Transcript Knutsen-Value orientations and party choice

Value orientations and party choice
Lecturer:
Oddbjørn Knutsen,
Department of Political Science,
University of Oslo
The value concept
Psychologist Milton Rokeach:
a value is an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or
end-state of existence is preferable to opposite or converse modes
of conduct or end-states of existence.
Two types of values: terminal (end-state of existence) and
instrumental (mode of conduct) values.
Personal and social values. People have values they want to
emphasise in their own lives (self-centred) but also values they
would emphasise in their social environment (societal-centred).
This differentiation can be expanded to different domains, and we
can talk about, for example, family values, work values,
bureaucratic values and political values.
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For Rokeach, a value is a basic and relatively stable element in a
person’s belief system.
A value is a prescriptive belief wherein some means or end of
action is judged to be desirable or undesirable.
Attitudes, which are often defined as a set of beliefs organised
around a specific object or situation.
A value is considered to be a basic (prescriptive) belief that often
influences a specific attitude together with other beliefs.
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Building on Rokeach and others, Shalom Schwartz identifies six
formal characteristics that are the defining features of basic human
values:
a) Values are beliefs
b) about desirable end-states or behaviours (modes of conduct)
that:
c) transcend specific situations or actions,
d) guide selection or evaluation of behaviour and events, and
e) are ordered by relative importance to form a value system
f) The relative importance of values guides attitudes and
behaviour.
Rokeach and Schwartz have their own value batteries and
dimensions of more personal and social values
The focus here: Political values
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Political values
Terminal political values can be considered as end-states that
individuals would like to see characterise the society as a whole
and see implemented through the political system.
Instrumental political values are modes of conduct that are
considered legitimate (or illegitimate) to influence political
decisions, for example various types of political participation and
ways of influencing political decisions.
In political science, the concept of values is at the core of David
Easton’s famous definition of politics as those interactions through
which values are authoritatively allocated for a society.
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New Politics values
The most well-known political value dimension
Ronald Inglehart: Materialist/post-materialist (MPM) value
orientations.
Materialist values emphasise economic and physical security,
such as economic stability and growth, law and order, and strong
defence.
Post-materialist values emphasise self-expression, subjective wellbeing and the quality of life.
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Another way of conceptualising ’New Politics’ is represented by
environmental versus economic growth values.
Environmental protections versus various trade offs
Scott Flanagan: Inglehart’s conceptualisation of value change
combines two dimensions: a materialist/non-materialist dimension
and a libertarian/authoritarian dimension.
Flanagan considers value change along the latter dimension as
most important.
Libertarian values: autonomy, openness and self-betterment.
Authoritarian values: a broader cluster of values, which, along with
concerns about security and order, includes respect for authority,
discipline and dutifulness, patriotism and intolerance towards
minorities, and conformity to customs.
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The libertarian/authoritarian value orientations are also the central
components in Herbert Kitschelt’s important work on changes in
the party systems of western democracies.
Immigration orientations
Are different orientations towards immigrants and immigration
values or attitudes?
Perhaps they are included in the libertarian-authoritarian value
dimension?
They might be considered as basic orientations which are close to
values. Comparative research has shown that these orientations
are closely related to and reflect basic values and beliefs about
different conceptions of national identity, ethnicity and
multiculturalism
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Old Politics values
Religious/secular values
Christian values focus on the importance of Christian morals and
principles in society and politics, and on traditional moral
guidelines in school and society in general.
Secularisation is often understood as a process whereby mundane
reality is less and less interpreted from a supernatural perspective,
and secular values are based on more modern norms of morality
that people want to decide for themselves without the guidelines of
the church.
Religious/secular values tap these contrasting orientations.
Religious orientations:
One aspect is the religious beliefs that people hold
The other aspect is church-oriented religion or church religiosity.
The essence of this dimension is ‘church integration’: the more
people participate in the relevant church’s rites and services, the
more church-integrated they are.
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The Industrial Revolution gave rise to economic interest conflicts.
Economic left–right values or left–right materialist values.
These value orientations are economic in nature, and they refer in
particular to the role of government in creating more economic
equality in society versus the need for economic incentives and
efficiency.
These value orientations incorporate value conflicts related to
control, power and the degree of distribution of resources in the
production sphere.
They include:
• The degree of workers’ control in the workplace
• state regulation of the economy versus private enterprise
• private property and the market economy versus state
regulations
• the size of the welfare state
• economic and social equality versus the need for differentiated
rewards for stimulating effort.
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Model for political values
Old Politics
Religious-secular values
Economic left-right values
New Politics
Materialist/post materialist values
Or
a) Environmental versus economic growth and other trade offs
and
b) Libertarian-authoritarian values
and
c) Immigration orientations, values or attitudes?
