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Force planning constructs since the end of the Cold War The Quadrennial Defense Review: what’s next?
Opportunity to create new Service visions
What is a Force Planning Construct?
Guidance on the size (capacity) and shape (mix of capabilities) of U.S. Armed Forces needed for a range of planning scenarios
Includes assumptions on the nature of the operating environment, frequency and concurrency of contingency operations, steady-state and surge requirements, force availability, etc.
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SITUATION: PEACETIME ENGAGED IN ONE MRC SHIFTING TO TWO MRCS ENGAGED IN SECOND MRC POST-CONFLICT PERIOD FORCES ENGAGED FORCES AVAILABLE OVERSEAS PRESENCE DEMOCRACY PEACEKEEPING HA/DR STRAT LIFT NUKE DETER.
STRAT LIFT ACTIVE FORCES RESERVE FORCES MRC #1 RESERVE FORCES OVERSEAS PRES.
PEACEKEEPING STRAT LIFT NUKE DETER.
ACTIVE FORCES RESERVE FORCES MRC #2 WIN MRC #1 RESERVE FORCES OVERSEAS PRES.
STRAT LIFT NUKE DETER.
ACTIVE FORCES RESERVE FORCES WIN MRC #2 RESERVE FORCES POST-CONFLICT STABILITY OPS OVERSEAS PRES.
HA/DR STRAT LIFT NUKE DETER.
ACTIVE FORCES RESERVE FORCES STABILITY OPS PEACEKEEPING OVERSEAS PRES.
DEMOCRACY HA/DR STRAT LIFT NUKE DETER.
STRAT LIFT ACTIVE FORCES RESERVE FORCES
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Assumed a force that was properly sized for 2 major regional contingencies (MRCs) could also support smaller-scale conventional operations (“lesser included cases”)
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Most significant cuts
Army Navy Air Force
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Marine Corps
Major QDR Objectives
Preserve the Bottom-Up Review force planning approach, create a rationale for cuts to force structure and personnel Address requirements to support multiple, concurrent smaller-scale contingencies Continue capability enhancements to support operations to halt invasions (e.g., improved surveillance and precision strike) Active Personnel Reserve Personnel Civilian Personnel Active Divisions Reserve Personnel Aircraft Carriers (Active/Reserve) Air Wings (Active/Reserve) Amphibious Ready Groups Attack Submarines Surface Combatants Active Fighter Wings Reserve Fighter Wings Reserve Air Defense Squadrons Bombers (Total) Marine Expeditionary Forces FY1997 Programmed Force 1,450,000 900,000 800,000 FY1997 Programmed Force 10 582,000 11/1 10/1 12 73 128 13 7 10 202 3 1997 QDR 1,360,000 835,000 640,000 1997 QDR 10 530,000 11/1 10/1 12 50 116 12+ 8 4 187 3
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Major Objectives
Size for homeland defense and smaller-scale contingencies Accept risk in the second of 2 major theater wars Deter forward to prevent conflicts, rather than respond to crises Shift from optimizing for conflicts on the Korean and Arabian Peninsulas to a broader range of scenarios
1-4-2-1
Defend the United States; Deter aggression and coercion forward in critical regions; Swiftly defeat aggression in overlapping major conflicts while preserving the option for decisive victory in one of those conflicts – including the possibility of regime change or occupation; and Conduct a limited number of smaller-scale contingency operations
USA USN USAF USMC (3 MEFs) Major Forces (Active/RC )
Divisions Cavalry Regiments Enhanced Separate Brigades 10/8 1/1 15 Aircraft carriers Air Wings Amphib Ready Groups Attack Submarines Surface Combatants Fighter Squadrons Air Defense Squadrons Bombers (combat-coded) Divisions Air Wings Force Service Support Groups 12 10/1 12 55 108/8 46/38 /4 112 3/1 3/1 3/1
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“Michelin Man”
Active Partnering & Tailored Shaping
Homeland Defense
Consequence Management
Global Deterrence
Interdiction Train & Equip Active Partnering & Tailored Shaping
War on Terror Irregular Warfare
Stability Operations
Transnational Deterrence
Information Operations Foreign Internal Defense Counterinsurgency Forward Presence
Regional Deterrence
Active Partnering & Tailored Shaping Information Operations
Conventional Campaign(s)
Stability Ops Reconstruction Consequence Mgmt.
