercises,
and ACTDs
Work with allies and draw lessons learned
fostering urban-relevant M&S
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Recommendation: Improve ISR
Recommendation
•
Lead Responsibility
Significant improvement in battlespace
ISR and supporting analysis
–
–
–
• ASD(C3I) and CMS
Develop the capability to employ a 24/7
Persistent ISR in a designated area for days
or weeks
A layered architecture from space, air, and a
rich set of new ground sensor capabilities for
now, next and after-next ISR systems
Overlay with Network Centric Information
Infrastructure (NCII) for support of network
centric and gridlock capabilities
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“Cost”
• $1.6 Billion/FY over
FY-04 POM period
• IOC in FY-06
• FOC in FY-09
54
Recommendation: Scenarios, Plans, and Templates: An
Important Initiative For a “Red Team”
Lead Responsibility
Recommendation
• For the WMD issues, there should be a dedicated
team of smart, creative individuals dedicated to
planning, as terrorists might, ways to attack the
US homeland and forces overseas
–Collect and collate terrorist MOs from previous
incidents
–Establish specialized sub teams with knowledge in
WMD mischief making
–Scenarios are made widely accessible to analysts
and collectors who derive “observables” from the
scenarios and focus collection on these
• DCI with support from
SecDef and CJCS
“Cost”
Hiring/finding the
two dozen skilled
people
Resources to reach
out to nongovernment skills
Operations support
cost of $20M/yr
• Includes comprehensive tagging, tracking and locating
critical componentry
• Includes monitoring of support structures
• Monitoring individuals and institutions with critical knowhow
–Provide the systems support so that the notional
components can be stored and recombined, and
can index into intelligence reports
• Avoid premature focus on one or several end-to-end
scenarios
–Reports to Director CIA
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Recommendation: Develop and Implement a
Comprehensive Counter-WMD Plan
Lead Responsibility
Recommendation
• Execute consolidated oversight and funding of
an aggressive and coordinated RDT&E
program
• USD(AT&L), ATSD(NCB)
–Services, SOCOM
“Cost”
$1B/yr
– Create and exercise WMD operational decision support
systems
– Push R&D on WMD sensors, sampling, and retrieval
concepts
– Develop networked C4ISR systems specific to WMD
targets
– Get serious about acquiring a WMD agent, device,
and/or delivery defeat
• Provide resources for near-term staffing and
equipage for an expanded Counter-WMD Force
Element
• SOCOM
–Services
$500M/yr
– Joint, deployable; CONUS or overseas
– Force protection, offensive action, consequence
management
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Recommendation: Identify and Redress Force
Projection Vulnerabilities
Recommendation
•
•
•
•
Increase tenfold (over three years) the
people and resources devoted to
assessing vulnerabilities of our DoD
force projection capabilities and critical
infrastructure
– Support with extensive Red Teaming
and R&D on new analysis techniques
Assign Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Homeland Security [ASD(HLS)] as
Executive Agent for DoD Critical
Infrastructure Protection and assure the
vulnerabilities are addressed
Task NORTHCOM and ASD(HLS) to
coordinate the vulnerability
assessments and develop a plan to
redress the vulnerabilities
Move funding for the JPO-STC to a new
NORTHCOM funding line
7/7/2015 4:55 PM
Lead Responsibility
• JPO-STC
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“Cost”
> $100M
Personnel costs. Need to
coordinate multiple
groups conducting
vulnerability assessments
$150M/year
57
A Much More Responsive, Flexible, and Effective Military Capability
1.
Understanding new adversaries and providing “actionable”
intelligence: deep penetration - understanding, finding, and tracking
the terrorists and their networks
2.
“Tools” to handle tough environments and difficult targets and
understand our vulnerabilities
3.
Tailoring forces for more SOF-centric operations
4.
Operationalizing new approaches and capabilities
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Preparing for SOF-Centric Operations
Traditional
“SOF-Centric”
SOF
Allied
SOF
US
Conventional
Forces
Combat Support
&
Combat Service
Support
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Allied
Conv.