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How to measure political values?
They should be tapped by multiple indicators
General political issue items/questions can be used as indicators,
in particular those who take the existing situation at a point of
departure.
Do you want more or less of ..
But the distributions of such orientations are difficult to compare
between countries
Ranking or rating? Both can be used
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Research questions related to the role of political values in
determining party choice:
• The strength or the various value orientations
• The ordering of party voters along the various value dimensions
• Changes over time and comparative differences
• How social structure and value orientations determine party
choice in combination.
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0.70
The impact of value orientations on party choice in Norway,
1969-2005
0.65
0.66
0.63
0.60
0.58
0.55
0.52
0.50
0.50
0.54
0.54
0.47
Eta-coefficients
0.44
0.42
0.40
0.40
0.35
0.30
0.43
0.43
0.39
0.38
0.37
0.34
0.34
0.31
0.42
0.39
0.38
0.37
0.34
Econ. left-right
Moral-rel. values
Lib/auth. item
Lib/auth. index
Ecology/growth
0.20
0.16
0.12
0.00
1969
0.46
0.44
0.42
0.31
0.30
0.27
0.20
0.10
0.46
0.43
0.41
1973
1977
1981
1985
1989
1993
1997
2001
2005
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Social structure, value orientations and party
choice
V a lu e o rie n tatio ns
S o c ia l structu re
P a rty c h o ic e
C a u s a l m o d e l fo r d e te rm in a n ts o f p a rty c h o ic e
1.
Pure structural voting: The direct effect from social structure to party
choice
2. Pure value voting: The direct effect of value orientations on party
choice (controlled for social structure)
3. Cleavage voting: The indirect effect of social structure via value
orientation to party choice
Knutsen and Scarbrough (1995): Specification of the Mair/Bartolini
cleavage model.
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Inglehart (1984): From a class-based to a value-based pattern of
political polarisation
More general: From social structure to value orientations (the
general model, not only MPM).
The dynamics between social structure and value orientations with
regard to determining party choice
Value orientations as the central, driving force?
Inglehart’s two hypotheses:
• Issue/value polarisation (associated with MPM)
• Group polarisation: A new axis of group polarisation caused by
the new value-based polarisation. Education and social class
play a new role alongside the old industrial polarisation
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Herbert Kitschelt’s two dimensions for party
competition in advanced industrial societies
Libertarian
politics
Economicleftist
politics
Economicrightist
politics
Authoritari
an politics
Figure 1. A two-dimensional space of party competition in advanced industrial
democracies.
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Social structure and preference formation
(high education, women, symbol and
client processing)
Libertarian
politics
Left-libertarian
politics
high education
symbol and client
processing jobs in
the public sector
Economicleftist politics
(public and/or domestic
sector, nonowners)
high skill, processing symbols and
clients in the private sector
administrative
and
manual
public
sector
jobs
high skill jobs in the
inter - nationally
competitive
manufacturing and
service sectors
low-skill jobs
in domestic
services and
manufacturing
liberal
professionals
and
corporate
organization
men
petite
bourgeoisie
Authoritarian
politics
Economicrightist politics
(private and/or
internationally
competitive
sector,
owners)
Right -authoritarian politics
(low education, men, symbol and artifacts
and documents)
Figure 2. Ideology and occupational groups in advanced industrial democracies.
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The transformation of European social democracy
Libertarian
Politics
Left-Libertarian
Politics
New main axis of party competition
SDny1
Economicleftist politics
Old Main Axis of
Party Competition
SDny2
SDny3
SD1
Economic-rightist
politics
MC1
MC21
MC22
P
R
W
Authoritarian
Politics
Right-Authoritarian
Politics
Figure 3. The competitive space in advanced industrial democracies.
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Rune Stubager’s model for the New Politics
education cleavage
Value orientations
Libertarian/authoritarian
orientations
Social structure
Education
Party choice along a
new politics dimension
Group consciousness and identity
Identification with people with the
same education level as the
respondent
Felt conflicts between people with
lower and higher level of
education
Stubager’s causal model Ulike
for explaining
indikatorerthe
for structural
tilhørighet bases for the New Politics
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cleavage
med mennesker på samme
Correlations between value orientations and party
choice based on the European Values Study 2008.
Source
Knutsen (2012) Conflict dimension in the West European
party systems: A comparative study based on European
Values Study 2008
Paper prepared for presentation at the XXIInd World Congress of
Political Science in Madrid, July 8 to 12, 2012.
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T a b le 2 . C o rre la tio n b e tw e e n p a rty c h o ic e a n d v a lu e o rie n ta tio n s (e ta -c o e ffic ie n ts ).