Major Combat Operations WMD Elimination
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Support wartime requirements Change the capabilities mix, forces sized about right Prioritize capabilities for 4 focus areas Build partner capacity
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Multiple scenario cases for near-term (next 5 to 7 years) and mid- to long-term (years 7 to 20) planning Preserved 2 war planning requirement, prioritized capabilities that can rapidly “swing” between theaters Project power in anti-access/area-denial environments
Scenario Case
Major stabilization operation + Deter and defeat a highly capable regional aggressor + Support civil authorities in response to a catastrophic event in U.S. homeland
or Mid- to Long-Term Scenario Case
Deter and defeat regional aggressor #1 + Deter and defeat regional aggressor #2 + Enhanced homeland defense posture
or Scenario Case
Major stabilization operation + Long-duration deterrence operation in separate theater + Medium-sized counterinsurgency operation + Support civil authorities in homeland
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No longer size for large-scale, long-duration stability operations Asia-Pacific rebalancing Another nuclear forces cut may be possible
Steady-State
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Support continuing counter terrorism operations
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Sustain other “steady-state” mission demands
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Maintaining a stabilizing global presence
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Nuclear deterrence Homeland defense, defense support to civil authorities
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Lesser contingencies Surge (Illustrative)
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Theater #1 Combined arms campaign in all domains to defeat acts of aggression +
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Theater #2 Deny the objectives of / impose unacceptable costs on an opportunistic aggressor in 2 nd region +
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Homeland Defense Defend the homeland and provide support to civil authorities during consequence management events
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STEADY-STATE OPTEMPO SURGE OPERATIONS PHASE 4/5 OPERATIONS Theater #2 Deny Objectives / Impose Unacceptable Costs on Opportunistic Aggressor Theater #1 Combined Arms Campaign to Defeat Aggression Defeat Presence Homeland Defense Support to Civil Authorities / Consequence Management Steady State: Nuclear Deterrence, Support to Counter-Terrorism Operations
Air Force Rotation Goal
Active 1:3 (1:4 desired)
Rotation Policy
Reserve 1:5 (AF 1:10 volunteerism) Component
Full Mobilization
No force rotation
Rotation Policy
1:2 Active 1:5 Reserve
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Rotational Post-surge rotational Examples
Air superiority fighters, bombers Low-density, high-demand Strategic mobility
Examples
Majority of the fighter force Theater mobility
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Change surge scenarios to enable force structure/end strength cuts
(e.g., adopt new operational concepts that emphasize global surveillance and strike, cyber, SOF, “swing” forces, undersea warfare, etc. vice deploying forces to engage in major ground operations)
Increase timing between major warfights Decrease steady-state and long-term rotational requirements
In other words, “do less with less”
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Post Surge Rotation 1:2 Active 1:5 Reserve
These changes could have profound implications for the Air Force’s AC/RC mix
Decrease
Post Surge Rotational Demand New planning scenarios that change requirements for rotational forces Changing COCOM requirements for rotational forces Supply A smaller overall force due to budget cuts AC/RC mix more similar to a peacetime steady-state mix AC/RC mix may favor forces with greater rotational availability
Increase
AC/RC mix may favor forces with greater rotational availability
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Predominately Air and Naval Capabilities Predominately Ground and Expeditionary Capabilities
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Expeditionary Crisis Responses Building Partner Capacity Sustained Counter-Terrorism Operations
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AirSea Battle in the Western Pacific
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Hybrid Major Contingency WMD Elimination Operations Joint Theater Entry Operations Expeditionary Combat Support, Force Enablers, Force Generation Capabilities, etc.
Range of Defense Planning Scenarios
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“The fundamental element of a military service is its purpose or role in implementing military policy … the strategic concept of the service…a description of service expects to protect the nation against some threat how, when, and where the military to its security.” “ Changes in the principal threats to the security of any given nation … must be met by shifts in national policy and corresponding changes in service strategic concepts ” — Dr. Samuel P. Huntington, 1954
New visions should consider:
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Operational domains that are increasingly contested Asia-Pacific rebalancing Growing need for systems that are survivable, persistent, multi-mission capable, and can operate from access-insensitive areas
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Future Pacific?
Future Gulf?