Forces
Covert
Action
US
USSOF
SOF
Conventional
Forces
Combat Support
&
Combat Service
Support
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Preparing for SOF-Centric Operations
- Key Initiatives •
Provide operational command flexibility
•
Increase SOF capabilities
•
Couple SOF and conventional forces more tightly
•
Enhance the contributions of conventional forces
•
Make SOF more central in our military planning with our Allies
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Provide Operational Command Flexibility
•
Prepare SOF to be the supported command in at least some phases of
future campaigns
– Enhance the robustness of the theater special operations commands and joint
special operations task force (JSOTF) headquarters (level/resources, skills, C4)
– Expand exercises and training with conventional forces
•
Provide for seamless transition of supported/supporting commands
during a campaign; task JFCOM and SOCOM to:
– Develop transition phasing experiments and exercises
– Ensure interoperable situational awareness capabilities among SOF and
conventional forces
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61
Increase SOF capabilities
•
A greater role in “preparing the battlefield”
– Focus SOF worldwide day-to-day presence to exploit human and
geographic access in potential crisis locations
– Exploit SOF’s inherent intelligence collection capabilities
•
“Modest” increase in personnel
– ~2% per year (+ some additional growth from transfers possible)
– CENTCOM crisis response element
•
Substantial increase in equipage:
•
•
•
•
•
Blue force tracking
Sensor “emplacement”
Common Operating Picture
Communications and other equipment
Upgrade special mission aircraft, maritime and ground mobility
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Couple SOF and Conventional Forces More Tightly
•
More training and rehearsal for both SOF-led and conventional-led
operations
•
Standardize TTPs between SOF and conventional forces for SOFinitiated operations
–
–
•
Command relationships
Enhanced institutional and unit education
Tailor force packaging to enhance pre-conflict/post-conflict
capabilities
–
–
Identify “packages” of engineers, civil affairs, military police, and medical
personnel that can be coupled to in-theater SOF
These resources reside mostly in Reserve Component (RC)
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Enhance Conventional Force’s Contributions in the GWOT
•
Improve selected conventional capabilities to support SOF-centric
operations
–
–
–
–
•
Night vision/night flying/tactical resupply
Sea-basing
Fire support
Foreign internal defense (training)
Explosive ordnance disposal
Consequence management
Force protection
Combat service support
Accelerate development and fielding of specialized capabilities in
selected conventional forces
–
Includes changes to training, professional military education, equipage,
personnel practices
•
•
•
•
•
–
–
–
–
Operate dispersed and distributed
Leverage remote fires and aerial ISR
Use language and cultural awareness as force multipliers
Leverage indigenous ground forces
Have conventional forces with requisite capabilities assume
missions currently being performed by SOF
-
E.g., USMC MEU(SOC)
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Make SOF More Central in Military Engagement
Planning With Our Allies/others
•
One of few areas where allies can be near peer partners
– JSOTF-South in OEF provides a model: forces of eight nations
•
Focus efforts at early stages of emerging crisis
•
Center Allied and coalition planning operations at Combatant
Command level
•
Prioritize engagement opportunities
•
Aggressively fund combined exercises and training events
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Recommendation: Preparing For More, Larger and More Complex
Operations in Which SOF (and SOF-like) Capabilities Play a Central Role
Recommendation
Lead/Supporting Responsibility
“Cost”
•
SecDef/JFCOM
$10s of M
•
SecDef/SOCOM
Billions
•
CJCS/JFCOM & SOCOM/Services
Enhance the contributions of
conventional forces in
– Warfighting
– Shaping
•
SecDef/JFCOM/Services
$100s of M
Make SOF more central in our
military planning with our Allies
and coalition partners
•
SecDef/ASD(SO/LIC)
$10s of M
•
Provide operational command
flexibility
•
Increase SOF capabilities
•
Couple more tightly SOF and
conventional forces
•
•
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$10s of M
66
A Much More Responsive, Flexible, and Effective Military Capability
1.
Understanding new adversaries and providing “actionable”
intelligence: deep penetration - understanding, finding, and tracking
the terrorists and their networks
2.
“Tools” to handle tough environments and difficult targets and
understand our vulnerabilities
3.
Tailoring forces for more SOF-centric operations
4.
Operationalizing new approaches and capabilities
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Operationalizing New Approaches and Capabilities
- Key Initiatives Business as usual puts us at risk of not having capabilities when needed.