T h e v alu e o rie n tatio n s are ran ke d acco rd in g to th e stre n g th o f th e co rre latio n s
A. T h e N o rd ic co u n trie s
e clr
im m ig r
D e n m a rk
0 ,5 7 3
0 ,4 0 1
e clr
re lse c
Fin la n d
0 ,5 5 9
0 ,4 0 2
0 ,3 7 4
0 ,3 1 2
0 ,2 5 6
e clr e n viro n m
im m ig r
lib a u t
re lse c
Ice la n d
0 ,5 0 2
0 ,3 0 2
0 ,2 9 4
0 ,2 4 3
0 ,1 1 2
e clr
im m ig r
re lse c e n viro n m
lib a u t
N o rw a y
0 ,5 3 6
0 ,4 3 7
0 ,4 2 0
e clr
re lse c
im m ig r
Sw eden
0 ,6 0 8
0 ,3 7 4
0 ,3 5 6
e clr
im m ig r
0 ,5 5 5
0 ,3 7 2
Me a n
lib a u t e n viro n m
re lse c
Mean
0 ,2 3 4
0 ,1 1 8
0 ,3 2 6
im m ig r e n viro n m
lib a u t
0 ,3 0 4
0 ,2 7 3
0 ,2 3 3
0 ,2 9 1
0 ,3 8 0
lib a u t e n viro n m
0 ,2 5 5
0 ,2 4 8
re lse c e n viro n m
lib a u t
0 ,2 8 5
0 ,3 8 1
0 ,2 7 4
0 ,2 5 8
0 ,3 6 8
0 ,3 4 9
Ex p lan atio n s:
re ls e c - re lig io u s -s e cu la r va lu e s
e clr - e co n o m ic le ft-rig h t va lu e s
lib a u t - lib e rta ria n -a u th o rita ria n va lu e s
e n viro n m - e n viro n m e n ta l ve rs u s e co n o m ic g ro w th , h ig h e r ta xa tio n e tc.
im m ig r - im m ig ra tio n o rie n ta tio n s
22
T a b le 2 . C o rre la tio n b e tw e e n p a rty c h o ic e a n d v a lu e o rie n ta tio n s (e ta -c o e ffic ie n ts ).
T h e v alu e o rie n tatio n s are ran ke d acco rd in g to th e stre n g th o f th e co rre latio n s
B . C e n tral We ste rn co u n trie s
im m ig r
lib a u t
e clr
0 ,4 8 9
0 ,3 7 8
0 ,3 3 2
0 ,2 9 1
0 ,1 9 1
e n viro n m
e clr
im m ig r
re lse c
lib a u t
0 ,3 4 6
0 ,3 4 5
0 ,3 2 7
0 ,3 2 7
0 ,2 7 1
e clr
im m ig r
re lse c e n viro n m
lib a u t
0 ,3 3 5
0 ,3 1 9
0 ,3 0 6
re lse c
e clr
im m ig r
0 ,4 4 3
0 ,3 5 6
0 ,2 7 5
0 ,2 6 1
0 ,1 3 0
Au s tria
B e lg iu m
re lse c e n viro n m
Mean
0 ,3 3 6
0 ,3 2 3
B e lg iu m
p a rty fa m .
G e rm a n y
im m ig r e n viro n m
L u xe m b o u rg
N e th e rla n d s
S w itze rla n d
Me a n
0 ,2 6 7
0 ,2 4 5
lib a u t e n viro n m
e clr
re lse c
lib a u t
0 ,2 4 5
0 ,2 3 8
0 ,2 3 3
0 ,1 7 5
re lse c
e clr
im m ig r
0 ,5 5 6
0 ,4 2 4
0 ,3 9 1
im m ig r
e clr
lib a u t
0 ,4 6 8
0 ,3 8 9
0 ,3 3 8
im m ig r
re lse c
e clr
0 ,3 6 7
0 ,3 6 4
0 ,3 4 7
0 ,2 5 0
0 ,2 9 4
0 ,2 9 3
0 ,2 2 8
lib a u t e n viro n m
0 ,3 4 8
0 ,2 1 4
0 ,3 8 6
re lse c e n viro n m
0 ,3 3 2
0 ,3 2 9
0 ,3 7 1
lib a u t e n viro n m
Mean
0 ,2 9 5
0 ,2 4 3
0 ,3 2 3
Ex p lan atio n s:
re ls e c - re lig io u s -s e cu la r va lu e s
e clr - e co n o m ic le ft-rig h t va lu e s
lib a u t - lib e rta ria n -a u th o rita ria n va lu e s
e n viro n m - e n viro n m e n ta l ve rs u s e co n o m ic g ro w th , h ig h e r ta xa tio n e tc.
im m ig r - im m ig ra tio n o rie n ta tio n s
23
T a b le 2 . C o rre la tio n b e tw e e n p a rty c h o ic e a n d v a lu e o rie n ta tio n s (e ta -c o e ffic ie n ts ).