22x greater than Iraq’s landmass Taiwan Strait Denied Areas Denied Areas
1,500 nm 1,000 nm
Andersen AFB Key Considerations
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Increased depth of the battlespace Close-in bases at risk Average range to possible target areas > 1,200 nautical miles Campaigns may be protracted
Sea Base
2,400 nm
Northern RAAF Bases UK Bases Aviano AB
2,355 nm 1,850 nm
Tehran Denied Areas Potential target sets much greater in size, more time sensitive, more mobile, better concealed, better hardened, deeply buried
2,200 nm
Diego Garcia
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A future force capable of attacking the full range of targets in contested environments
– Greater focus on preparing for potential Asia-Pacific operations •
America’s “swing force” that can rapidly deploy to a 2nd theater to deter or spoil opportunistic acts of aggression A force that takes full advantage of new technologies (unmanned, DE, other) to maintain freedom of action in the air, space, and EM spectrum Balancing mix of short-and long-range Creating resilient forward postures Fully harnessing the robotic revolution Dominating the EM spectrum
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Improve the ability of aircraft carriers to project power ashore and into contested areas Take advantage of manned and unmanned undersea capabilities that can operate in denied areas Take advantage of new technologies that could create cost/exchange ratios favorable to the United States Prepare for operations that may be of long duration Getting the future carrier air wing right Harnessing the potential of cyber & DE Expanding payloads of the submarine fleet Developing the right PGM magazine
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More Dispersed, Resilient Basing Posture Space Assets Aerial Refueling Standoff Strike Platforms Air-Breathing, Long-Endurance Communications Relays Undersea Land Attack Capacity Penetrating Munitions Standoff Strike Platforms Carriers with Longer Range Air Wing Capabilities Next Generation Jammers Penetrating, Carrier-based Multi-Mission UCAV Penetrating Bombers Electronic Warfare Expendables
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Focus on rapid crisis responses
– Not a second land army •
Distributed operations in the Pacific and Middle East
– Work with allies and partners to establish forward expeditionary operating locations •
Joint theater entry ops (different than traditional “forcible entries) Right-sizing expeditionary lift Modernizing the STOVL force Supporting capabilities for distributed ops Fielding next generation EW capabilities
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New approaches and capabilities for imposing costs in the Pacific and Persian Gulf Focus on preparing for hybrid and counter-WMD operations Land-based sea control
Land-based long range strike Leveraging the indirect approach: SFA, BPC Land-based sea denial Air and missile defense
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Early 1990s: 2001:
End of Cold War
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shift to conventional theater contingency scenarios 9/11
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address homeland defense requirements
2002-2013:
Iraq, Afghanistan
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major expansion of SOF, CT, unmanned aircraft, building partner capacity, etc. • •
Today
End of 12 years of war
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no large-scale stability ops Pacific rebalancing, A2/AD challenges, WMD proliferation, hybrid conflicts
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time for a new FPC rather than an “update” that sustains the status quo
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35%
1993 BUR
30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5%
Service Shares of the Base Defense Budget
0%
Does not include funding for overseas contingency operations Today
Air Force Navy & Marine Corps Army Defense-Wide
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FY2014-18 FY2019-23 Two FYDP Total Full Sequester
-$260 B -$261 B -$522 B
Baseline: No Additional Cuts FY14 President’s Budget Scenario B: Half Sequester Scenario A: Full Sequester Half Sequester
-$56 B -$191 B -$247 B
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Example exercise results for a full sequester scenario $150 B $100 B $50 B $0 B -$50 B -$100 B -$150 B -$200 B -$250 B -$300 B -$350 B
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Accelerated next bomber procurement Funded new stealthy, multi-mission remotely piloted aircraft Added precision-guided munitions to help offset force cuts Invested in airborne directed energy weapons 26
Example exercise results for a full sequester scenario $150 B $100 B $50 B $0 B -$50 B -$100 B -$150 B -$200 B -$250 B -$300 B -$350 B
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Traded military and civilian personnel, contractors, to support modernization Reduced near-term readiness FY14-18, fully restored readiness for FY19-23
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Traded DoD TACAIR for long-range capabilities
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Kept Air Force above 1,000 combat-coded fighters Traded non-survivable RPAs for a new generation of stealthy, multi-mission unmanned vehicles Reduced strategic and tactical airlift 27