Achieving capabilities will require
•
Extensive joint experimentation, training, and doctrine development
•
Adaptive joint C4 systems
•
Interoperability at low levels
•
Hard-headed assessment of real world operations and experiments
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68
Creating an Organizational Center for Developing
Joint and Special Operations in GWOT
•
SecDef/CJCS should formally and visibly recognize JFCOM’s new focus
– As their “executive agent” for joint doctrine, training, experimentation, and
joint integration to meet GWOT requirements
• Linchpin for integration of joint and special ops efforts by services, USSOCOM,
and other Combatant Commands
• Relieved of geographic and homeland defense responsibilities
• Transition to NATO functional Supreme Allied Commander-Transformation or
divest SACLANT
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Accelerate Maturation of JFCOM to Fulfill Joint Doctrine,
Training, Experimentation Roles
•
Create and sustain continuous experimentation/spiral development
capability
– flexible to connect to real world operations
•
New responsibility for joint doctrine
•
Establish closer links to other Combatant Commands and Services
•
Enlarge interagency and multinational initiatives
•
Serve as Executive Agent for improving Joint Urban Operations
•
Joint training capability
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Accelerate Development and Fielding of More Adaptive and Capable
Joint Command, Control, Communication, and Computer Systems
•
Provide, through spiral development, continuous improvement of joint
C4 systems (including Joint Headquarters) at the Regional Combatant
Commanders
•
Work closely with:
– Regional Combatant Commands to tailor to theater
– SOCOM to empower SOF-centric operations
– The new STRATCOM in their potential role as provider of global
sensors and comms
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Empower JFCOM to Ensure Jointness and
Interoperability at Appropriate Levels
•
Establish Service acquisition program standards for
processing/formatting (not just interface)
•
Make JFCOM effective “gatekeeper” for interoperability for all Service
requirements
•
Accelerate integration of common operational pictures
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Turning Lessons into Lessons Learned and Acted Upon
Needed: a standing process for development and top-down
direction of lessons learned
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
Make Joint Center for Lessons Learned subordinate to JFCOM
Collect from operations, experiments, and training events (US and others)
Create synthesis capability
Develop an integrated electronic library
Facilitate horizontal dispersion
Create action plan
Routinely report high priority lessons to SecDef/CJCS
Result: Greater likelihood of discovering weaknesses before our
adversaries do
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Resourcing Jointness to Support the GWOT
•
Create a program (set of program elements) to provide JFCOM the
resources (through control of the funds) to fulfill the responsibilities we
have laid out for:
–
–
–
–
–
Joint training, doctrine development, and experimentation
Providing of joint C4 at the Combatant Commands
Ensuring interoperability at all joint levels
Joint urban operations
Joint Center for Lessons Learned
Should include funds and contracting authority for limited “acquisition” of products and
other opportunities in support of this mission
Should make maximum use of existing acquisition and procurement organizations in
carrying out these responsibilities
•
Provide JFCOM additional intellectual resources
– JFSC and NDU
– A formal relationship with counterpart activities in the Services (TRADOC, NWDC,
AFDC, MCCDC/MCWL)
•
Establish a premier system-of-systems engineering and integration
capability to support JFCOM
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Recommendation: Creating an Organizational Center for
Developing Joint and Special Operations in GWOT
Lead Responsibility
Recommendation
•
Create a program to provide JFCOM the
resources (through control of the funds)
to fulfill the responsibilities we have laid
out
•
Provide them premier system
engineering and integration support
•
Assign NDU/JFSC to JFCOM to ensure
more influence of Service institutional
counterparts
7/7/2015 4:55 PM
“Cost”
• SecDef/CJCS
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75
What Will You Get If You Implement Our Recommendations
•
Understanding of the adversary
–
–
Proactive operations for Intelligence
Deeper understanding and broader coverage
•
•
•
–
–
•
•
•
Deeper, broader, and more expert analysis
Customer and query-driven analysis
More capabilities for “tough” operations
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
•
A new and new kind of expansion of HUMINT
Intelligence surge capability
Understanding the enemy as a complex adaptive system (beyond physical dimensions)
Facilities for urban operations, experiment, training, and mission rehearsal/planning
3D maps of urban environments
Responsive ISR, persistent focus
Tagging, tracking, and locating – even of people
Sensors for WMD
A “red team” to anticipate the terrorists
A “SWAT-like” team to contain WMD weapons
Powerful SOF-centric military options tailored to the GWOT
– Greater contributions from the conventional forces
Robust, adaptive, and flexible operational-level C4
Finally, interoperability of C4 – and at the lower levels needed
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What It Will Mean
•
Much better able to anticipate terrorist behavior and react to “boltsout-of-the-gray”
•
Much richer set of proactive/preemptive options
•
More responsive, flexible, and effective military instrument to
prosecute the GWOT
– better prepared for simultaneous campaigns
– more capable in tough environments and against difficult targets
•
Allies much more capable (and perhaps willing) to contribute militarily
•
DoD’s missions much less vulnerable to terrorist disruption
•
A catalyst for a broad and deep transformation of DoD’s capabilities
and practices
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77
“ Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign unlike
any other we have ever seen…What is at stake is not just America’s
freedom. This is the world’s fight. This is civilization’s fight. This is the
fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance, and
freedom.”
President George W. Bush
September 20, 2001
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78