T h e v alu e o rie n tatio n s are ran ke d acco rd in g to th e stre n g th o f th e co rre latio n s
C . T h e Islan d s
e clr
G re a t B rita in
0 ,3 4 2
re lse c
Ire la n d
Me a n
im m ig r e n viro n m
lib a u t
re lse c
Mean
0 ,2 3 3
0 ,1 7 9
0 ,1 4 1
0 ,2 3 5
im m ig r e n viro n m
lib a u t
e clr
0 ,1 6 5
0 ,0 9 0
0 ,1 8 8
re lse c e n viro n m
lib a u t
Mean
0 ,1 7 2
0 ,2 1 1
0 ,2 8 1
0 ,2 7 8
0 ,2 2 2
im m ig r
e clr
0 ,2 5 1
0 ,2 1 6
0 ,1 8 3
0 ,2 1 0
0 ,2 0 8
Ex p lan atio n s:
re ls e c - re lig io u s -s e cu la r va lu e s
e clr - e co n o m ic le ft-rig h t va lu e s
lib a u t - lib e rta ria n -a u th o rita ria n va lu e s
e n viro n m - e n viro n m e n ta l ve rs u s e co n o m ic g ro w th , h ig h e r ta xa tio n e tc.
im m ig r - im m ig ra tio n o rie n ta tio n s
24
T a b le 2 . C o rre la tio n b e tw e e n p a rty c h o ic e a n d v a lu e o rie n ta tio n s (e ta -c o e ffic ie n ts ).
T h e v alu e o rie n tatio n s are ran ke d acco rd in g to th e stre n g th o f th e co rre latio n s
D . S o u th e rn E u ro p e
Fra n ce
G re e ce
Ita ly
S p a in
P o rtu g a l
Me a n
e clr
im m ig r
lib a u t
0 ,4 5 2
0 ,3 8 6
0 ,2 6 3
lib a u t
e clr
re lse c
0 ,3 2 4
0 ,2 7 8
0 ,2 7 0
im m ig r
e clr
re lse c
0 ,4 3 0
0 ,3 2 6
0 ,2 9 4
re lse c
e clr
im m ig r
0 ,3 9 7
0 ,2 6 3
0 ,2 4 4
0 ,2 2 8
0 ,1 9 6
re lse c e n viro n m
e clr
lib a u t
im m ig r
0 ,1 2 8
0 ,0 7 4
0 ,1 4 1
lib a u t e n viro n m
Mean
0 ,2 0 2
0 ,1 7 4
0 ,1 2 9
e clr
re lse c
im m ig r
0 ,2 9 0
0 ,2 7 2
0 ,2 6 5
re lse c e n viro n m
0 ,1 9 8
0 ,1 9 2
Mean
0 ,2 9 8
im m ig r e n viro n m
0 ,1 9 1
0 ,1 0 4
0 ,2 3 3
lib a u t e n viro n m
0 ,2 4 5
0 ,2 0 9
0 ,3 0 1
lib a u t e n viro n m
0 ,2 3 7
0 ,1 7 5
0 ,2 6 6
0 ,2 4 8
Ex p lan atio n s:
re ls e c - re lig io u s -s e cu la r va lu e s
e clr - e co n o m ic le ft-rig h t va lu e s
lib a u t - lib e rta ria n -a u th o rita ria n va lu e s
e n viro n m - e n viro n m e n ta l ve rs u s e co n o m ic g ro w th , h ig h e r ta xa tio n e tc.
im m ig r - im m ig ra tio n o rie n ta tio n s
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Literature.
Flanagan, Scott C. (1987): 'Value Changes in Industrial Societies',
American Political Science Review, 81:1303-1319.
Flanagan, Scott C. & Lee, Aie-Rie (2003): 'The new politics,
culture wars, and the authoritarian-libertarian value change in
advanced industrial democracies', Comparative Political Studies
36: 235-270.
Kitschelt, Herbert (1994): The Transformation of European Social
Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kitschelt, Herbert (1995): The Radical Right in Western Europe –
A Comparative Analysis. Ann Arbor: The University Press of
Michigan.
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Stubager, Rune (2009): ‘Education-based group identity and
consciousness in the authoritarian-libertarian value conflict’,
European Journal of Political Research 48 (2): 204-233.
Stubager, Rune (2010): ‘The development of the education
cleavage: Denmark as a critical case’, West European Politics 33
(3): 505-533.
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